

Kengo Harimoto

God, Reason, and Yoga

A Critical Edition and Translation of the
Commentary Ascribed to Śaṅkara on
Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.23–28



INDIAN AND TIBETAN STUDIES 1

Hamburg • 2014

Department of Indian and Tibetan Studies, University of Hamburg

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Edited by Harunaga Isaacson and Dorji Wangchuk

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Preface

This book has been in the making for too long. The initial idea was to publish an improved version of my doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Pennsylvania in 1999. It was a critical edition of the first chapter (*pāda*) of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa (i.e., the Yogasūtra + its commentary, the Yogabhāṣya). When I was preparing the book in Hamburg in 2001, the hard drive of my computer crashed and took all the contents with it, including the source for the whole book. At that time, I had not been able to afford another hard drive for backup and I had trusted the mechanical device too much. What little backup I had was extremely old. In order to make a better use of the opportunity, I decided to re-do the whole thing. In the meantime, the software had been evolving and I decided to adopt to the new software situation. In 2005, while I was in Leiden as a Gonda Fellow, I was persuaded by Arlo Griffiths and the late Professor Tilmann Vetter to provide a translation. It was a sensible thing to do. I am thankful to both of them. By looking at the text again thoroughly, producing a translation, I believe the critical text has improved much. Also, we decided to read the part on Īśvara in the text since I thought that part might be interesting for Professor Vetter. By the end of the period as a Gonda Fellow, I made a decision to have only the part we read in Leiden as a book to accelerate the process. By 2006, the book was 90% ready, I thought. I cannot quite explain why it took so long till this book is finally out. I am the only person to be blamed for the delay.

I find it ironical that in the end, this books deals with in principle the same part of the Vivaraṇa as my master's thesis did. It feels as if I am going back to my roots. I hope my scholarly experiences in the meantime gave me better understanding of that part.

There have already been two complete translations of the whole of the Vivaraṇa, based on the Madras edition published in 1952. I trust, however, that there still is room for this book with an improved edition of the text itself and many notes accompanying the translation.

I do intend to publish an edition and translation of the rest of the first chapter of the Vivaraṇa. The other parts also contain important discussions in terms of the history of Indian philosophy. This first installment took too long. I hope the next one will not take that long. Also, I am considering to present my thoughts on the authorship problem of

the Vivaraṇa—whether it was written by the famous commentator on the Brahmasūtra, Śaṅkara—in the form of a separate volume. In this book, readers will find my observations on the issue in the form of footnotes or in the appendix. They probably will get an impression where I might stand. However, I have not formed a final opinion even after all these years. The issue needs a systematic treatment and I should make a clear statement regarding the issue. I would like to ask the readers to pray for an early completion of the book.

This book is typeset using the X_YL^AT_EX typesetting system. The document class is `memoir` and for the critical text, the `ednotes` suite is used. The book is typeset in Latin Modern family of fonts alongside the Devanagari MT font for the Devanagari text.

Hamburg, May 2014

Kengo Harimoto

Acknowledgements

This book owes much to two German scholars who are sadly not with us any more. I am sorry for not being able to present this book in front of them. They are the late Professor Dr. Wilhelm Halbfass, and the late Professor Dr. Tillman Vetter.

Professor Halbfass was the patient supervisor of my doctoral thesis in my five and a half years at Penn in Philadelphia. Knowing my interest in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa, he almost matter-of-factly suggested that I prepare a critical edition of the text as the topic for my doctoral dissertation. I did not have to think much before saying yes. He also made it possible that I had access to manuscripts. The thesis became the basis of this book. I am not happy that I became one of his very last students.

Professor Vetter practically determined the content of this book. Even before I met him, a brief remark in one of his writings directed me to look at the Īśvara section of the Vivaraṇa. I was fortunate to meet him years later, as a Gonda Fellow in Leiden in 2005 to 2006. He agreed to read my edition with me. In view of the limited time period, I asked him to read the Īśvara section in which I thought he might be interested. In the end, it is not a coincidence that the content of this book corresponds to the part we read together, including the commentary on sūtra 1.1. It was also he who insisted that I have a translation to read the edition with him.

I also owe much to Professor Albrecht Wezler. He agreed that I work on a critical edition of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa and let me use his copies of the Lahore manuscript which has always been difficult to gain access to. After I came to Hamburg in 2000, he arranged weekly reading sessions for the edition I prepared for my thesis. Much of the improvements in the text come from those reading sessions between 2000 and 2002.

I am thankful to all my teachers. Professor Osamu Hayashima first taught me Sanskrit. It might be that I am the only person who still reads Sanskrit among his students. The way he taught me Sanskrit was very efficient; he told me to learn it by myself. Professor Hiromasa Tosaki imparted to us what it is to be a scholar. Professor Akihiko Akamatsu introduced me to the concept of philology. It took some time for me to digest the concept but I hope now I get it. I have learned many many things from Dr. Futoshi Omae when he was an assistant at the Kyushu University. It might have been during the daily chatting over many things

with him that I learned most about our field of studies.

When I was at Penn, it was a golden age for classical indological studies there. We had Professors Halbfass, George Cardona, Ludo and Rosane Rocher and many inspiring fellow students. I learned various things from all of them. I have so many fond memories of my time in Philadelphia. One of them is the memory of reading the *Vākyapadīya* with Prof. Cardona for five years.

Working for the *Skandapurāṇa* project, led by Professor Hans Bakker, in Groningen, the Netherlands, was a new experience for me. Exposure to the Dutch Indology had an effect on me. I had to reshape my self-perception as an indologist. I also thank Prof. Bakker's support/insistence to finish this book as soon as possible.

The same thanks go to Arlo Griffiths whom I first met in 1997 or so at an AOS meeting before seeing each other again in Groningen in 2004. He, too, has been supportive and persuasive. He arranged that I could read my text with Professor Vetter. He also looked at my English many times. I was also fortunate to have had an opportunity to work with Professor Yuko Yokochi in Groningen. In 2012, she arranged an intensive course to read the *Vivaraṇa* at the Kyoto University. Inputs from scholars and students there were very valuable. The people who were present there include Diwakar Acharya, Somdev Vasudeva, Akihiro Kanabishi, Koreto Ikehata.

Special mention has to be made to Harunaga Isaacson with whom I seem to share some fate in that we have been moving symmetrically around Hamburg in the past 14 years. Not only has he been a tremendous inspiration, without him, this book would have been impossible. If there is any quality in it, it is largely because of him. I sincerely thank him for his support, not only for this book but also for everything.

There are many other people to whom thanks are due. Here are some of the names: Ashok Aklujkar, Orna Almogi, Loriliai Biernacki, Piotr Balcerowicz, Benita von Behr, Bidur Bhattarai, Peter Bisschop, Tim Cahill, Britton Chanceĉ, Danielle Cuneo, Jonathan Duquette, Christina Edingloh, John Freeman, Camillo A. Formigatti, Angelika Frankowski, Elisa Freschi, Takamichi Fujii, Dominic Goodall, Kunihiko Harikai, Tomoko Himeno, Kazuo Kano, Kei Kataoka, Kenichi Kuranishi, Andrey Klebanov, Masato Kobayashi, Stasinos Konstantopoulos, Sonja Lakner, Philipp Maas, Kristin McGee, David Mellins, Mai Moriguchi, Shin'ya Moriyama, Yasutaka Muroya, Hodo Nakamura, Masanori Nakagawa, David Nelson, Heidi Neubert, Sachio Nioka, Shoko Nioka, Luther Obrock, Kiyokazu Okita, Dimitri Pauls, Kim Plofker, Akane Saito, Florinda de Simini, Barbara Schuler, Greg Seton, Francesco Sferra, Taisei Shida, Kiyokuni Shiga, Jaekwan Shim, Iain Sinclair, Michael Slouber, Hans-Jörg Stein, Vidyasankar Sundaresan, Peter Szanto, Masaya Takahashi, Ryugen Tanemura, Somdev Vasudev, Dorji Wangchuk, Eiichi Yamaguchi.

Since it took so long to complete this book, practically anyone I knew has been in one way or another influential. I would like to thank all the

friends I have ever had. And at last but not least, the biggest thanks are due to my parents for their unwavering support.



Abbreviations

Texts and editions

AA	Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini (Vasu 1962)
BĀU	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (Shastri 1986)
BĀUBh	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara (Shastri 1986)
BhG	Bhagavadgītā (Paṇṣīkar 1978)
BhGBh	Bhagavadgītābhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara (Paṇṣīkar 1978)
BS	Brahmasūtra (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917)
BSBh	Brahmasūtrasaṅkarabhāṣya of Śaṅkara (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917)
BSi	Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana Mīśra (Sastri 1984)
ChU	Chāndogyopaniṣad (Shastri 1982)
ChUBh	Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara (Shastri 1982)
JS	Jaiminisūtra a.k.a. Mīmāṃsāsūtra (Frauwallner 1968, Śāstri et al. 1976, 1929, Āpaṭe et al. 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934a,b)
KAŚ	Kauṭilyārthaśāstra (Kangle 1960)
KaU	Kaṭhcopaniṣad (Shastri 1979)
KaUBh	Kaṭhcopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara (Shastri 1979)
KeU	Kenopaniṣad (Shastri 1979)
KeUBh	Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara (Shastri 1979)
Manu	Manusmṛti (Olivelle 2006)
MāU	Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad (Shastri 1979)
MāUBh	Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara (Shastri 1979)
MBh	Mahābhārata (Sukthankar et al. 1927)
MMK	Mūlamadhyamikakārikās of Nāgārjuna (de la Vallée Poussin 1913)
MuU	Muṇḍakopaniṣad (Shastri 1979)
MuUBh	Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara (Shastri 1979)
NBh	Nyāyabhāṣya (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985)
NBhū	Nyāyabhūṣaṇa of Bhāsarvajña (Yogīndrānanda 1967)

NKd	Nyāyakandalī (Dvivedin 1984)
NKn	Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra (Tailanga 1907, Goswami 1978, Stern 1988)
NM	Nyāyamañjarī of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (Śukla 1936)
NS	Nyāyasūtra (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985)
NV	Nyāyavārttika (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985)
NVTT	Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṅikā of Vācaspati Miśra (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985)
PDhS	Padārthadharmasaṅgraha (Dvivedin 1984)
PāSū	Pāsupatasūtra (Ananthakrishna Sastri 1940)
PraPa	Prakaraṇapañcikā (Sastri 1964)
PYŚ	Pātañjalayogaśāstra (Āgāṣe et al. 1919, Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952)
PV	Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti (Shastri 1968b, Pandeya 1989)
ŚBh	Śābarabhāṣya (Frauwallner 1968, Śāstrī et al. 1976, 1929, Āpaṭe et al. 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934a,b)
SK	Sāṃkhyakārikās (Pandeya 1967)
ŚRTS	Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita (Shastri 1968a)
SS	Sphoṭasiddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra (Śāstrī 1931)
ŚV	Ślokaivārttika of Kumārila (Sastri 1971, Śāstrī 1978, Sastri 1943)
TaiU	Taittirīyopaniṣad (Shastri 1979)
TaiUBh	Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śāṅkara (Shastri 1979)
TS	Taittirīyasamhitā (Weber 1871)
TSP	Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā of Kamalaśīla (Shastri 1968a)
TV	Tattvavaiśārādī (a commentary on the Yogabhāṣya) of Vācaspati Miśra (Āgāṣe et al. 1919, Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952)
Upad	Upadeśasāhasrī (Mayeda 1973)
VidhiV	Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana Miśra (Tailanga 1907, Goswami 1978, Stern 1988)
VMBh	Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Kielhorn and Abhyankar 1985, 1972)
VP	Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari (Rau 1977, 1988, Iyer 1983)
VS	Vaiśeṣikasūtra (Jambūvijayaī 1961)
YBh	Yogabhāṣya (Āgāṣe et al. 1919, Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952, Maas 2006)
YD	Yuktidīpikā (Wezler and Motegi 1998)
YS	Yogasūtra (Āgāṣe et al. 1919, Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952, Maas 2006)
YV	Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu (Rukmani 1981–89)
YVi	Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952)

Sigla and Others

See pp. 41 for details.

MS	manuscript
em.	emendation
conj.	conjecture
T _m	Trivandrum manuscript
T _m ^{ac}	ditto before correction
T _m ^{pc}	ditto after correction
T _d	A transcript of the Trivandrum manuscript
T _d ^{ac}	ditto before correction
T _d ^{pc}	ditto after correction
T	A reading common in T _m and T _d
L	Lahore manuscript
L ^{ac}	ditto before correction
L ^{pc}	ditto after correction
M	Madras Government Oriental Manuscript Library manuscript
M ^{ac}	ditto before correction
M ^{pc}	ditto after correction
A	Adyar Library manuscript
A ^{ac}	ditto before correction
A ^{pc}	ditto after correction
ℰ	1952 edition of the YVi
Σ	all the witnesses, including the 1952 edition
└	the following text is lost in T _m
┘	the preceding text is lost in T _m
┐	the following text is reported missing in T _d
┑	the preceding text is reported missing in T _d
†	the enclosed text is suspected to be corrupt
क	(text in a lighter shade) uncertain text
...	in critical text, suspected loss of text
[·]	physically lost sign in a manuscript
·	a sign indicated as lost in the exemplar
क	highly illegible but ascertainable as क
*	an illegible (but not lost) sign
⟨क⟩	cancelled क
»क«	inserted क
∪	space left by scribe



Introduction



General Introduction

Scope of this volume

The subject matter of this volume is the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (YVi): a commentary on the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, the combined Yoga-sūtra (YS) and its commentary, the Yogabhāṣya (YBh).¹ The whole of the YVi was first published as the *Pātañjala-yogasūtra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇam of Śaṅkara-bhagavatpāda* by P. S. Rama Sastri and S. R. Krishnamurthi Sastri in Madras in 1952. This volume presents a new edition of the section where Īśvara (God) is generally the main subject, i.e., the commentary on YS 1.23–28.

¹See Maas (2006: xii–xix), Wezler (1983: 17–8), and Bronkhorst (1985: 203) for the use of the term Pātañjalayogaśāstra. It is beyond the scope of this volume to discuss the original composition of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra—whether the sūtras were compiled by the author of the Bhāṣya or the sūtras existed already when the Bhāṣya was written, who the author was or authors were, etc. As far as the YVi is concerned, its author states that it is an explanation (*vivaraṇa*) of the *pātañjalayogaśāstra* [see p. 187]. Given the prevalent indifference to using strict titles when referring to texts in the Sanskrit culture, we cannot assume the word *pātañjalayogaśāstra* meant the title. It can just be a generic designation of what it is (see below). Nonetheless, the author was fully aware that the *śāstra* he comments upon consists of sūtras and the Bhāṣya; words such as *sūtra*, *bhāṣya*, *sūtrakāra*, and *bhāṣyakāra* occur frequently in the YVi. Aside from what the author of the YVi considered to be the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, there is an ambiguity whether the YBh itself treats only the YS as the *śāstra* or it includes itself as part of the *śāstra*. The word *śāstra* is used in the YBh itself, paraphrasing the word *yogānuśāsanam* in the very first sūtra with *śāstram*. From this, it might seem that the Bhāṣya treats the teaching expounded only in the following sūtras as the *śāstra*. On the other hand, the combined beginning of the YS and the YBh imitates that of the Mahābhāṣya (VMBh). The combined beginning of YS 1.1 and its Bhāṣya is thus apparently designed to form an integral whole. In that sense, the word *śāstra* might refer to the work inclusive of the place that uses the word, viz., the Bhāṣya. At any rate, I will use the expression “Pātañjalayogaśāstra” sometimes to refer to the combined whole of the YS and YBh, as it seems to be the designation the author of the YVi uses.

Today, it is generally accepted that the author of the YS is Patañjali and that of the YBh Vyāsa but the author of the YVi does not appear to hold that view. Although we do not know who he thought were (or was) the author(s) of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, we can still be relatively certain of the following: that he did not see any link between Patañjali, the author of the VMBh, or Vyāsa, the author of the Mahābhārata (MBh), and the text he was commenting on, the YS and the YBh. He refers to both by name but Patañjali as the author of the VMBh. See Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952: 299) and related notes 366 on p. 194 and 368 on p. 194; for Vyāsa as the author of the MBh, see note 521 on p. 246.

This book consists of four parts: an introduction, critical text of YVi 1.23–28, its translation, and appendices. The introduction is divided into two parts: a general introduction (this part) and an introduction to the critical text. The general introduction discusses the scope of the volume, the title of the text, the significance of the Īśvara section (1.23–28) of the YVi, and briefly touches upon the author of the YVi.

The introduction to the edition discusses the need for a new edition of the YVi, manuscripts of the YVi used in the edition, the relationship between the manuscripts, and editorial principles. The last includes discussions on how the text is presented and explains the relatively complex critical apparatus.

The translation is provided to demonstrate how I understand the text. How the editor understands a text is probably the most crucial part of editing a text, i.e., hypothesizing a state of the text, the hypothesis being presented as the constituted text. A translation of a segment of the text should clarify why the editor reached the hypothesis that is the reading of the corresponding part of the text. The translation augments the critical apparatus. To achieve that goal, I heavily utilize footnotes in the translation to elaborate text critical issues in hand and the reasoning to reach the constituted reading. Various other issues are discussed in footnotes; some provide background information that helps understand the text; some are related to what root text our author was commenting on;² and others may be about related passages in other texts.

The appendices consist of a critical text of the beginning of the YVi up to the commentary on YS (and YBh) 1.1; its translation; discussions on the end of the YVi; and some materials related to the authorship problem. The beginning of the YVi, particularly the opening stanzas, is relevant to the main body of this volume since they allude to points discussed in the Īśvara section. Also, the commentary on the first sūtra sets the tone of the whole commentary by exhibiting the author's attitude toward the root text and several philosophical systems. It also gives some hint when the text was written. My plan is to publish a new edition of the whole of the first pāda of the YVi. The edition and translation of YVi 1.1 included here also serves as part of that undertaking. Similarly, the end of the text provides various information about the author. Some of the stanzas recorded at the end of manuscripts most likely come from the author's own hand. The remaining appendices reproduce some parts of my doctoral dissertation submitted in 1999 in which I discussed the authorship of the YVi. Since, as in the case of many other texts, the colophons of the manuscripts of the YVi ascribes the text to a Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda, whether the author is the same person as the famous author of the Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya (BSBh) becomes an issue. I may be disappointing some readers for not fully exploring the authorship problem. I plan to give it a full treatment in a separate volume. This part of the appendix prepares for the full treatment.

²See note 88 on p. 43 for the significance of the root text preserved in the YVi.

Title of the work

When our text was first published, its editors called it the *Pātañjalayoga-sūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, and this title has been generally followed in many subsequent publications. Wezler (1983: 17), however, suggested that the text should be called the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa*, following the first prose sentence of the text itself:

*athetyādīpātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇam ārabhyate*³

However, I consider this reading to be corrupt and propose the reading

*athetyādi pātañjalayogaśāstram; tasya vivaraṇam ārabhyate*⁴

This, in effect, annuls the main argument of Wezler who thought that the title was explicitly mentioned in the beginning of the text. It rather appears that the author did not conceive of any specific title for his commentary. This opening is formulaic and blandly states what the work is.

Nonetheless, we have no viable alternative for the title of our text. It is probably appropriate to call our text the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa*, following Wezler's suggestion, as a convention. The author states that it is a commentary on the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* at any rate.

Īśvara section of the YVi

This volume presents an edition and translation of the part of the YVi where Īśvara is the focus, i.e., the commentary on YS 1.23–28. YS 1.23 introduces Īśvara as the object of contemplation (*prañidhāna*); contemplating on Īśvara is taught to bring the acquisition of *samādhi* extremely near. The next sūtra (1.24) characterizes Īśvara as a special *puruṣa*, a Sāṃkhya term for consciousness, who is not tainted by deposits (*āśaya*) of impurities (*kleśa*), deeds (*karman*), and ripening (*vipāka*). The next sūtra (1.25) is, according to the author of our commentary, an inference to prove the existence of Īśvara. YS 1.26 then teaches that Īśvara is the first teacher of all teachers. YS 1.27 teaches that the signifier of Īśvara is the syllable *om*, followed by the next sūtra (1.28) that teaches how to use it: one should mutter the syllable and visualize what it represents (Īśvara).

The YVi on these sūtras is notable for several reasons.⁵ First of all, the YVi is outwardly unique in having a very long commentary on these sūtras, and of course the Bhāṣya accompanying them, particularly on sūtra 1.25. In length, the section on the six sūtras out of 190+ sūtras of the entire YS occupies about 9% of the whole text. The commentary on sūtra

³This in fact is not precisely how the 1952 edition reads. It reads *athetyādīpātañjalayogaśāstra[sūtrabhāṣya]vivarāṇam ārabhyate* (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 1,21). According to the editors, this means that they prefer the reading *°sūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇam* rather than *°śāstravivaraṇam*. The reading found in all the manuscript is what they do not prefer (*°śāstravivaraṇam*). And this is the reading adopted by Wezler.

⁴See p. 172 for the text and parallel openings in the commentaries ascribed to Śaṅkara. See also note 338 on p. 187 for the discussion on adopting this reading.

⁵Cf. Vetter (1979: 21).

1.25 alone occupies about 6% of the whole text. In number of syllables, the whole section is equivalent of about 500 *ślokas*, about the size of a small work.

The opening stanzas also indicate the importance of the part in the entire commentary. They allude to major themes discussed in it.⁶ Except for one pāda (1d), we can point out references to the Īśvara section.⁷ The opening stanzas do not simply express allegiance to God who happens to be mentioned in the work being commented. Some points mentioned in the second stanza are not found in the sūtras or the Bhāṣya, but only in the YVi.⁸ Thus, for the author, what he introduces in the commentary was equally important as the attributes of Īśvara mentioned in the YS. As a śāstric work, the fact that its opening stanzas mention the contents of a part of it is an indication that that part was central to the whole work.

The content of the section is indeed unique and worth studying. Īśvara is certainly a widely discussed topic in many philosophical works. The YVi has several peculiarities even among them.

The most significant is that the author (possibly correctly) interprets the Bhāṣya on YS 1.25 as explaining the sūtra as an inference. The argument, recognized by Nakamura as analogous to the ontological argument in Christian theology (Nakamura 1979–83: pt. 22, p. 37), is unique in that most authors who wrote on Īśvara, either for or against, do not refer to the sūtra as an argument for an omniscient being. The argument, in accordance to our author's understanding, may be paraphrased as "Knowledge has degrees; anything that has degrees reaches its peak somewhere; the person in whom knowledge has reached the peak is omniscient."⁹ There are obviously several assumptions in this and the author tries to rationalize them here and there. One assumption is that knowledge that has reached its peak (necessarily) has "everything" as object. He even goes one step further to state that knowledge about everything has infinity as its object because there are infinite number of things to know. The au-

⁶An edition of the opening stanzas is presented in Critical Text 1.1, pp. 171 ff. of this volume. Their translation is found in pp. 185–186. For specific references and allusions, see notes in the edition and the translation.

⁷The fourth pāda of the first stanza identifies Īśvara as Viṣṇu. This identification, or more precisely the identification of Īśvara as Nārāyaṇa or the Bhagavat, is not specifically discussed but is assumed. See pp. 77, 80, 81, 138, 149, 153, and 186. This has implications for the authorship problem. See p. 244.

⁸The expression *yas sarvavit sarvavibhūtiśaktiḥ* in stanza 2 echoes the typical triad of epithets of Īśvara found many times in the Īśvara section of this work: *sarvajña*, *sarveśvara*, *sarvaśakti*. This set of expression is not found in the Yogasūtra or in the Yogabhāṣya. The compound *vihīnadoṣopahitakriyāphalaḥ* pertains to a long discussion whether Īśvara is capable of actions in the Īśvara section. See note 337 on p. 186. That such references are found in the opening stanzas probably indicates that, as in fact seems natural, the opening stanzas were written *after* much of the commentary, at least the Īśvara section, had been written. This further implies that the opening stanzas and the Īśvara section were written by the same person. Even the only pāda (1d) that does not represent a specific topic in the body of the text bears the same feature as the Īśvara section: the identification of Īśvara with Viṣṇu.

⁹The argument might have some links with Buddhist (Dharmakīrti's) argument regarding the Buddha's omniscience. See note 123 on p. 100.

thor gave so much significance to this line of argument that he applies the same argument for two other aspects of Īśvara, viz., the power (*śakti*) and sovereignty (*aiśvarya*). Since apparently these three arguments can prove the existence of a person with knowledge of everything, a person with all the powers, and a person with the sovereignty over everything at best, our author had to argue that these attributes fall together in one person. All these arguments are, regardless of how convincing they are, unique, hardly seen elsewhere. The only person who gave some significance to all these arguments is Maṇḍana Mīśra, but he is a critic of them. He criticizes all the points I have mentioned, including Īśvara's knowledge having infinity as object or Īśvara. After Maṇḍana Mīśra, as far as I am aware, very few, if any, paid attention to this line of argument.¹⁰

The second unique feature of the Īśvara section of our text is that it lists, in my count, 35 syllogisms or short formulas related to Īśvara. I am not aware of a work on Īśvara that has so many syllogisms. Those who support Īśvara, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, usually employ only a few.

The third feature is the long refutation of criticism by those who do not accept Īśvara. There are indications that they are the Bhāṭṭas but there is no exact quote from Kumāriḷa's works.¹¹ There also are elements of the criticism that we do not find in Kumāriḷa's Ślokavārttika. This part, the refutation of the criticism, hence offers an interesting material in the history of theological discourse. And finally, as first recognized by Hacker (1968), this whole part dealing with Īśvara, having considerably departed from the teachings of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra (the sheer amount is already an indication), professes the author's own thoughts. There one finds intriguing bits—reminiscent of Śāṅkara's BSBh or other commentaries ascribed to him—in the topics our author picks up, the vocabulary, syntax and grammar he uses, and his thoughts. When I find related passages, they are noted.

The author

As has been hinted above, much attention has been paid to the question whether this commentary on the Pātañjalayogaśāstra is by the same author who wrote the BSBh, the famous Advaita philosopher Śāṅkara. The reason why this question has drawn so much attention is probably be-

¹⁰What happened to this argument for omniscient being in YS/YBh 1.25 is comparable to that to the argument for Īśvara presented in the Nyāyasūtra 4.1.19. After the Nyāyabhāṣya, even when the discussion on Īśvara became prevalent, not much attention was paid to this type of argument: God exists because things do not work as expected[, and hence there must be someone/something that interferes].

¹¹Even though Kumāriḷa's works are not directly quoted in the Īśvara section, his Ślokavārttika is quoted in the third pāda, i.e., in the commentary on YS 3.17 the author quotes ŚV Sphoṭavāda kk. 131–6 and modifies the verses so that they support the *sphoṭa* theory.

cause some modern Western scholars¹² accepted it as an authentic work of Śaṅkara. The YVi is not among the texts traditionally studied as by the celebrated “Ādiśaṅkarācārya.” While most Western scholars are usually skeptical about Śaṅkara’s authorship of many texts ascribed to him, this one gained support from some of them as being a work by him. On the other hand, most Indian scholars, including the ones who had access to it before the 1952 publication, dismissed it. The only exception among Indian scholars may be the editors of the 1952 edition. This question deserves a dedicated treatment and I am planning a volume on it. In the meantime, a brief survey of the background of this controversy is included in this volume in the appendix (pp. 225 ff.).

The name Śaṅkara

I frequently mention the name Śaṅkara in this volume, especially in footnotes. When I do, I primarily refer to the author of the BSBh since it defines the famous Śaṅkara.¹³ Readers will often see mentions of other works widely accepted as his, as well. With regard to them, I try to be cautious not to refer to the author of those works as Śaṅkara. Still, I may sometimes do so. I ask readers to be aware that I do not call their author as Śaṅkara because I believe this attribution. Rather, I simply refer to the author of these works sometimes as Śaṅkara for convenience.

Three works generally accepted as Śaṅkara’s need a special mention here: the commentary (BhGBh) on the Bhagavadgītā, that (BĀUBh) on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, and the Upadeśasāhasrī (Upad). They appear in my notes almost as often as the BSBh does. For those texts, especially when I make references to them along with the BSBh, I may simply call their author as Śaṅkara. Note that these works, including the BSBh, see frequent mention in this volume because they help restore the text, understand it, and are generally interesting for shared idiosyncrasies.¹⁴ I even think some passages in different works supplement each other. I might subscribe to the view that they are all composed by a single person.

This is, however, not to say that I have made up my mind. Ever since I started to work on the YVi, I keep asking myself how or even whether we can scientifically discuss the identity of authors of different works. There can be cases where determining different authorships or the same author-

¹²In this case, the West includes Japanese scholars, such as Hajime Nakamura and Sengaku Mayeda.

¹³As far as I know, the most common designation of Śaṅkara is the Bhāṣyakāra or the Bhāṣyakṛt in Sanskrit works that refer to him. This follows the widely adopted custom of not referring to an author by name. Since there are many authors of Bhāṣyas, this designation does not apply to Śaṅkara alone. Whether the author is that of the BSBh or of something else is context dependent. The difficulty arises when we consider a case where such an author is referred to in another context. What kind of epithet should he be given?

¹⁴It is perhaps worth mentioning that there is no quote from, or even allusion to, any of these works despite their usefulness in studying the YVi.

ship of two works is relatively easy. We can make a strong case against the same authorship if an author cites from another work as belonging to someone else. The two works can hardly be by the same person. Or, by extension, if a work (A) cites another (B) which is established as posterior to yet another work (C), then A cannot be by the same author as that of C.¹⁵ On the other hand, it would be in principle safe to assert the same authorship of two texts if in one text there is a statement such as “I have discussed this in that text as . . .” followed by a citation from the other. As far as I know, none of the works ascribed to Śaṅkara does this. Such a lack of strong evidence makes it hard to establish the authorship of the works ascribed Śaṅkara. As mentioned above, I plan to tackle this problem in a coming volume.

¹⁵This—reference to a work later than Śaṅkara—was what I, as an M.A. student, first hoped to find in the YVi when I started to work on it. I had become aware of some passages in the YVi where interpretations of “others” were mentioned. I tried to see if they came from Vācaspatimiśra’s commentary on the PYŚ, hoping to establish posteriority of the YVi to Vācaspati and hence Śaṅkara, disproving his authorship of the YVi. I was quickly disappointed to find out that the commentary on the YBh the author of the YVi was looking at was not Vācaspati’s. At that point, I realized that there was no easy answer to the authorship problem of the YVi. Some time later, I came across Rukmani (1998). I was astounded to see some pieces of evidence were not correctly presented, leading to a conclusion that is not possible from available evidence. See pp. 237 ff.



Introduction to the Edition in This Volume

Call for a new edition

An edition of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa¹⁶ (YVi) was published in 1952 (the 1952 edition). That *editio princeps* made this interesting, but little known sub-commentary on the Yogasūtra (YS) and the Yogabhāṣya (YBh) easily accessible. The significance of the text may be summarized in the following two points: 1) it was a newly found commentary on the whole of the YBh, not just on the YS. Prior to its publication, studies on Patañjali's Yoga system (Pātañjalayogaśāstra=PYŚ) depended mostly on Vācaspati Miśra's commentary. Having a new commentary on the YBh opened new possibilities for studying the PYŚ;¹⁷ 2) the editors of the edition ascribed the YVi to Śaṅkara, the author of the BSBh. Whether it is an authentic work of Śaṅkara is still a focus of debate. An attempt to shed some light on the issue will be made in the section "Materials for the Authorship Problem" on pp. 225ff. in the appendices of this volume.

The 1952 edition, being based on a single Devanāgarī transcript copied from a Malayalam manuscript (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: vii), inevitably left much to be desired. Wezler (1983), in the first installment of his series of articles titled "Studies in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa,"¹⁸ pointed out some text-critical problems of the edition. Because of its deficiencies, a number of scholars who were interested in the text at first have been turned away from studying the text.

Perhaps the most problematic feature of the edition is the fact that many emendations were silently introduced into the text. It is one thing that the text in an edition is incomprehensible due to the scarce availability of manuscript evidence (being based on a single Devanāgarī transcript); but it is another that even the evidence is not faithfully reported. At

¹⁶For the title, see section "Title of the work" on page 9.

¹⁷Wezler (1983) points out that the YVi contains older readings of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. The examples given in the article were, as Wezler states, only a fraction. The YVi, as a commentary, suggests quite different readings of both the YS and the YBh. This will be noted throughout the edition. Maas (2006: 127–164) contains the text of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra reconstructed from my earlier version of the edition of the first pāda of the YVi (Harimoto 1999). In some places our reconstructions diverge.

¹⁸Others in the series are: Wezler (1984b), Wezler (1984a), and Wezler (1986).

many places the conditions that tempted the editors to emend are understandable and such emendations appear reasonable.¹⁹ However, silent emendations without critical apparatus diminish the scholar's confidence in an edition. Without being provided with an apparatus, readers will not know that there was an alternative.

What Wezler (1983) did was not merely to point out the problems in the 1952 edition, but to give hope to scholars. By reporting the availability of more manuscript material, he suggested the possibility of a critical edition. Scholars have since been waiting for a new improved edition based on new material.

This volume presents a text of part of the first pāda of the YVi critically edited on the basis of the material reported by Wezler. It is hoped that this edition provides a more intelligible and more original text of the YVi than the 1952 edition. As the *stemma codicum* on page 25 will show, however, all the material stands in a very close relation—the exemplar of one of the two Malayalam manuscripts is also an ancestor of the other Malayalam manuscript. Furthermore, all the Devanāgarī transcripts were derived from one or the other of the Malayalam manuscripts. In addition to this, theoretically the most reliable manuscript, being an apograph of the common ancestor, is heavily damaged, thus rendering the documentary situation similar to that of the 1952 edition at many places. There remain many places where readings are not very certain. Despite this state of affairs, I believe that this edition has one certain advantage over the 1952, i.e., it has a critical apparatus. In addition, I present my translation of the text. It should facilitate clarifying my judgements in adopting the text presented in the edition.

Manuscripts

Five manuscripts have been used to prepare this edition—**A**: from the Adyar Library; **M**: from the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library; **L**: from Lahore University; **T_m**: from the Oriental Manuscript Library, Trivandrum; and its transcript **T_d**. The readings of the *editio princeps* (1952 Madras edition) have also been recorded as **ℒ**.

A (The Adyar Library manuscript)

The manuscript A is preserved in the Adyar Library, Madras. It is cataloged as TR 152.1 and 2 and listed in the *Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library* (Sarma and Raja 1942). This manuscript is also numbered 63532. It is written in Devanāgarī script on ruled paper and bound in two volumes. It has 393 folios in total. The

¹⁹See the entries in the variant register of the critical apparatus in the current edition where the constituted readings have the siglum *E(em.)*. Those are where I agree with the editors of the *editio princeps*. Note, however, that there is no indication in the edition itself. That they are emendations is deduced from the fact that the reading is not in their source manuscripts.

first volume consists of 237 folios and the second of 156 folios. Folios are numbered except for the first of each volume. The first 41 folios of the second volume have no folio numbers but only page numbers. Pages are numbered consecutively throughout the two volumes. There are 780 pages in total: 472 pages in the first volume, 308 pages in the second. The recto of the first folio of each volume is left blank and has no page numbers. This witness is complete and its physical dimensions are 21.2×16.8 cm ($8\frac{3}{8} \times 6\frac{6}{8}$ inches). 14 lines on a page. About 17 syllables on a line.

It is dated October 21, 1925, and was copied by V. Nārāyaṇaśarmā. The condition of the manuscript is excellent. Corrections are rarely made, and substantial alterations—such as cancellation of of large amount of text, or marginal notes reflecting the discovery of correct sequence of exemplar's folios found in M below—are even rarer. The introduction to the 1952 edition mentions this manuscript:

[A] copy of the same manuscript was available in the Adyar Library. Sri S. R. Krishnamurthy Sastry took the press-copy to Adyar Library to have it collated with the manuscript in that Library. . . . (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: vii)

Although this gives the impression that A was transcribed from the same Malayalam manuscript as the Devanāgarī manuscript in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library (M below) on which the 1952 edition was based, A was in fact copied from that Devanāgarī transcript (M).²⁰ Internal evidence will be discussed below in section “M → A” on pp. 29 ff., but there also is external evidence for this. A brief note in the *Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library* (Sarma and Raja 1942) says:

Transcript of the MS. from Madras.

This appears to refer to the fact that it was copied from a manuscript preserved in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. In addition to this, the colophon of the manuscript specifically says:

madrapurastharājakīyapustakaśālāyāṃ mūlamātrkāyāḥ vilikhitam idam pustakam|| (This manuscript was copied from an original preserved in the Madras Government Manuscripts Library.)

This seems to be absolutely clear.

I obtained a photocopy of the manuscript through the Adyar Library.

Since this manuscript is a transcript from M, which, in turn, is a transcript from L (see pp. 26 ff.), its readings have little significance for preparing an edition. In addition to this, this manuscript appears to have been transcribed in a hurry. There are a number of simple mistakes that escaped the attention of the scribe.

A page number, rather than a folio number and a side, will be used when I refer to a location in this manuscript since all the sides have a page number while some folios do not record folio numbers.

²⁰Wezler also follows the introduction of the 1952 edition (Wezler 1983: 18).

M (The Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library manuscript)

M is a Devanāgarī manuscript preserved in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, cataloged as R. No. 2783 in *A Triennial Catalogue of Manuscripts*, vol. III, part 1 (Sastri 1922). It is complete and written in Devanāgarī script on ruled paper with black ink. Its dimensions are 26.3×23.6 cm ($9\frac{3}{4} \times 10\frac{7}{8}$ inches). It is bound as a single volume. 162 folios, 321 pages. The first folio and the verso of the last folio are blank and not numbered. A page consists of about 20 lines, and a line has about 33 syllables. Its exemplar's folio numbers up to 55 are recorded in the margin. The condition is generally good. The paper has become brown, and darker spots are found on many folios. Some folios are torn at the center folding. This witness was the basis of the 1952 edition.

The colophon in the last page state in English that it was

Transcribed in 1918–19 from a manuscript of Narayana Namboodri of Kudalur Mana, Nareli, Tirttala, Malabar.

The Kudalur Mana is now in Ottapalam Taluk of Pallakad (Palghat) District, Kerala.²¹

Above the colophon in different ink this transcript is stated to have been “Compared with the original . . . [the rest illegible due to weathering of the ink].”

Three stages of corrections are encountered in this manuscript. The first stage of corrections was apparently by the original scribe. Corrections at this stage were made in the same black ink as the body of the manuscript, and involved relatively small portions of the text, such as one character at a time. The next stage of corrections is recorded in another kind of black ink. At this stage, some substantial corrections were made. They are mostly found in the margin or between the lines. In some cases, a large portion of text, the equivalent of one or more lines from a Malayalam manuscript,²² is inserted. Apparently the person who made the corrections still had access to the original manuscript from which M was copied. Otherwise, such corrections would have been impossible. Although the ink is different, the hand appears to be of the original scribe himself. We may safely say that this stage of corrections was made when M was “compared with the original,” as stated in the colophon of M (see above). The ink used for the corrections and the one used to record the statement appear to be the same. This ink has become fainter due to age and is sometimes not very legible. There is another hand involved in this manuscript. This hand, which used blue ink, was mostly concerned with recovering the original continuity of the text. Given the description of the process of preparing the 1952 edition (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: vii–viii), it is

²¹I was originally informed of this location of the Mana by John Freeman, then of the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, in 1999.

²²Such lines are indeed equivalent to lines from manuscript L below. See “L → M” on pp. 26 ff.

likely that this was done by one of the editors of the 1952 edition, perhaps P. S. Rama Śāstri.²³

M was the exemplar of A above (see pp. 29 ff.). L (the Lahore manuscript) is most likely the exemplar of M (see 26 ff.).

The material used to prepare the present edition was a set of photographs I took on January 12th, 1992.

This manuscript may be said to have little significance as a source of the readings in the archetype α (see below) since we have M's exemplar, L. However, I find that the copyist of this manuscript was intelligent and knowledgeable. Many of his conjectural emendations seem appropriate. In addition, I found this manuscript useful to identify problematic readings precisely because of the conjectural emendations, because they suggest that the learned copyist of M thought that there was a problem. Even when I did not adopt its emendation, I still benefitted from this manuscript as a signal of problems in the archetype. Of course, M is a good source of readings in L since the printout from microfilm of L is not always very legible.

L (the Lahore manuscript)

Manuscript L is part of the Woolner Collection at the Punjab University Library, Lahore.²⁴ The accession number is PUL (Punjab University Library) Woonler 7065 and the catalogue number is 428. It is written in Malayalam script on palm-leaf, incised and inked. Each side of a folio usually has 10 lines. It consists of 138 folios and the text is complete. The original dimensions are unknown. The condition of the manuscript was generally good as of 1977. Most of the folios had been darkened by age, and some, especially the first and the last folios, were very dark. Some folios have wormholes. Folios are numbered using the letter numerals common in Malayalam manuscripts²⁵ on the left hand side of the recto of each folio. Folios 9–10 are placed after folio 14. Folios 53, 69, 77, 78 are flipped (verso first). Corrections are seldom made and not always visible.²⁶ L records

²³He was the one who found the correct order of the text, according to the introduction (p. viii).

²⁴There had been some uncertainties regarding the whereabouts of the manuscript after Wezler obtained his microfilm copy there in 1977. A team of scholars from the Geumgang University, Korea, working on the project "Establishing the Catalogue and Database of the Manuscripts of the Woolner Collection, Lahore," informed me that the manuscript was still there as of 2009. The catalogue has since been published online. The data for this particular manuscript is found at https://www.istb.univie.ac.at/cgi-bin/smw/smw.cgi?uid=default&browse_ms=374&nav=2&subnav=94.

²⁵The system is called *nanādi* (Renou and Filliozat 1996: 701). See also Bendall (1896).

²⁶M, while showing clear signs of its being copied from L, sometimes reads quite differently from what I find in L. In some cases, readings in M are identical to those in T, or preferable to those in L. Since it is difficult to think that such readings can be arrived at by mere conjectures, it appears that they were present in L in some way. Given that corrections are made at different times than original copying of L, written in different manners, and given the difficult conditions of the microfilm, perhaps we can postulate the existence of corrections now invisible.

the name of the original owner or the scribe: Satyānanda, a disciple of Keśavaparakā(śa?) Bhaṭṭāraka.²⁷

The owner of L in 1918–9 perhaps was Narayana Namboodri of Kudalur Mana, Nareli, Tirttala, Malabar (now in Ottapalam Taluk of Palghat District, Kerala), recorded in M to be the name of the owner. L is most likely the exemplar of M.²⁸

A print-out from microfilm on A4 paper of this manuscript was made available by Albrecht Wezler for this edition. The microfilm was made for him in 1977. This manuscript is mentioned briefly by Wezler (1983: 29).

Each frame of the film contains one side of 5 folios. The folios were placed upside down when filmed. Due to weathering, out of focus frames, as well as being printed on paper sheets, characters are not always legible despite the good condition of the manuscript.

T_m (the Trivandrum manuscript)

This is the Trivandrum manuscript Wezler refers to in his articles (Wezler 1982, 1983, 1984b,a, 1986). It is written in Malayalam script on palm-leaf and preserved at the Oriental Manuscript Library, Trivandrum, catalogued as L. 662. Its dimensions are 5 × 55.5 cm (2 × 21 $\frac{7}{8}$ inches).

Folios are numbered in the same letter numeral system as L on the left hand margin of recto of each folio.²⁹ There are two folios each that are numbered 4, 81, 101, and 107. No folios numbered 13–17, 26, 70–73 are found. However, fragments of folios that must have been numbered 16 and 17 are randomly placed and assigned various numbers by later hands. Beginning with 101, folios are renumbered by another hand with the same letter numeral system. This is an apparent attempt to remove the duplicate folio numbers. In addition to the letter numerals, at one time the manuscript had Arabic numerals corresponding to the Malayalam letter numerals beginning with 58. The Arabic numbers appear in the earlier set of photographs but not in the one taken later.³⁰ Table 3 shows the relationship of original numbering, later numbering and numbering in Arabic numerals.

A discord may be noted between the original numbering and the rest caused by placing folios originally numbered 108–10 between 101₁ and 101₂. The original preserves the continuity of the text. The attempt to resolve the order unfortunately failed although it had the order of the folios with duplicate numbers right.

The exact number of the original folios is unknown since we cannot exclude the possibility that there might have been more than one folio that bore the same number among the missing leaves, or that some numbers

²⁷The colophon reads *śrīkeśavaparakā[sic]bhaṭṭārakāṅgāṃ śiṣyasya satyānandasya iyam pādañjala[sic]ṭīkā*. See p. 221

²⁸See section “M (The Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library manuscript)” on pp. 18 ff. and section “L → M” on pp. 26 ff.

²⁹See note 25 on page 19.

³⁰For the two sets of photographs see below (p. 22).

original	secondary	Arabic
101 ₁	101	101
101 ₂	105	105
102	105 → 106	106
103	107	107
104	108	108
105	109	109
106	110	110
107 ₁	111	111
107 ₂	112	112
108	102	102
109	103	103
110	104	104
111	113	113
112	114	114
113	115	115
114	116	116
115	117	117
116	118	118
117	119	119
118	120	120
119	121	121
120	122	122
121	123	123
122 (no number)	124	124
123	125	125

Table 3: Various numberings in T_m

might have been skipped already in the original. Under the assumption that a missing number corresponds to a missing folio, the estimated number of original folios is 127. Folios 13–15, 26, 70–73 are completely missing in the photographs used to prepare the edition. This estimate seems correct when we compare the estimated length of the text in missing folios with the text available from other manuscripts.

T_m is heavily damaged. Not a single folio is completely legible. Some are broken into several pieces, among which fragments of folios 4₂, 22, 23, 57, and 62 are randomly placed in the photographs.

I refer to folios by the original numbering in letter numerals. When two folios bear the same number, I refer to them with subscript ₁ or ₂ appended to the number recorded in the folio itself.

Each folio has 9 to 10 (mostly 9) lines on a side. Three names are recorded at the very end of the manuscript:³¹ Samavartīśatru, Gārgya

³¹For the discussion on the end of the manuscripts T_m and L, see section “The

and Parakroḍa. At least, it is clear that a certain Gārgya ordered the manuscript to be copied. And this manuscript probably has something to do with the Parakroḍa family of Kerala.

This manuscript has many corrections. Apparently some of the corrections were made by the original scribe immediately after mistakes were made. Some lines bend in order to avoid corrections made on the line just above. Other corrections suggest that proof readings were performed, comparing the readings in T_m to those in the exemplar. The revisor, possibly the original scribe himself, appears to have been not only careful, but also to have been well versed in Sanskrit. A number of corrections appear to be emendations by him since some of the readings before the corrections are shared with L.

Two sets of color photographs taken at two different occasions have been used. Koh Endoh requested the first set of photographs in 1990. The photographs were later purchased by Albrecht Wezler, and made available for this project. Another set was taken in 1993 by the order of Futoshi Omae on my behalf.³² The photographs were taken with one half of two folio-sides per frame, with some exceptions where one half of one folio is in one frame. In the second set, the letter numerals of folios are not in the frame.³³

The worsening condition of the manuscript is apparent when comparing the two sets. More portions of folios are missing in the second set. The verso sides of folios 6 and 7 were not photographed in the first set. Fragments of 4₂, 22, 23, 57, and 62 are not photographed in the second set. The aforementioned Arabic numerals appear in the first set but not in the second. On the other hand, the folios photographed in the second set have Arabic numerals on each half on a side, in such a way that folio 1 recto has number 1 on the left-hand margins and 2 on the right-hand margin, on the verso 3 on the left-hand margin and 4 on the right-hand margin. This must have been done when photographing the manuscript with one half of a side of a folio in one frame. It can be observed that the Arabic numbers are given not once but twice, once with red ink and then with blue ink. This manuscript was photographed by the same photographer more than once after 1990, the year our first set of photographs was taken. The order of folios, especially of fragments of folios, is not consistent in the two sets.

This manuscript was mentioned and used in Wezler's articles (Wezler 1983, 1984b,a, 1986, 1982) on the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa. Endoh (1993) gives bibliographical information and some observations on the manuscript.

ending of the YVi" on pp. 207 in the Appendices.

³²It is known that Yasuke Ikari also acquired a photo copy of the manuscript. This manuscript must have become popular especially among scholars. The curator of the Trivandrum Manuscript Library, when I told the number of the manuscript, had no trouble finding the manuscript, as if he had been prepared to bring it up.

³³This, combined with the further loss of fragments, and arbitrary numbering by the photographer, unfortunately made the photographs of this second set of less value.

Assuming that T_m is the exemplar of T_d and that the name of the owner recorded in T_d is that of the owner of its exemplar, the owner of T_m is “Narayan Narayanan Namboodripad, at Puliyanur Mana, Eeroor, Thrippunithura.” I was informed in 1999 by John Freeman that the location of the Mana is now in Kanayannur Taluk of Ernakulam District, Kerala, close to the city of Cochin and that it has changed its name several times. Although the names of two owners (Narayan Narayanan Namboodripad and Narayana Namboodri) of our Malayalam manuscripts (T_m and L) are similar,³⁴ this does not necessarily mean that the manuscripts had been preserved in the same area.

T_d (a Devanāgarī transcript from the Trivandrum manuscript)

This is another manuscript from Trivandrum, made available by Professor Wezler for this project. It is written in Devanāgarī script on ruled paper. Original dimensions are not known. The available photocopy of it is on A4 letter. Not much information about this manuscript is available. It is obviously a transcript from T_m because almost all the places where the copyist of T_d indicates his exemplar was damaged and illegible are also damaged in T_m , and marginal notes that indicate folios in the exemplar correspond to those of T_m . T_m itself bears a number of indications that T_d was copied from it. Vertical strokes in blue ink on T_m correspond to page changes of T_d .

Where the copyist of T_d found that signs were missing, he indicated the number of signs he estimated missing with dots.

The transcript has the date “2-20-24,” which most likely represents February 20th, 1924. It was copied by S. Śaṅkaranārāyaṇa Śāstrī. The owner of the manuscript is recorded as “Narayan Narayanan Namboodripad, at Puliyanur Mana, Eeroor, Thrippunithura” in Roman letters.

The 1952 edition mentions a manuscript in Trivandrum and its transcript in the introduction. It is not certain, although it does seem likely, that T_d was the mentioned transcript. Evidently, it was not thoroughly used in the collation process of the 1952 edition.³⁵

T_d , despite being a transcript of T_m , does not always provide us the same information as T_m . Apparently T_m has suffered much more damage after the transcription of T_d even though much of the damage had already taken place at the time of T_d . Generally the portion recorded as missing in T_d is slightly smaller than the missing portion in T_m . Consequently, T_d provides a slightly less damaged text than T_m .

³⁴See p. 20

³⁵There indeed are a few places that might suggest influences from T_d on the 1952 edition, i.e., readings not in M are introduced, and they correspond to those in T_d . The readings are apparently preferable and one may suspect conjecture, but it appears difficult to reach those readings just by conjecture without consulting another manuscript. However, because of the scarcity of the evidence, I cannot be certain whether they indeed are incorporated from T_d .

However, the copyist of T_d sometimes had to resort to speculation around the edges of missing portions. Many times readings surrounding a missing portions (dots in T_d) are found to be incorrect.

Additionally, T_d introduces some standard features that modern readers may expect, such as punctuation and *avagraha*. Orthographic features peculiar to Malayalam manuscripts (see “Presentation of the text” on pp. 37 ff., especially sections “Treatment of nasals”—“Voiceless consonants before voiced consonants”) are discarded in favor of standard orthography of Sanskrit texts in Devanāgarī. Sandhi is sometimes applied, and sometimes resolved. T_d does not report corrections made in T_m . Emendations, many times correct, are silently introduced. And of course new errors are introduced.

I use the siglum T in the apparatus if an identical reading is recorded in both T_m and T_d . Otherwise, I will distinguish T_m and T_d .

℘ (the 1952 edition)

The 1952 edition of the YVi (siglum ℘) is the *editio princeps* of the YVi. As the introduction to this edition (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: vii) says, it is based on a single paper manuscript, which is our M. The introduction also mentions the existence of another paper manuscript in the Adyar Library, viz., our A, and says the manuscripts did not differ from each other. As stated above in section “A (The Adyar Library manuscript)” on pages 16 ff., A indeed was a copy from M. The introduction to the edition (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: vii–viii) also mentions the existence of a manuscript and implies the existence of a transcript in the Oriental Manuscript Library, Trivandrum, but it is not clear which manuscript or transcript it is referring to. Perhaps we can assume that the manuscript it refers to is our T_m , but the identity of the transcript with our T_d remains uncertain. T_d is from Trivandrum, and if we understand what the introduction says literally, there was a manuscript of the YVi in Trivandrum, while a transcript of a portion of it was made and sent to Madras. However, we do not know of the existence of a partial transcript in Madras, but we do know of the existence of a complete (in the sense that it reproduces T_m with its lacunae) Devanāgarī transcript in Trivandrum. Even though the editors say that they were unable to collate their edition with the manuscript in Trivandrum, there are some places where readings match with those in T_m . Even considering the possibility of emendation, it is hard to imagine that those readings in the edition derive solely from M.³⁶ In those places, the editors do not give any notes whether they have made emendations, or have found their readings in a manuscript.

³⁶The agreements between T and the edition that seem more than just clever emendations by the editors of the 1952 edition include: °*pekṣayā ātma*° while L, M, and A have °*pekṣayātma*° on p. 180 (no reason to alter the reading), °*lakṣaṇābhīdhāne sampra*° for °*lakṣaṇābhīdhānam pra*° of L, M and A on p. 183, *yatra* for *yata* of L and *yataḥ* of M and A on p. 54, an addition of *na* on p. 72, *hīyeta* instead of *nīyeta* of L, M and A on p. 75, *tān* for *tāvat* of L, M and A on p. 76, etc.




Figure 1: Stemma Codicum

Nevertheless, the editors are very worthy of praise for their knowledge, insight, and skill in preparing the edition. They were in the disadvantaged situation of having only a transcript. Even with the help of additional manuscripts, they would not have gotten much further, because the text had already become severely corrupt in the archetype we can attempt to reconstruct when comparing all the manuscript evidence. Still, they managed to reach an edition that is to some degree usable. We can witness their insights all over the edition where they made emendations (though silently). And above all, the fact that they made this very interesting text widely available is the most important contribution they made.³⁷

Relationship among manuscripts

A very close relationship among our manuscripts can be established. The following are my observations that lead to the stemma codicum in figure 1, Stemma Codicum, on this page.

³⁷Rukmani (2001) includes the Sanskrit text of the YVi. However, it is not used in preparing this edition; it is no more than a reproduction of the *editio princeps* with additional errors. See Harimoto (2004).

T_m → T_d

As stated above (section “T_d (a Devanāgarī transcript from the Trivandrum manuscript)” on pp. 23 ff.), T_d is a transcript from T_m.

L → M → A

The rest of the manuscripts L, M, and A share many common readings. This situation can be summarized as follows: if a text of any length, including a zero length text, found in L disagrees with that of T, it is normally the case that the reading is also found in M and A. If a reading that is found in neither T nor L is found in M, it is normally also found in A. Finally, there are readings that are unique to A. What this situation implies is an L → M → A relation.

L → M

According to the introduction to the 1952 edition, M, the source of that edition, was copied from a manuscript in 1919. After it was made, the manuscript was reportedly returned to its owner. Evidence in the manuscripts shows that L, whose existence was not widely known until reported by Wezler, was the manuscript from which M was copied. The evidence that leads to this conclusion is that physical characteristics of L are reflected in M.

A major example of this is a misplacement of folios in L.³⁸ Folios 9 and 10 are misplaced after folio 14 in L. This resulted in the order 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 9, 10, 15. The folios appear in this order in our microfilm of L.

L8 (the eighth folio of L) ends with

सुखरागादिविज्ञानस्य चानिन्द्रियप्रनाडि³⁹

and the next, the 9th folio in the stack, numbered 11, begins with:

नपेक्ष्यसम्बन्धः

Combination of these two is what M (21,14) reads:

सुखरागादिविज्ञानस्य चानिन्द्रियप्रनाडी↑नपेक्ष्यसम्बन्धः

The arrow is present in the manuscript and to the left of the arrow is “31-v,” and to the right is “36-v,” pointing where to read next within M. The above reading is almost the reading achieved by reading L in its misplaced order. Considering that the final character in the 9th folio (numbered 11) of L can be read as डी, the reading achieved by connecting misplaced folios in that order can be said to be identical to the one recorded in M.

Since folios 9–10 are placed between folios 14 and 15, another discontinuity reappears four folios later, when the 12th folio, which should be—and in fact is—numbered 14 ends with:

³⁸The discontinuity under discussion is mentioned in the 1952 edition, p. 20.

³⁹The final sign could also be read as डी.

सा यतः प्रमा

and the next folio, the 13th, numbered 9, begins with:

कापूर्वत्वात्

Combination of these two is similar to what M (31,14) reads:

सायतः प्रमा↑पूर्वत्वात्

The text is divided by a vertical stroke in blue ink (the body is in black ink)⁴⁰ and to the left of the stroke is “36-v,” and to the right is “21-v,” indicating where to read next within M.

The final discontinuity due to the misplacement of folios 9–10 is found two folios further, between the 14th folio (numbered 10) and the 15th (numbered 15).

The 14th folio, numbered 10, ends with:

सम्बन्धिनाव

and the 15th folio, numbered 15 begins with:

णेन प्रवाह्यते अभूतार्थादि

On the other hand, M (36,17) reads:

सम्बन्धिनाव↑(. . .)अभूतार्थादि⁴¹

To the left of the arrow is “21-v,” and to the right is “31-v,” pointing to where the text continues.

Thus the discontinuities in M reflect those in L. We may say that M is derived from L, directly or indirectly. Differences in readings between mechanically connecting L and M may be explained as results of attempts to obtain intelligible readings. Another example of such a discontinuity caused by misplacement of a folio of L⁴² is found where folio 79 is placed in the stack with the verso instead of the recto facing upwards.⁴³

The above observations, however, may still leave room for the possibility that M may not be a direct transcript of L, i.e., that there may have been one or more steps of copying between L and M. Evidence that further supports M having been directly copied from L is available.

1. The lines L18r3 and 4 end as below:

(L18r3) . . . आह दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यं संस्कारासेवितो दृढभूमिः दीर्घकाल¶⁴⁴

(L18r4) . . . दृढो भवति नापि नैरन्तर्यं सेवितो दीर्घकालत्वे वर्जितोवा¶

M omits the portion enclosed with $\left\{$ and $\rightarrow\right\}$ (and so does A). This is approximately one line in L, and नैरन्तर्यं appears twice in about the same position on lines 3 and 4 of L18r. It is easiest to understand this as an omission influenced by the same string (नैरन्तर्यं) that appears at a similar position on two consecutive lines (*aberratio oculi*).

⁴⁰See pp. 18 ff.

⁴¹Between \langle and \rangle are some erased characters.

⁴²This corresponds to discontinuities reported in the 1952 edition, pages 219, 221, and 223. In M they are on pages 190, 191, and 192.

⁴³Not all the discontinuities found in M, and subsequently reported in the 1952 edition, are due to the misplacement of folios in L. Other discontinuities are already present in L in the middle of folios.

⁴⁴The ¶ sign denotes the end of a line.

2. A portion of text⁴⁵ does not exist in M (nor in A) while it exists in L. This is L21v4 plus यते at the beginning of L21v5.⁴⁶
3. L34v6 reads:

॥विवपर्ययानाभ्युपगमादित्येवमात्मपक्षे स्वमञ्जसतान्दर्शयति यदि पु-
नरिदञ्चित्तं . . .सांख्ययोगवादिन इव तवापि॥

M, after writing down the same text as this line, immediately repeats the text from पर्ययानाभ्युपगमा° up to चित्तं (86,9–10).⁴⁷ Then the copyist cancels this repetition. That is, M, after writing down L34v6, comes back to the beginning of the same line.⁴⁸

4. M (101,2–3) has यदि तदाकारेण परिणमेत deleted after द्वारमस्ति. The reading यदि तदाकारेण परिणमेत is found on the previous page. An error of this kind can be explained if the scribe of M became confused by two occurrences of द्वारमस्ति on two consecutive lines in his exemplar. In L, the corresponding place appears as follows:

(L40v3) ॥द्वारमस्ति यदि तदाकारेण परिणमेत . . .

(L40v4) ॥ात्सति बन्धे परिणतिद्वारमस्ति कथन्तर्हि . . .

Two occurrences of द्वारमस्ति are found toward the beginning of lines 40v3 and 40v4, the first preceding यदि तदाकारेण परिणमेत. If a scribe was looking for द्वारमस्ति toward the beginning of a line, he may by mistake have hit upon the first line since it is also at the beginning of a line.

All of the above suggests that the exemplar of M had the same line-breaks as L.⁴⁹ Especially 3 and 4 above exclude the possibility that M's

⁴⁵न ह्यनुश्रुतपरिणामरहिते निष्क्रिये पुरुषमात्रे प्राप्त्यभावात्प्रतिषेधो भागी स्यात्तस्मान्नित्यनिर्मलज्ञाननिरति-
शयैश्चर्यविशिष्टः सत्त्वद्रविणः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः प्रतिज्ञा (see my edition, p. 48)

⁴⁶M initially omits about four lines from L. The equivalent of three lines from L is later added in the margin, omitting the line in question.

⁴⁷तवापि is first written as न वा वि (therefore न वा विपर्यया°). One of the characteristics of L is that there is little distinction between प and व. Even though this is a common tendency among many scripts, especially from South India, it is particularly prominent in this manuscript. Furthermore, in this particular case, त is written in such a way that it can be read as न.

⁴⁸Repeating the beginning at पर्याया may not seem like exactly returning to the beginning of the same line. However, it is likely that the copyist of M thought वि was erroneously repeated at the end of a line and at the beginning of the next line. If this is the case, he did not exactly begin repeating from पर्याया, but from the very beginning of the line. See also the previous note.

⁴⁹I observe two more similar instances of eye-skips that were realized and supplemented by the copyist in M (p. 53). Line 11 of the page reads °ra iti avidyādayah. . . . Another hand (or the same hand but in different ink) instructs that between iti and avidyā° a lengthy text should be supplied. The text recorded in the margin reads: sāmkhyaśāstraprasiddhyabhāvād . . . puruṣaviśeṣa īśvara iti. In L folio 21 recto the reading īśvara iti occurs in both lines 9 and 10 about the same position, slightly left to the first (left) binding hole. The text first omitted and later supplied in M is the rest of line 9 after īśvara iti and up to īśvara iti on line 10. The next instance of eye-skip recorded in the same page of M (p. 53, line 17) is four lines of text in L. L21v has °parāmr̥ṣṭa iti on line 3 and °parāmr̥ṣṭa ity on line 7, again left to the first binding hole. M originally omits the text after the first parāmr̥ṣṭa iti, which is on line 3 on L21v, up to the second °parāmr̥ṣṭa iti on L21v7.

exemplar was a mere derivative from L. If that had been the case, the scribe could not have corrected the readings. The very fact that corrections were possible suggests that the exemplar contained the correct reading, but that it had arranged the text in such a way that those errors could easily be introduced.⁵⁰

Additionally, the places where M gives the folio numbers of its exemplar in the margin always correspond to where folios change in L. Even though M does not give the exact location by marking the characters surrounding the border, and the numbers do not correspond to those given in L, it appears extremely unlikely that folio changes even of a copy of L always would have occurred within the same range of one line of M as those of L throughout the text. Accordingly, we may consider it an established fact that M was copied from L.⁵¹

M → A

The Introduction to the 1952 edition suggests that the transcript preserved at the Adyar Library (A) is another transcript from the same manuscript from which M was copied. We have seen, however, (pp. 17 ff.) that the colophon and the manuscript catalog claim it as a transcript from M. There is further support for the assumption that A was copied from M:

- Errors introduced in M are also found in A. Most significantly, the same omission introduced above (p. 27) as items 1 and 2 are observed.⁵² If M and A had been copied from an identical manuscript independently, it is very unlikely that two separate copyists would have omitted the same portion. Other errors common to M and A include: संशय आपवर्गा on L38r7 is read as संशयं तूपवर्गा in M and A. आ in L is small and may be read as न्तु. Still, unless the copyist of A had been dependent on M or vice versa, this misreading is unlikely to have happened in both manuscripts.
- An indication that the direction of dependency was from M to A is that lengthy dittographies and their corrections, which typically occur in copies of palm-leaf manuscripts with very long lines, such as those introduced as 3 and 4 above (pp. 28ff.), are not found in A. In those places A has correct readings, or when M is concerned, readings that had been corrected. In other words, M contains more clues of its being copied from L, while on the other hand, A contains fewer indications that it derived from L. Considering that either of

⁵⁰In fact, one can even predict errors in M if similar readings appear at similar locations on consecutive lines in L. The copyist of M was very prone to this type of error.

⁵¹The lack of correspondence in folio numbers can be attributed to the lack of knowledge of the scribe how to read the letter numerals of Malayalam manuscripts. If he had had that knowledge, the load on the editors of the 1952 edition might have been much lighter since the copyist of M could then have rearranged the folios of L.

⁵²The 1952 edition was another victim of these omissions in M. See Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952: 43, 54).

M or A is dependent on the other, such errors and corrections are highly unlikely to have happened if M derived from A.

- Errors that can hardly happen if A had been copied from a Malayalam manuscript are observed: रचना (25r1) is read as स्वना in A (149,5); where M (61,5) has र and च very close to each other and च is spread horizontally; मेघ in L (19r1) and M (47,6) is read as मेघ in A (113,14)—घ and ध look very different in Malayalam script; दुरवबोध in L (40v6) and M (101,8) is read as दुःखबोध in A (240,12)—रव in the Malayalam script has no resemblance to ख as in the Devanāgarī script.
- Readings in A reflect the scribal habits of M. The copyist of M has a tendency of writing ˘ (e) toward the left of the consonant character rather than precisely above it. Hence when, for example, the correct reading is ०यते, M appears to read ०येत even if the copyist of M might have intended to write ०यते. At such places, we find that A reads ०येत—one case is युक्तन्दृश्यते in L (43r2), which is read as युक्तं दृश्येत in M (107,3) and A (254,7). Similarly, क्षेत्रे (L42v8) is read as क्षेत्र in A (253,3). In this case, M (106,14) can be read as either क्षेत्रे or क्षेत्र since two ˘ marks are close to each other toward the top of the sign क्ष. If A had been copied from a Malayalam manuscript, this would not have happened since in the Malayalam script ˘ comes before a consonant character on the same line.
- Confusing readings in M are reflected in A. त्थं उपावर्त्त on L41r5 is read as र्थी उपावर्त्त in A. Although M appears to read र्थ उपावर्त्त, the diacritical sign for र् is added twice on top of another on थ as if र् has to be repeated twice. It is understandable that the confused copyist of A wrote it down as र्थी.
- Exactly one line from M (111,8) is omitted in A (264,7).
- A omits almost one line of M (115,5–6) where M 115,5 and 6 both read द्युत्थानसंस्कार toward the end of the line. A omits a portion of text that is after the द्युत्थानसंस्कार toward the end of M 115,5 and continues after the द्युत्थानसंस्कार in M 115,6.
- The dates of transcription of M and A do not suggest that A was copied immediately after M was copied, before L was to be returned to the owner. M contains a date 1918–19 in the colophon, and A is dated 21/10/1925 (October 21st, 1925). There are about six years between the two dates. If the exemplar of M was returned to the owner after the transcript (M) was made in 1919, it would have been impossible for someone at the Adyar Library to make another transcript from it in 1925 unless it was brought to Madras once again.

T_m and L

The two Malayalam manuscripts, T_m and L, most likely derive from a single Malayalam manuscript. T_m is a direct copy of the manuscript,

while L is not. The forking of the branch that lead to L preceded copying of T_m . The following observations lead me to these conclusion.

Exemplar of T_m

We can glean some information from T_m as to what its exemplar looked like. From the following observations, I conclude that the exemplar of T_m appeared quite similar to T_m itself, i.e., a line in the exemplar contained a similar number of characters, and each side of a folio contained about the same number of lines, and therefore the exemplar had about the same number of folios.

The first clue is the anomalies found at in the end of folio 3 and the following. There we can learn the exact extent of one folio of T_m 's exemplar: where it started and where it ended. The scribe left signs that he first failed to copy one folio and later supplied the content. The following are the signs:

- T_m has two folios numbered 4 (4_1 and 4_2 in the order of appearance).
- At the end of folio 3 a portion of text⁵³ is cancelled.
- The same text appears at the end of folio 4_1 .
- Folio 4_1 leaves significant spaces toward the end: about one third of the folio length is left blank in 4_1v8 ; about half the folio length is left blank in 4_1v9 (the last line).
- The text that was cancelled in the end of folio 3 and that appear again in the end of folio 4_1 properly continues with the beginning of folio 4_2 .

The only possible explanation of the above is that folio 4_1 was later inserted to supply the text omitted first. Also, the omission was most likely caused by skipping one folio in the exemplar; the skipped folio started with the text in the beginning of folio 4_1 and ended before the text that was cancelled in the end of folio 3 and appearing again in the end of folio 4_1 . This should also explain why there are two folios that are numbered 4; folio 4_1 was supplied at the time of re-checking where the copying of T_m had finished and all the remaining folios already had been numbered.⁵⁴

Now we have the content of one folio⁵⁵ of the exemplar of T_m . Since no folio of L starts or ends with the same text where the initially omitted

⁵³चित्स्थितिशीलत्वात्त्रिगुणमिति तत्र चित्तत्रिगुणमिति प्रतिज्ञायते प्रख्याप्रवृत्तिस्थितिशीलत्वा

⁵⁴Interestingly, the scribe, whose hand does not appear to be different from the original scribe, appears to have learned the use of *avagraha* in the meantime. Folio 4_1 is the only folio in which I have found the use of *avagraha*. See p. 38.

⁵⁵Although it is theoretically possible that the content is from multiple folios, I find it unlikely that the content of multiple folios (this assumes a manuscript of arbitrary size) fits nicely in one folio of its copy. Combined with the observations regarding the length of lines in T_m 's exemplar below, it is unrealistic that it had about the same length of lines but had only the half (in case two folios were originally omitted) or the one-third (three folios omission) of lines. Even if the omission was from multiple folios, it does not affect the following discussion. The significance is that we know where a folio started and where a (or the) folio ended.

folio of T_m 's exemplar does, we can conclude that at least L was not the exemplar of T_m .

There are some cases of dittography (19v2, 27v6, 33v6, 43v2, etc.) in T_m that are apparently caused by similar text repeated on two consecutive lines at a similar horizontal location. Interestingly, after the dittography, T_m also has the same text aligned on a similar horizontal location on two consecutive lines as a result of dittography. This suggests that T_m and its exemplar had a similar length of lines.

This observation confirms that L was not the exemplar of T_m . L does not have similar text aligned on a similar horizontal location where T_m 's exemplar is expected to have had such text.

T_m 's exemplar and L

As briefly mentioned above (in note 43 on p. 27), not all the discontinuities preserved in M are due to the misplacement of folios in L. In some cases L already contained a discontinuity without being thus noticed. One such example is the one reported in the 1952 edition pages 178, 192, and 262. That is, the text spanning from L93r6 to L99r3 (लक्ष्यमाण°...तथा), which should come between °त्वेनानुपप and च तात्सारूप्य in L69r8, is inserted between परिदृष्टा on L93r6 and स्वविषयवृत्ति on L99r3.⁵⁶

On the other hand, this discontinuity is not observed in T_m . Instead, T_m contains a trace of misplaced folios in its exemplar at exactly the same place. At the end of folio 65, T_m reads पृथक्त्वेनानुप(वपतत्सारूप्य ...).⁵⁷ This is the same discontinuity found in L69, except that it is corrected. And the next folio begins with लक्ष्यमाण, the correct text. This shows that the discontinuity recorded in L was there in the exemplar of T_m .⁵⁸ This discontinuity was probably in the form of misplaced folios since the discontinuity is at the end of a folio of T_m and was easily fixed. Note that I have observed that T_m probably shared similar line length and number of lines per folio with its exemplar. If the discontinuity had not been in the form of misplacement of folios and fixed by rearranging them in the correct order, there should be some signs at other places where the discontinuity was involved. However, there is no such sign in T_m 90v7 that corresponds to L99r3.⁵⁹

What happened to the scribe of T_m may be described as follows: when he was about to finish the folio numbered 65, and began copying from the next folio in the stack of his exemplar, he noticed a discontinuity. He

⁵⁶Unfortunately for the editors of the 1952 edition, L69 was for some reason placed so that the verso had to be read first. Since the copyist of M did not realize this, things became even more complicated. See Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952: vii–viii). The two editors deserve respect for recovering proper continuity from such a disarray.

⁵⁷The text between “(” and “)” is cancelled in T_m . T_m uses parenthesis-like signs to mark the deletion of the enclosed text.

⁵⁸Note also that the exemplar obviously read °त्वेनानुपपलक्ष्यमाण° instead of °त्वेनानुपलक्ष्यमाण°.

⁵⁹Folio 71 of T_m whose beginning should correspond to the end of misplaced text in L (93r6–99r3) is missing.

looked for the folio that properly continues from the one he just copied. He perhaps found five continuous folios that were placed after 30 folios.⁶⁰ He might have been helped by the foliation in his exemplar. After rearranging the exemplar's folios in the correct order, he continued to copy, starting at the beginning of the previously misplaced folio (probably numbered 67).⁶¹

From this observation, we can draw the following conclusions:

1. T_m and L both derived from the same manuscript α .
2. L (or the original manuscript that eventually led to L) was copied before the scribe of T_m rearranged the folios. Otherwise, L would not show this discontinuity.
3. T_m was directly copied from α .

It is not clear whether L also is an apograph of α . Although it derived from T_m 's exemplar, α , one or more generations of manuscripts could have intervened between L and α . Yet the likelihood of many generations of intervening manuscripts is very small; L does not exhibit significant increase in erroneous readings, a sign that there was more copying from the common ancestor, compared to T_m . One can observe this in the variant register in the critical edition in this volume. If there were more erroneous readings (newly introduced readings) than T_m , our variant register would have many more entries where readings from L (and its descendants) are relegated to variants rather than constituted readings. There are about the same number of occurrences where a reading in L is preferable to that of T_m . For practical purposes, we may treat L to be as faithful a copy of α as T_m . I will assign β as the designation for possible intermediates between L and α . β does not have to be one manuscript or does not even have to exist. It is there to express uncertainty.

The relationship so far discussed is shown in figure 1 on p. 25.

Editorial principles

What text are we recovering?

The edition in this volume aims at recovering the text originally intended by the author. This statement, however, calls for qualification, for, I believe different kinds of texts demand different approaches when it comes to critically editing them. There are some assumptions that have to be made in order to determine the goal in editing and presenting our text.

First of all, I assume that our manuscripts are witnesses to a single integral entity, viz., a commentary on the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. This assumption in fact consists of two parts. I assume 1) that the manuscripts consulted here all derive ultimately from the same source, i.e., I am not

⁶⁰The numbers of folios are estimates based on the assumption that T_m and its exemplar contained a similar amount of text per folio.

⁶¹Note that there are two folios numbered 4 in T_m . Therefore, if T_m advanced at about the same pace as its exemplar, the folio number in its exemplar would be 66th when T_m 's scribe finished T_m 's folio numbered 65.

looking at manuscripts of different texts; and 2) that the source represented an integral whole, in this case, a text written by an author. The first assumption should be warranted by the fact that the manuscripts transmit more or less the same text with only minor variations that can be accounted for as arising from transmission process. As presented in the section “Relationship among manuscripts” (pp. 25 ff.), we can determine the genealogy of our manuscripts with a high degree of certainty.

The second assumption again can be divided into two parts: that the text I am attempting to recover is 2a) intended as one unit, and 2b) written by one author. I consider the first part of this assumption to be safe since the text, as a commentary, covers the whole Pātañjalayogaśāstra without major omissions or overlaps.⁶² If the text were not originally meant to be a commentary on the whole of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, for example, if the bundle of folios that eventually produced the α in the *stemma* was a collection of fragments from different commentaries, we would expect to see overlaps or omissions. In addition, I am aware of no part that is irrelevant, in other words, there is no sign of interpolation from unrelated texts. Hence I consider it highly probable that our text forms a whole unit. The second part of the assumption, that the commentary was written by a single person, is hard to prove. There appears to be a consistency in style and way of thinking throughout the text, and I find no indication of the text being written by more than one person. This is particularly so in the sections edited and translated in this volume.⁶³ For the time being, until I find an indication otherwise, I work with the assumption that our text is by a single person.

Secondly, there is a question of authorial intention. The natural assumption is that there was such a thing behind our text: someone wanted to convey something through his composition; the series of syllables he formed was not a random gibberish but meant to communicate. Furthermore, I assume that he had the ability to formulate his thoughts in intelligible classical (Pāṇinan) Sanskrit. Clearly these are again assumptions that are hard to prove, but I find no indication otherwise. I shall accept these assumptions as long as our evidence allows it, and try to make the reconstruction (the edition) in accordance with them.⁶⁴

The primary material we have for the recovery of the text is our manuscripts. Since we know the relationship between the manuscripts (see the section “Relationship among manuscripts” on pp. 25 ff.), it should at least be possible to recover the reading in α with some certitude in most places where the readings from both T and L are available. When readings in any of the Devanāgarī manuscripts diverge from their immediate ancestor,

⁶²What the exact text of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra is a difficult question since it has its own long history and variations among its manuscripts. Still, if we follow the text of the YVi, we can identify where in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra it is related without having much doubt.

⁶³But for the possibility of revisions by the author himself, see below.

⁶⁴Note that the assumptions made above are not always applicable to any kind of Sanskrit text. In many cases, we have to drop some of them and adopt others.

the reading must have originated in that manuscript.⁶⁵ Slightly trickier is when readings in T_m and L diverge. In those cases the reading in T_m is first given consideration since we know that T_m is an apograph of α . We do not know whether L was, as well. Theoretically speaking, T_m might have a better chance of transmitting the reading in α . However, the problem is that such a statistical approach does not help in solving individual cases.⁶⁶ In the end, an intelligent decision must be made in each case; one of the criteria will be intelligibility. Another kind of circumstances that make the recovery of α difficult is when the reading in either T_m or L is not available. T_m is heavily damaged, and therefore in many places its reading is not available. With just L, the certitude that we are facing the reading in α decreases. Again, we will have to exercise intelligent decisions in the light of intelligibility.

Note that the above discussion only applies if our goal was to restore the readings in α . So far, we have not even taken the possibility that a reading in α was already undesirable, in the sense that the reading was not what the author intended. It is not guaranteed that the readings of α perfectly represent the text intended by the author. Rather, it is almost guaranteed that they do not since α was most likely a manuscript that was copied from another manuscript.⁶⁷ My observation so far is that the text in α already had gone through significant changes through generations of copying. There are many places where a reading that L and T_m agree on is simply not possible but can be explained as a change typically introduced during transmission by copying manuscripts. I introduce conjectural emendations in those places. I also have adopted in many places readings found in the Devanāgarī manuscripts or the *editio princeps* since they are more intelligible. Those are emendations by the scribe of the manuscript or those by the editors of the *editio princeps*. This is why readings in those modern transcripts (T_d , M, A) and the 1952 edition were reported in the critical apparatus. In a similar vein, it should be noted that when a reading was adopted from either T_m or L, it does not necessarily mean that the reading was in α . The scribe of either manuscript might have corrected the reading in α . Whether that was the case or not is not a concern here; my principle aim is not to recover the reading in α .

This is the general principle. As with any general principle, there are exceptions. This goes back to the question of authorial intention. There are in fact some places in this edition where it was impossible to

⁶⁵It does not follow that the introduced reading was an undesirable reading. See below.

⁶⁶See Housman (1922).

⁶⁷Even if it was an autograph authorized by the author himself as the definitive final version, simply reproducing the reading of it would not constitute a useful edition today. Authors themselves do make mistakes. Just look at this book; there are still typographical errors and ungrammatical sentences even after going through checks and revisions. Also, the script he used was probably something not many of us are familiar with today, and if we followed the conventions used by him, the text would be hard to follow for modern readers. See the next section for conventions adopted in this edition.

satisfactorily recover (or rather postulate) intelligible, coherent text. Some are where I suspect damages beyond repair in transmission;⁶⁸ others are where I suspect the presence of hasty, incomplete editing.⁶⁹ The latter is a little problematic because we usually do not take such a possibility much into consideration. Those are places where the text does not flow smoothly. The best explanation I could conceive was that it was the author himself who introduced disturbance in the flow of discussion by adding substantial text. I found it less likely that those insertions were by a later hand because the portions involved are intertwined with other significant portions of the text.⁷⁰ It is as though our text, especially the part whose edition is presented in this volume, was still in the middle of a major revision process, and not quite finished. The overall impression I get from the *Īśvara* section of this commentary is that, as its unusual size in comparison to the rest of the text suggests, it was significantly expanded after finishing the entire commentary on the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. It is not only hardly possible but also probably irresponsible to try to guess what the final outcome could have been, based on the text which was in the middle of the revision process. I leave the text incoherent if the incoherency might be the result of unfinished editing process. Thus the text presented here would represent the text when the author last made changes.

The constituted text represents my hypothesis regarding the last state of the text when the author worked on it the last time. It is a result of series of text critical decisions. The decisions are made based on the readings found in the manuscripts (and a printed edition to some degree). The readings are reported in the critical apparatus when they affect my decisions. That is, they are not reported when all the sources agree on one reading and I adopt it. Reasonings behind the decisions—especially concerning emendations, conjectures—are explained in the footnote accompanying the translation. In places, I may be uncertain of decisions I make even when I adopt the reading that all the sources agree, leaving no entry in the apparatus. Those are where I suspect that the reading is not what the author intended but I cannot postulate any good alternatives (irrecoverable damages). In other places, the constituted text may not represent what the author ultimately intended (being in the middle of revision process). Those text critical issues are also discussed in the footnote accompanying the translation. The translation (and punctuation in the edition, see below) should also indicate the decision making process, revealing my understanding of the text.

⁶⁸Problematic portions are indicated by being typeset in a lighter shade. See p. 41.

⁶⁹For example, see notes 128 on p. 102, 159 on p. 113, 175 on p. 120, 225 on p. 134, and 230 on p. 135.

⁷⁰For my reasoning in each case, see references in the previous footnote.

Presentation of the text

Reconstructing the text that may have been conceived by the author and presenting it in a scholarly fashion in the 21st century are two different things. In order to present the reconstructed text to modern readers, some orthographic and typographical conventions that were most likely absent in the author's autograph must be employed.

Some modern conventions have been introduced; orthographies that do not follow known rules concerning the Sanskrit phonology are standardized; other features in Malayalam manuscripts, as long as they follow or reflect traditionally prescribed rules, are maintained.

Conventions introduced

I have introduced conventions that most likely differ from the original text written by the author.

Script I present the text in the Devanāgarī script. I believe most readers are more comfortable reading Sanskrit text in this script. Using Devanāgarī has another advantage over romanized text. Since the Devanāgarī script has a very similar set of signs to that of the Malayalam script, and forms ligatures in a similar way, it can suggest the nature of errors even in the Malayalam manuscripts in the critical apparatus.

Punctuation Punctuation has been editorially introduced. Our Malayalam manuscripts have no punctuation⁷¹ except the sign that marks an end of a section; a section consists of a sūtra, the bhāṣya on it, and their interpretations.⁷² The text is presented in paragraphs to indicate the change of subject matter and positions (objection or proponent). All the punctuation and paragraphing are based on my understanding of the text.

Two conventions are used to distinguish the citations and quotations from the body of the text visibly. Words or phrases from the root text being interpreted by the YVi are typeset in bold typeface at their first occurrence. On the other hand, quotes from other texts are enclosed in single quotes. They include references to sūtras and Bhāṣya that are not the immediate subject of an interpretation. The text from the root text quoted again in the same section of interpretation is also enclosed in single quotes. Larger quotations are typeset in narrower columns.

Sandhi is resolved around most punctuation. An exception is around a single quote where *sandhi* is retained. Since most of the punctuation

⁷¹There are, however, some places where the lack of *sandhi* suggests that either the author or the copyists considered there to be the end of a sentence or a phrase. These places may be taken into consideration when providing punctuation. Similarly, the punctuation found in our Devanāgarī transcripts may be taken into consideration as suggestions.

⁷²The end of a section will look like ॥ १ ॥ etc., in this edition. These numbers are supplied by me. There is no number in the Malayalam manuscripts. Similar notation supplied to a sūtra is not present in the manuscripts.

(except around single quotes) involves separating *sandhi*, readers are reminded that usually the original reading around a punctuation was the one without the punctuation and with *sandhi* applied.

Orthographies introduced or standardized

The following are orthographic features that are not necessarily found in our Malayalam manuscripts. They are standardized following the modern conventions and even when the reading in the edition deviates from any of our manuscripts, they are not reported in the apparatus.

Avagraha I have found only three instances of what could be *avagraha* in our Malayalam manuscripts. They are all found in the second folio numbered 4 of T_m.⁷³ To help readers to understand the text, *avagrahas* have been added where I think they are appropriate. Accordingly, most instances are not actually found in the Malayalam manuscripts. In the edition that follows, only one case of *avagraha* is present in a Malayalam manuscript.⁷⁴

Voiceless consonants before voiced consonants Sometimes a voiceless consonant does not become voiced before another voiced consonant in our Malayalam manuscripts. For example, °त्वात्भवति instead of °त्वाद्भवति, सम्यक्ज्ञान instead of सम्यग्ज्ञान, उत्भव instead of उद्भव, etc. These instances are normalized in the body of the text since the two Malayalam manuscripts are inconsistent. According to Raja (1992: 69), this phenomenon is a reflection of regional pronunciation.⁷⁵

No ligature ccha In both Malayalam manuscripts, I do not find any use of the ligature च्छ. Instead, at the places I expect the ligature, I find the one that can only be seen as च्श. The sign that appears to be च्श was most likely used to represent the consonant cluster *cch*.⁷⁶ I have not found a grammatical rule that dictates the interchangeability between *ś* and *cch*, and therefore standardize the ligature with च्छ.

Orthographies adopted from the Malayalam manuscripts

Some unconventional, compared to the modern conventions widely accepted in prints, features of the Malayalam manuscripts are preserved. The text presented in this edition may look strange for eyes that are only accustomed to printed Sanskrit texts. However, features found in

⁷³They are in: *pañcaparvaṇo 'vidyān* (p. 183); *tuśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ* (in the commentary on sūtra 1.2); *yogagrahaṇe 'sati* (ibid.). For the nature of the folio numbered 4 in T_m, see p. 31.

⁷⁴See the previous note.

⁷⁵In addition, the scribe of T_m has a tendency to write *t + p* as *l + p*. This feature is discarded since it is not shared with the L manuscript. This is a common phenomenon in Sanskrit pronunciation in Kerala. See Raja (1992: 69). Cf. also Burnell (1878: 43).

⁷⁶On this phenomenon, see Ikari (1995: 14–5) and Kobayashi (2004: 80–1). The latter proposes an explanation.

Malayalam manuscripts (discussed below) are very consistent. Furthermore, it appears that they are more than just arbitrarily chosen customary spellings peculiar to a scribe or a region.⁷⁷ Accordingly, as long as those conventions do not impede proper understanding of what is meant, a few unfamiliar orthographic conventions may be tolerated. My hope is to call attention of readers who do not normally read the introductions of critical editions to the following pages through those features found in the main text.

Treatment of nasals Our Malayalam manuscripts are very consistent in using nasals, including the sign that represents *anusvāra*.⁷⁸ In most cases *m* (like *n*) is assimilated to the following consonant. For example:

- $m + c/ch/j/jh/\tilde{n} \rightarrow \tilde{n}c/\tilde{n}ch/\tilde{n}j/\tilde{n}jh/\tilde{n}\tilde{n}$
- $m + t/th/d/dh/n \rightarrow nt/nth/nd/ndh/nn$
- $m + p/ph/b/bh/m \rightarrow mp/mph/mb/mbh/mm$ (this only occurs with *m*, not *n*), etc.

This is observed both within or external to words. Of these, $m + p/ph/b/bh$ are written with $ma + virāma$ (𑀧) + $p/ph/b/bh$, in two signs even within a word. That is, only mm is written in the form of a *saṃyukta* character. I generally use *saṃyukta* characters within or outside a word.

⁷⁷Many of the orthographic features mentioned are often observed in Sanskrit manuscripts from different regions, but systematic observations on them have been scarce. I find it regrettable that not much attention has been paid to the orthographies in Sanskrit manuscripts. Until recently, there seems to have been an assumption that irregular orthographies—in the sense that they deviate from the standard for print publications that was started in the 19th century—in manuscripts from a particular region are arbitrary or even erroneous, and that altering from one spelling convention to another does not affect the information contained in the text. The features found in Malayalam manuscripts that are mentioned below are consistent and prescribed not only in Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī but also in various Vedic Prātiśākhya. (See notes 78, 79, 81, 82, and 83.) This suggests the awareness of the scribes—or possibly of the community that produced those manuscripts, since those features are found also in the manuscripts of other texts—that they were following a standard, much of which is consistent with pronunciation rules of the Taittirīya branch of the Yajurveda. Even though the Taittirīya may be one of the most popular schools of the Vedas, I found it noteworthy that scribes who wrote down the manuscripts of the YVi faithfully reproduced the pronunciation prescribed as Vedic. I do not believe that the manuscripts of the YVi are the only cases that show such features. However, these features are often reported only in passing, with exceptions of editions of Vedic texts. See for example, Ikari (1995: 13–14) where the author reports similar features in his Malayalam manuscripts, or Griffiths (2004: XLIX–LXVII) on features in Oriya manuscripts of the Paippalādasamhitā. If in the future, editors of Sanskrit texts become conscious of orthographic or linguistic features of manuscripts and enough data are collected, we may have a better tool in philologically understanding the Sanskrit culture; e.g., we may assert the background of a text; we may better understand how certain readings arose (when a scribe who is not familiar with certain conventions copy a manuscript, he might have introduced a reading what was not meant).

⁷⁸For the sound *anusvāra*, see Cardona (1999). In the case of the Malayalam script, it is written as a small circle (almost dot like) sign that comes after (on the right side) of a syllable complete with a vowel. Unlike the orthography of primarily northern origin, it is not used as a sign for arbitrary nasals, but as a reflection of pronunciation. See the next note.

On the other hand, exceptions from what one might expect from this convention exist in our Malayalam manuscripts. Anusvāra (the sign) is used for nasals before *k/kh/g/gh*, except for the word final *n* (such as in *tasmin*, *suptavān*). Therefore such forms as अंकुर, संग, आशंका, instead of अङ्कुर, सङ्ग, आशङ्का. Since this use of *anusvāra* (the sign) appears to reflect pronunciation of *anusvāra* (the sound) and the concept of *anusvāra*,⁷⁹ i.e., it was conceived as a sound, this convention is followed.⁸⁰

Consonant doubling or lack thereof Malayalam manuscripts double consonants except *b*, *bh*, sibilants and *h*, after a vowel + *r*. For example, the scribes write वितर्क, अर्थ, कर्म, सर्व, etc, but not उत्कर्ष, दर्शन, अहर्हित, etc. Since this may have implications for the question of what tradition the (manuscripts of) the YVi belonged to, this feature is followed.⁸¹

On the other hand, I found no instances of *ttv/tty/ddv* + vowel in our Malayalam manuscripts even when they are expected. When one expects *ttv/tty/ddv* + vowel, it is always written *tv/ty/dv* + vowel—therefore सत्व, instead of सत्त्व, तत्व instead of तत्त्व, उत्पत्यभाव instead of उत्पत्यभाव, तद्दारेण instead of तद्दारेण. This lack of doubling of *t/d* takes precedence before doubling of consonants after *r*—therefore कीर्त्यते instead of कीर्त्यते. Although I fear that some confusions may arise, such as *sa tv a°* instead of *sat(t)va°*, it is mostly not difficult to make a judgment on what is meant according to the context; so I decided to retain this feature of Malayalam manuscripts. Again, this feature may have implications regarding the tradition the YVi belonged to.⁸²

Visarga or word final s In Malayalam script, word final *s* sometimes remains as *s* before *s* without becoming *visarga*, as in many published

⁷⁹Firstly, I doubt that the use of *anusvāra* (the sign) is done in order to save the effort of producing complicated conjoined characters for ङ्क, ङ्ख, ङ्ग, ङ्घ. In fact, the scribes always use the conjoined forms ङ्, etc., even though this form is much more complicated than ङ्, etc., would be. In addition, they could choose ङ + *virāma* (ङ्) etc. I suspect that they were loyal to their pronunciation of *anusvāra* as a sound. According to Cardona (1999: section 7.2.2), Yajurvedic texts (Prātiśākhya and Śikṣās) prescribe the pronunciation of *anusvāra* as having a velar element. We may conclude from this seemingly exceptional use of *anusvāra* (the sign) before velars (other instances of the use of *anusvāra* are before sibilants, *r*, *y*, and *h*) in our Malayalam manuscripts that (1) at least the scribes of our Malayalam manuscripts did pronounce *anusvāra* like *ṅ*, (2) they used the sign *anusvāra* when they pronounce the sound.

⁸⁰There are some more peculiarities in our Malayalam manuscripts. Not always, but sometimes *ma* + *virāma* (म्) is used before *v* instead of *anusvāra*—therefore किम् वा, सम्वेदन, etc., instead of किं वा संवेदन, etc. This may have something to do with the fact that *p* and *v* look very similar to each other in the Malayalam script. Since this use of म् is not consistently maintained between manuscripts, and since the same word can be found spelled in both ways, I suspect this is just confusion.

⁸¹See Cardona (1999: section 9.1). Note that only consonants after vowel + *r* are doubled, but not after vowel + *h* (as allowed by AA 8.4.46) nor *l/v* (as allowed by Taittirīyaprātiśākhya 14.2–3, etc.) in our Malayalam manuscripts. There is no doubling of a consonant cluster after a vowel (as allowed by AA 8.4.47, Taittirīyaprātiśākhya 14.1, etc.), either. See also the next paragraph.

⁸²See Cardona (1999: section 9.1.2.lg, chart II). The lack of च्च and च्य corresponds to Harita's prohibition of doubling mentioned in the Taittirīyaprātiśākhya.

texts. Therefore यस्स instead of यः स, etc. Such readings are retained unless punctuation is inserted between the word final *s* and the following word, in which case a *visarga* (:) is used before the punctuation.

On the other hand, *visarga* is dropped before a sibilant + voiceless stop, semivowel or nasal. For example, निस्वभाव instead of निःस्वभाव, प्रत्यय स्मृतिः instead of प्रत्ययः स्मृति; य स्त्रीषु instead of यः स्त्रीषु.⁸³ This feature is retained.

Signs and conventions in the edition

- In the body of the text the marks $_$, $_$, \lrcorner and \lrcorner signify the portions that are not available in the manuscripts from Trivandrum (T_m and T_d). The first set ($_$ and $_$) of marks enclose a portion that is not available in T_m , and the second (\lrcorner and \lrcorner) in T_d . When exactly the same portion is missing, the combined forms \lrcorner and \lrcorner will appear.
- When portions of text are enclosed in † symbols, I suspect the presence of a corruption but cannot offer a viable conjecture.
- Where there remains some uncertainty about the constituted text, the text is typeset in a lighter shade of gray (such as अथेत्यादि पातञ्जल-योगशास्त्रविवरणमारभ्यते).
- ... is used to indicate suspected loss of text.

Critical apparatus

There can be as many as four registers of critical apparatus on a particular page. In all registers the text portion a note refers to is indicated by the combination of line number and the lemma—the relevant text itself—except for the second register, where only the line number is indicated. A lemma may be given in a form not meaningful by itself, such as a part of a word. This is done in order to keep a lemma to a reasonable length so that the location of the text in question is identifiable without undoing *sandhi*.⁸⁴

Variant readings The first register records variant readings. This register is present on all pages. This is a positive apparatus. An entry consists of the line number, constituted text, the witness of the constituted reading in the form of sigla, followed by the variant readings accompanied by their own witnesses. If the constituted reading is a result of emendation or conjecture, it is indicated as such with the abbreviations “em.” or “conj.”. Furthermore, the following conventions are adopted:

⁸³See Wackernagel (1957: §287c). Cf. Macdonell (1987: 35).

⁸⁴I chose not to break *sandhis* in order not to introduce characters not present in the manuscripts. The sign(s) used at a *sandhi*, whether a *samyukta* character is used or two separate characters are used in a manuscript, may have significance in understanding the nature of an error in transmission.

- The sigla are presented continuously without space or comma, such as in “TLMA,” meaning that the reading preceding it is found in manuscripts T_m, T_d, L, M, and A.⁸⁵
- If a reading is a result of correction in a witness, it is indicated with ^{PC} attached to the siglum. On the other hand, if a reading is the one before correction, it is indicated by ^{ac} attached to a siglum. If such a correction is clearly by a second hand, the siglum is followed by “(s.h.)” for a “second hand.”
- When a reading in a witness is a result of emendation (without a trace of correction in the manuscript itself), a siglum is followed by “(em.)” or “(em.?),” depending on the certainty; this is possible in the Devanāgarī manuscripts and in the *editio princeps*; for, we know their exemplars.⁸⁶
- The sigla appear in the following order: T_m, T_d, L, M, A, and ℰ, but naturally one or more of them missing in the list in most cases.
- When I refer to all the witnesses, the siglum Σ is used.
- Readings—constituted or variant—may incorporate readings with minor (mostly orthographic) differences. When this is the case, the exact readings with the minor differences are reported inside braces (‘{’ and ‘}’) followed by their own sigla.
- In reporting a reading in manuscripts, portions of the text that are physically lost are enclosed in brackets (‘[’ and ‘]’). Between them are typically raised dots (see the next remark), but signs partly lost but still reasonably legible are also enclosed between brackets.
- A raised dot (‘·’) in a reading signifies a sign⁸⁷ that is presumed to have been lost. The · sign typically appears in variant readings from the Malayalam manuscripts (T_m and L) enclosed in brackets in the form of “[· · ·]” and so on. The dots appear in the notes that report readings in T_d where the scribe report portions that were illegible to him (presumably due to physical damage in T_m), using dots himself.
- Hardly legible signs that exist in a manuscript (not physically lost) are marked with _ (for example ऋ).
- Signs that are illegible (but not physically lost) are represented with the sign “*” in notes.
- Signs cancelled in a manuscript are enclosed in angled brackets (“⟨” and “⟩”). In our Malayalam manuscripts small cancellations are marked by a small dot over each sign to be cancelled,

⁸⁵The siglum T refers to both T_m and T_d when they record the same reading. See p. 24. For other sigla, see pp. 16 ff.

⁸⁶See pp. 25 ff.

⁸⁷Note that in Malayalam script the equivalents of Devanāgarī ढ, ॢ, and ॣ occupy as much horizontal space as a single character, such as the equivalent of ऋ, and ॣ as much as two. Therefore syllables such as *kau* can occupy as much horizontal space as four separate signs.

and large cancellations are marked by enclosing the portion in parenthesis-like markers.

- Inserted signs, usually between the lines, are enclosed between “»” and “«.” There is no specific way to represent a small correction when it was made by changing a small number of signs to something else. Those cases are reported by the use of the above two conventions, recording cancellation and insertion, or by reporting the readings before and after the change.
- When the scribe leaves space for no apparent reason, the space is represented with a series of the sign ∪. The number of ∪ approximates the number of signs that would fit in the space.
- Repeated parentheses (‘(’ and ‘)’) and brackets (‘[’ and ‘]’) appear in notes that report readings from the 1952 edition (siglum \mathcal{E}) to signify the use of parentheses and brackets in the edition. The editors used parentheses to report a rejected reading in their manuscript (M) and brackets for their conjectural readings.

Reconstructed *mūla* text The second is for the text of the *mūla* text being interpreted by the YVi.⁸⁸

Relevant passages The third is for references and citations—mainly quotation of/reference to Sanskrit texts are given here. On some occasions, secondary material may be presented.

Miscellaneous notes The fourth is for miscellaneous critical notes. Note that significant critical issues are discussed in the footnote to the translation. Other notes, such as the meter or major lacunae are noted here. As for the latter, they are marked in the body of the text (see above p. 41); however, occasionally a large amount of text, longer than a page, for example, may not be available and this fact may not be obvious unless the reader carefully follows the markings in the text. In those cases, the fact that the text from T is missing is mentioned in this register.

A word on translation

Not all the text critical problems are apparent in the critical apparatus. Some of them require further explanation. Text critical judgements in particular, being hypotheses about the intended text, require detailed discussions on how I reached my hypotheses. Such discussions are found in footnotes accompanying the translation of relevant portions. Since text critical issues are inseparable from the understanding of the text, it seems appropriate that such discussions should accompany the translation.

⁸⁸For the significance of the readings of the YBh preserved in the YVi, see Wezler (1983) and Maas (2006).



Critical Text



Critical Text 1.23

किमेतस्मद्विवासन्नतरो भवति, अथ तस्य लाभे भवत्यन्यो ऽपि कश्चिदुपायो, न वेति, उपा-
यान्तरमस्तीत्याहि—

ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा ॥ २३ ॥

ईश्वरशब्दार्थमुत्तरत्र व्याख्यास्यति । प्रणिधानमिह व्याचष्टे । भक्तिविशेषादावर्जित इत्य-
नुग्रहप्रत्यभिमुखीभवमापादितः, तम्—भक्त्यतिशयिनं योगिनमभिध्यानमात्रेण परमेश्वरस्य
निरायासतया सत्यसंकल्पत्वादनुगृह्णाति । तदनुग्रहादपि प्रत्यासन्नतरः समाधिलाभः फल-
ञ्चेति ॥ २३ ॥

Critical Text 1.24

अथ प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तः को ऽयमीश्वर इति, सांख्यशास्त्रे प्रसिद्धभावात्, ईश्वरसद्भावे
चोपपत्तेरवश्यत्वात्, अनवगतेश्वरशब्दार्थः पृच्छति । तत्र तावत्प्रतिजानीते—

क्लेशकर्म्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥ २४ ॥

अविद्यादयः क्लेशयन्तीति क्लेशाः । तपूर्वानुष्ठितानि कुशलाकुशलानि कर्माणि—कुशलानि
चाकुशलानि च कुशलाकुशलानि चेत्येकशेषः । कुशलाकुशलानीति कुशलाकुशलविमिश्राणीति
1 तस्य]LMA, ((तस्य)अस्य ङ 1 भवत्यन्यो]LMAङ, [. .]वत्यन्यो T_m, . . व(मावादि)त्यन्यो
T_d 1 न वे]ङ(em.), ने LMA 5 'तिशयिनं योगि°]em., 'तिशययोगिनं योगि° LMAङ 5-6 'स्य
निरा°]conj., 'त्वादोः निरा° L^{ac}, 'त्वादे निरा° L^{pc}, 'त्वादे निरा° MA, त्वादेव निरा° ङ(em.) 9 'ते-
रवश्यत्वात्, अ°]conj., 'त्तिन्नवश्यम् L, 'मवश्यम् MAङ 9 'शब्दार्थः]conj., 'विशेषो वा Σ 11
अविद्यादयः]LMA, क्लेशा इति अविद्यादयः ङ 12 च कुशलाकुशलानि चे°]T, चे कुशलाकुशलानि चे° L, चे°
MA, च [कुशलाकुशलानि च] इ° ङ 12 कुशलाकुशलविमिश्राणीति]LMA, om. ङ

3 ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा ॥ २३ ॥] Cf. BSBh 2.2.42: श्रुतिस्मृत्योरीश्वरप्रणिधानस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 573)

6 सत्यसंकल्पत्वात्] See BSBh 1.2.2: तदिह ये विवक्षिता गुणा उपासनायामुपादेयत्वेनोपदिष्टाः सत्य-
संकल्पप्रभृतयस्ते परस्मिन्ब्रह्मण्युपपद्यन्ते । सत्यसंकल्पत्वं हि सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारेष्वप्रतिबद्धशक्तित्वात्परमात्मन एवा-
वकल्पते । परमात्मगुणत्वेन च 'य आत्मापहतपाप्मा' (ChU 8.7.1) इत्यत्र 'सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्प' (ibid.) इति
श्रुतम् । (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 233); ChU 3.14.2: भारूपः सत्यसंकल्पः; 8.1.5: एषात्मापहत-
पाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सो ऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः; ChUBh 8.1.5: तथा कामहेतवः
संकल्पा अपि सत्याः यस्य स सत्यसंकल्पः । संकल्पाः कामाश्च शुद्धसत्त्वोपाधिनिमित्ताः ईश्वरस्य, चित्रगुवत् .;

11 अविद्यादयः क्लेशयन्तीति क्लेशाः ।] See YS 2.3: अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः .

11-48,1 कुशलाकुशलानि कर्माणि . . . कुशलाकुशलविमिश्राणीति यावत्] See YS 4.7: कर्माशुक्लाकृ-
ष्णं योगिनस्त्रिविधमितरेषाम् . . .

1 किमेतस्मद्विवासन्नतरो भवति, अथ तस्य लाभे भवत्यन्यो ऽपि कश्चिदुपायो, न वेति— 3
ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा ॥ २३ ॥ 4-6 भक्तिविशेषादावर्जितस्तमभिध्यानमात्रेणानुगृह्णाति 6-7
तदनुग्रहादपि प्रत्यासन्नतरः समाधिलाभः फलञ्च । 8 अथ प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तः को ऽय-
मीश्वर इति— 10 क्लेशकर्म्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥ २४ ॥ 11-48,2
अविद्यादयः क्लेशाः । कुशलाकुशलानि कर्माणि । तत्फलं विपाकः ।

- 1 यावत् । तत्फलं विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणः । त एव क्लेशादय आ निर्वाणाच्छेरत इति क्लेश-
 2 कर्मविपाकाशयाः । यदि वा क्लेशादीनां राशयः क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयाः ॥
 3 ते मनसि वर्तमाना मृतेवृत्तिप्रभवत्वात् पुरुषे ऽपदिश्यन्ते । कस्मात् ? स हि तत्फलस्य
 4 भोक्तेति । यथा राजनि जयपराजयौ योधेषु वर्तमानावपदिश्येते । तत्फलं राजसम्बन्धीति ॥
 5 यो ह्यनेन भोगेनापरामृष्ट इति न कालविवक्षा, उपलक्षणार्थत्वात्—न परामृश्यते, नापि
 6 परामृश्यते, नापि परामृष्ट इति । परामृष्ट इति क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयानामाश्रयसम्बन्धयोग्य
 7 इत्यर्थः] न ह्यन्यथा परिणामरहिते निष्क्रिये पुरुषमात्रे प्रास्यभावात् प्रतिषेधो भागी स्यात् ॥
 8 तस्मान्नित्यनिर्मलज्ञाननिरतिशयैश्वर्यविशिष्टसत्वद्रविणः स पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः प्रतिज्ञा-
 9 यते ॥
 10 सूत्रार्थविशुद्धिं कुर्वन्नाह—कैवल्यप्राप्तास्तर्हीति । क्लेशाद्यपरामर्शस्य कादाचित्कतयापि स-
 11 म्भवात् सन्ति बहवः केवलिनः । किन्त ईश्वरा इति—न, परामर्शस्यापि सम्भवात् । न त एका-
 12 न्तेन क्लेशादिभिरपरामृष्टाः । परामर्शापरामर्शो हि स्तस्तेषाम् । ईश्वरस्त्वपरामृष्ट एव । न ह्यसं-

2 ष्यः] LMA४, ष्याः T 3 ऽपदिश्यन्ते] LMA{पदिश्यन्ते L}, व्यपदिश्यन्ते ४ 3 कस्मात्?] ४(em.), तस्मात् LMA 3 हि तत्फलस्य] ४(em.), हितफलस्य LMA 4 योधेषु] ४(em.), योधेषु LMA 4 °सम्बन्धी] LMA, °संबन्धि इ° ४ 5 इति] L, इति उच्यते MA४ 5 °विवक्षा, उप°] MA४ [विवक्षोप° MA}, °विव [. .] T_m, °विवके . . T_d, °विवक्षोप° L 5 °त्वात्—न] em., °त्वन्न L, °त्वं न MA, °त्वं—न ४ 6–7 °नामाश्रयसम्बन्धयोग्य इ°] em., °नाश्रयसम्बन्धयोगी° L, °सम्बन्धयोगी° MA, °संबन्धी(न्धयोगी)° ४ 7–9 न ह्यन्यथा . प्रतिज्ञायते] (L), om. MA४ 7 °मात्रे] T_m^{pc}T_dL, °मात्र T_m^{ac} 8 °विशिष्ट°] em., °विशिष्टः L 8 स] conj., om. L 10 कैवल्यप्राप्ता°] TL, कैवल्यप्राप्त° MA, कैवल्यं प्राप्त° ४ 11 बहवः] LMA४, बहि . . T_d 11 किन्त ईश्वरा] em., किन्तत् ईश्वरा L, किं तदीश्वरा MA, किं तदी] ते ऽपी] श्वरा ४ 11 न] T_dLMA, om. ४ 12 °मृष्टाः] TMA४, °मृष्टा L 12–49, 1 ह्यसंवृतः] conj., ह्यन(त्)»व(?) »वृतः L, ह्यनवधृतः MA४

1 तत्फलं विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणः] See YS 2.13: सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः.

4 यथा राजनि जयपराजयौ . . . सम्बन्धीति] Cf. BhGBh 18.67: यथा राजा युद्धमानेषु योधेषु युध्यत इति प्रसिद्धम्, स्वयमयुध्यमानो ऽपि संनिधानादेव जितः पराजितश्चेति च (Paṇṣīkar 1978: 765); VP 3.7.22: यथा राजा नियुक्तेषु योद्धृत्वं योद्धृषु स्थितम् । तेषु वृत्तौ तु लभते राजा जयपराजयौ ॥

7 प्रतिषेधो भागी स्यात्] For the use of प्रतिषेधो भागी, cf. JS 1.2.5 अभागिप्रतिषेधाच्च ।; BSBh 1.4.6: इह च 'अन्यत्र धर्मात्' इत्यस्य प्रश्नस्य प्रतिवचनं 'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्' इति जन्ममरणप्रतिषेधेन प्रतिपाद्यमानं शारीरपरमेश्वरयोरभेदं दर्शयति । सति हि प्रसङ्गे प्रतिषेधो भागी भवति । प्रसङ्गश्च जन्ममरणयोः शरीरसंस्पर्शाच्छारीरस्य भवति, न परमेश्वरस्य । (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 383, 12–15). For the word *bhāgin* used in a similar sense, cf. also BSBh 1.1.24 न तु निष्प्रदेशस्यापि ब्रह्मणः प्रदेशविशेषकल्पना भागिनी । (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 207, 12).

8 °सत्वद्रविणः] For the use of the word *draviṇa*, see TaiUBh 1.10.1: 'द्रविणम्' धनम् (Shastri 1979: 417). With regard to what the author means with this compound, cf. YBh 1.24 प्रकृष्टसत्त्वोपादानादीश्वरस्य in the following (p. 50). Cf. also BhGBh 12.1: सर्वयोगैश्वर्यसर्वज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वोपाधेरीश्वरस्य (Paṇṣīkar 1978: 499).

3 ते मनसि वर्तमानाः पुरुषे ऽपदिश्यन्ते । 3–4 स हि तत्फलस्य भोक्तेति । 4 यथा राजनि जयपराजयौ योधेषु वर्तमानावपदिश्येते । 5 यो ह्यनेन भोगेनापरामृष्टः 8 स पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः । 10–49, 2 कैवल्यप्राप्तास्तर्ही सन्ति बहवः केवलिनः ।

वृत्तः शब्दार्थो लक्षणत्वेनोपादेययोः परामृष्ट इति । तस्माच्च एकान्तेनापरामृष्टः स एवापरामृष्ट इत्युच्यते ॥

ते हि त्रीणि बन्धनानि प्राकृतवैकृतदाक्षिणानि सम्यग्दर्शनेन हित्वा कैवल्यम्प्राप्ताः। ईश्वरस्य तु तत्सम्बन्धः क्लेशादिसम्बन्धो न भूतो यथा मुक्तस्य । तस्य हि पूर्वा बन्धकोटिः—मुक्तत्वोपपत्तेरेव—ज्ञायते । बन्धपूर्विका हि मुक्तिः । नापि भावी यथा प्रकृतिलीनस्य । तस्य ह्यनारब्धसंसारस्योत्तरा बन्धकोटिः सम्भाव्यते । प्रवृत्तसंसारस्य च प्रकृतिलीनचित्तस्य साधिकारत्वात्पूर्वोत्तरबन्धकोटी सम्भवतः ॥

तदिदं सर्वमत्रापरामृष्ट इति कालाविवक्षाप्रदर्शनार्थम्—स तु सदैव मुक्तस्सदैवेश्वरः ॥

1 °पादेययोः]L, °पादेय[. .] T_m, °पादेय . . T_d, °पादेयः MA 4 न भूतो] ४(em.), नुभूतो L, ऽनुभूतो MA 4 तस्य हि]conj., om. Σ 5 बन्धपूर्व]MA ४, बन्धनपूर् T, वनपूर् L 6 सम्भा°]TL^{pc}MA ४, सम्भो° L^{ac} 6 °व्यते]TLM ४, °व्येत A 6 च प्रकृति°]em., चाप्रकृति° Σ 6 साधि°] ४(em.), समाधि° LMA 7 °त्तर°]T_m^{pc}T_d ४, °क्तम् T_m^{ac}, °क्त° LMA 8 °र्थम्]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA ४{°र्थ T_dMA}, °र्थ T_m^{ac}

3 त्रीणि बन्धनानि प्राकृतवैकृतदाक्षिणानि] See the YD on SK 44d–45c: विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः । (SK 44d) ज्ञानविपर्ययो ऽज्ञानम्, तस्माद्बन्धस्त्रिविधो भवति । प्रकृतिबन्धो दक्षिणाबन्धो वैकारिकबन्धश्चेति ॥ ४४ ॥ आह—कस्माद्भावात्प्रकृतिबन्धो भवति [इति] । उच्यते—वैराग्यात्प्रकृतिलयः । (SK 45a) वैराग्यादष्टसु प्रकृतिषु लयं गच्छति । असावुच्यते प्रकृतिबन्ध इति । ... आह—अथ दक्षिणाबन्धः कुतः ? उच्यते—संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् । (SK 45b) यो जं दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयाभिलाषः स रागः । तत्र दृष्टविषयरागात्तत्प्राप्तिनिर्वर्तकं कर्म करोति ततश्च तत्रोपपद्यते । आनुश्रविकविषयाभिलाषादग्निहोत्रादिसु प्रवर्तते ततश्च स्वर्गादिपुपपत्तिर्भवति । असौ दक्षिणाबन्धः । ... ऐश्वर्यादविघातः । (SK 45c) यदष्टगुणमैश्वर्यमणिमादि प्रागुपदिष्टं तस्मात्त्वे स्वे विषये ऽविघात उत्पद्यते । तदभिरतिर्वैकारिको बन्धः । (Wezler and Motegi 1998: 236–7); the Mātharavṛtti on SK 44d: स च बन्धस्त्रिविधः । प्रकृतिबन्धो वैकारिकबन्धो दक्षिणाबन्धश्चेति । तत्र प्रकृतिबन्धो नामाष्टासु प्रकृतिषु परत्वेनाभिमानः । वैकारिकबन्धो नाम ब्रह्मादिस्थानेषु श्रेयोबुद्धिः । दक्षिणाबन्धो नाम गवादिदानेज्यानिमित्तः । (Śarmā and Vaṅgiya 1970: 45); the Jayamaṅgalā on SK 44d: ज्ञानविपर्ययादज्ञानात्संसारचक्रबन्धः, पुनः पुनरावर्तनम् । स च त्रिप्रकारः—प्रकृतिबन्धः, दक्षिणाबन्धः, विकारबन्धश्चेति । येषां प्रकृतिरेव परतत्त्वं नान्यत्, तेषां प्रकृतिवादिनां प्राकृतिको बन्धः । येषामिष्टापूर्तभाविन एव दिव्यादिव्यमानुषभोगाः पुरुषार्थ इति, तेषां कर्मवादिनां दक्षिणाबन्धः । ... येषां विकार एवैश्वर्यलक्षणः पुरुषार्थ इति, तेषां विकारत्ववादिनां वैकारिको बन्धः । (Śarmā and Vaṅgiya 1970: 102); the Tattvakaumudī on SK 44d: विपर्ययादतत्त्वज्ञानादिष्यते बन्धः । स च त्रिविधः प्राकृतो वैकारिको दाक्षिणश्चेति । तत्र प्रकृतावात्मज्ञानाद्ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषाम्प्राकृतो बन्धो यः पुराणे प्रकृतिलयान्प्रत्युच्यते 'पूर्णं शत सहस्रं तु तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तका' इति । वैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विकारानेव भूतेन्द्रियाहंकारबुद्धीरुपासते । तान् प्रतीदमुच्यते 'दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः । भौतिकास्तु शतम्पूर्णं सहस्रमभिमानिकाः । बौद्धा दश सहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वराः ।' ते खल्वमी विदेहा येषां वैकारिको बन्ध इति । इष्टापूर्तेन दक्षिणा । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञ इष्टापूर्तकारी कामो ऽपहतमना बध्यत इति । (Srinivasan 1967: 150).

6–7 साधिकारत्वात्] See YBh 1.19: तथा प्रकृतिलयाः साधिकारे चेतसि प्रकृतिलीने कैवल्यमिवानुभवन्ति, यावन्न पुनरावर्तते ऽधिकारवशाच्चित्तमिति (Maas 2006: 30), 1.51: यस्मात्ते संस्काराश्चित्तस्याधिकारविरोधिना न स्थितिहेतवो भवन्ति, तस्मादवसिताधिकारं सह कैवल्यभागीयैः संस्कारैश्चित्तं निवर्तते (Maas 2006: 86–7).

3 ते हि त्रीणि बन्धनानि हित्वा कैवल्यम्प्राप्ताः । 3–4 ईश्वरस्य तु तत्सम्बन्धः न भूतो यथा मुक्तस्य । 4–5 तस्य हि पूर्वा बन्धकोटिर्ज्ञायते । 5 नापि भावी यथा प्रकृतिलीनस्य । 5–6 तस्य ह्युत्तरा बन्धकोटिः सम्भाव्यते । 8 स तु सदैव मुक्तः सदैवेश्वरः ।

1 तत्र पुरुषविशेष ईश्वर इत्युक्तत्वात्, ईश्वरस्य पुरुषस्यानैश्वर्यधर्मत्वात्, चित्तस्य चैश्वर्य-
2 धर्मत्वात्, निरतिशयैश्वर्यस्य च प्रकृष्टचित्तसम्बन्धापेक्षत्वात्, प्राप्तमेवोत्तरार्थमनुवदति यो
3 ऽसौ प्रकृष्टसत्वोपादानादीश्वरस्य शाश्वतिक उत्कर्ष इति । नित्यनिरतिशयसर्वज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्ति-
4 सम्पत्तिरुत्कर्षः ॥

5 तत्र प्रतिज्ञाविशुद्ध्यर्थमश्रुपूर्वमुपक्रमते—स किं सनिमित्त आहोस्विन्नितिमित्त इति ।
6 निमित्तशब्दः कारणपर्यायः । स किं सकारण आहोस्विन्निकारण इति ॥

7 किञ्चातः—यदि तावत्सकारणस्तदा सदैवेश्वर इत्युक्तमनित्यत्वात् । अथ निष्कारणस्तदा
8 चोत्कर्षस्य कार्यत्वादसत्वप्रसंगः । न हि निष्कारणं कार्यन्दृश्यते लोके ॥

9 अत्रोच्यते—न निष्कारणः, शास्त्रनिमित्तत्वात्—शास्त्रं ज्ञानम्, शास्त्रस्य ह्येतुत्वात् । यतः

5 सनिमित्त] T_mLMAḪ, सन्निमित्तः T_d 7 यदि ताव°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḪ, यदि तोव° T_m^{ac} 7
सदैवेश्वर] T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḪ, सदैवेश्वर T_m^{ac} 7 इत्युक्तमनित्य°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḪ, इत्यनित्यमयुक्त°
T_m^{ac} 7 °स्तदा] T_m^{pc}T_d, °स्तथा T_m^{ac}LMAḪ 8 चोत्कर्ष°] T_dLMAḪ, चो[.]कर्ष° T_m 8 °स्य
कार्य°] LMAḪ, °स्य कारण° T_m^{ac}, °स्याकार्य[°यं T_d]° T_m^{pc}T_d

1–2 ईश्वरस्य ... °प्रकृष्टचित्तसम्बन्धापेक्षत्वात्] Cf. Intro. to BSBh 1.1.5: एवं सर्वज्ञत्वमप्युपप-
द्यते; कथम्? यत्त्वं ज्ञानं मन्यते, स सत्त्वधर्मः; 'सत्त्वात्संजायते ज्ञानम्' (BhG 14.17) इति स्मृतेः । तेन च
सत्त्वधर्मेण ज्ञानेन कार्यकरणवन्तः पुरुषाः सर्वज्ञा योगिनः प्रसिद्धाः । सत्त्वस्य हि निरतिशयोत्कर्षे सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रसिद्धम् ।
न केवलस्याकार्यकरणस्य पुरुषस्योपलब्धिमात्रस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं किञ्चित्त्वं वा कल्पयितुं शक्यम् । त्रिगुणत्वात् प्रधानस्य
सर्वज्ञानकारणभूतं सत्त्वं प्रधानावस्थायामपि विद्यत इति प्रधानस्याचेतनस्यैव सतः सर्वज्ञत्वमुपचर्यते वेदान्तावक्येषु ।
(Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 164–165). Note that this is a *pūrvapakṣa*.

3 °निरतिशयसर्वज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्ति°] For the two attributes, *aiśvarya*, *śakti*, of Īśvara, in
addition to *jñāna*, see 54,1–3 in this edition. Cf. also BSBh 1.1.4: 'तत्' ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वश-
क्ति जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं ... (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 102); 2.2.45 ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यते-
जांसि गुणाः, आत्मान (°तेजोगुणा आत्मान ?) एवेते भगवन्तो वासुदेवा इत्यादिदर्शनात् (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar
1917: 575); 3.2.5 तत्रैवं सति यथाग्निविस्फुलिङ्गयोः समाने दहनप्रकाशनशक्ती भवत एवं जीवेश्वरयोरपि ज्ञानै-
श्वर्यशक्ती ... part of *pūrvapakṣa* (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 693) (the compound *jñānai-
śvaryaśakti* here is construed as *jñānaśaktiś cāiśvaryaśaktiś ca*); BhGBh intro: स च
भगवान् ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोभिः सदा संपन्नस्त्रिगुणात्मिकां वैष्णवीं स्वां मायां मूलप्रकृतिं वशीकृत्य ... (Pa-
ṇṣīkar 1978: 4–5), 10.15: 'स्वयमेवात्मानात्मानं वेत्थ त्वं' निरतिशयज्ञानैश्वर्यबलादिशक्तिमन्तमीश्वरम् ... ;
11.3: 'द्रष्टुमिच्छामि ते' तव ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोभिः संपन्नमैश्वरं वैष्णवं 'रूपं पुरुषोत्तमं'; 12.1: सर्व-
योगैश्वर्यसर्वज्ञानशक्तिमत्सत्वोपाधेरीश्वरस्य and numerous other places in Śāṅkara's works where
only one or two of these attributes are mentioned.

9–51,1 शास्त्रं ज्ञानम् ... °व्यवहितविप्रकृष्टास्पदम्] Cf. BSBh 1.1.3: शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥ १.१.३ ॥
महत ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्यानेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत्सर्वाथावद्योतितः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्र-
ह्म । न हीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्यर्गवेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञानन्वयतः संभवो ऽस्ति । यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं
यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात्संभवति, यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेर्ज्ञैकदेशार्थमपि, स ततो ऽप्यधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं
लोके । किमु वक्तव्यमेकशाखाभेदभिन्नस्य देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यवर्णाश्रमादिप्रविभागहेतोर्ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकर-
स्याप्रयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिःश्वासवद्यस्मान्महतो भूताद्योनेः संभवः 'अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वासितमेतद्यदृ-
ग्वेदः' (BĀU 2.4.10) इत्यादिश्रुतेः, तस्य महतो भूतस्य निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं चेति । इति प्रथमवर्ण-
कम् ॥ (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 95–99) [Note the allusions to YS 1.24 and 25 (*sarvajña*,

1–4 यो ऽसौ प्रकृष्टसत्वोपादानादीश्वरस्य शाश्वतिक उत्कर्षः । 5–6 स किं सनिमित्त
आहोस्विन्नितिमित्तः ? 9–51,1 न निष्कारणः, शास्त्रनिमित्तत्वात् ।

सर्वविषयं ज्ञानत्रित्यन्द्रव्यस्वभाववत्साध्यसाधतुव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टास्पदम्।

यद्येवं ज्ञानस्यान्यतोऽधिगमपूर्वत्वात्प्रागनुत्कर्षः प्राप्त इत्यत आह—शास्त्रस्पुनः किञ्चिन्निमित्तमिति । यदि स्वाभाविकं ज्ञानं मत्तोन्मत्तज्ञानवदनुत्कर्षहेतुत्वम् । अथ पुनः सनिमित्तकञ्चिन्निमित्तात्प्रागनुत्कर्ष इति मन्यते ॥

न तावन्निर्निमित्तम्, यतः प्रकृष्टसत्वनिमित्तम् प्रकृष्टसत्वाश्रयमिति यावत् । अत एव स्वभावज्ञानदोषाभावः ॥

किञ्च स्वाभाविकज्ञानत्वे ऽपि न मत्तादिज्ञानवदपकर्षहेतुत्वम्, नित्यमुक्तकेशादिसत्वाश्रयत्वात् । तत्र यथैव ज्ञानसंस्कारस्मृतिप्रतिसन्धानानामन्योन्यनिमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेन बीजांकुरवदनादिसंबन्धः, तथैव शास्त्रप्रकर्षयोरीश्वरचेतसि नित्यप्रवृत्तप्रबन्धरूपेण प्रवर्तमानयोरनाद्यन्तः सम्बन्धः । तत्रोत्कर्षो ज्ञानस्य कार्यमेव । ज्ञानमपि तस्य कार्यमेव ॥

अन्येषां व्याख्यानम्—निमित्तशब्दः प्रमाणवाची । तस्य शास्त्रनिमित्तं प्रमाणम् । तेन हि तदुत्कर्षः प्रमीयते । शास्त्रस्पुनः किम्प्रमाणकम् ? ईश्वरनिर्मलसत्वप्रमाणम् । विशुद्धसत्वप्रणीतत्वाद्धि शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यम्, यथा मानवादीनाम् । तथा च श्रुतिः—‘यत्किञ्चिन्मनुरभ्यवदत्तद्भेषजमिति । यथा च लोके ‘गुरुणाभिहितमिति । एतयोः शास्त्रोत्कर्षयोः प्रमाणप्रमेयतया निराद्यन्तः सम्बन्धः ॥

ननु च नैवेश्वरसत्त्वे वर्तमानेन शास्त्रेण तदुत्कर्षः प्रमीयते ॥

1 °भाववत्सा°]conj., °भावसा° Σ 3 सनिमित्तकञ्चि°]℄(em.), सनिमित्तकः नि° TLMA 5-6 स्वभावज्ञान°]MA℄, स्वभावञ्जा[.]° Tm, स्वभाववं जा° Td, स्वभावजा° L 7 न मत्ता°]℄(em.), निमित्ता° TLMA 7 हेतुत्व°]LMA℄, . . तत्व° Td 8 °प्रतिसन्धानानामन्यो°]em., प्रबन्धानामन्यो LMA℄ 10 तत्रोत्कर्षो°]LMA℄, तत्रोत्[. .] Tm, तत्रोत् . . Td 10 तस्य कार्य°]em., तस्य कारण° LMA℄, तस्य कार[.] Tm, तस्य कार . Td 13 मानवा°]LMA, मन्वा° ℄ 13 यत्कि°]LMA, यकि° ℄ 16 वर्तमानेन]LMA{°र्त° MA}, [[अ]]वर्तमानेन ℄

puruṣaviśeṣa, niratiśayaṃ sarvajñatvam); BSBh 1.1.5: योगिनां तु चेतनत्वात्सत्त्वोत्कर्षनिमित्तं सर्वज्ञत्वमुपपन्नमित्यनुदाहरणम् । (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 170).

8 ज्ञानसंस्कारस्मृतिप्रतिसन्धानानाम्] See YVi 1.4: तत्रापि ज्ञानसंस्कारस्मृतिप्रतिसन्धानादीन्यात्मन एव न मनस इति साधनीयानि । (Śāstri and Śāstri 1952: 15), etc.

11 अन्येषां व्याख्यानम्—निमित्तशब्दः प्रमाणवाची] Cf. BSBh 1.1.3: अथ वा यथोक्तमृगवेदादि शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्स्वरूपाधिगमे । शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणाज्जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्माधिगम्यत इत्यभिप्रायः । शास्त्रमुदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे—‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ इत्यादि । किमर्थं तर्हीदं सूत्रम् ? यावता पूर्वसूत्र एवैवंजातीयकं शास्त्रमुदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम् । उच्यते—तत्र पूर्वसूत्राक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्यानुपादानाज्जन्मादि केवलमनुमानमुपन्यस्तमित्याशङ्क्येत, तामाशङ्कां निवर्तयितुमिदं सूत्रं प्रवृत्ते—‘शास्त्रयोनित्वात्’ इति (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 99-100).

13-14 यत्किञ्चिन्मनुरभ्यवदत्तद्भेषजम्] See TaiS 2.2.10.2: यद्वै किं च मनुरवदत्तद्भेषजम् । Cf. BSBh 2.1.1: भवति चान्या मनोर्माहात्म्यं प्रख्यापयन्ती श्रुतिः—‘यद्वै किं च मनुरवदत्तद्भेषजम्’ इति (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 435)

2-4 शास्त्रस्पुनः किञ्चिन्निमित्तम् ? 5-6 प्रकृष्टसत्वनिमित्तम् । 14-15 एतयोः शास्त्रोत्कर्षयोरीश्वरसत्त्वे वर्तमानयोनिराद्यन्तः सम्बन्धः ।

1 नैष दोषः। तत्प्रभवत्वात्तत्र वर्त्तमानम्] वर्त्तत एव तत्प्रभवमपि शास्त्रन्तस्मिन्, सर्व्व-
2 त्वादेव। लोके ऽपि—यतो यत्प्रभवति, वर्त्तते तत्तस्मिन्, यथा तन्त्वादिषु पटादीति। तत्प्रभव-
3 त्वमनुमानागमाभ्यामवगम्यते। शास्त्रप्रमाणक उत्कर्षः, ईश्वरप्रमाण]कं शास्त्रमिति भिन्नाश्रय-
4 त्वाच्छास्त्रोत्कर्षयोर्ज्ञेतेरेतराश्रयत्वम् ॥

5 ननु च शास्त्रादीश्वरप्रामाण्यम्, तत्प्रामाण्याच्च शास्त्रप्रामाण्यमिति स्यादन्योन्याश्रयत्वम् ॥
6 उच्यते—ईश्वरप्रामाण्यस्यानुमानेन सिद्धत्वाददोषः ॥

7 एतस्मादेतद्भवति। कस्मात् ? ईश्वरप्रकृष्टसत्त्वाश्रययोर्निरतिशयज्ञानोत्कर्षयोः कार्यकार-
8 णरूपेण प्रबन्धनित्यतया नित्यत्वादेतद्भवति—स तु सदैव मुक्तः सदैवेश्वर इति ॥

9 अत्राह—तच्च तस्यैश्वर्यं साम्यातिशयविमुक्तमिति वक्ष्यमाणप्रमाणफलम्, एतत्सूत्रपि-
10 ण्डार्थो वा ॥

11 अतिशयविमुक्ततां व्याचष्टे—न तावदैश्वर्यान्तरेण तदतिशय्यते। कुतः ? यदेवैश्वर्यान्त-
12 रन्तदतिशयानन्तरेण तदेव तदैश्वर्यमयाभिहितम्। यदेवैश्वर्यान्तरातिशयि भुवत्यैश्वर्यं स
13 एवेश्वर इति यावत् ॥

14 न च तत्समानमैश्वर्यमस्ति, समानधर्मप्रकर्षिसम्भवात्। नु ह्येकस्मिन् राज्ये द्वयोः स-
15 म्भवो राज्ञोः, एकस्य वा द्वे राज्ये। तथा प्रतिपादयति—तद्द्वयोस्तुल्यत्वम्प्रसक्तम्। न ह्ये-
16 कस्यान्यतरत्र प्राकाम्येवाधित्वान्यतरस्मिन्प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते ॥

17 द्वयोश्च युगपदर्थयोरेकस्य प्राकाम्येण प्रवृत्तिरेव नास्ति। प्रकामिते वस्तुनि समानप्र-
18 कर्षस्यार्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात्। येन च समानप्रकर्षता यस्य तेनैव स बाध्यते। तेन च तस्या बाध-
19 नम्। इतरत्र 'रूपातिशया वृत्यतिशयाश्च विरुध्यन्ते। सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैस्सह वर्त्तन्त' इति
20 वक्ष्यामः ॥

1 वर्त्तत] ४(em.), वर्त्त[^० T_dMA]मानत TLMA, वर्त्त(मान)त ४ 2 लोके]MA४, लोको L 2 प-
टादीति]em., पटादि LMA४ 3 *प्रमाणक]LMA, प्रमाणकः ४ 4 *त्वाच्छा]T_dLMA४, *त्वात् च्छा°
T_m 7 कार्य]LMA४, कार . T_d 8 *रूपेण]em., *रूपे LMA४ 8-9 इति ॥ अत्राह]LMA{इत्यत्राह
LMA}, {इत्यत्राह} ४ 9-10 *त्रपिण्डा]४(em.), *त्रपिण्डा° LMA{*त्रं पिण्डा° MA} 12 तदेव
तदै°]TMA४, तदेवन्तदै° L 15 *त्वम्प्र°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA४{*त्वं प्र° T_dMA४}, *त्वम्»प्र« T_m 16
*न्यतरत्र]४(em.), *न्यतरन्त्र[*रं त्र MA] LMA 16 *त्वान्य°]T४(em.), *त्वादन्य° LMA, *त्वा अन्य° ४
17 युगपदर्थ°]TL, युगपदेवार्थ° MA, युगपदेकार्थ° ४ 17 प्राकाम्येण]४(em.), प्राकाम्ये न TLMA 17
*वृत्तिरेव ना°]T_m^{pc}LMA४, *वृत्तिरेवना[*वं ना° T_d]° T_m^{ac}T_d 18 यस्य]em., तस्य LMA४ 18 तेन
च तस्या]conj., ते च न वाचा TLMA, (ते च) तच्च न वाचा ४ 19 *तरत्र]em., *तरस्य T_m^{pc}T_dLMA४,
*तरत्रस्य T_m^{ac}

19-20 'रूपातिशया वृत्यतिशयाश्च विरुध्यन्ते। सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैस्सह वर्त्तन्त' इति वक्ष्यामः] YBh
2.15 (Āgāśe et al. 1919: 77,4-5), appearing again in 3.13 उक्तं च रूपातिशया ... (Āgāśe et al.
1919: 129,7-8). The YD (Wezler and Motegi 1998: 137) ascribes this to Vārṣaganya.

7-10 एतस्मादेतद्भवति—स तु सदैव मुक्तः सदैवेश्वर इति। तच्च तस्यैश्वर्यं साम्यातिशय-
विमुक्तम्। 11-13 न तावदैश्वर्यान्तरेण तदतिशय्यते। यदेवैश्वर्यान्तरन्तदतिशयानन्तदेव
तदैश्वर्यम्। 14-16 न च तत्समानमैश्वर्यमस्ति। तद्द्वयोस्तुल्यत्वम्प्रसक्तम्। 17-20 द्व-
योश्च युगपदर्थयोः प्रवृत्तिरेव नास्ति, अर्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात्।

तस्माद्यस्य साम्यातिशयविप्रोषितमैश्वर्यं स ईश्वर इति प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तः पूरुष-
विशेष ईश्वरः सिद्धः ॥ २४ ॥

Critical Text 1.25

यथाप्रतिज्ञातस्येश्वरस्य सिद्धौ प्रमाणमुपन्यस्यते—

तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञबीजम् ॥ २५ ॥

‘तत्र’ तस्मिन्प्रतिज्ञातलक्षण ईश्वरे ‘निरतिशय’म्भवितुमर्हति । किन्तदिति यदिदमव्य-
भिचारि प्रत्यक्षानुमानज्ञानम् । अतीतविषयम्, अनागतविषयम्, वर्तमानकालप्रत्युत्पन्नविष-
यम्, अतीतादिसमुच्चयविषयम्, अतीन्द्रियविषयञ्च—इन्द्रियविषययोश्चातीतानागतयोरर्थ-
योस्सम्भवादतीन्द्रियमित्युच्यते । तच्चातीन्द्रियविषयन्निविधम्, सूक्ष्मविषयं व्यवहितविषयं
विप्रकृष्टविषयञ्च—अल्पम्बद्धिति यथाप्रसिद्धम्, एतद्विवर्द्धमानं सातिशयत्वेन सर्वज्ञबीजं यथा
धूमविज्ञानमग्निविज्ञानस्य । कथम् ? यत्र प्रकर्षकाष्ठाम्प्रतिपद्यते—ज्ञानस्य ज्ञात्राश्रयत्वाद्यत्रेति
ज्ञातोच्यते, यस्मिन् ज्ञातरीति—स सर्वज्ञः सिद्धः ॥

3 न्यस्यते] TL^ℓ, न्यस्ते MA 4 सर्वज्ञं] TLM^ℓ, सर्वं A 5 लक्षणं] T^ℓ, लक्षणम्[^०णं MA]
LMA 5 ईश्वरे] T_m^pcT_dLMA^ℓ, ईश्वर T_m^ac 5 किन्तदिति] T_m^pcT_dLMA^ℓ, किन्तमिति T_m^ac
5-6 व्यभिं] T_m^pcT_dLMA^ℓ, °(ह्य)»व्य«भिं T_m 6 वर्तमानकालं] TLMA, ((वर्तमानकालं)° ℓ
6-7 प्रत्युत्पन्नविषयं] ℓ(em.), प्रत्युत्पन्नं TLMA, °प्रत्युत्पन्नं[विषयं]° ℓ 7 °म्, अतीतां] T_mT_d^pc-
LMA^ℓ{°मतीं T_mT_d^pcLMA^ℓ}, °मिति । तीतां T_d^ac 7 इन्द्रियविषययोश्चां] T_m^pcT_d, इन्द्रिययोश्चां
T_m^acL, इन्द्रिययोरं MA, अतीन्द्रिययोरं ℓ 7-8 °रर्थयों] TL, om. MA^ℓ 8 °न्द्रियमिं] TLMA,
°न्द्रियं[ग्रहणं]मिं ℓ 8 °न्द्रियविषयन्त्रिं] conj., °न्द्रियत्वन्त्रिं[°त्वं त्रिं T_dMA] TLMA, °न्द्रियग्रहणं त्रिं
ℓ 9 °एतद्विं] T_m^pcT_dLMA^ℓ, °त*(°)द्विं T_m 10 ज्ञात्रां] MA^ℓ, ज्ञातां TL 11 स] LMA^ℓ, om.
T 11 सर्वज्ञः] TLM^pcA^ℓ, om. M^ac

9-11 अल्पम्बद्धिति ... स सर्वज्ञः सिद्धः] See VidhiV k. 19: ननु सातिशयानां काष्ठाप्राप्तिः परि-
माणानामुपलब्धा । सातिशयं च ज्ञानम् । अतः क्वचित्काष्ठाप्राप्तं सर्वविषयमिति । (Stern 1988: 1478). Cf. PV
Pramāṇa kk. 122-132(M)/121-131(P): अभ्यासेन विशेषे ऽपि लंघनोदकतापवत्(1) स्वभावातिक्रमो
मा भूदिति चेद्, आहितः स चेत्(1) पुनर्यत्नमपेक्षेत; यदि स्यादस्थिराश्रयः(1) विशेषो नैव वर्धेत; स्वभाव-
श्च न तादृशः । तत्रोपयुक्तशक्तीनां विशेषानुत्तरान् प्रति(1) साधनानामसामर्थ्यान्नित्यञ्चानाश्रयस्थितेः(1) विशेष-
स्यास्वभावत्वादृद्धावप्य, आहितो यदा । नापेक्षेत पुनर्यत्नं, यत्नो ऽन्यः स्याद्विशेषकृत् । काष्ठापरदहेमादेरग्यादेरिव
चेतसः । अभ्यासजाः प्रवर्तन्ते स्वरसेन कृपादयः । तस्मात्स तेषामुत्पन्नः स्वभावो जायते गुणः । तदुत्तरोत्तरो यत्नो
विशेषस्य विधायकः । यस्माच्च तुल्यजातीयपूर्वबीजप्रवृद्धयः । कृपादिबुद्धयस्तासां सत्यभ्यासे कुतः स्थितिः ॥ न
चैवं लंघनादेव लंघनं; बलयत्नयोः(1) तद्धेतवोः स्थितशक्तित्वाल्लंघनस्य स्थितात्मता । तस्यादौ देहवैगुण्यात्पश्चा-
द्ददविलंघनं । शनैर्यत्नेन वैगुण्ये निरस्ते स्वबले स्थितिः । कृपा स्वबीजप्रभवा स्वबीजप्रभवैर्न चेत् । विपक्षैर्वाध्यते;
चित्ते प्रयात्यत्यन्तसात्मताम् । तथा हि मूलमभ्यासः पूर्वः पूर्वः परस्य तु । कृपावैराग्यबोधेदश्चित्तधर्मस्य पाटवे ।
कृपात्मकत्वमभ्यासाद्घृणावैराग्यरागवत् । (cf. also VidhiV on k. 19: प्रयत्नविशेषाच्चान्तिकदूरप्राप्तेर्ननुष्य-
वातहरिणहरिपतत्रिणां । न च तस्यासम्भावनीयपरावस्थो ऽतिशयः, अनन्तत्वाञ्जसः । (Stern 1988: 1484-
86)).

1-2 तस्माद्यस्य साम्यातिशयविप्रोषितमैश्वर्यं स ईश्वरः । 4 तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञबी-
जम् ॥ २५ ॥ 5-11 यदिदमतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नसमुच्चयातीन्द्रियविषयम्, अल्पम्बद्धिति,
एतद्विवर्द्धमानं सर्वज्ञबीजं यत्र प्रकर्षकाष्ठाम्प्रतिपद्यते, स सर्वज्ञः ।

1 तथा शक्तिरपि सातिशयत्वेन विवर्द्धमाना यत्र काष्ठाप्रोति, स सर्वशक्तिः। तेन जग-
2 न्निर्माणस्थापनोपसंहारादिकर्तृत्वसिद्धिः। तथैश्वर्यस्यापि विवर्द्धमानस्य यत्र काष्ठाप्राप्तिः स
3 परमेश्वरः। ततश्च शक्त्यादिविपर्ययदोषाभावसिद्धिः ॥

4 अथापि स्यात्—अज्ञानस्यापि विवर्द्धमानस्वभावसिद्धस्य काष्ठाप्राप्तस्य तस्मिन्नीश्वरे सि-
5 द्धिरिति—

6 न, ज्ञानविरोधात्। न हि ज्ञानाज्ञानयोर्विवर्द्धयोरेकस्मिन्नभिसंयोगो ऽस्ति। न हि ज्ञाने
7 प्रकर्षवति तत्राज्ञानं सम्भवति। यत्र हि ज्योतिर्विवर्द्धते तत्र तमो ऽपकृष्यते एव ॥

8 विपर्ययो ऽपीति चेत्—तच्च न। सति ज्योतिषि तमसो ऽनुपलम्भात्। विद्यमानं हि तमो
9 ज्योतिषा तिरस्क्रियते। न कदाचिद्विद्यमानज्योतिस्तमसाभिभूयते। यदपि जलधरोपरोधा-
10 त्प्रावृषि रवेरदर्शनन्तदपि दृष्टिव्यवधानमात्रम्। न पुनः प्रकाश एव तिरोधीयते तमोवत्।
11 तस्मान्न यत्र ज्ञानविवृद्धिस्तत्राज्ञानस्य भावः, सवितरीव तमसः। नित्यात्यन्ततिरोहितरज-
12 स्तमोगुणसत्वोपादानात् ॥

13 किञ्च ज्ञानस्यावस्तुविषयत्वाद्विवृद्धिः सम्भवति। ज्ञानस्य तु ज्ञेयवस्तुविषयत्वादभि-
14 वृध्युपपत्तिः। अज्ञानस्य हि वस्तुविषयत्वे ज्ञानत्वप्राप्तिः ॥

15 यश्चापि स्थावरादिष्वज्ञानप्रकर्ष इति, नासौ प्रकर्षः। अत्यन्तज्ञानाभावापेक्षया हि स उ-
16 च्यते। अज्ञानस्य प्रकर्षे हि सत्यज्ञानसहस्रस्य न ज्ञानेनैकेन बाधे स्यात्। तथा हि प्रत्यज्ञानं
17 ज्ञानेनोत्पन्नेनैकेन बाधनं स्यात्। तस्मान्नाज्ञानस्य प्रकर्ष स्वरूपेण ॥

18 यस्य हि सातिशयत्वन्तस्य काष्ठाप्राप्तिर्दृश्यते, यथा पलादिपरिमाणानामाकाशपर्यन्तता,
19 तथा सर्वज्ञबीजमपि परां काष्ठाप्रोतिमर्हति ॥

20 समस्तं व्यस्तञ्च सर्व्व वस्तुजातमेकस्य प्रत्यक्षम्, ज्ञेयत्वात्, घटादिवत् ॥

21 ज्ञानविषयत्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वात्, घटादिवदेव ॥

22 उत्पत्तिमती च पृथिवी, सावयवत्वात्, घटादिवत् ॥

1 °रपि सा°] TLM^{PC}A⁸, °रपि सिद्धः सा° M^{ac} 2 °कर्तृत्वसिद्धि°] T_dLMA⁸, °कर्तृत्वसि .] T_m 2
विवर्द्ध°] em., वर्द्ध° Σ 2 यत्र] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA⁸, यस्त्रस्य T_m^{ac} 2 काष्ठाप्रा°] TMA⁸, °काष्ठप्रो° L 2-3
स परमे°] T_dLMA⁸, स परमे T_m 3 °श्च श°] T, आश LMA⁸ 4 °स्वभावसिद्ध°] em., [.
]सिद्ध° T_m, . . भावसिद्ध° T_d, °स्य स्वभावसिद्ध° LMA⁸ 6 °ज्ञानयोर्वि°] TL^{PC}MA⁸, °ज्ञानयोर्वि-
व्वि° L^{ac} 6 °संयोगो] T_dLMA⁸, °संयो* T_m 7 सम्भवति] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA⁸{संभ° MA⁸}, सम्भ-
वन्ति T_m^{ac} 7 यत्र] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA⁸, <<(*)यत्र (मेव)»हि ज्ये<<)यत्र T_m 8 °लम्भात्। वि°] T_dLMA-
8{°लम्भाद्वि° L}{°लंभाद्वि° MA}, °लम्भावि° T_m 9 °मानज्यो°] 8(em.){°नं ज्यो° 8(em.)}, °मानज्यो°
TLMA 9 °तिस्तमसा°] T_m^{PC}T_dMA⁸, °तितंसा° T_m^{ac}, °तितम्सा° L 10 रवेर°] LMA⁸, [. . . .
]वर° T_m, . . . वर° T_d 10 दृष्टि°] TL⁸, दृष्ट° MA 10 °तमोव] LMA⁸, तमोप° T_m^{ac}, तमो*
T_m^{PC}, तमोत्° T_d 11 तस्मान्न] TLMA, तस्मान्नित्या न 8 11 यत्र] T⁸(em.?), यत L, यतः MA
11 तमसः। नि°] TL⁸{तमसो नि° TL}, तमसो ऽनि° MA 13 तु] conj., om. LMA⁸ 14-15 प्राप्तिः ॥
यश्चापि] LMA⁸{°सिर्त्य° L}, {°सिर्त्य° MA}, प्राप्ति(*)श्चापि T_m^{ac}, प्रति*यश्चापि T_m^{PC}, प्रउयश्चापि T_d
16 तथा] TLMA, तथा[दा] 8 17 °नोत्प°] T_dLMA⁸, °नोत्प° T_m 17 °नैकेन] em., °नानेकेन Σ
18 पलादि°] em., बलादि° LMA, फलादि° 8

18-19 यस्य हि सातिशयत्वन्तस्य काष्ठाप्राप्तिः, यथा परिमाणानाम्।

प्राणिकर्मतत्साधनफलविभागजैकनिष्पादितञ्जगत्, तदुपभोग्यस्थानादिरचनाविशेषव- 1
त्वात्, प्रासादादिवत् ॥ 2

अनेकप्राण्युपभोगविज्ञानवदेकनिर्व्वर्त्तिता पृथिवी, अनेकप्राणवदुपभोग्यत्वात्, त्रीहियवा- 3
दिवत् ॥ 4

अनेकप्रयोजनार्थिनैकेन निर्म्मिता पृथिवी, गृहादिवदेव ॥ 5

सर्व्वे प्राण्याश्रयो गिरिनदीसमुद्रादयस्तन्निवासिपरिभोगयोग्यविज्ञानवदेककुशलोत्पादि- 6
ताः, प्रकृतहेतुनिदर्शनाभ्यामेव ॥ 7

अनेकप्राणभाकप्रकाशादिसामर्थ्यज्ञानवतैकेन निर्व्वर्त्तितः सविता, प्रकाशात्मकत्वात्, प्र- 8
दीपादिवत् ॥ 9

नियतकालमादित्योदयास्तमयोदिसञ्चरणमेतत्प्रयोजनज्ञानवद्वैकप्रयुक्तम्, प्रतिनियतका- 10
लत्वात्, कृष्यादिवत् ॥ 11

बुद्धिमदेकेश्वरप्रयुक्ता सूर्यग्रहचन्द्रनक्षत्रादिप्रवृत्तिः, प्रवृत्तेर्दुःखात्मकत्वे सति नियतसम- 12
यत्वात्, धर्मज्ञशिष्यभृत्यादिप्रवृत्तिवत् ॥ 13

चन्द्रमसो वृद्धिक्षयौ तिथ्यादिकालज्ञानवतैकेन प्रयुक्तौ, कालपरिच्छेदकत्वात्, घटिकादि- 14
वत् ॥ 15

कालपरिच्छेदज्ञानवतैकेन निर्व्वर्त्तितश्चन्द्रमाः, वृद्धिक्षययुक्तत्वात्, घटिकादिवदेव ॥ 16

1 °फल°]TLZ, om. A 1 °भागजैक°]TLMA, भागविदेक(गधेक) Z 3 °प्राण°]Z(em.), °प्रामाण°
LMA 5 गृहादि°]Z(em.), ग्रहादि° L^{pc}MA, ग्रहणादि° L^{ac} 6 सर्व्वे]LM, सर्व्व° AZ 6 °श्रया]LMA,
श्रयो Z 6 °समुद्रादयस्त°]conj., °समुदायस्त° LMAZ{°यः त° Z} 6-7 °त्पादिताः]LMA, °त्पादितः Z
7 °दर्शना°]L^{pc}MAZ, °दर्शना(त्) L 8 °र्थ्यज्ञा°]T_dLMAZ, °र्थ्यं ज्ञा° T_m 10 °तत्प्रयो°]LMAZ,
[. .]प्रयो° T_m, . . प्रयो° T_d 10 °प्रयुक्तम्]LMAZ{°क्तं MAZ}, [. . . क]» T_m, . . तं
T_d 11 कृष्यादिव°]TLMZ, कृष्या° A 12 °ग्रहचन्द्र°]TZ, °ग्रहश्चन्द्र° LMA 12 °त्तेर्दुः°]T_dLMA-
Z, °त्तेर्दुः° T_m 13 °त्वात्, धर्म°]L{°त्वाद्धर्म° L}MA{°त्वाद्धर्म° MA}Z, [. .]ाद्धर्म° T_m^{ac}
13 °भृत्या°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAZ, °(वृ)»भृ°त्या° T_m 14 घटिका°]LMA, घटिका[हरा]° Z 16 निर्व्व-
र्त्तित°]Z(em.), निर्व्वर्त्त[°र्वर्त° MA]त° LMA 16 °माः, वृद्धि°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAZ{°माः वृद्धि T_m^{pc}T_d-
LMAZ}, °माः»वृद्धि° T_m

1-2 प्राणिकर्मतत्साधनफल° ... तदुपभोग्यस्थानादिरचनाविशेषवत्त्वात्, प्रासादादिवत्] See p.58,
l.4, p.59, l.7ff. Cf. ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 74-76: संनिवेशविशिष्टानामुत्पत्तिं यो
गृहादिवत्। साधयेच्चेतनाधिष्ठानं देहानां तस्य चोत्तरम् ॥७४॥ कस्य चिद्धेतुमात्रत्वं यद्यधिष्ठातृतेष्यते। कर्मभिः सर्व-
जीवानां तत्सिद्धेः सिद्धसाधनम् ॥७५॥ इच्छापूर्वकपक्षे ऽपि तत्पूर्वत्वेन कर्मणाम्। इच्छानन्तरसिद्धिस्तु दृष्टान्ते ऽपि
न विद्यते ॥७६॥; VidhiV Pūrva k.22: ननु सिद्धमेव सन्निवेशादिमतां बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वात्। सन्निवेशादिमत्स-
र्व्वं बुद्धिमद्धेतु यद्यपि। प्रसिद्धोत्सन्निवेशादेरेककारणता कुतः ॥; (Stern 1988: 1506-1542); PV Pramāṇa
k.13(M)/11(P): सिद्धं यादृगधिष्ठातृभावाभावानुवृत्तिम्। सन्निवेशादि तद्युक्तं तस्माद्यदनुमीयते ॥; ŚRTS
kk.47-48: यत्स्वारम्भकावयवसन्निवेशविशेषवत्। बुद्धिमद्धेतुगम्यं तत्तद्यथा कलशादिकम् ॥४७॥ द्वीन्द्रियग्राह्य-
मग्राह्यं विवादपदमीदृशम्। बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकं तेन वैधर्म्येणाणवो मताः ॥४८॥ Cf. also BSBh 1.1.2: अस्य जगतो
नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य, अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य, प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य, मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरच-
नारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद्भवति, तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar
1917: 82-3)

6 गिरिनदीसमुद्रादय°] Cf. BSBh 2.4.20: गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिषु (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar
1917: 651).

- 1 बुद्धिमदेकस्वामिकञ्जगत्, अन्योन्यविरुद्धसंहतानेकप्राणिनायकाधिष्ठितबहुमण्डलत्वात्, इ-
 2 त्थंजातीयकैकराज्यवत् ॥
- 3 सर्वमेतत् साधनसाध्यव्यापोरावस्थम्प्रत्यक्षं कस्यचिदेकस्य, इतरेतरविरोधानुग्रहवत्तयै-
 4 कप्रयोजनवत्वात्, सांग्रामवस्तुवत् ॥
- 5 संहतत्वात्, कुलजलादिवस्तुवत्, सैव प्रतिज्ञा ॥
- 6 युगपच्च सर्वम्प्रत्यक्षमेकस्य, अनेकत्वे सत्यन्योन्यसम्बन्धात्, प्रसिद्धसम्बन्धानेकार्थवत् ॥
 7 अग्निहोत्रादिसाधनसाधनीये कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षे, साध्यसाधनरूपत्वात्, भुजितृप्तिवत् ॥
- 8 सर्वाः शक्तयः कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाः, वस्तुत्वात्, घटादिवत् ॥
- 9 अन्तरप्रतिबन्धाभावे सर्वं वस्तुजातत्नैरन्तरव्यंण कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षम्, शब्दादिमत्वेन सम्ब-
 10 न्धात्, द्राघीयसीमिव शष्कुलीम् भक्षयतः शब्दादयः ॥
- 11 स्वतन्त्रतया केनचिदेकेन सर्वम्प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते, ज्ञेयत्वेनाभिमतत्वात्, नाट्यवस्तुवत् ॥
 12 अप्रतिबन्धेन कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यं सर्वम्, अनेकत्वे सत्यन्योन्यसम्बन्धात्, नाट्यसम्ब-
 13 द्धनर्त्तकादिवत् ॥
- 14 संसाररहितः सर्वज्ञः, अज्ञानाभावात्, मुक्तात्मवत् ॥
- 15 क्लेशादिर्हित ईश्वरः, अप्रतिबद्धज्ञानत्वात्, सिद्धयोगिवत् ॥
- 16 एतेन क्लेशादिप्रतिबन्धाज्ञानरहितत्वेन चक्षुरादीन्द्रियग्रामनिरपेक्षसर्वविषयज्ञानत्वं सि-
 17 द्धम्। सर्वार्थग्रहणसमर्थस्य परमेश्वरचित्तसत्वस्य सर्वव्यापिनो युगपत्सर्वविषययोगित्वा-
 18 त्। एवं सति समस्तवस्तुग्रहणे करणाभावानुपपत्तिः ॥
- 19 नापि मूर्त्तिमत्, प्रतिबन्धे ऽपि सर्वव्यापित्वात्, आकाशवदेव। सर्वविषययोगिनो ऽपि

1 बुद्धिम°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA_z, बुद्धिव° T_m^{ac} 3 °वस्थम्प्र°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA_z{°स्थं प्र° T_dMA_z}, °व-
 स्थ°म्«प्र° T_m 3 °कस्य, इतरेतर°] em., °कस्या[°स्य, अ°]वान्तर° Σ 4 °प्रयोजनवत्वा°] em., प्रयोज-
 नत्वा° Σ 6 °कस्य] T_m^{pc}T_d, °तस्य T_m^{ac}LMA_z(conj. ?), °क(त)स्य] z 6 सत्य°] T, सत्र° L, त्व°
 MA, ((त्व))सत्य°] z(conj. ?) 7 °रूपत्वा°] T_dz(em. ?), रूपा° LMA 8-9 वत् ॥ अन्तर°] TMA{°वत्
 अन्तर° T_m}{°वत्। अन्तर° T_d}{°वदन्तर° MA}, °वत् दन्तर° L, °वत् ॥ अ[वा]न्तर°] z 9 °जात-
 न्नै°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA_z{°तं नै° T_m^{pc}MA_z}, °जात° «नै° T_m 9 °मत्वेन] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA_z{°मत्वेन T_d-
 MA_z}, °(व)मत्वेन T_m 10 °सीमिव] TLz, °सीमिष् M, °सीमिष् A 10 भक्षयतः] TLz, मक्षयतः
 MA 12 °नेकत्वे] z(em.), °नेकसत्वे TLMA, °नेक(सत्वे)त्वे] z 12 °न्धा°] LMA_z, °न्ध(त्व)I° T_m,
 °न्धत्वा° T_d 12-13 °सम्बद्ध°] T_d, [. .]बद्ध° T_m, °सम्ब{°संब° MA}न्ध° LMA, °संबन्धि°] z 14 °र-
 हितः] T_m^{pc}T_dz, °रहितं T_m^{ac}MA, °रहितम् L 15 °बद्ध°] T, °बन्ध° LMA_z 16 °न्धाजा°] TLMz,
 °न्धः जा° A 16 °निरपेक्ष°] TL^{pc}MA_z, °निरपेक्ष° L^{ac} 17 °सत्वस्य] T_m^{pc}T_d, °सत्वसत्वस्य T_m^{ac}L,
 °(सत्वसत्वान्यनुपूर्व)स्य M, °स्य A_z 18 °वस्तुग्रहणे] conj., °वस्तुग्रहणाभावे Σ 18 करणा°] em., °कारणा°
 Σ 18 °भावानु°] TLMA, भा(वानु)वो] z 19 °बन्धे ऽपि सर्वव्यापित्वात्, आ°] conj., °बन्धो ऽप्या[°न्धो
 प्या° T_mL]° Σ

3-4 सर्वमेतत् ... सांग्रामवस्तुवत्] Cf. the third *hetu* Dharmakīrti mentions in PV Pramāṇa k.12(M)/10(P): स्थित्वा प्रवृत्तिसंस्थानविशेषार्थक्रियादिषु। इष्टसिद्धिरसिद्धिर्वा दृष्टान्ते संशयो ऽथ वा ॥

14-57,9 संसाररहितः ... सर्वस्य विषयत्वात् ॥] For a related discussion with reference to yogins, see BSBh 1.1.5.

19 नापि मूर्त्तिमत्, प्रतिबन्धे ऽपि सर्वव्यापित्वात्, आकाशवदेव।] Cf. PDhS (Dvivedin 1984:308,3-5): आकाशकालदिगात्मनां सत्यपि द्रव्यभावे निष्क्रियत्वं सामान्यादिवदमूर्त्तत्वात्। मूर्त्तिरसर्वगत-

- 1 म्यार्थत्वाच्च, भैषज्याद्युपदेशवत् ॥
 2 शरीरेन्द्रियाणि सर्वतत्प्रयोजनविदेकनिमित्तकारणाभिनिर्व्वर्त्तितानि, नियतक्रियास्थि-
 3 तिहेतुसाधनवत्वात्, प्रासोदगृहदास्यन्त्रादिवत् ॥
 4 नियतप्रयोजनरचनावित्वाच्च, तद्वदेव ॥
 5 तथेन्द्रियाणि, करणत्वात्, वासीवृक्षादनादिवत् ॥
 6 तथा सर्वम्, कार्यनियतोपादानत्वात्, भोक्त्रर्थत्वात्, भोग्यसाधनत्वाच्च, घटादिवत् ॥
 7 उत्पत्तिमत्वे ऽप्येते हेतव एव—
 8 मध्यमपरिमाणत्वात्, अनेकविनाशहेतुसम्बन्धयोग्यत्वात्, भोगाधिष्ठानत्वात्, क्रियाफल-
 9 साधनतद्रूपादिमत्वाच्च ॥
 10 आधीयमानापचीयमानापूर्यमाणापनीयमानदह्यमानभिद्यमानानेकेदेशत्वाद्द्विनश्वरी पृथि-
 11 वी, शरीरादिवत् ॥
 12 नश्वराणि पृथिव्यादिभूतानि, अन्योन्यनाशकशक्तिमत्वात्, शस्त्रपुरुषादिवत् ॥
 13 तथैव, विरोधात्, पुरुषविपरीतत्वाच्च ॥
 14 उत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकमाकाशम्, साक्षोदुपकरणत्वात्, घटादिवत् । बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणा-
 15 श्रयत्वाच्च ॥
 16 तस्मान्निरतिशयशक्तिज्ञानैश्वर्य्यः परमेश्वरः सिद्धः ॥
 17 अत्रोच्यते—ईश्वरशब्दार्थः सर्वज्ञो न भवति, प्रमेयत्ववस्तुत्वशब्दाभिधेयत्वात्मत्वसाध-
 18 नापेक्षोपलब्धत्वादिभ्यः, अस्मदादिवत् ॥
 19 ईश्वरशब्दो ऽपि निरतिशयज्ञानयुक्ताभिधायी न भवति, शब्दत्वात्, घटादिशब्दवत् ॥
 20 सर्वज्ञसर्वेश्वरशून्यज्ञात्, अनेकप्राणिव्यपाश्रयत्वात्, अन्योन्यविरुद्धानेकनायकराज्यव-
 21 त् ॥

2 सर्वत°] ४(em.), सर्वन्त[°वं त° MA]° LMA 5 °दाना°]em., °दाना° LMA ४ 6 भोग्य°]LMA, भोग° ४ 7 हेतव,एव]T_dLMA, [. . . .]एव T_m, हेतवः ॥ एवं ४ 12 पृथिव्यादि°]LMA ४, पृथिव्यानि° T_m, पृथिव्या नि° T_d 12 °पुरुषा°]LMA ४, °पु[र . .] T_m, °पुर . . T_d 14 °दुप°]T_m^{PC} ४, °दप° T_m^{AC}T_dLMA 17 °शब्दार्थः°]LMA ४, °शब्दोत्थः° T_d 17 °मेयत्व°] ४(em.), °मेय° T_dLMA 18 °लब्धु°]T_mLMA ४, °लब्ध° T_d 20 °नायक°]TMA ४, °नयक° L

3 °दारुयन्त्र°] Cf. MBh 5.156.14: न ह्येव कर्ता पुरुषः कर्मणोः शुभपापयोः । अस्वतन्त्रो हि पुरुषः कार्यते दारुयन्त्रवत्; PDhS (Dvivedin 1984: 69): निमेषोन्मेषकर्मणा नियतेन दारुयन्त्रप्रयोक्तेव . . . कश्चिदेको विजायते; BĀUBh 3.4.1: सर्वाः कार्यकरणसंघातगताः प्राणनादिचेष्टा दारुयन्त्रस्येव येन क्रियन्ते । न हि चेतनावदनधिष्ठितस्य दारुयन्त्रस्येव प्राणनादिचेष्टा विद्यन्ते । तस्माद्विज्ञानमयेनाधिष्ठितं विलक्षणेन दारुयन्त्रवत्प्राणनादिचेष्टां प्रतिपद्यते । तस्मात्सो ऽस्ति कार्यकरणसंघातविलक्षणो यश्चेष्टयति ॥

12 नश्वराणि . . . अन्योन्यनाशकशक्तिमत्वात्] Cf. BhGBh 2.24: यस्मादन्योन्यनाशहेतूनि भूतान्येनमात्मानं नाशयितुं नोत्सहन्ते, तस्मान्नित्यः । (Paṇśīkar 1978: 77-8).

17 प्रमेयत्व°] See 54,20-54,21; 56,11-56,11.

17 °वस्तुत्व°] See 56,8-56,8.

17 °आत्मत्व°] See 66,21-66,22.

17-18 °साधनापेक्षोपलब्धुत्व°] See 69,7-74,5.

20-21 सर्वज्ञसर्वेश्वर° . . . °नायकराज्यवत्] Cf. 56,1-56,4.

भूतभविष्यत्कालयोरपीदानीमिव सर्व्वज्ञस्यानुपलब्धारः सर्व्वप्राणिनः, प्राणित्वात्, अ-
स्मदादिवत् ॥

वाद्यन्तरपरिकल्पितः सर्व्वज्ञः सर्व्वेश्वरश्च नास्ति, अनुपलभ्यमानत्वात्, शशविषाणवत् ॥
तथा—असर्व्वज्ञो ऽनीश्वरश्च, अशरीरत्वात्, मुक्तात्मवत् ॥

सशरीरश्चेद्धर्माद्यपेक्षशरीरत्वम् । तथा च संसारित्वम्, अस्मदादिवदेव । अशरीरत्वमेवेति
चेत्—जगत्कर्तृत्वानुग्राहकत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिः, मुक्तात्मनिदर्शनेन ॥

न विशिष्टपरिभोगयोग्यजगद्रचनाविशेषोपपत्तिः, स्वभावादेव, कण्टकतीक्ष्णत्वकुमुदकम-
लसंकोचविकोचादिवत् ॥

निशाकरदिवाकरतारकादिगमनागमनाद्यपि स्वाभाविकम्, लोहायस्कान्तमणिवत् ॥
अत्राभिधीयते—

स्वाभाविकी तावन्न भवति पृथिव्यादिरचना । दृष्टान्तो नैव तत्साधनस्य विद्यते । कण्टका-
दीनाञ्च तैक्ष्ण्यन्न स्वाभाविकमभ्युपेयते ॥

अग्न्यादीनामिवौष्ण्यादि, स्वभावो वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्धेतोः पृथिव्यादिरचनेति चेत्—प्रासा-
दादिरचनाया वस्तुधर्मत्वात्स्यादनैकान्तिकत्वम् ॥

अथ स्वाभाविकत्वादिति चेत्—असिद्धत्वम्, जगद्रचनाया धर्माधर्मफलोपभोगार्थप्रयु-
क्तत्वाभ्युपगमात् । कर्तृधर्माधर्मास्तित्वमुपरिष्ठात्साधयिष्यते ॥

तस्मात्पृथिव्यादिरचना स्वाभाविकी न भवति, प्राण्युपभोगार्थत्वात्, प्रासादादिरचना-
वत् ॥

चन्द्रादिप्रवृत्तिर्न स्वाभाविकी, प्रवृत्तित्वात्, अस्मदादिप्रवृत्तिवत् ॥

4 तथा—असर्व्वज्ञो] LMA⁸{तथासं L}{तथा स० MA}{तथा असं 8Td}, [. . .] असर्व्वज्ञो T_m 5
०श्रेद्धर्मा] MA⁸, ०श्वेतधर्मा[०र्मा T_d० T, ०श्वेतधर्मा L 7 न] conj., om. Σ 7 ०योग्यज] TMA-
8, ०योग्य[.] ज L 7 कण्टक] TL⁸, कण्टक MA 9 लोहा] T_dMA⁸, लोका T_mL^{ac} 11 ०की
ता] TMA⁸, ०कीन्ता L 11 पृथि] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA⁸, प्रथि T_m^{ac} 11 ०रचना] TLM⁸, स्वना A(M
confusing) 11 कण्टका] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA⁸, कनका T_m^{ac} 14 ०रचना] 8(em.), रचन TLMA 14
०नैकान्तिकत्व] LMA⁸, ०नैकान्द्रत T_m^{ac}, ०नैकाश्रित T_m^{pc}, ०नैकाश्रित T_d 15 ०चनाया] T_m^{pc}T_d-
LMA⁸, ०जना T_m^{ac}

4-6 तथा असर्व्वज्ञो . . . मुक्तात्मनिदर्शनेन] See 67,5-67,9.

7-8 न विशिष्टपरिभोग. . . ०विदिवत्] See 55,1-55,2. See NS/NBh/NV 4.1.22: अनिमि-
त्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् ॥ २२ ॥ . . . ; ŚRTS kk. 110-112: सर्वहेतुनिराशंसं भावानां जन्म
वर्ण्यते । स्वभाववादिभिस्ते हि नाहुः स्वमपि कारणम् ॥ ११० ॥ राजीवकेसरादीनां वैचित्र्यं कः करोति हि । मयूर-
चन्द्रकादिर्वा विचित्रः केन निर्मितः ॥ १११ ॥ यथैव कण्टकादीनां तैक्ष्ण्यादिकमहेतुकम् । कादाचित्कतया तद्द्रुःखादी-
नामहेतुता ॥ ११२ ॥ Cf. BSBh 1.1.2: न च यथोक्तविशेषणस्य जगतो यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं मुक्तान्यतः प्रधा-
नादचेतनादणुभ्यो वाभावाद्वा संसारिणो बोत्वत्यादि संभावयितुं शक्यम् । न च स्वभावतः, विशिष्टदेशकालनिमि-
त्तानामिहोपादानात् । एतदेवानुमानं संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरास्तित्वादिसाधनं मन्यन्ते ईश्वरकारणवादिनः ॥ (Śāstri
and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 88) Note the use of *svabhāvataḥ* in the second sentence.

9 निशाकरदिवाकर. . . लोहायस्कान्तमणिवत्] Cf. 55,10-55,16

19 चन्द्रादिप्रवृत्तिर्न . . . अस्मदादिप्रवृत्तिवत्] Cf. 55,8-56,2

1 अस्मदादिप्रवृत्तिरपि स्वाभाविकीति चेन्न, अश्रुयुष्णत्ववन्नित्यत्वप्रसंगात् । न ह्यश्रुयुष्णत्वं
2 स्वाभाविकं सन्नियतनिमित्तमात्मलाभाय कांक्षति धर्मिसत्तद्व्यतिरेकेण । क्रियाफलरचनादी-
3 नान्तु विशिष्टनिमित्ताकांक्षणमात्मप्रतिलम्भायेति, न स्वाभाविकत्वम् ॥

4 नियतनिमित्ताकांक्षणमपि प्रासादादिरचनानां स्वभाव इति चेत्—अस्तु तथाविधं स्वभा-
5 वत्वम् । तथापि पृथिव्यादिरचनायो नियतनिमित्तकांक्षणस्वभावत्वम्प्रासादादिवदेव । ततश्च न
6 नाम्नि विप्रतिपत्तिद्वेषाय, कारकान्तरापेक्षत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञा प्रतिरूपकारिणी च ॥

7 भवद्भिरुक्तानि लोकार्त्विमानागमविरोधादननुमानानि । अनुमानविरोधन्तावत्सातिशय-
8 त्वादिभ्यो ब्रूमः । आगमविरोधश्च 'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्', 'एको वशी'त्येवमादिभ्यः समा-
9 चक्षमहे । समस्तलोकविरोधश्चापीति । सर्व एवा नारीगोपालं संव्यवहरमाणाः सततं शिव-
10 नारायणादिनम्रा प्रणिहितचेतसः प्रतिषेधत्वपि सम्भिन्नबुद्धिष्वकर्णिकृततत्प्रतिषेधविषय-
11 पल्लवाः परमेश्वरम्प्रणतमूर्धानः कुसुमाञ्जलिप्रभृतिभिरर्चयन्ति । फलञ्चापि त एव प्रार्थयन्ते-
12 न्ते ॥

13 अथ चेद्ब्रूयात्—सर्वज्ञाभावप्रतिपादिभिरस्मदनुमानैरितरप्रतिज्ञानां विरोध इति ॥

14 अत्रोच्यते—नैतान्यनुमानानि ।

15 कथम् ?

16 प्रथमन्तावत्प्रतिज्ञैव दुष्टा । यदि तावदीश्वरशब्दार्थः सर्वज्ञो न भवतीति, युष्मदभिप्रेते ई-

2 °यतनि°]em., °यतन्नि[°तं नि° T_dMAḥ]° Σ 4 यत°]TLḥ(em.?), °यतं MA 4 °निमित्ता°]MA-
ḥ, °मिति तम् T_m^{ac}, °निमित्तम् T_m^{pc}, °निमित्तं T_dL 4 °कांक्षण°]ḥ(em.), °कांक्षि[°काङ्क्षि° MA]णा°
TLMA 4 °विधं]TLMA, °विध° ḥ 5 तथापि]T_mLMAḥ, तथा हि T_d 5 °रचनायो]MAḥ, °रच-
नया L 5 °दिवदेव]TMAḥ, °दिवदेक L 5 न]conj., om. Σ 6 °पत्तिर्दो°]TLMA{°दो° T_dMA},
°पत्तिर्न दो° ḥ 6 °कारिणी]ḥ(em.), °कारिणि LMA 7 °क्तानि]TLMA, °क्तानि [[अनुमानानि] ḥ 7
लोकार्त्वि°]LMAḥ, [लोका .] T_m 7 °माना°]em., °मा° LMAḥ 7 °दननुमानानि । अनु]conj., °दनु°
LMA, °त् [[अप्रमाणानि] । अनु° ḥ 8 °धश्च]Tḥ(em.?) {°धं च T_dḥ}, °धश्च LMA 9 °पीति]em.,
°पि Σ 9 सर्व्व ए°]Lḥ, सर्व्वे° MA 10 °षेधत्व°]LMAḥ, °षेधात्व° T 10 °कर्णो°]TLḥ{°र्णो°
ḥ}, °कर्णो° MA 11 °श्वरम्प°]LMAḥ, °श्वरः प्र° T 11 त]em., तत LMAḥ 13 °पादि°]TLḥ,
°वादि° MA 13 °स्मदनु°]T_dLMAḥ, °स्मदनु° T_m

8 यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्] MuU 1.1.9. In full, the verse reads यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यस्य ज्ञानमयं
तपः । तस्मादेतद्ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते ॥ It is referring to the *akṣara* (n.) introduced in
1.1.5. Śāṅkara argues that the passage refers to *parameśvara* in BSBh 1.2.21: 'अथ परा
यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते' (MuU 1.1.5) ... तत्र संशयः—किमयमद्रेष्यत्वादिगुणको भूतयोनिः प्रधानं स्यात्, उत
शरीरः, आहोस्वित्परमेश्वर इति ... तस्माददृश्यत्वादिगुणको भूतयोनिः परमेश्वर एव ॥ (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar
1917: 255–258).

8 एको वशी] KaU 2.2.12/ŚAU 6.12. Whichever may have been meant, the upani-
ṣadic passage refers to ātman. See, however, Śāṅkara's interpretation of KaU 2.2.12:
किञ्च स हि परमेश्वरः सर्वगतः स्वतन्त्र एको, न तत्समो ऽभ्यधिको वान्यो ऽस्ति ... (Shastri 1979: 113).

9–11 सर्व्व एवा ... कुसुमाञ्जलिप्रभृतिभिरर्चयन्ति ।] Cf. BSBh 2.2.42: भगवतो ऽभिगमना-
दिलक्षणमाराधनमजस्रमनन्यचित्ततयाभिप्रेयते, तदपि न प्रतिषिध्यते, श्रुतिस्मृत्योरीश्वरप्रणिधानस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् ।
(Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 573,2–4). Note that Śāṅkara alludes to YS 1.23 with the
word *īśvarapraṇīdhānasya*.

16 यदि तावदीश्वरशब्दार्थः सर्वज्ञो न भवतीति] See 58,17.

श्वर उच्यते। तथा च सति सिद्धसाध्यता स्यात् ॥

अथ नास्मदभिर्प्रितः ॥

तथापि युष्माकमसिद्धविशेष्यता भवेत् ॥

अथेश्वरत्वस्यासर्वज्ञत्वमुच्यते ॥

तथापि सिद्धं साध्यते। तथैवाभ्युपगमविरोधो ऽपि ॥

कथम् ?

ऐश्वर्यसर्वज्ञबीजयोर्विवर्द्धमानत्वात् काष्ठाप्राप्तिः परिमाणविदेवाभ्युपगमनीया। तथा काष्ठाप्राप्तैश्वर्यसर्वज्ञत्ववाचिनावपीश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दावेषितव्यौ। काष्ठाप्राप्तिश्च निरवधिकत्वम्, यथा परिमाणादीनामात्माकाशाद्यन्तुपरिमाणान्तत्वम्। तथा चानुमानाभ्युपगमस्ववचनविरोधा स्युः ॥

किञ्चान्यत्—काष्ठाप्राप्तेश्वरत्वस्य शब्दार्थस्य परित्यागे शब्दार्थबाधः प्राप्नोति। न हि शब्दः परित्यक्ताभिधेयैकदेश उच्चरितः ॥

अथ परिमाणादेरपि निरवधिकनिष्ठत्वन्नेष्यते ॥

सिद्धान्तविरोधः, आत्माकाशादीनां सर्वगतत्वाभ्युपगमात्। आत्माकाशादीनां हि सर्वगतत्वाभावे मध्यमपरिमाणत्वानित्युत्वादिदोषप्रसंगः ॥

अथोप्यात्मनः सर्वत्र कार्यदर्शनात्सर्वगतत्वम् ॥

तत्रापि शकुन्याद्यात्मनाम्ननुष्यगोचराकृशादिगतत्वं सामान्यतोदृष्टादेवानुमानात्स्यात्। तथा चेहृषि सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानत्वं केन वार्यते ॥

अथानुमानविरोधान्नवधार्यते इति चेत्—आत्मादीनामपि प्रमेयत्ववस्तुत्वादिभ्यः पृथिव्यादिवदित्यनुमानविरोधोद्भावना शक्यते वक्तुम्। न च तत्रवतात्रानुमानविरोधित्वम्, अनु-

1 उच्यते] TL, उच्येत MA १ सति] conj., om. Σ 1-2 स्यात् ॥ अ°] Tm^{pc}LMA ४[स्याद° Tm^{pc}L], स्याद्य° Tm^{ac}, स्यात्। य° Td 2 °थ ना°] conj., °था° Σ 7 °बीज°] em., °बीजत्व° Σ 7 °व- देवा°] ४(em.), °पदेवा° LMA 9 यथा] ४(em.), तथा LMA 9 °गमस्व°] ४(em.), °गमः स्व° TLMA 11 °श्वरत्वस्य] LMA ४, [. .] सर्वज्ञश्वर्य[त्व . .] Tm, . . सर्वज्ञश्वर्यत्व . Td 11 °बाधः] em., वादः LMA ४ 14 आत्माकाशादीनां सर्वगतत्वाभ्युपगमात्।] conj., om. Σ 15-16 °संगः ॥ अथा°] em., °संगोश्चाथा° L^{ac}, °संगश्चाथा° L^{pc}, °सङ्गाश्चाथा° MA, °सङ्गश्च। अथा° ४ 17 °चराकृ°] LMA ४, °च- रोक[.] T 17 सामान्यतो°] TdL ४, सामान्येता M(possibly meant as °न्यतो°)A 20 वक्तुम्] LMA, [[कर्तुम्] वक्तुम् ४

8-9 काष्ठाप्राप्तिश्च निरवधिकत्वम् ... °परिमाणान्तत्वम्] Cf. VidhiV 1.21: अपि च—नासम्भाव्य- परावस्थं नभः परिमितं यदि। अथानन्तताया तत्त्वं नन्वेषापरिमाणात् ॥१.२१॥ परिमितं चेदाकाशम्, ततो ऽधिकं किमिति न सम्भाव्यते। अनन्तत्वात्। किमिदमानन्त्यम्। अपरिच्छिन्नता। नन्वेष परिमाणाभाव एव, एतावता हि परिमाणम्, ईदृशीं च काष्ठाप्राप्तिमीश्वरज्ञानस्य वदन्नज्ञानमाविर्भावयति, सो ज्यं शान्तिकर्मणि वेतालोदयः। (Stern 1988: 1496-1500)

14-15 आत्माकाशादीनां सर्वगतत्व°] Cf. PDhS: आकाशकालदिगात्मनां सर्वगतत्वम्परममहत्त्वं सर्व- संयोगिसमानदेशत्वं च (Dvivedin 1984: 22); VS 7.1.28-29: विभवान्महानाकाशः। तथाचात्मा। Cf. also ŚV Ātmavāda k. 20: तव नित्यविभुत्वाभ्यामात्मानो निष्क्रिया यदि। सुखदुःकाविकार्याश्च कीदृशी कर्तुंभोक्तुता ॥ (opponent); k. 73: ज्ञानशक्तिस्वभावो ऽतो नित्यः सर्वगतः पुमान्। देहान्तरक्षमः कल्प्यः सो ऽगच्छन्नेव योध्यते ॥

16 सर्वत्र कार्यदर्शनात्सर्वगतत्वम्] See ŚV Anumāna k. 80cd-81ab: सर्वत्र दृष्टकार्यत्वादात्मा सर्व- गतस्त्विति ॥८०॥ बौद्धम्प्रत्याश्रयासिद्धौ लौकिकादेस्तु संशयः।

- 1 मानाभावप्रसंगात् ॥
 2 तदानुमानाभाव इष्यत इति चेत्—प्रत्यक्षे ऽप्यनाश्वास स्यात् ॥
 3 अथ निश्च्रीयमानबुध्युत्पत्तेः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणत्वम् ॥
 4 अनुमानस्यापि तर्हि निश्चितबुद्धिसमुद्भवास्तु प्रामाण्यम् ॥
 5 अथ दृष्टसम्बन्धधूमादिविषयमेवानुमानमिति चेत्—
 6 तत्राप्यनुमानाभाव एव, अनग्निर्द्रूमवान् प्रदेशः प्रत्यक्षानुपलभ्यमानाग्निसम्बन्धे सति प्र-
 7 देशत्वात्, अग्निशून्योपलभ्यमानप्रदेशवदिति ॥
 8 अथ प्रमाणान्तरसंवादादृष्टसम्बन्धविषये ऽनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वम् ॥
 9 उच्यते—प्रत्यक्षमपि प्रमाणान्तरसंवादात्प्रमाणम्भवेत्, प्रमाणत्वात्, अनुमानवदेव । अप्र-
 10 माणं स्यात्, प्रमाणान्तरसंवादाभावात्, सामान्यतोदृष्टादिवदिति ॥
 11 तस्मान्न सामान्यतोदृष्टस्य प्रमाणत्वनिश्चितबुद्धित्वाद्वाधितुं शक्यम् ॥
 12 किञ्च सामान्यतोदृष्टस्यानुमानत्वमनभ्युपगच्छत स्वशरीरमरणसम्बन्धस्यानुपलब्धपूर्व-
 13 त्वात्सर्प्यादिभ्यो भयानुपपत्तिः । व्याधिप्रतीकाराय चिकित्सादिप्रयोगो न घटेत्, मरणशंका-
 14 कारणाभावात् । तथा जन्मनो ऽप्यनुपलम्भादात्मशरीरस्याजत्वञ्चिन्त्येत । हानोपादाननियो-
 15 गाभावश्च स्यात् ॥
 16 तस्मात्सामान्यतोदृष्टपरिमाणादिसातिशयत्वसामान्यादीश्वरज्ञाननिरवधिकत्वसिद्धिः ॥
 17 किञ्चान्यत्—ईश्वरसर्वज्ञत्वस्य प्रतिषिध्यमानत्वात्सत्त्वाभ्युपगमः । अनुपगतपदार्थस्य

2 दानु]em., °थानु° Σ 6 °ग्निर्द्रू]ऽ(em.), °ग्निधू° TLMA 6 °वान्]T_m^{pc}T_qLMAऽ, °वा T_m^{ac} 8 °संवादादृ]em., °संवादा(त)दृष्ट° T_m, °संवादादृष्ट° T_qL, °संवादाददृ° MAऽ 8 °स्य प्रमाण°]em., °स्या-
 नुमान° Σ 10 °तोदृष्टा°]ऽ(em.), °दृष्टा° TLMA 11 °त्वाद्वा°]T_qMAऽ, °त्वात् वा° T_mL 12 °दृ-
 ष्तस्यानु°]em., °दृष्टानु° TMA, °दृष्टानु° L, °दृष्टस्य ऽ 12 °मरण°]TMAऽ, मण L 12 °सम्बन्ध°]TL,
 °संबन्धलक्षण° MAऽ 14 °प्यनुपलम्भादा°]T, °प्यनुपलम्भावाभा° L, °प्यनुपलम्भावादा° MA, °प्युपल-
 भावादा° ऽ 14 °जत्व°]ऽ(em.), °जत्व° TLMA 14–15 °नियोगा°]Aऽ(em.), °वियोगा° TLM
 16 °माणान्ति°]em., °माणत्वादि° TLMऽ, °णामत्वादि° A 17 °षिध्यमान°]TLऽ, °षिद्धस्यमान° MA
 17 °नुपगत°]conj., °नुप° TLMA, अ((नुप))° ऽ

3 अथ निश्च्रीयमानबुध्युत्पत्तेः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणत्वम्] Cf. Kumārila's definition of *pramāṇa* in the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* referred to by Ratnakīrti: तथा बृहट्टीकापि—तत्रापुर्वार्थविज्ञानं निश्चितं बाधवर्जितम् । अदृ-
 ष्टकारणारब्धं प्रमाणं लोकसंमतम् ॥ (Thakur 1975:109).

5 अथ दृष्टसम्बन्धधूमादिविषयमेवानुमानमिति चेत्] See ŚV Anumāna k. 138 द्वैविध्यं नोपपन्नं तु
 यथैव ह्यग्निधूमयोः । प्रत्यक्षदृष्टसम्बन्धः गतिप्राप्त्योस्तथैव हि ॥ and the following, commenting on ŚBh:
 तत्तु द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं सामान्यतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं च.

6–7 तत्राप्यनुमानाभाव ... अग्निशून्योपलभ्यमानप्रदेशवदिति] Cf. ŚV Anumāna k. 139: आदित्ये
 ऽनुपलब्धिश्चेन्न देशे ऽप्यधुनातने । क्वचित्तत्रोपलब्धिश्चेदेवदत्ते ऽपि दृश्यताम् ॥

8 अथ प्रमाणान्तरसंवादात् ... अनुमानत्वम्] Cf. ŚBh 1.1.2: ननु सामान्यतो दृष्टं भविष्यति । पौरु-
 षेयं वचनं वितथमुपलभ्य वचनसामान्याद्वेदवचनं मिथ्येत्यनुमीयते । न, अन्यत्वात् । न ह्यन्यस्य वितथभावे ऽन्यस्य
 वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति, अन्यत्वादेव । न हि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्यापि श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति । अपि च पुरुष-
 वचनसाधर्म्यद्वेदवचनं वितथमित्यनुमानम् । प्रत्यक्षस्तु वेदवचने प्रत्ययः । न चानुमानं प्रत्यक्षविरोधि प्रमाणं भवति
 (Frauwallner 1968:18); ŚV Codanāsūtra k. 80: तस्माद्दृढं यदुत्पन्नं न विसंवादमृच्छति । ज्ञानान्तरेण
 विज्ञानं तत्प्रमाणं प्रतीयताम् ॥

प्रतिषेधासम्भवात् । न हि केवलो नेति नञ् प्रयुज्यते, ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञो न भवतीत्युच्यते । तत्र 1
क्वचित्सर्वज्ञत्वमभ्युपगतम्भवति ॥ 2

तद्यथा शशस्य विषाणन्नास्ति, वन्ध्यायाः सुतो नास्ति, कुसुममाकाशस्य नास्तीति क्वचि- 3
द्विद्यमानानामेव विषाणसुतकुसुमादीनां शशदिसम्बन्धेन प्रतिषेधः, तद्वदिहापि स्यात् ॥ 4

किञ्चेश्वरः सर्वज्ञो न भवतीतीश्वरशब्दार्थसर्वज्ञत्वसम्बन्धप्रतिषेधादीश्वरादन्यस्य स- 5
र्वज्ञत्वाभ्युपगमः । सम्बन्धिनावनभ्युपगम्य सम्बन्धप्रतिषेधो हि न शक्यः कर्तुम् । स एष 6
युक्तः सम्बन्धः प्रतिषिध्यते, अयुक्तश्चाभ्युपगम्यते । तत्परिश्रममात्रम्, ईश्वरसर्वज्ञयोः प्रसि- 7
द्धपदार्थयोः प्रतिषेधात् । न ह्यनन्तपरिमाणन्न भवतीत्युक्ताशस्य प्रसिद्धमनन्तपरिमाणत्वम् 8
प्रतिषिध्याप्रसिद्धानन्तपरिमाणत्वेषु घटादिषु व्यवस्थापयितुं युक्तम् ॥ 9

अथ सम्बन्धिनावेश्वरसर्वज्ञत्वे प्रतिषिध्यते ॥ 10

स्ववचनविरोधिनी प्रतिज्ञा स्यात्, ईश्वरसर्वज्ञत्वयोरीश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दार्थत्वाभ्युपगमात् । 11
न हि भवेत्यग्निरग्निशब्दार्थो न भवतीति ॥ 12

अथप्रसिद्धपदार्थावीश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दौ ॥ 13

तथापि तदर्थप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः, अप्रसिद्धस्यार्थस्य प्रोक्त्यभावात् । न हि कश्चिदप्रसिद्धमे- 14
रुशिखरे मेषकुटुम्बिनीं प्रतिषेद्धुमर्हति । किञ्च शब्दोपादानानर्थक्यञ्च, अप्रसिद्धपदार्थत्वात् ॥ 15

अथ प्रसिद्धार्थयोरीश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दयोर्द्विरवधिकेश्वरसर्वज्ञाभ्यामप्रसिद्धाभ्यां गगनस्येव 16
कुसुमैः सम्बन्धः कैश्चित्कल्पितः, स प्रतिषिध्यते ॥ 17

तथाप्यभ्युपेतार्थप्रतिषेधात्स्ववचनविरोधिन्येव प्रतिज्ञा स्यात्, सातिशयनिरतिशयानेके- 18
श्वरसर्वज्ञव्यक्तिमत्सामान्ययोरीश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दार्थत्वेनाभ्युपगमात् । प्रसिद्धं हि लोक ईश्वर- 19
सर्वज्ञशब्दयोर्लक्षणापकर्षयुक्तानेकव्यक्तिविषयबुध्युत्पादकत्वम् । न हि ग्रामाधिपतिरीश्वर 20
इति द्वित्रिग्रामविषयाधिपतय उत्तरोत्तरेश्वरा न भवन्ति, यो वा कुटुम्बाधिपतिरीश्वरो न भ- 21
वतीति । सर्वेश्वासावर्थवानीश्वरशब्दः । तथा वैयाकरणः सर्वज्ञ इत्युक्ते नाधिकविज्ञानयुक्तो 22

1 नेति नञ्]em., नेति न TLMA, नेति ((न)) ४ 1 °ते, ईश्व°]LMA४, °ते[. .]श्व° T_m, °ते . ईश्व°
T_d 2 °ज्ञत्व°]MA४, °ज्ञ TL 4 स्यात्]TLM४, गतम् A 5 °दीश्व°]T, °दिनां श्व° L, °दिना ईश्व°
MA४ 5-6 सर्वज्ञत्वाभ्युपगमः]TMA४, सर्वज्ञत्वाभ्युपगमः सर्वज्ञत्वाभ्युपगमः L 6 शक्यः]४(em.),
शक्यं LMA 8 °र्थयोः]em., °र्थयोर° Σ 8 °न्न]TLMA, माकाशन्न ४ 9 °षिध्या°]LMA४, °षिद्धा°
T 9 °प्रसिद्धा°]४(em.), °प्रतिषिद्धा° TLMA 9 व्यव°]LMA, तत् व्यव ४ 10 °नावेवे°]४(em.),
°नी एवे° TLMA 10 °ज्ञत्वे°]T_mLMA४, °ज्ञत्व T_d 11 °विरोधिनी]LMA४, [. .]राधिनी T_m,
. . . राधिनी T_d 11 °ज्ञशब्दा°]४(em.), °ज्ञा° LMA 14 कश्चि°]em., कि . . T_d, किञ्चि° LMA-
४ 14-15 °मेरुशि°]em., मेतशि L, मेतच्छि MA४ 16 °श्वरसर्वज्ञा°]LMA, °श्वरसर्वज्ञत्वा° ४ 18
स्यात्]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA४, स्यात्« T_m 18-19 °केश्वर°]TMA४, केश्वरे L 19 लोक]TMA, लोके ४
20 ग्रामाधिपति°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA४, ग्रामादिभिरधिपति T_m^{ac} 21-22 भवतीति]em., भवति Σ

8-9 न ह्यनन्तपरिमाणः... व्यवस्थापयितुं युक्तम्] Cf. VidhiV 1.20: न हि सातिशया अपि घटादयः 1
परिमाणतः परासम्भावनीयातिशयाशालिनः । अन्यानवकाशप्रसङ्गात् । एकेनैव सर्वव्यासेः । (Stern 1988: 1482-
1484).

22-64,1 तथा वैयाकरणः सर्वज्ञ इत्युक्ते नाधिकविज्ञानयुक्तो न भवति] Cf. BSBh 1.1.3: महत् ऋग्वे-
दादेः शास्त्रस्यानेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य, प्रदीपवत्सर्वाथिवद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म । न हीदृशस्य
शास्त्रस्यगर्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञान्यतः संभवो ऽस्ति । यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषा-

1 न भवति॥

2 निरवधिकौ सावधिकौ वेश्वरसर्वज्ञावीश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दयोरर्थावभ्युपगम्येयात्। अत-
3 स्तत्प्रतिषेधादभ्युपगमविरोधिनी प्रतिज्ञा स्यात्, आत्माकोशादीनाम्महत्त्वस्य सहच्छब्दार्थ-
4 त्वप्रतिषेधवत् ॥

5 अथेश्वरसर्वज्ञौ निरवधिकौ न स्तः, अनुपलभ्यमानत्वात्, अनीश्वरद्वितीयशिरोवदित्यु-
6 च्येत॥

7 तथापि शब्दार्थाभ्युपगमविरोधिनी प्रतिज्ञा। सातिशयत्वादिभिरेश्वर्यसर्वज्ञबीजादि-
8 लिंगैर्निरवधिकेश्वरसर्वज्ञत्वयोरुपलभ्यमानत्वान्निरवधिकपरिमाणत्ववदित्यसिद्धिः, अनुपल-
9 ब्धेः ॥

10 अथाविशेष्यैवेश्वरशब्दार्थः सर्वज्ञो न भवतीत्युच्येत, वस्तुत्वादिहेतुभिरस्मदादिवदिति ॥
11 तदा सर्वप्रमाणविरोधिनी प्रतिज्ञा स्यात्, प्रसिद्धेश्वरशब्दार्थस्य प्राकृतसर्वज्ञत्वस्य स-
12 र्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात्, यथेश्वरशब्दार्थः ॥

13 प्रमेयत्वादिभिर्हेतुभिर्घटादिवदित्युक्ते यद्ब्रूयास्तदेवाहं वक्ष्यामीह—

14 अथ सर्वज्ञशून्यजगत्, कालो वा, दिश, आकाशं वा, प्राणिमद्देशो वा, प्राणिनो वा, स-
15 र्वे सर्वज्ञशून्याः, प्रमाणानि वा सर्वाण्यसर्वज्ञविषयाणि, प्रमातारो वा सर्वज्ञस्याप्रतिपत्तार
16 इत्येवज्ञातीयासु प्रतिज्ञासु निरवधिकेश्वरे सर्वज्ञे वा प्रतिषिध्यमाने प्रसिद्धेश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दा-
17 र्थाभ्युपगमविरोधाः प्रतिज्ञादोषा वचनीयाः ॥

18 ननु च वन्ध्यासुतो नास्तीति तच्छून्यजगत्, कालो वेति प्रतिज्ञायमाने यथोक्तप्रतिज्ञादो-
19 षप्राप्तिर्भवेत् ॥

20 नैष दोषः, वन्ध्यासुतसत्तालक्षणस्य प्रतिषेधव्यस्य वाक्यार्थस्येश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दार्थवद-
21 प्रसिद्धत्वात्। केवलशब्दप्रापितसन्निधानबुद्धिमात्रे प्रतिपन्ने पदार्थव्यापारो ऽस्तीति वन्ध्या-

2 *कौ वे°]LMA, *केरेवे° T_m^{ac}, *कैरेवे° T_m^{pc}T_d 5 *शिरोवदि°]T_m^{pc}T_dMA, *शिरोवि° T_m^{ac},
*शीरोवदि° L 7 *भ्युपगम°]conj., *भ्युपगमाभ्युपगम° L, *भ्युपगमादभ्युपगम° MA 7 *ज्ञबीजा°]em.,
*ज्ञत्वबीजा° Σ 8 *त्यसिद्धि°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA, om. T_m^{ac} 10-13 *रस्मदादिवदिति ... प्रमेयत्वादिभि-
र्हेतुभि°](LMA), om. T (an eyeskip caused by °हेतुभि°. The omitted text is almost ide-
ntical to L26v6. Both L26v6 and L26v7 have °हेतुभि° towards the end of the line.) 11
तदा]LMA, तथा 12 *शब्दार्थः ॥]LMA, *शब्दार्थः [°सर्वज्ञो न भवति] 13 *यास्त°]em., *यात् स्त°
T, *यात् LMA 13-14 *मीह—अथ]TLMA{°मीहाथ TLMA}, *मि ॥ इह 15 *शून्याः]TMA-
15, *शून्या L 15 *प्रमाणानि]T_dLMA, *प्रमाणानि T_m 15 *सर्वाण्य]T, सर्वा[°र्वा° MA]श्च LMA,
सर्वाणि 15 *ज्ञविषयाणि]TMA, *ज्ञाविषयानि L 20 *षेधव्यस्य]TMA, *षेधव्यस्य L 21
°सिद्धत्वात्]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA, °सिद्धत्वा°त्« T_m 21 *मात्रे]em., *मात्र° Σ 21 *पदार्थ°]TLMA, प-
दार्थ°[°पदार्थे प्रतिषेध] 15

त्सम्भवति, यथा व्याकरणदि पाणिन्यादेः ज्ञैकदेशार्थमपि, स ततो ऽप्यधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं लोके। किमु
वक्तव्यम् ... ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य ... यस्यान्महतो भूताद्योनेः संभवः, ... तस्य महतो भूतस्य निरति-
शयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं चेति। (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917:96-9).

5-6 अनीश्वरद्वितीयशिरोवदित्युच्येत] See the Mātharavṛtti on SK 7: अत्यन्ताभावो यथा द्विती-
यमनीश्वरशिरः, तृतीयो बाहुः, शशविषाणादयो वा। (Śarmā and Vaṅṅīya 1970:11); Cf. MMK 7.31:
असतो ऽपि न भावस्य निरोधो न युक्तः। न द्वितीयस्य शिरसश्छेदनं विद्यते यथा॥ (de la Vallée Poussin
1913:170).

सुतास्तित्वस्य वा नास्तित्वस्य वा नाभ्युपगमो ऽस्ति। ततो नाभ्युपगतप्रतिषेधदोषः ॥

ननु चेश्वरः सर्वज्ञो न भवतीत्यत्रापि बुद्धिमात्रमप्राप्यमाणम्प्रतिषिध्यते। न क्वचिदपि प्राप्नुवद्वस्तु नजा प्रतिषेद्धं शक्यते, प्रतिहस्तिनेव हस्ती। यदि च नजा वस्तु निराकरिष्यत नञ्मात्रेणेश्वरवादिपक्षत्वमपि निराकरिष्यत। तस्मादिहापि बुद्धिमात्रप्रतिषेध इति नाभ्युपगतप्रतिषेधप्रतिज्ञादोषः ॥

सत्यमेवम्। किन्त्वस्ति विशेषः। प्रमाणसिद्धवस्तुविषया बुद्धिर्वस्त्वन्तरे कालविशेषे वा प्रतिषिध्यते वस्तुसामान्यात्प्राप्नुवती, यथा घटो नास्तीति। क्वचिद्विनाप्यर्थेन बुद्धिरेव शब्दप्रत्युपनीतसन्निधाना कल्पितवस्त्वन्तरा प्रतिषिध्यते, यथा वन्ध्यासुतो नास्तीति। यत्र तु प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धसद्वस्तुप्रतिषेधस्तत्राभ्युपगतार्थप्रतिषेधदोषः, यथा ईश्वरशब्दार्थः सर्वज्ञो न भवतीति। ईश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दयोरभिवर्द्धमानेश्वरसर्वज्ञव्यक्त्यनुगतसामान्यवचनत्वेन लिंगेन निरवधिकेश्वरसर्वज्ञसत्तावद्योतित्वं सिद्धमेव, महद्बहुसर्वानन्तपरिमाणादिशब्दवत् ॥

यथैवैते महदादिशब्दाः प्रसिद्धसातिशयमहदाद्यनुगतसामान्यार्थाभिधायिनः सन्तो निरवधिकमहद्बहुसर्वानन्तपरिमाणव्यक्तीनामस्तित्वावद्योतनलिङ्गा भवन्ति। महदादिसामान्यानां सातिशयव्यक्त्यनुगतानामा निरवधिकमहदादिव्यक्तेरव्याक्षीणशक्तित्वात्। न हि सन्तं व्याप्यमर्थन्तद्वापकः सन्नर्थो न व्याप्नोतीति, निरवधिकात्तु परो व्याप्यो नास्तीति, निरवधिकव्यक्तौ व्यापकस्य सामान्यस्य क्षयः, व्याप्यविषयत्वेनैव प्रसिद्धत्वात् ॥

तस्मात्प्रमाणसिद्धत्वादीश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दार्थयोरभावं साधयतो ऽभ्युपगतार्थप्रतिषेध एवेति दुष्टा प्रतिज्ञा। न चेश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दयोरतदर्थत्वमन्यार्थत्वं वा कर्तुं शक्यते। तथा शक्तिज्ञानेश्वर्याणां प्रतिपुरुषं समुच्चितानां सातिशयानान्निरवधिकान्तत्वन्न प्रतिषेद्धमुत्सहेतेत्यनुमानविरोधित्वम्प्रतिज्ञायाः ॥

1 वा नास्तित्वस्य वा]TMA, वा नास्तित्वस्य वा नास्तित्वस्य वा L, ((वा नास्तित्वस्य) ४ 1 नाभ्युपगमो]TL^{ac}MA४, *भ्युपगमो L^{pc} 1 ऽस्ति]LMA४{स्ति L}, नास्ति T 3 नजा]L, न M, *नः A, ((न) ४ 3 *करिष्यत]LMA, *करिष्यते ४ 4 *पक्षत्वमपि]LMA, *पक्षत्वमपि[पक्षो ऽपि] ४ 4 *करिष्यत। तस्मा]em., *करिष्यततस्मा L, *करिष्यतस्तस्मा M, *करिष्यत्यतस्मा A, *करिष्यते, ((अतः)तस्मा ४ 5 *षेधप्रति]LMA, *षेधः प्रति ४ 6 प्रमाणसिद्ध]L^{pc}MA४, प्रमाण(वस्तुविषया)सिद्ध L 7-8 शब्दप्रत्यु]em., शब्दप्रत्यु LMA ४ 8 *वस्त्वन्तरा]MA४, *वस्त्वान्तरा L 9 *सिद्धसद्वस्तु]M४, सिद्धसद्वस्तु L, *सिद्धवस्तु A 9 *त्राभ्युप]L, *त्रापि अभ्युप MA, *त्रापि[स्ति]अभ्युप ४ 11 महद्बहु]MA४, महद्बहु L 14 *नामा निर]em., *नानि[*नां नि MA४]र LMA ४ 14 *व्यक्तेरव्याक्षीण]em., *व्यक्तेरव्याक्षीण LMA, *व्यक्तिव्यापन((रव्याक्षीण)] ४ 15-16 निरवधिकव्यक्तौ]conj., om. LMA ४ 16 *त्वात्]L, *त्वान्त्र MA ४ 17 *माणसिद्ध]L^{pc}MA४, *माणशब्दसिद्ध L^{ac} 17 *शब्दार्थयो]MA४, *शब्दयो L 18 चेश्वरसर्व]L^{pc}MA४, चेश्वर(श)सर्व L 18 *मन्यार्थ]LM४{र्थ M४}, *सामान्यार्थ A 18 कर्तु]LMA, कर्तु [वक्तु] ४ 19 *कान्तत्वन्न]conj., *कन्तत्वम् तःL, *कं तत्वमतःMA, *कं तत्त्वं अतः[नानुन्तः] ४

3 प्रतिहस्तिनेव हस्ती] Cf. KAŚ 1.14.7 : 'यथा मदान्वो हस्ती मत्तेनाधिष्ठितो यद्यदासादयति तत्सर्वं प्रमुद्रति, एवमयमशास्त्रचक्षुरन्वो राजा पौरजानपदवधायभ्युत्थितः, शक्यमस्य प्रतिहस्तिप्रोत्साहनेनापकर्तुम्, अमर्षः क्रियताम्' इति कृद्धवर्गमुपजापयेत् ॥

2 *त्रम् प्राप्यमाणम् ... 66.20 मतिमोहनार्थः] Missing in T, due to the lack of folio 26 of T_m and corresponding part in T_d.

- 1 किञ्चान्यत्—परिकल्पितस्येश्वरस्य प्रतिषेधं कुर्वतो ऽप्रत्यक्षपरचित्तानिष्टता प्राप्नोति॥
 2 परवाक्यादिति चेन्न, सातिशयत्वादिसर्वज्ञसाधकलिंगप्रतिपादकवदविशिष्टत्वात् परवा-
 3 क्यस्य। तादृशवाक्यार्थप्रतिषेधे चाभ्युपगतप्रतिषेधः पूर्ववदेव। अनुमानविरोधश्च॥
 4 किञ्च प्रमेयत्वादिहेतूनामसिद्धत्वम्। कुतः? अस्माभिर्निरतिशयज्ञानैश्वर्य्यविशिष्टस्याभ्यु-
 5 पगतत्वात्। अथ स्वयमपि तादृशमभ्युपगच्छेत्, तथा सर्वज्ञसिद्धिः, अभ्युपगतत्वात्॥
 6 किञ्चान्यत्—अभ्युपगततादृक्प्रतिषेधे यथा घटो घटो न भवति, वस्तुत्वात्, घटवदित्येव-
 7 मिहापि स्यात्॥
 8 किञ्च निरवधिकस्यानभ्युपगमे, प्रमेयत्वादीनामपक्षधर्मत्वमाश्रयासिद्धत्वञ्च। तदभ्युप-
 9 गमे हि किं साध्यम्भवेत्? यो हि तुप्तवन्तम्ब्रूयान्माऽत्राऽप्सीरिति किं तेन कृतं स्यात्॥
 10 अथापि स्यात्—निरवधिकमीश्वरमभिसन्धाय तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वन्निषेधामीति॥
 11 नैतदपि युक्तम्, सर्वज्ञत्वस्यापि निरवधिकत्वात्। अपि च सातिशयैश्वर्य्यसर्वज्ञत्वयोरु-
 12 त्कर्णानुत्कर्षविषयत्वेन व्यभिचारान्नेश्वरसर्वज्ञशब्दमुख्याभिधेयत्वम्। यथा महदादयः शब्दा
 13 व्यभिचरितमहत्वादिषु घटादिष्वमुख्याः, नाकाशादिषु, तथैवात्रापि निरतिशयमैश्वर्य्यं सर्व-
 14 ज्ञत्वञ्चाव्यभिचारीति स एव मुख्यः शब्दार्थः। न च मुख्यनिराकरणं साधिमानमृच्छति॥
 15 किञ्च यथा भवतानुमानागमप्रसिद्धेश्वरस्य प्रमेयत्वादिधर्मविकल्पतया सर्वज्ञत्वन्निरा-
 16 क्रियते, तथैव प्रमेयत्वादिभिरचेतनत्वमपि घटादिवदेव प्राप्नुयात्, अविरोधात्। यथा प्रमेयत्व-
 17 मसर्वज्ञत्वेन व्याप्तमेवमचेतनत्वादिभिरपि॥
 18 प्रत्यक्षविरोध इति चेत्—इहाप्यनुमानागमविरोधं किं कटाक्षेणापि नेक्षसे!
 19 नापि च प्रमेयत्वादिधर्मसामान्येन सपक्षे विपक्षे वा किञ्चित् क्वचिदध्यारोपयितुं शक्यम्,
 20 वस्तुविषये सर्वत्र प्रमेयत्वादीनामस्तित्वात्। न मतिमोहनार्थः, प्रमेयत्वाद्युपन्यासः॥
 21 अथात्मत्वान्मुक्तात्मवदिति चेत्—अज्ञत्वप्रसंगं स्याद्भूवदात्मनाम्॥
 22 प्रत्यक्षादिविरोध इति चेत्—अत्राप्यनुमानादिविरोधः पूर्ववदेव॥

1 परिकल्पित°]LMA, परि[पर]कल्पित° ४ 1 कुर्वतो ऽप्र°]L(कुर्वतो प्र°), कुर्वतः प्र° MA, कुर्वन्तः प्र°
 ४ 1 °चित्तानिष्टता]em., °चित्तज्ञातानिष्टा L, °चित्तानिष्टाः MA ४ 1 प्राप्नोति]L, प्राप्नुवन्ति MA ४ 2
 परवा°]MA ४, परवा° L 3 °भ्युपगत°]L ४, °भ्युपगते MA 4 °नामसिद्ध°]L, °नामपि असिद्ध° MA ४
 4 °विशिष्ट°]LMA, °विशिष्टत्व° ४ 5 तथा]LMA, तदा ४(em.) 6 न भवति]MA ४, न वति L 6
 घटव°]L, पटव° MA ४ 8 °नामपक्ष°]L ४{°नाम्[अ]प° ४}, °नां पक्ष° MA 9 °प्सीरिति]L, °प्सीदिति
 MA, °प्सीरिति ४ 10 °सन्धाय]MA ४, °सन्धायं L 11 °ज्ञत्व°]MA ४, °ज्ञात्व° L 13 °चरित°]LM-
 ४, °चारित° A 16-17 °त्वमसर्व°]४(em.), °त्वम् सर्व° L, °त्वं सर्व° MA, °त्वं[अ]सर्व° ४ 18
 नेक्षसे]MA ४, नैक्षसे L 19 किञ्चित् क्वचिद°]LM ४, किञ्चिद° A 21 °न्मुक्तात्मवदिति चेत्—अ°]conj.,
 °दिति चेन्मु[°त्—सु° ४]क्तात्मवद° Σ 21 °दात्मनाम्]conj., °दीश्वराणाम् Σ

21 अथात्मत्वान्मुक्तात्मवदिति] Cf. ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra k. 78: अथ तस्याप्यधिष्ठानं तेनैवेत्यविपक्षता। अशरीरो ह्यधिष्ठानात्मा मुक्तात्मवद्भवेत्॥

22-67,4 प्रत्यक्षविरोध इति चेत् ... अस्मदादिवत्] Cf. BSBh 1.3.33: इतिहासपुराणमपि व्याख्यातेन मार्गेण सम्भवन्मन्त्रार्थवादमूलकत्वात्प्रभवति देवताविग्रहादि साधयितुम्। प्रत्यक्षादिमूलमपि सम्भवति। भवति ह्यस्माकमप्रत्यक्षमपि चिरन्तनानां प्रत्यक्षम्। तथा च व्यासादयो देवादिभिः प्रत्यक्षं व्यवहरन्तीति स्मर्यते। यस्तु ब्रूयात्—इदानीन्तनानामिव पूर्वेषामपि नास्ति देवादिभिर्व्यवहर्तुं सामर्थ्यमिति, स जगद्वैचित्र्यं प्रतिषेधेत्। इ-

20 मतिमोहनार्थः] T (folio 26 of T_m) is not available up to here (inclusive).

भूतभविष्यत्कालयोरपीश्वरस्यानुपलब्धार इति। इदानीन्तनेश्वराणामुपलब्धुभिरनैका-
न्तिकम्प्राणित्वादित्यादि ॥

किञ्चातीतानागतकालयोरपि सातिशयत्वादिर्लिङ्गैरुपलब्धवन्त उपलप्स्यमानाश्च प्राणिनः
प्रमाणकुशलाः, प्रमाणकुशलत्वात्, अस्मदादिवत् ॥

अथाशरीरत्वादसर्वज्ञो मुक्ताकाशादिवदिति चेन्न, सशरीरत्वात्। व्यक्ताव्यक्तं हि सर्वं
शरीरम् ॥

सशरीरत्वादनित्येश्वरत्वम्, धर्माद्यपेक्षत्वादियुक्तत्वादिति चेन्न, अशरीरत्वात् ॥

सशरीराशरीरत्वविरोध इति चेन्न, मुक्तमुच्यमानैकात्मनो ऽशरीरत्वसशरीरत्वदर्शनात् ॥

तत्र भिन्नकालत्वादविरोध इति चेन्न, अत्रापि भिन्नकालाभ्युपगमात् ॥

किञ्च—युगपदीश्वरत्वादेव द्वयसम्भवः। सकरणताकरणत्वे ऽपीश्वरत्वादेव युक्ता। तथा च
श्रुतयः—‘अशरीरं शरीरेष्विति, तथा ‘यः सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्नि’ति, तथा ‘यः सर्वज्ञः सर्व-
विदि’त्यादयः ॥

3 °गत°] T_m^{PC}T_dLMAḥ, °गति° T_m^{ac} 3 °त्वादिलिङ्गै°] T_m^{PC}T_dLMAḥ, °त्वादि(न)लिङ्गै° T_m 3
°रूपलब्ध°] T_m^{PC}T_dLMAḥ, °रु°प«लब्ध° T_m 3 °लप्स्य°] T_m^{PC}T_dLMAḥ, °लब्धस्य° T_m^{ac} 4 प्र-
माण°] TLMḥ, om. A 5-6 सर्वं शरीरम्] T_m^{PC}T_d, सर्वं» «शरीरं T_m, सर्वं[र्व MAḥ]मशरीरं LMAḥ
7 °दियुक्तत्वा°] T_d, °दियुक्ता° T_m, °दित्युक्तत्वा° LMAḥ 10 सकरणता°] TLMA, सकरणता अ° ḥ 10
°करणत्वे ऽपी°] em., °करणतापी° T, °करणत्वापी° L, °करणत्वपी° M^{ac}, °करणत्ववी° M^{PC}, करणत्व* A,
°करणताऽपि ई° ḥ 10 युक्ता] TLḥ, मुक्ता MA

दानीमिव च नान्यदापि सार्वभौमः क्षत्रियो ऽस्तीति ब्रूयात्, ततश्च राजसूयादिचोदना उपरुन्ध्यात्। इदानीमिव च
कालान्तरे ऽप्यव्यवस्थितप्रायान्वर्णाश्रमधर्मान्प्रतिजानीत। ततश्च व्यवस्थाविधायि शास्त्रमनर्थकं कुर्यात्। तस्माद्धर्मो-
त्कर्षवशाच्चिरन्तना देवादिभिः प्रत्यक्षं व्यवजहुरिति श्लिष्यते (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 346).

1 भूतभविष्यत्कालयोरपीश्वरस्यानुपलब्धार इति] Cf. ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 46,
57cd-59: ज्ञाता च कस्तदा तस्य यो जनान् बोधयिष्यति। उपलब्धेर्विना चैतत्कथमध्यवसीयताम् ॥४६ ॥; 57cd-
59: न च कैश्चिदसौ ज्ञातुं कदाचिदपि शक्यते ॥५७ ॥ स्वरूपेणोपलब्धे ऽपि स्रष्टृत्वं नावगम्यते। सृष्ट्याद्याः प्रा-
णिना ये च बुध्यन्तां किं नु ते तदा ॥५८ ॥ कुतो वयमिहोत्पन्ना इति तावन्न जानते। प्रागवस्थां च जगतः स्रष्टृत्वं च
प्रजापतेः ॥५९ ॥.

5-9 अथाशरीरत्वादसर्वज्ञो ... भिन्नकालाभ्युपगमात्] See 59,4-59,6. Cf. ŚV Sambandhā-
kṣepaparihāra kk. 77-78: अनेकान्तश्च हेतुस्ते तच्छरीरादिना भवेत्। उत्पत्तिमांश्च तद्देहो देहत्वादस्मदादि-
वत् ॥७७ ॥ अथ तस्याप्यधिष्ठानं तेनैवेत्यविपक्षता। अशरीरो ह्यधिष्ठिता नात्मा मुक्तात्मवद्भवेत् ॥७८ ॥.

5-6 व्यक्ताव्यक्तं हि सर्वं शरीरम्] Cf. BSBh 1.4.1-3.

8 मुक्तमुच्यमानैकात्मनो ऽशरीरत्वसशरीरत्वदर्शनात्] Cf. BSBh 4.4.12: द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरा-
यणो ऽतः ॥ बादरायणः पुनराचार्यो ऽत एवोभयलिङ्गश्रुतिदर्शनादुभयविधं साधु मन्यते, यदा सशरीरतां संकल्पयति
तदा सशरीरो भवति, यदा त्वशरीरतां तदाशरीर इति, सत्यसंकल्पत्वात्, संकल्पवैचित्र्यत्वाच्च। (Śāstri and
Paṇṣīkar 1917: 1012-1014).

11 ‘अशरीरं शरीरेष्विति] KaU 1.2.22: अशरीरं शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्। महान्तं विभूमात्मानं
मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥. Quoted in BSBh 1.1.4 (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 116), 1.3.19 (Śāstri
and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 304). The subject is ātman.

11 ‘यः सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्नि’ति] BĀU 3.7.15: यः सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्सर्वेभ्यो भूतेभ्यो ऽन्तरो यं
सर्वाणि भूतानि न विदुर्यस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि शरीरं यः सर्वाणि भूतान्यन्तरो यमयत्येप त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृत
इत्यधिभूतमाध्यात्मम्. The subject is antaryāmin/ātman.

11-12 ‘यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविदि’त्यादयः] MuU1.1.091.1.9. See also 60,8.

- 1 श्रुतीनां विधिप्रतिषेधार्थत्वादीश्वराप्रत्यायकत्वमिति चेन्न, अनन्यशेषत्वात् । न हि कर्म-
 2 शेषत्वे श्रुतिलिंगादीनामन्यतमदपि प्रमाणमस्ति॥
- 3 स्वाध्यायविधिपरिग्रहादर्शपूर्णमासादिशेष इति चेन्न, ज्योतिष्टोमादिवद्विध्यन्तरस्य भा-
 4 वात् । यथैव ज्योतिष्टोमादीनां पृथक्प्रकरणादन्योन्यशेषशेषिभावो नास्ति, तथैव 'मन्तव्यो
 5 निदिध्यासितव्य' इत्यादिविषयत्वान्नाग्निहोत्रादिशेषत्वं युक्तम्॥
- 6 फलोभाव इति चेन्न, 'सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान्यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य वि-
 7 जानाती'त्यादि फलमुद्दिश्य विधानात् ॥
- 8 अथैवमप्युपासनाविधिषेधत्वास्तुतिरेवेति चेन्न, अत्यन्तमसता स्तुतिर्नास्ति । न हि 'वा-

1 विधि°]em., वि° Σ 3 स्वाध्यायविधि°]TL^{PC}MA⁸, स्वाध्यायविधि°]«° L 3 °तिष्टोमादि°]LMA⁸,
 [. षो]मादि° T_m, . षोमादि° T_d 4 पृथक्°]8(em.), [पृ . . .] T_m, प . . . T_d, प्रथ° L, प्रथम° MA,
 ((प्रथमप्र)पृथक्° 8 4 °प्रकरणाद°]em., [.]कारणाद° T_m, कारणाद° T_d, °प्रकरणा-
 दिकारणाद° LMA⁸ 5 °होत्रादि°]LMA⁸, °हो[.] T_m, हो T_d 5 °त्वं युक्तम्]MA⁸,
 °त्वमयुक्तम् L 6 कामा°]8(em.), काला° LMA 8 स्तुतिर्ना°]em., स्तुतिर° Σ

1 श्रुतीनां ... अनन्यशेषत्वात्] Cf. similar discussions in BSBh 1.1.4, especially कथं पुन-
 ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते, यावता 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शानामिति (JS 1.2.1) क्रियापरत्वं
 शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम् । अतो वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यम्, अक्रियार्थत्वात्, कर्तृदेवतादिप्रकाशनार्थत्वेन वा क्रियाविधिषेप-
 त्वम्, उपासनादिक्रियान्तरविधानार्थत्वं वा । (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 100); यदपि केचिदाहुः प्रवृत्तिनि-
 वृत्तिविधितच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण केवलवस्तुवादी वेदभागो नास्तीति, तन्न, औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वात् (Śāstri
 and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 130–31).

1–2 न हि कर्मशेषत्वे श्रुतिलिंगादीनामन्यतमदपि प्रमाणमस्ति] For *śruti*, *liṅga*, etc., see JS
 3.3.14: श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात्. Cf. also BSBh 1.1.1:
 शेषशेषित्वे ऽधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावात् (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 64).

3 स्वाध्यायविधि] i.e., Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 2.15 स्वाध्यायो ऽध्येतव्यः

4–5 पृथक्प्रकरणाद°... शेषत्वं युक्तम्] Cf. BSBh 1.1.4: अथ प्रकरणान्तरभयान्नैतदभ्युपगम्यते, तथा-
 पि स्ववाक्यगतोपासनादिकर्मपरत्वम् (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 101–2).

4–5 'मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्य'] BĀU 2.4.5. Quoted in BSBh 1.1.4 (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar
 1917: 113). See also the answer to the objection on p. 153 ff.

6 फलोभाव इति] Cf. BSBh 1.1.4: यत्तु हेयोपादेयरहितत्वादुपदेशानर्थक्यमिति, नैष दोषः (Śāstri
 and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 106–7).

6–7 सर्वांश्च ... विजानाति] ChU 8.7.1 (The whole of ChU 8.7.1 reads य आत्मा अपहृत-
 पाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युविशोको विजिघत्सो ऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः सो ऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः । स
 सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान्यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य विजानातीति ह प्रजापतिरुवाच ॥) Cf. BSBh 3.4.1:
 पुरुषार्थो ऽत इति । अस्माद्वेदान्तविहितादात्मज्ञानात्स्वतन्त्रात्पुरुषार्थः सिध्यतीति बादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते । कुत
 एतदवगम्यते ? शब्दादित्याह । तथा हि— ... 'य आत्मापहृतपाप्मा' इत्युपक्रम्य 'स सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च
 कामान्यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य विजानाति' इति (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 869). Quoted also in BSBh
 1.3.33.

8 अथैवमप्युपासनाविधिषेधत्वास्तुतिरेवेति] Cf. ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra k. 63: स्तुति-
 वाक्यकृतश्रेय जनानां मतिविभ्रमः । पीर्वापर्यापरामृष्टः शब्दो ज्यां कुरुते मतिम् ॥; JS 1.2.7: विधिना त्वेकवा-
 क्यत्वात्स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः; BSBh 1.1.4: अत एव 'सो ऽरोदीत्' इत्येवमादीनामानर्थक्यं मा भूदिति 'विधिना
 ... स्युः' (JS 1.2.7) इति स्तावकत्वेनार्थवचत्वमुक्तम् (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 100).

8–69,1 'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवते'ति] TaiS 2.1.1. ŚBh uses this as the example in explaining
 JS 1.2.7. Quoted in BSBh 1.3.33.

युर्वे क्षेपिष्ठा देवते'ति वा॒योर्क्षेपिष्ठत्वम् ॥

क्वचिदसतापि स्तुत्यादि सम्भवेदिति चेन्न, अनुमानसिद्धस्येहोपादानात् ॥

अथ सर्वकार्यकरणयोगादीश्वरस्य सर्वप्राणिसुखदुःखादिसम्बन्ध इति चेन्न, निमित्त-
भेदात् । धर्मादिनिमित्तः संसारिणां शरीरादिसम्बन्धः । धर्मादिनिमित्तत्वाद्दुःखादियोगः । न
चेश्वरस्य धर्मादयः, निरतिशयैश्वर्यादिहेतुत्वाच्छरीरादिकार्यकरणसम्बन्धस्य, यथा ग्रह-
तदाविष्टयोः ॥

अथ चक्षुरादिकरणवत्त्वादस्मदादिवत्सर्वानुपलब्धिरिति चेन्न, सर्वविषयग्रहणसमर्थ-
नाम् प्रतिबन्धकारणाभावात् । सर्वगतानां हि करणानान्धर्मादिसंवरणेन स्वविषयसंकोचः
क्रियते । यस्य पुनरावरणम् प्रतिबन्धकधर्मादि न विद्यते, तस्य तदभावोदशेषस्वविषयग्रह-
णानि करणानीति न दुष्यति ॥

अथ वा सर्वप्राणिकरणैः पृथगात्मनः करणाभावे ऽप्यावेशग्रह इव सर्वमनुभवति । न च
प्राणिशून्यो विषयः कश्चिद्विद्यते, 'यः पृथिव्यान्तिष्ठन्,' 'यो ऽप्सु तिष्ठन्'त्येवमादिश्रुतेरन्त्य्या-

2 सम्भवेदिति] em., सम्भवे इति सम्भ[संभ० MA]वे इति TLMA, सम्भव ४ 3 *करण०] ४(em.), *करण०
LMA 4 *निमित्तत्वाद्दुः०] conj., *निमित्तानान्दुः[०नां दुःMA]० LMA, *निमि[त्तानां]त्तो दुः ४ 4-5
*योगः। न चे] em., [.] यागो ने० T_m, . यागो ने० T_d, *योगो ने० L, *योगेने० MA, *योगः। ने० ४ 5 *दयः,
नि] LMA ४ { *यो नि० LMA } { *यः। नि० ४ }, *दयो हि नि० T 5-6 ग्रहत०] TLM ४, *ग्रह०त० M, *ग्रहः
त० A 7 *करणवत्त्वा०] LMA, *करणत्वा० ४ 8 *नान्ध०] TLMA, *नां [अ]ध० ४ 9 *कध०] TLMA,
*क[म]ध० ४ 11 *करणैः] TLMA, *करणैः [ईश्वरः] ४ 12 यो ऽप्सु] LMA ४, [. . . ऽप्सु] T_m, . . .
।सु T_d 12 *तिष्ठन्'त्ये०] LMA ४ { *ष्ठन्' इ० ४ }, तिष्ठ[. . .] T_m, तिष्ठतीत्ये० T_d 12 *दिक्षु] LMA ४,
दि[. .] T_m, *दिश . T_d 12-70,1 *र्यामि०] LMA ४, [. .]दि० T_m^{ac}

2 क्वचिदसतापि . . . 'उपादानात्] Cf. BSBh 1.3.33: यथा हि 'वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतकामः' इत्यत्र
विध्युद्देशवर्तिनां वायव्यादिपदानां विधिना संबन्धः, नैवम् 'वायुर्वे क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव स्वेन भागधेयेनोपधावति
स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति' इत्येषामर्थवादगतानां पदानाम्; न हि भवति वायुर्वा आलभेतेति, क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वा आ-
लभेतेत्यादि । वायुस्वभावसंकीर्तनेन त्ववान्तरमन्वयं प्रतिपद्येवं विशिष्टदैवत्यमिदं कर्मेति विधिं स्तुवन्ति । तद्यत्र यो
ऽवान्तरवाक्यार्थः प्रमाणान्तरगोचरो भवति, तत्र तदनुवादिनार्थवादः प्रवर्तते । यत्र प्रमाणान्तरविरुद्धस्तत्र गुणवा-
देन । यत्र तु तदुभयं नास्ति तत्र किं प्रमाणान्तराभावाद्गुणवादः स्यादाहोस्त्वित्प्रमाणान्तराविरोधाद्विद्यमानवाद इति
प्रतीतिशरणैर्विद्यमानवाद आश्रयणीयो, न गुणवादः (Śāstri and Paṇṣikar 1917: 342-346)

3 अथ सर्वकार्यकरण० . . . सम्बन्ध इति] Cf. ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 50-1: सा-
धनं चास्य धर्मादि तदा किं चिन्न विद्यते । न च निस्साधनः कर्ता कश्चित्सृजति किं चन ॥५० ॥ नाधारेण विना
सृष्टिरूर्णनाभेरपीष्यते । प्राणिनां भक्षणआच्चापि तस्य लाला प्रवर्तते ॥५१ ॥, 68cd-70: न च कर्मवतां युक्ता स्थि-
तिस्तद्भूगवजिता । कर्मान्तरनिरुद्धं हि फलं न स्यात्क्रियान्तरात् ॥६९ ॥ सर्वेषां तु फलापेतं न स्थानमुपपद्यते । न
चाप्यनुपभोगो ऽसौ कस्यचित्कर्मणः फलम् ॥७० ॥ Cf. also BS (संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात्) and BSBh
1.2.8.

12 यः पृथिव्यान्तिष्ठन्] BĀU 3.7.3. Quoted in BSBh 1.2.14, 1.2.18, 2.3.13.

12 यो ऽप्सु तिष्ठन्] BĀU 3.7.4. Quoted in BSBh 2.2.3.

12-70,1 अन्तर्यामिनाम् ईश्वरस्य सर्वेष्ववस्थितत्वश्रवणात्] Cf. BĀUBh 3.7.3: यस्य पृथिवी
शरीरमिति । देवताकार्यकरणस्येश्वरसाक्षिमात्रसान्निध्येन हि नियमेन प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्याताम् । य ईदृगीश्वरो
नारायणाख्यः पृथिवीं पृथिवीदेवतां यमयति नियमयति स्वव्यापारे । अन्तरो ऽभ्यन्तरस्तिष्ठन्नप्ये त आत्मा 'ते'
तव मम च सर्वभूतानां चेत्युपलक्षणार्थमेतदन्तर्यामी यस्त्वया पृष्टोऽमृतः सर्वसंसारधर्मवजित इत्येतत् (Shāstri
1986: 263); BSBh 1.2.18 इदमुच्यते—यो जन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु श्रूयते स परमात्मैव स्यान्नान्य इति (Śāstri
and Paṇṣikar 1917: 252); 2.3.13 स एव परमेश्वरस्तेन तेनावतिष्ठमानो ऽभिधायस्तं तं विकारं सृजतीति ।

1]मिनाम्न ईश्वरस्य सर्वेष्ववस्थितत्वश्रवणात्॥

2 अपि वा प्रकृष्टमेव सत्त्वन्नित्यानतिशायितशक्तिज्ञानेश्वरत्वधर्मकम्, सर्वगतत्वादाकाश-
3 वत्सर्व्वयोगि, सर्व्वार्थत्वात्सर्व्वविषयप्रकाशकम्, धूर्म्माधूर्म्मादिविप्रयोगादप्रतिबद्धशक्ति-
4 च्चेत्यकायानिन्द्रियत्वपक्षे ऽपीश्वरसर्व्वज्ञत्वसिद्धिः ॥

5 चक्षुराद्यपेक्षमेव चित्तस्य रूपादिप्रतिलम्भसामर्थ्यमिति चेन्न, ऐश्वर्य्यधर्म्माद्यभावाभ्या-
6 म्परिहृतत्वात् ॥

7 अपि च चक्षुर्ग्राह्यस्यापि चक्षुषाग्रहणं लोके दृश्यते । चक्षुर्ग्राह्यं सत्सन्तमसन्निमीलितलो-
8 चनैरपि स्वस्थान्तःकरणैरुपलभ्यते । तदेव चान्धतमसं विस्फारितनयनैरप्यन्यगतचित्तैर्नैव गृ-
9 ह्यते, यथागृह्यमाण एवाकाशे प्रकाशः॥

10 अथापि प्रकाशाभावमात्रमेव तमो न वस्त्विति ब्रूयात्—तच्च न, अभावस्य वस्तुतिरो-
11 धानसामर्थ्याभावात् ॥

2 सत्त्वन्नि°] ४(em.), सन्नि° T, स*नि° L, सर्वं नि° MA, स((वै))त्वं नि° ४ 2 °तिशायित°] TLMA, °ति-
शायित° ४ 3 °प्रकाश°] LMA ४, प्र[कृ . .] T_m, प्रक्र . . T_d 3 °प्रतिबद्ध°] em., °प्रतिबन्ध° Σ 5
चेन्न, ऐश्वर्य्य°] TMA ४{°नैश्व° T_m}{°न। ऐ° MA}{चेत्—न—ऐश्व° ४}, चेन्नैर्य्यश्वर्य्य° L 7 सत्सन्तमस-
न्नि°] T_m^{pc}(s.h.)T_d, तत्सन्तमसन्नि° T_m^{ac}, सत्सर्व्वन्तमसन्नि° L, सत् सर्वं तमः सन्नि° MA ४ 8 विस्फा-
रित°] em., विष्फारित° Σ 9 °गृह्यमाण] TL^{pc}MA ४, °गृह्यम(तु)ण L

कुतः? तल्लिङ्गात् । तथा हि शास्त्रम्—‘यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्त्यः पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद . . .’ इत्येवंजातीयकं
साध्यक्षणामेव भूतानां प्रवृत्तिं दर्शयति। (Sāstri and Pañśīkar 1917: 595).

9 यथागृह्यमाण एवाकाशे प्रकाशः] Cf. YBh 4.31: ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याज्जेयमल्पं सम्पद्यते, यथाकाशे खद्योतः

10 अथापि प्रकाशाभावमात्रमेव तमो न वस्त्विति ब्रूयात्] See VS 5.2.21: द्रव्यगुणकर्मनिष्पत्तिवैध-
र्म्माद्भावास्तमः and Wezler (1984a) for the following discussion. Cf. PDhS: अनुमेयासिद्धौ
यथा पार्थिवं द्रव्यं तमः कृष्णरूपत्वादिति (Dvivedin 1984: 238); NKd: तमो नाम रूपसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व-
परत्वापरत्वसंयोगविभागवद्द्रव्यान्तरमस्तीति चेदत्र कश्चिदाह, etc. (Dvivedin 1984: 9–10); Vyomavatī:
अथाधिक्योपलब्धेस्तदभावो ऽसिद्धः । तथा हि च्छाया द्रव्यम्, क्रियावत्त्वात्, गुणवत्त्वाच्चेति । चक्षुर्व्यापाराद्द्रव्य-
तीति ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः, देशान्तरप्राप्तेश्च । तथा हि गतिमती छाया देशान्तरप्राप्तित्वात् । यो यो देशान्तरप्राप्तिमान् स
स गतिमानुपलब्धः, यथा देवदत्तः, तथा देशान्तरप्राप्तिमती छायातस्माद्गतिमती । गुणवत्त्वं च ‘आतपः कुटुम्बो रु-
क्षश्छाया मधुरशीतला’ इत्यागमात् । तदेतदसत् ।, etc. (Kavirāj 1983: 46–47); NBh 1.2.8: द्रव्यं छयेति
साध्यम्, गतिमत्त्वादिति हेतुः साध्येनाविशिष्टः साधनीयत्वात् साध्यसमः । and NV, NVT^T on the same sū-
tra (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985: 384–87); VP 1.113: अणवः सर्वशक्तित्वाद्भेदेसंसर्गवृत्तयः ।
छायातपतमःशब्दभावेन परिणामिनः ॥ (Rau 1977: 47); Sucaritamīśra on ŚV Anumāna k. 138 न
च तमो नाम किञ्चिद्वस्त्विति भवत्सिद्धान्ते, भासो ऽभावमात्रात् (Sastri 1943: 84) as part of the criti-
cism against the view that accepts *sāmānyatodrṣṭa anumāna*; NBhū (Yogindrānanda
1967: 543) where Bhāsarvajña criticizes the view that *tamas* is an entity (*vastu*) as
the non-existence of light (*ālokābhāva*); VidhiV 1.12: ज्ञानाभावे ज्ञानभ्रमः, व्यवहाराभावे व्यव-
हारभ्रमः, आलोकादर्शने ऽन्धकारभ्रमवत् (Stern 1988: 822) and a long discussion on this and the
following in the NKṇ (Stern 1988: 822–844); The editors of the *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇa*
have a summary of various positions with regard to the existence of *tamas*: तमसः स्वरूपे
मतद्वयम्—केचित्तमो भावरूपं मन्यन्ते केचित्त्वभावरूपम् । तत्र जैनाः पुद्गलपरिणामतया भर्तृहरिप्रमुखवैयाकरणा
अणुपरिणामतया, सांख्याः प्रकृतिपरिणामतया मीमांसकाश्चाभावस्य पदार्थान्तरत्वाभावेन च तमसो भावरूपतां
प्रतिपन्नाः । नैयायिकवैशेषिकौ तु तमसस्तेजोऽभावरूपत्वेनाभावरूपतां स्वीकृतवन्तः । (Samghavin and Dośi-
nin 1984: vol. 2, 543)

अथ ग्रहणनिमित्तस्य प्रकाशस्याभावादेव घटाद्यग्रहणं, न वस्तुतिरोधायकन्तम इति ब्रु-
वीत ॥

न । चक्षुषः प्रकाशकत्वात्प्रकाशसाहायकापेक्षानुपपत्तिः । असति भिन्नजातीये वस्तुनि व-
स्तूनान्तिरोधातृणि तत्र या च यावती च मात्रा प्रकाशकत्वाच्चक्षुषा प्रकाशयेत । न हि प्रदीपः
प्रदीपान्तरद्वैतीयकापेक्षः प्रकाशयति ॥

किञ्चान्यत् । चक्षुषः प्रकाशकत्वे प्रकाशान्तरसाहायकापेक्षतायाञ्च निशायामपि तारा-
धिपतिप्रकाशद्वितीयेन चक्षुषा दिवस इव रूपादिग्रहणप्रसंगः, तिरोधानस्यासति निमित्ते ॥

किञ्चान्यत् । अभावश्चेत्तमः, चन्द्रभासु निशायां भवन्तीषु तमसा मन्देन न प्रवर्तितव्यम् ।
सर्वात्मनैव हि तेन विनशनीयम्, भासाम्भावात् । तमसस्तु वस्तुत्वान्मन्दत्वपाटवादि विशेषो
घटते, न भाभावस्य, अभावस्य निर्विशेषत्वात् ॥

किञ्च सहायाभावाच्चक्षुष उपलब्धिसामर्थ्याभावादग्रहणमित्येतदपि व्यभिचरति । यथा
सत्यपि विद्युल्लताप्रकाशे तीव्रतरे विद्युल्लतविलासेन चकितदृष्टिर्ज्ञोपलभते । न हि विद्युति
सहायके दृष्टिचकितत्वेनाग्रहणं विरोधाभावाद्युक्तम् ॥

किञ्च—चिकित्साशास्त्रे 'छाया मधुरशीतले'त्युच्यते । न ह्यवस्तुनो मधुरशीतलत्वम् । त-
था चाक्षिपथ्यत्वम् । नाभावस्य पथ्यापथ्यत्वम्ब्रूयुः । प्रदीपच्छायापलब्धेश्च । अभावश्चेत्तमः,
प्रदीपप्रभामण्डले प्रदीपच्छाया कथं भवेत् ॥

वस्तुत्वे ऽपि विरोधादयुक्तमिति चेन्न, विषसर्प्योरिव संभवात् । यथा प्राणिवियोग-

1 *धायक*]४(em.), *धानक* TLMA 3 *साहायका*]TLM४, *सहायक* A 3-4 वस्तूनान्तिरोधा-
तृणि]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA४, वस्तूनान्तिरो([धानसा]मर्थ्याभावादथ ग्रहणनिमित्तस्य प्रकाशस्याभावादेव घटा(द्र)-
द्यग्रहणन्न वस्तुतिरोधानकन्तम इति ब्रवीति न चक्षुषः प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रकाशसाहायकापेक्षानुपपत्तिरसति भिन्नजातीये
वस्तुनि वस्तूनान्तिरो)धातृणि T_m (dittography of about one line) 6 प्रकाशकत्वे प्रकाशा*]conj.,
प्रकाशा* Σ 6 *साहायका*]em., *सहायत्वा* Σ 6-7 ताराधि*]MA४, ताराताराधि* TL 8 *न्यत् ।
अभा*]T_m^{pc}T_d४{*न्यद* T_m^{pc}T_d}{*न्यत्-अभा* ४}, *न्य*द*भा* T_m, *न्यभा* LMA 8 *भासु
नि*]T_mLMA४, *भासुरनि* T_d 8 भवन्तीषु]TLMA, भा((भव)न्तीषु ४ 9 तमसस्तु]conj., भासा-
न्तु[सां तु T_dMA४] Σ 10 भाभावस्य, अभावस्य]L{भाभावस्याभावस्य L}, भावस्याभावस्य T_mMA,
भावस्य T_d, ((भावस्य)अभावस्य ४ 11 सहाया*]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA४, सहा(भ)या T_m 12 *विलासेन च-
कितदृष्टि*]T, *विलासे चकितदृष्टि* L, *विलासे च कितदृष्टि* MA४ 12 विद्युति]em., विद्युतः Σ 13
दृष्टि]em., दृष्ट Σ 14 चिकित्सा*]T_dLMA४, चिकित्साचिकित्सा* T_m 14 छाया]T४, छाया LMA
14 *शीतले*]T_dMA४, *शीतले* T_mL 14 मधुरशीतल*]MA४, मधुरशीतले* T_mL, शीतल* T_d 15
क्षिपथ्यत्व]TL, *क्षिपति पथ्यत्व* MA४ 15 पथ्या*]T_dLMA४, पथ्या* T_m 15 *दीपच्छायो*]em.,
दीपच्छायो Σ 16 *पच्छाया]TLMA, *पाच्छाया ४ 17 विषसर्प्य*]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA४{*सर्प* T_dMA-
४}, विष(य)सर्प्य* T_m

14 चिकित्साशास्त्रे 'छाया मधुरशीतले'त्युच्यते] See Rājanighaṇṭu 21.52-53: तमस्तमिन्नं तिमिरं
ध्वान्तं संतमसं तमः । अन्धकारं च भूछायां तच्छान्द्यतमसं घनम् ॥३७॥ आतपः कटुको रूक्षश्छाया मधुरशीतला ।
त्रिदोषणमनी ज्योत्स्ना सर्वव्याधिकरं तमः ॥३८॥ (Śarma 1925: 416); Kaiyadevanighaṇṭu (Sharma
and Sharma 1979: 549) आतपः पित्तरक्ताग्निस्वेदमूर्च्छातृषावहः ॥४१८॥ दाहवैवर्ण्यजननो रूक्षः कुटुरसश्च
सः । आतपोक्तगुणान् हन्ति छाया मधुरशीतला ॥४१९॥. The Vyomavati also quotes आतपः कटुको
रूक्षश्छाया मधुरशीतला (Kavirāj 1983: 46). Cf. also Upad Padya 18.34ab, 41 and 42: वस्तु छायाया
स्मृतेरन्यन्माधुर्यादि च कारणम् । ... छायाक्रान्तेनिषेधो ऽयं न तु वस्तुत्वसाधकः । न ह्यर्थान्तरनिष्ठं सद्वाक्यमर्थान्तरं
वदेत् ॥४१॥ माधुर्यादि च यत्कार्यमुष्णद्रव्याद्यसेवनात् । छायाया न त्वदृष्टत्वादपामेव च दर्शनात् ॥४२॥

- 1 करमपि विषम्पन्नग्रहाणवियोगाय न पर्याप्नोति, तथा प्रदीपतच्छाययोरपि ॥
 2 तस्माद्वस्तु तमः, प्रकर्षापकर्षवत्वात्, प्रभावत्। विरोधिद्रव्यापनेयत्वाच्च, घटवत्। उप-
 3 लब्ध्व्यवधानकरत्वाच्च, भित्तिवदिति ॥
 4 इतश्चेन्द्रियनिरपेक्षमप्यन्तःकरणमिन्द्रियविषयग्रहणाय समर्थम्, पिहितकर्णविवरस्य
 5 घोषोपलम्भात्। न च पिहितकर्णसम्पुटस्य श्रोत्रान्तरमनुमार्ति शक्यम्, बधिरस्य पिहितश्रो-
 6 त्रपुटस्य तदग्रहणात् ॥
 7 किञ्च प्रतिभाज्ञानेनापि रूपादिग्रहणमिन्द्रियनिरपेक्षन्दृश्यते ॥
 8 किञ्चान्यत्—स्मृतेश्चानुपपत्तिर्यात्, इन्द्रियनिरपेक्षस्य चित्तस्यासति ग्रहणसामर्थ्ये। वि-

1 न] T₂, om. LMA 2 °पनेय°] TLM₂, °पेय° A 3 भित्ति°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA₂, भित्ति° T_m^{ac} 4
 पिहित°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA₂(em.), »पि«हित° T_m, विहित° LMA 4 °विवरस्य] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA₂, °विवरस्य
 T_m^{ac} 5 च पिहित°] LMA₂, च विहित° LMA 5 °स्य पिहित°] em., [. . .]त° T_m, . विहित° T_d,
 °स्य विहित° LMA, °स्यापि पिहित° L 7 किञ्च] LMA₂, [. च] T_m, . श्च T_d 7 प्रतिभाज्ञा°] em.,
 प्रतिभाज्ञा° L, प्रतिज्ञा° MA₂ 8 चित्तस्यासति] em., [. तस्य] सा[.] T_m, . तस्य साति T_d,
 चित्तस्य साति L, चित्तस्य सातिशय° MA₂ 8 °सामर्थ्ये। वि°] em., [सामर्थ्ये .] T_m, सामर्थ्ये . T_d,
 सामर्थ्ये पि° L, °सामर्थ्ये ऽपि MA, °सामर्थ्ये ऽपि। L

2 तस्माद्वस्तु तमः] Cf. VidhiV तमोदर्शनं तु भूच्छायादर्शनमालोकाभावदर्शनं चेत्यसमानम्। (Stern 1988: 828–846); BSi 3.50cd–51ab: तमोदृष्टिस्तु भूच्छायामालोकाभावमेव वा ॥ आलम्बते न त्वदृष्टविष्टो दर्शनविभ्रमः।; Vibhramaviveka k. 48: यत्र न प्रथते किञ्चित्तत्र तावन्न विभ्रमः। सुपुत्राविव भूच्छाया तमो (5)भावो यथेक्ष्यते ॥ (Schmithausen 1965: 27); Bṛhaṭṭikā?: न च भासाभावस्य तमस्त्वं वृद्धसम्मतम्। छायायाः काष्ण्यमित्येवं पुराणे भूगुणश्रुतेः ॥ दूरसन्नप्रदेशादिमहदल्पचलाचला। देहानुवर्तिनी छाया न वस्तुत्वाद्भिना भवेत् ॥ [quoted in the NKd (Dvivedin 1984: 9–10) to which Wezler (1984b: 471) refers; Vācaspati in his NKṅ (Stern 1988: 836) also cites these stanzas. Vācaspati ascribes these stanzas to a Vārttikakāra, and hence the possibility that they might have come from the Bṛhaṭṭikā. The edition of the Tattvasamīkṣā (Acharya 2006: 230) has two pādas तथा द्रव्यान्तरं छाया रूपभेदसमाश्रयम् that the editor suspects to have come from the Bṛhaṭṭikā. However, the reconstruction [उपपादितं हि (वार्त्तिककृतैव—त)था द्रव्यान्तरं छाया रूपभेदसमाश्रयम्। इति] appears problematic. For, even though the apparatus cites छायोरुसमा° as the reading in the manuscript, in the facsimile of folio 153r, what is read as छायो appears to read तमो with some correction. The scribe of the manuscript indicates further problem in his text by means of a wide gap between मो and सु; in the middle of the gap there is a sign (न?) surrounded by dotted square. From the context and the fact that Vācaspati omits the discussion on the nature of the perception of *tamas*, it appears more reasonable if he referred to the portion of the NKṅ where he had a long discussion on the issue.]; BSBh 2.3.12: पौराणिका अपि पृथिवीच्छायां शर्वरीमुपदिशन्ति, सा च कृष्णाभासेत्यतः कृष्णं रूपं पृथिव्या इति श्लिष्यते। (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 593); Prakaraṇapañcikā (Sastri 1964: 322 ff.): यच्चेदमुच्यते—छायैव तमः, सा च चलत्वाचलत्वमहत्त्वमहत्त्वदूरत्वासन्नत्वादिगुणयोगिनी वस्तुभूतेति। तदप्यसारम्। . . .

4 इतश्चेन्द्रियनिरपेक्षमप्यन्तःकरणमिन्द्रियविषयग्रहणाय समर्थम्] Cf. BĀUBh 1.5.3: तस्मात् यस्या-सन्निधौ रूपादिग्रहणसमर्थस्यापि सतः चक्षुरादेः स्वस्वविषयसम्बन्धे रूपशब्दादिज्ञानं न भवति, यस्य च भावे भवति, तदन्यदस्ति मनो नामान्तःकरणं सर्वकरणविषययोगीत्यवगम्यते। तस्मात्सर्वो हि लोको मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा शृणोति, तद्व्यग्रत्वे दर्शनाद्यभावात्। (Shastri 1986: 123).

4–5 पिहितकर्णविवरस्य घोषोपलम्भात्] Cf. YBh 3.22: घोषं स्वदेहे पिहितकर्णो न शृणोति।

स्पष्टाश्च स्मृतयः स्वाप्ना रूपादिविषयाः । यदि चक्षुराद्यन्तःकरणाभ्यां समन्विताभ्यां रूपादिग्रहणम्पूर्वमपि निरवर्तिष्यत, स्वप्नादावपि समुच्चिताभ्यामेव पृथ्यग्रहीष्यत । न चैवमस्ति ॥

सुखादिग्रहणे स्वातन्त्र्यञ्चित्तस्य सर्वप्रसिद्धम् । तस्मादालोकस्थानीयानीन्द्रियाणि चित्तस्य विषयग्रहणे स्वतन्त्रस्यैव । स्वतस्तदुक्तमिन्द्रियप्रनाडिकयेति । तथा श्रुतिरपि 'मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा शृणोतीति ॥

अथोच्येत—इन्द्रियाणामालोकापेक्षावदन्तःकरणमपीन्द्रियसाहायकापेक्षमेव ग्राहकमिति ॥

तत्र, व्यभिचारात् । रात्रिञ्चराणां निशायां विनाप्यालोकद्वैतीयकेन दिवस इव रूपग्रहणम् । सत्यपि प्रकाशे न रूपस्य ग्रहणमुलूकादिभिर्दिने ॥

किञ्च साधनापेक्षस्य विज्ञस्य साधनादृते ऽपि तुलादेर्दर्शनमात्रेणैव सुवर्णादिपरिमाणज्ञानन्दृश्यते ॥

अथ चेद्ब्रूयात्—आनर्थक्यञ्चक्षुरादीनामिति—

स वक्तव्यः—तुलादिवदेवान्यत्रार्थवत्वमिन्द्रियाणामिति । यथैव तुलादिविषयवैमल्यप्रकर्षात् पुरुषस्य विनापि तुलादिसाधनेन दर्शनमात्रादेव कर्णकादिवस्तुपरिच्छेदकौशलम्, तथैवान्तःकरणस्यानपेक्षितचक्षुरादिसाहायकस्यापि वैमल्यप्रकर्षाद्रूपादिग्रहणसामर्थ्यन्न विहन्यते ॥

1 स्वाप्ना] ४(em.), स्वप्ना LMA 1 रूपादि°]em., रूप° LMA ४ 2 निरवर्तिष्यत] T, निवर्तिष्यत L, निवर्तिष्यते MA ४ 3 °लोकस्थानीयानी°] ४(conj.), °लोकस्थानी° LMA 4 °स्तदुक्तमि°]LMA ४, °न्तमि° Td 4 मनसा ह्ये°]LMA ४, मनसा [. . .] T 6 °च्येत—इ°]LM ४{°च्येते° LM}, °च्येते° A 7 निशायां विनाप्या°]conj., [. . . . ना°]प्या° Tm, नाप्या° Td, विहिUUUUनप्या° L, विभिन्नव्या° MA ४ 8 रूपस्य]LMA ४, [. पस्य] Tm, . पस्य Td 8 °मुलूकादिभि°]LMA ४, [. लूकादिभि°] Tm, . त्रकादिग्र Td 9 विज्ञस्य]em., विज्ञात्व° L, विज्ञान° MA ४ 9 °देर्द°]em., °दौ द° LMA- ४ 14 °र्षाद्रूपा°]LMA ४, °र्षा[द्रू . .] Tm, °र्षाद्रू . Td 14 °सामर्थ्यन्न]LMA ४{°र्थ्यं न MA ४}, [. . °र्थ्यं]न Tm, . . °थ्यं न Td

1 स्मृतयः स्वाप्ना] Cf. YS 1.11: अनुभूतविषयासम्प्रमोषः स्मृतिः ।; YBh 1.11: सा [स्मृतिः] द्वयी, भावितस्मर्तव्या चाभावितस्मर्तव्या च । स्वप्ने भावितस्मर्तव्या ।; YVi 1.10: न हि स्वप्नस्याभावप्रत्ययालम्बनता, स्मृतिवत् । स्मृतेश्चानुभूतविषयत्वात् । तथा भाष्यकारः 'स्वप्ने भावितस्मर्तव्ये'ति ।

4 इन्द्रियप्रनाडिकया] YBh 1.6/7.

4-5 मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा शृणोति] BĀU 1.5.3. With regard to the current discussion, cf. BĀU 4.3.7: **विज्ञानमयः** विज्ञानप्रायः बुद्धिविज्ञानोपाधिसम्पर्काविवेकाद्विज्ञानमय इत्युच्यते । बुद्धिविज्ञानसम्पृक्त एव हि यस्मादुपलभ्यते, राहुरिव चन्द्रादित्यसम्पृक्तः । बुद्धिर्हि सर्वार्थकरणम् । तमसीव प्रदीपः पुरोवस्थितः ; 'मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा शृणोति' इति ह्युक्तम् । बुद्धिविज्ञानालोकविशिष्टमेव हि सर्वं विषयजातमुपलभ्यते, पुरोवस्थितप्रदीपालोकविशिष्टमिव तमसि । द्वारमात्राणि तु अन्यानि करणानि बुद्धेः । तस्मात् तेनैव विशेष्यते विज्ञानमय इति (Shastri 1986: 305-6); BSBh 2.3.32: अथवा अन्यतरस्यात्मन इन्द्रियस्य वा शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो ऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । न च आत्मनः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धः संभवति, अविक्रियत्वात् । नापि इन्द्रियस्य । न हि तस्य पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोरप्रतिबद्धशक्तिकस्य सतो ऽकस्माच्छक्तिः प्रतिबध्यते । तस्मात् यस्यावधानानवधानाभ्यामुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी भवतः, तन्मनः । तथा च श्रुतिः 'अन्यत्रमना अभूवं नादर्शनमन्यत्रमना अभूवं नाशौषम्' इति, 'मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा शृणोति' इति च (Śāstri and Paṅṣikar 1917: 612).

7 रात्रिञ्चराणां निशायां विनाप्यालोकद्वैतीयकेन दिवस इव रूपग्रहणम्] Cf. BhGBh 2.69: **या निशा** रात्रिः सर्वपदार्थानामविवेककरी तमःस्वभावत्वान्निशा सर्वेषां भूतानाम् **सर्वभूतानां** । किं तत्परमार्थतत्त्वं स्थितप्रज्ञस्य विषयो यथा नक्तंचराणामहरेव सदन्त्येषां निशा भवति, तद्वत् नक्तंचरस्थानीयानामज्ञानिनां सर्वभूतानां निशेव निशा परमार्थतत्त्वागोचरत्वात्तद्बुद्धीनाम् ।

1 नापि ह्यनेकनिर्व्वर्त्तनीयं क्रियाजातिभेकेन नाभिनिर्व्वर्त्त्यते। दृश्यन्ते च बहुभिरुत्तोल्यमानं
2 शिलादिकमद्वितीया हस्तिपुरुषादयः केचिदुत्तोलयन्तः। तथैवेन्द्रियसहायेनान्येषामन्तःकरणे-
3 न गृह्यमाणा रूपादयः परमेश्वरचित्तसत्वेनावकर्णितचक्षुरादिपरिस्पन्देन केवलेनैव गृह्यन्ते,
4 काष्ठागतत्वाद्वैमल्यशक्त्यैश्वर्य्यप्रकर्षस्य। संसारिणान्ततो निकृष्टत्वादविद्यादिमलेनैश्वर्य्यशक्ति-
5 ज्ञानादीनामिन्द्रियसहकारित्वापेक्षित्वमन्तःकरणस्य, शिलादिसमुत्तोलनमिव हीनबलानाम्॥

6 येषाम्पुनः संसारिण एव सन्त ईश्वरीभवन्ति बुद्धर्षभादयः, तेषान्निरतिशयशक्तिज्ञानै-
7 श्वर्यानुपपत्तिः, कालपरिच्छेद्यत्वात्। अभ्युपगच्छन्ति च तद्दर्शनश्लाघिनः कालपरिच्छेदनी-
8 यत्वन्तेषाम्।

9 नास्मदीश्वरस्य कालपरिच्छेद्यता। तत्कालैस्तदन्यकालैश्च बुद्धादिभिः परिज्ञानैश्वर्यादि-
10 सातिशयत्वलिङ्गैरनुमेय एवासौ नामुष्मिन् काल उत्पन्न उत्पद्यत उत्पत्स्यमान इति त्रिधा कै-
11 श्चिदनुमीयते ॥

12 निरतिशयत्वविरोधो च तथा स्यात्, यस्माद्बुद्धादीनां सिध्यपेक्षत्वात्पूर्वबुद्धानां काला-
13 धिक्यप्राप्तेरुत्तरकालबुद्धस्यापि निरतिशयशक्त्यैश्वर्य्यज्ञानत्वमिति विरुद्धम् ॥

14 अथ तुल्यशक्तिज्ञानैश्वर्याणामेव तेषां समानराज्यराजानामिवासमानकालत्वमिति ब्रूया-
15 त् ॥

16 तथापि बुद्धान्तरकालव्याप्त्यभिलाषविधातान्निरतिशयैश्वर्याद्यभावः। अभिलषति हि क-
17 श्चिद्बुद्धान्तरं वशीकर्तुम्, तद्विषयश्च व्याप्तुम्, अनियतत्वादिच्छायाः। बुद्धान्तरवशीकरणे च

1 °निर्व्वर्त्तं] ४(em.), निर्व्वर्त्तं[वर्तं T_dMA]° TLMA 1 °निर्व्वर्त्त्यते] ४(em.), निर्व्वर्त्त्यते[वर्त्यं MA] LMA, [. .]र्त्यते T_m, . वर्त्यते T_d 2 °यन्तः। तं] TMA ४{यन्तः त T}, °यन्तःस्तं L 3 °वकर्णितं] LMA{°र्णिं MA}, °वकर्णितं(क)»त« T_m, °कर्णितं T_d, नाकलितं(वकर्णितं) ४ 3 के-वले] ४(em.), कोले TLMA 4 °रिणान्ततो] TLM ४{°णां ततो T_dM ४}, °रिणां A 4 निकृष्टं] TMA-४, निकृत L(possibly corrected to निकृष्टं) 4 °मलेनै] TLM ४, °मेलनै A 5 °लनमिव] TLMA, °लन इव ४ 6 येषाम्पुनः] TLMA{°षां पुं T_dMA}, ये(षां)पुनः ४ 6 °र्षभां] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA ४, °र्ष-भता T_m^{ac} 7 °च्छेद्यं] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA ४, °च्छेदं T_m^{ac} 7-8 °नीयत्व°] em., °नीयकं Σ 9 °द-न्य°] em., °दाद्यं Σ 9 °भिः परि°] em., °भिरपरि° Σ 9 °ज्ञानैश्वर्यादि°] TLMA, °ज्ञानैश्वर्यादि° ४ 10 °त्वलिङ्गै°] em., °त्वादिलिङ्गै° Σ 10 उत्पत्स्यमान] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA ४, उत्पत्स्य°म[ान T_m(म by second hand) 10 त्रिधा] TL ४, निधा MA 12 च तथा] em., हि तथा TLMA, हि तथा[दा] ४ 12 य-स्मा°] conj., तस्मा° Σ 13 °स्यापि°] T, °स्यानपि L, °स्यापि न MA ४ 13 °शक्त्यै°] TL^{PC}MA ४, °शैक्त्यै° L^{ac} 13 °त्वमिति] conj., °त्व° TL, त्वं MA ४ 16 °कालव्या°] TL, °कालस्य व्या° MA ४ 16 अभिलषति] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA ४, अभिलषति T_m^{ac}L

4-5 संसारिणान्ततो ... हीनबलानाम्] Cf. BSBh 1.1.5: यत्प्रसादाद्धि योगिनामप्यतीतानागतविषयं प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानमिच्छन्ति योगशास्त्रविदः, किमु वक्तव्यं तस्य नित्यसिद्धस्येश्वरस्य सृष्टिस्थितिसंहृतिविषयं नित्यज्ञानं भवतीति। यदप्युक्तं प्रागुत्पत्तेर्ब्रह्मणः शरीरादिसंबन्धमन्तरेणेशितृत्वमनुपपन्नमिति, न तच्चोद्यमवतरति; सवितृप्रकाशवद्ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानस्वरूपनित्यत्वे ज्ञानसाधनापेक्षानुपपत्तेः। अपि चाविद्यादिमतः संसारिणः शरीराद्यपेक्षा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः स्यात्; न ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकारणरहितस्येश्वरस्य। (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 171). Cf. also ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparīhāra kk. 47cd-48c: शरीरादेविना चास्य कथमिच्छापि सर्जने। शरीराद्यथ तस्य स्यात्तस्योत्पत्तिर्न तत्कृता। तद्वदन्यप्रसङ्गो ऽपि

7-8 अभ्युपगच्छन्ति ... कालपरिच्छेदनीयत्वन्तेषाम्] Cf. PV Pramāṇa k. 9-10(M)/7-8(P): तद्वत्प्रमाणं भगवान्, अभूतविनिवृत्त्ये(1) भूतोक्तिः, साधनापेक्षा ततो युक्ताप्रमाणता ॥ नित्यं प्रमाणं नैवास्ति प्रामाण्याद्वस्तुसंगतेः। ज्ञेयानित्यतया तस्या अध्रौव्यात् क्रमजन्मनः ॥

सर्ववशित्वं हीयेत॥

अथ चेदुच्येत—बुद्धान्तरस्याननुग्राह्यत्वाद्वागद्यभावाच्च तद्विषयव्याप्तावनभिलाष इति ॥

अत्रोच्यते—यथैव प्राप्तबुद्धत्वं कश्चित्कालमवस्थानाभिलाषपूर्वकम्, तथा बुद्धान्तरकाले ऽवस्थानाभिलाषेणावश्यम्भवितव्यम् । अनुग्राह्यप्राण्यन्तरभावाच्च कालान्तरावस्थानाभिलाषेण युक्तं भवितुम् । न च भविष्यता बुद्धेन सर्वे प्राणभृतो ऽनुग्रहीष्यन्ते, बुद्धत्वस्य दुःखाद्यात्मकत्वे ऽपि प्राण्यनुग्रहार्थत्वात् । तस्माद्बुद्धस्थितेः कालान्तरावस्थानेच्छया भवितव्यमेव ॥

सिद्धेश्च प्राग्विद्यादिपरामर्शात्, बुद्धस्वरूपस्य च दुःखशून्याद्यात्मकत्वस्य तैरभ्युपेतत्वात्, बुद्धर्षभाद्यन्तरीयकराणाग्निरतिशयशक्तिज्ञानैश्वर्यानुपपत्तिः । कालानवच्छेदात् नैते दोषा अस्मदीश्वरे क्रमन्ते । शक्तिज्ञानैश्वर्यादीनां हि निरवधिकत्वानुमानात् सातिशयत्वानवस्थितत्वादिदोषा नात्माकाशादीनामिवातिशङ्कनीयाः ॥

तथा च दर्शयति—सामान्यमात्रोपसंहारे कृतोपक्षयमनुमानमिति । निरतिशयशक्तिज्ञानैश्वर्ययुक्तपुरुषविशेषस्य सुत्वसामान्यमात्रोपसंहारे 'कृतोपक्षयम्'—कृत उपक्षयो यस्यानुमानस्य तत्कृतोपक्षयं सातिशयत्वादिति । तदुक्तमनुमाने—'यत्र प्राप्तिस्तत्र गतिमात्रमिति' ॥

तस्मान्नेश्वरसंज्ञागुणादिविशेषाणां सतामपि प्रतिपादने समर्थम्, सामान्यमात्रोपसंहार-

1 °वशित्वं] T_d^{pc}LMA \mathcal{E} , °वशीकत्वं T_m^{ac}, °वशीत्वं T_m^{pc}T_d^{ac} 1 हीयेत] T \mathcal{E} , नीयेत LMA, ही(नी)येत \mathcal{E} 2 °स्याननु] TL \mathcal{E} , °स्यननु MA 2 °गाद्यं] T_m^{ac}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , °गद्यं T_m^{pc} 2 तद्विषयं] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , तद्वितीयं T_m^{ac} 2 °भावन्] T_m^{pc}LMA \mathcal{E} , °स्यावनं T_m^{ac}, °स्यनं T_d 3 °बुद्धत्वं] em., °बुद्धतस्य T_m^{ac}, °बुद्धत्वस्य T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} 3 कश्चि] T \mathcal{E} , कश्चि LMA 3 °नाभि] em., नमभि Σ 3-4 °काले ऽव] T{°ले वं T_m}, °कालोपं LMA, °कालावं \mathcal{E} 4 °ग्राह्यप्राण्यन्तरं] MA \mathcal{E} , °ग्रा(ह्य)ं ह्य«सप्राण्यन्तरं T_m, °ग्राह्या(मप्र)न्तरं T_d, °ग्राह्यप्राण्यन्तरं L 5 °ग्रहीष्यन्ते] MA \mathcal{E} , °गृहीष्यन्ते TL 5 °स्य] em., °स्य च T_m^{ac}T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , °(स्य च)°स्य च« T_m 6 °त्वात्] तस्माद्] conj., °त्वाद् T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} {°त्। बु T_d}{°त्वात् बु T_m^{pc}}, °त्वात्«बु T_m 7 प्राग्विद्यां] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , प्रा(तं)ग«विद्यां T_m 7 च] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , om. T_m^{ac} 7-8 °त्वात्, बु] LMA \mathcal{E} {°त्वाद्] MA}, °त्वात्स बु T_m, °त्वात्। स बु T_d 8 °र्षभां] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , °र्महां T_m^{ac}, °र्षहां L 8 °करणात्] T_m, °करणात्] T_dLMA, °करणात्] करात्] निं \mathcal{E} 8 °त्तिः। कालां] LMA \mathcal{E} {°त्तिः कां LMA}, °त्तिकां T 9 °श्वरे] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , °श्वरे T_m^{ac} 9 °श्वर्यादीं] TL, °श्वर्यां MA \mathcal{E} 9 °णां हि] conj., °णान्तु] °णां तु T_dLMA \mathcal{E} Σ 10 °त्वादिं] \mathcal{E} (em.), °त्वादं TLMA 10 °दोषा] TL, °दोषः MA \mathcal{E} 10 °नीयां] TLMA, °नीयं \mathcal{E} 11 सामान्यं] T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , सामान्यं T_m 11 °मात्रो] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , °मात्रो(ं) T_m 11 कृतोपक्षयं] LMA \mathcal{E} , कृ[.]यं T_m, कृते . . . त्रयं T_d 12 °विशेषस्य सुत्व] em., °वि[. . .]त्वं T_m, °वि[. . . त्वं T_d, °विशेषसत्त्व[°त्वं L]° LMA \mathcal{E} 12 °क्षयो यस्यां] LMA \mathcal{E} , [. युं] यस्यां T_m, . यं यस्यां T_d 13 प्राप्तिं] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , प्राप्तिं T_m 14 सतामपि प्रतिपादने] LMA \mathcal{E} , [. . . . विप्रति] T_m, . . . विप्रतिपि . . . T_d

11-13 तथा च दर्शयति . . .] For the discussion in this paragraph and the following, cf. NBh 4.1.21, especially : गुणविशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः । तस्यात्मकत्वात् कल्पान्तरानुपपत्तिः । . . . न तावदस्य बुद्धिं विना कश्चिद्धर्मो लिङ्गभूतः शक्य उपपादयितुम् । आगमाच्च द्रष्टा बोद्धा सर्वज्ञाता ईश्वर इति । बुद्ध्यादिभिश्चात्मलिङ्गैर्निरुपाख्यमीश्वरं प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविषयातीतं कः शक्त उपपादयितुम् । (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985: 943-945).

13 तदुक्तमनुमाने—'यत्र प्राप्तिस्तत्र गतिमात्रमिति'] See YBh 1.7: देशान्तरप्राप्तेर्गतिमच्चन्द्रतारकं चैत्रवत् and the YVi on it.

11 सामान्यमात्रोपसंहारे कृतोपक्षयमनुमानम् 14 न विशेषप्रतिपादने समर्थम्

1 परत्वात्। तदेतदुक्तं भवति—यदेव सतामपि गुणानां सामान्यप्रतिपादनकृतक्षयत्वान्न प्रति-
2 पादकमनुमानम्, किंमंग पुनरत्यन्तासम्भाव्यमानसन्निधीनामनुमेयधर्मविरुद्धानामशक्यज्ञा-
3 नधर्माधर्मनैश्वर्यादीनान्तप्रत्यायकमिति ॥

4 अत एव च विरुद्धप्रतिसाधनानुपपत्तिः सर्वज्ञास्तित्वानुमानवत्, प्रथमन्तदभावप्रतिपाद-
5 का]नुमानाप्रवृत्तेः। न ह्यनुमानस्य परोक्त्युदीक्षाधर्मत्वमस्ति। न हि धूमदर्शनेनाग्न्यनुमाने प-
6 रोक्तिरुदीक्ष्यते ॥

7 न च स्वयमेव सर्वज्ञास्तित्वान्नास्तित्वं वा प्रति पूर्वमाशंक्यते घटादिवत्, सर्वज्ञसद्भावस्य
8 स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। न ह्यनिर्द्धारितशशस्वरूपः शशि विषाणमस्ति नास्तीति कश्चिदाशंकते ॥

9 परवाक्यात्प्रतिपाद्याशंकते इति चेत्—परेणापि कथमप्रसिद्धेश्वरसद्भावेनाशंकितमिति व-
10 क्तव्यम् ॥

11 अथ परस्य भ्रान्तिरिति चेन्न। न सामान्यानुपलम्भे भ्रान्तिकारणमस्ति। न हि शुक्तिका-
12 याम्पिकभ्रमः कस्यचिदुपजायते ॥

13 तस्मादाह—संज्ञादिविशेषप्रतिपत्तिरागमतः पर्येष्या वेदेतिहासपुराणयोगधर्मशास्त्रा-
14 द्यागमतः पर्येष्या ॥

15 तस्यात्मानुग्रहाभावे ऽपि तस्यात्मात्थमवासव्याभावात्, भूतानाञ्चाविद्यापंकनिमग्नानां
16 संसारसागरोत्तरणोपायप्लवोपदेश्यन्तरस्याभावात्, तदनुग्रहः प्रयोजनम्। ज्ञानधर्मोपदेशेन ये
17 जन्यशरणास्तस्मिन् सर्वात्मना निवेदितात्मानस्तान् कल्पप्रलयमहाप्रलयेषु ईश्वरानुगृहीता-
18 गमज्ञानविशेषेष्ववाचार्येषु प्रलीनेषु पुनःपुनर्जातकारुण्यामृतः सन्नुद्धरिष्यामीति प्रवर्तते इति
19 वाक्यशेषः ॥

20 तथा चोक्तमादिविद्वानिति—आदौ विद्वानादिविद्वान्। रजस्तमोभ्यामनभिभूतज्ञान इत्य-

1 यदेव]LMA, यदैवं ४ 2 शक्यं]४(em.), शक्यं LMA 3 र्यादी]LMA{र्यं MA}, र्यादा°
४ 3 नान्तत्वं]LMA{नां तं MA}, नां [न]तत्त्वं ४ 4-5 पादका°]४(em.), पादाना° LMA
5-6 परोक्तिरु°]T, पकेराक्ति° L, ऽवकेरोक्तिरु° M(in different ink), ऽवकेरोक्तिरु° A(dots underne-
ath)), वक्त्रन्तरो° ४ 7 प्रति]LMA, बुद्धि(प्रति)° ४ 8 शशि]LMA४, शे [.] T_m, शे . T_d 9
चेत्—परेणापि]४(conj.), चे(त्प/त्व)(रि/री)णा»म«(पि/वि) L, चेत्वरीणामपि MA(both underlined)
11 चेन्न। न]em., [. .]न T, चेन्न[चेत्—न ४] LMA४ 13 रोगमतः]LMA४, [. . गमतः]T_m 13
पर्येष्या]LMA, पर्यन्वेष्या इति ४ 13 वेदेति°]L^{pc}MA४, [वे]दिति° T_m^{ac}, [वे]दिति° T_m^{pc}, वेदेते L^{ac}
14 पर्येष्या]LMA, पर्यन्वेष्या ४ 16 सागरोत्ति°]LMA४, सागरोत् . T_d 17 त्मान°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA-
४, त्मा(ह)»न« T_m 17 स्तान्]T४, स्तावत् LMA 17 प्रलयमहाप्रलयेषु]T_dMA४, प्रलयमहा-
प्रलयेषु T_mL 17 रानुगृहीता°]TL^{pc}४, र(गु)तुगृहीता° L, रानुग्रहीता° MA(M possibly °गृहीता°)
18 पुनर्जात°]TMA४, पुनर्जातत° L(second त beginning of a line)

13-14 वेदेतिहासपुराणयोगधर्मशास्त्राद्यागमतः] For similar compounds, see BhGBh 3.1:
सर्वोपनिषत्स्वितिहासपुराणयोगशास्त्रेषु च (Pañśīkar 1978: 136); 6.1: श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणेतिहासयोगशास्त्रवि-
हितम् (Pañśīkar 1978: 284).

13 संज्ञादिविशेषप्रतिपत्तिरागमतः पर्येष्या cf. Maas (2006: 40) 15 तस्यात्मानुग्रहा-
भावे ऽपि 16 अनुग्रहः प्रयोजनम् 16-18 ज्ञानधर्मोपदेशेन कल्पप्रलयमहाप्रलयेषुद्धरि-
ष्यामीति। 20-77,4 तथा चोक्तमादिविद्वान्निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये
प्रोवाचेति

र्थः। ज्ञानधर्मादि वा तत आदीयत इत्यादिः, आदिश्चासौ विद्वांश्चादिविद्वान्। **निर्म्मणचित्तं** 1
संकल्पमात्रनिर्मितं योगिचित्तमावेशग्रहवदुपदेशनार्थमधिष्ठाय **भगवान् परमर्षिः** 2
इत्यर्थः। परमत्वञ्चागमतः। दर्शनार्थस्य वा गत्यर्थस्य वा धातोर्ऋषेर्ग्रहणम्। परमर्षिरीश्वर 3
एव कपिलनारायणादिसंज्ञ **आसुरये प्रोवाचेति**॥ 4

तस्मात् प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तः सर्वप्राणिभावकर्मफलपरिस्फुरणज्ञानात्तदनुग्रहकारणमी- 5
श्वरः सिद्धः। स प्रकृष्टसत्वधनोपादान ईश्वरः कथं कर्ता कथञ्चानुगृह्णातीत्येवमदि न चोदयि- 6
तव्यम्, 'आगमतः पर्येष्ये'त्युक्तत्वात्। अनुमानस्य च तद्विषयस्यानुपपत्तिः, विशेषसम्बन्धाग्र- 7
हणात्। इति ॥ २५ ॥ 8

Critical Text 1.26

स यथोक्तरूपः परमेश्वरः **पूर्वेषामपि** गुरुणामभ्युदयनिश्रेयससर्व्वसाधनसाध्यसम्बन्धोपदेशि- 9
नां **गुरुः**। तेषामपि ज्ञानोपदेशस्य कर्त्तव्यत्वर्थः। तदुद्भवत्वात् सर्व्वज्ञानानाम्, यथा ज्वलनलवण- 10
जलधिसमुद्भवा विष्फुल्लिगलवणकणाः। तस्य चादिविद्वत्तामवोचाम। **कालेनानवच्छेदादिति**॥ 11

1 °यत इ°] TLMA, °यते इ° ४ 1 °दिश्चा°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA ४, °दि(त्व)»श्र«T° T_m 1 °चित्तं] LMA ४,
°चित्तं T 2 निर्म्मितं] T_m^{pc}LMA ४ { °तम् T_m^{pc} }, °निमित्तम् T_m^{ac}, °निमित्तः T_d^{ac}, निमित्तः T_d^{pc} 2
°वेश°] T_mT_d^{pc}LMA ४, °वेगेन T_d^{pc} 3 इत्यर्थः] T_dLMA ४, इत्यर्थः T_m(त्य between lines in blue
ink, probably by the scribe of T_d) 3 °तोर्ऋषे°] em., °तो ऋषे° T, °तोः ऋषे° LMA ४ 4
°संज्ञ] TLMA, संज्ञः ४ 4 आसुरये] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA ४, आ°सु°रये T_m 5 °कारण°] LMA ४, °करण° T 6
°पादान°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA ४, पादान T_m^{ac} 6 कथञ्चा°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA ४ { °थं चा° T_dMA ४ }, कथया T_m^{ac}
7 °पर्येष्ये°] TLMA, पर्यन्वेष्या इ° ४ 10 कर्त्तव्यत्वर्थः] TLM ४, कर्त्तव्यर्थः A 10 तदुद्भवत्वात्] ४(conj.),
तदुदयत्वात् T_m^{pc}T_d, तदुभयत्वात् T_m^{ac}, तदुभयात् LMA 11 °लवणकणा°] ४(em.), °लवणका° TLMA

3 दर्शनार्थस्य वा गत्यर्थस्य वा धातोर्ऋषेर्ग्रहणम्] See Dhātupāṭha 6.7: ऋषी गतौ; Nirukta
2.11: ऋषिर्दर्शनात्.

7 'आगमतः पर्येष्ये'त्युक्तत्वात्] See 76,13.

9 अभ्युदयनिश्रेयससर्व्वसाधनसाध्यसम्बन्ध°] See 57,13. Cf. VS 1.1.2: यतो ऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससि-
द्धिः स धर्मः।; BhGBh intro.: प्राणिनां साक्षादभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसहेतुर्यः स धर्मो ब्राह्मणाद्यैर्वर्णिभिराश्रमिभिश्च
श्रेयोधिभिरनुष्ठीयमानः।; BSBh 1.2.21: परापरविभागो ह्ययं विद्ययोः अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसफलतया परिकल्प्यते।;
BĀUBh 1.4.9: मनुष्या एव हि विशेषतो ऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससाधने ऽधिकृता इत्यभिप्रायः; 1.4.17: भिन्नश्चेद्ब्र-
ह्मणः संसारी स्यात्, युक्तस्तं प्रत्यभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससाधनयोः कर्मज्ञानयोरुपदेशो नेश्वरस्याप्तकामत्वात् (part of an
objection); BhGBh 3.3: **लोके ऽस्मिन्** शास्त्रार्थानुष्ठानाधिकृतानां त्रैवर्णिकानां द्विविधा द्विप्रकारा **निष्ठा** स्थि-
तिः अनुष्ठेयतात्पर्यं **पुरा** पूर्वं सर्गादौ प्रजाः सृष्ट्वा तासामभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसप्राप्तिसाधनं वेदार्थसंप्रदायमाविष्कुर्वता **प्रोक्ता**
मया सर्वज्ञेन ईश्वरेण हे अनघापाप; 4.7: **यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिर्हानिर्वर्णाश्रमादिलक्षणस्य** प्राणिनामभ्युदय-
निःश्रेयससाधनस्य भवति.

10-11 ज्वलनलवणजलधिसमुद्भवा विष्फुल्लिगलवणकणाः] Cf. BĀU 2.1.20; 2.4.12 (4.5.13);
6.2.9; 6.2.14; ChU 6.13; BĀUBh 1.6.1; 4.3.33.

9-10 स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः 11 कालेनानवच्छेदात्

1 अतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नत्वविशिष्टेन कालेनान्ये गुरवो ऽवच्छिद्यन्ते, स त्वीश्वरः सर्वदा-
2 मुक्तेश्वरत्वेन तैरप्यस्माभिरिव माननीयः। कस्मात्पुनस्तस्य वस्तुत्वे गुरुत्वसामान्ये च सति
3 नावच्छेदकः काल इति चेदाह—यत्रावच्छेदार्थः कालो नोपावर्तत इति। यस्मिन्नीश्वरे वि-
4 षये ऽवच्छेदार्थः प्रस्थादिवत्परिच्छेदकरो नोपावर्तते—न परिच्छेदकत्वेनेश्वरं विषयीकरोति,
5 सर्वपरिणामिवस्त्ववच्छेदकरो ऽपि सन् ॥

6 ननु च—

7 ईश्वरप्रकृष्टसत्वस्य प्रधानकार्यत्वात् कार्यस्य च कालावच्छेद्यत्वात् कस्मात्तत्सत्वघ्नाव-
8 च्छिद्यते? पुरुषस्वरूपं हि सर्वेषामेव कालानवच्छेद्यमिति नाशं कनीयम्, अपरिणामित्वात्पु-
9 रुषस्य।

10 अथ मन्येथाः—तन्त्रान्तरप्रसिद्धेश्वरवत्सत्वनिरपेक्ष ईश्वर इति ॥

11 तदयुक्तम्, प्रकृष्टसत्वोपादानाभ्युपगमात् ॥

12 अथापि मन्वीथाः—ईश्वरसत्वत्प्रवृत्तमेव कार्यमवच्छिनत्ति कालो नेश्वरसत्वमिति ॥

13 तदप्ययुक्तम्, व्यक्तस्य परिच्छेद्यत्वात्। व्यक्तेश्वरसत्वम् ॥

14 अथाप्यभिसन्दधीथाः—प्रधानावस्थमेवेश्वरसत्वमिति ॥

15 तदनुपपन्नम्, ज्ञानानुपपत्तेः ॥

16 अथापि प्रतिपद्येथाः—सत्कार्योभ्युपगमाद्विजफलवल्लरीकुसुमादिवत् ज्ञानादीनाम् प्र-

1 °प्रत्युत्पन्नं]conj., °प्रत्युपदीयमानं TL, °प्रत्युपादीयमानं MA 1 गुरवो]TM 2, गुरवे L, सुखो
A 2 °व माननीयः]conj., °वानुमेयः Σ 3 °च्छेदार्थः कालो] 4 (em.), °वच्छेदार्थकालो[°च्छेदा
TmL][°र्थं TdMA] TLMA 4 °वत्परिच्छेदं]Tm^{pc}LMA 5, °वत्परिच्छेदे Tm^{ac} 7 कार्यस्य]TL,
प्रधानकार्यस्य MA 6 7 कस्मात्] 8 (em.), तस्मात् TLMA 8 कालानं]TLM 9, कालां ना
A 8 °वच्छेद्यमिति नाशं कनीयम्, अपरि] TLMA{°मपरि TLMA}, °वच्छेद्य[°मिति नाशं कनीय]मपरि
9 10 °थाः—तन्त्रां]Tm^{pc}TdLMA 10{°थास्तन्त्रां Tm^{pc}TdMA}, °तास्तन्त्रां Tm^{ac} 10 °वत्स-
त्व]Tm^{pc}TdLMA 11{°वत् TdMA 12}, °वत्स(त्य)त्व Tm 15–16 °पपत्तेः ॥ अथापि]Tm^{pc}TdLMA-
13 14{°पपत्तेरथापि Tm^{pc}TdLMA}, °पपत्ते(य)»र«थापि Tm 16 सत्कार्योभ्युप]LMA 17, [. . . यु]p
Tm, . . . भ्युप Td

6 ननु च] For the following, cf. BSBh 1.1.5: तत्र सांख्याः प्रधानं त्रिगुणमचेतनं स्वतन्त्रं जग-
त्कारणमिति मन्यमाना आहुः—यानि वेदान्तवाक्यानि सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तेर्ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं प्रदर्शयन्तीत्यवोचः,
तानि प्रधानकारणपक्षे ऽपि योजयितुं शक्यन्ते। सर्वशक्तित्वं तावत्प्रधानस्यापि स्वविकारविषयमुपपद्यते। एवं सर्वज्ञ-
त्वमप्युपपद्यते; कथम्? यत्त्वं ज्ञानं मन्यसे, स सत्त्वधर्मः, 'सत्त्वात्संजायते ज्ञानम्' (BhG 14.17) इति स्मृतेः।
तेन च सत्त्वधर्मण ज्ञानेन कार्यकरणवन्तः पुरुषाः सर्वज्ञायोगिनः प्रसिद्धाः। सत्त्वस्य हि निरतिशयोत्कर्षे सर्वज्ञत्वं
प्रसिद्धम्। न केवलस्याकार्यकरणस्य पुरुषस्योपलब्धिमात्रस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वं वा कल्पयितुं शक्यम्। त्रिगुणत्वा-
त्तु प्रधानस्य सर्वज्ञानकारणभूतं सत्त्वं प्रधानावस्थायामपि विद्यत इति प्रधानस्याचेतनस्यैव सतः सर्वज्ञत्वमुपचर्यते
वेदान्तवाक्येषु। अवश्यं च त्वयापि सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मेत्यभ्युपगच्छता सर्वज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वेनैव सर्वज्ञत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। न हि
सर्वदा सर्वविषयं ज्ञानं कुर्वदेव ब्रह्म वर्तते। तथा हि—ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वे ज्ञानक्रियां प्रति स्वातन्त्र्यं ब्रह्मणो हीयेत;
अथानित्यं तदिति ज्ञानक्रियाया उपरमे उपरमेतापि ब्रह्म, तदा सर्वज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वेनैव सर्वज्ञत्वमापतति। अपि च प्रा-
गुत्पत्तेः सर्वकारकशून्यं ब्रह्मेत्येते त्वया। न च ज्ञानसाधनानां शरीरेन्द्रियादीनामभावे ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः कस्यचिदुपपत्ता।
अपि च प्रधानस्यानेकात्मकस्य परिणामसंभवात्कारणत्वोपपत्तिर्मुदादिवत्, नासंहतस्यैकात्मकस्य ब्रह्मणः;— इत्येवं
प्राप्त इदं सूत्रमारभ्यते— (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 163–165).

1–2 कालेनान्ये गुरवो ऽवच्छिद्यन्ते, स त्वीश्वरस्तैरपि माननीयः 3 यत्रावच्छेदार्थः कालो
नोपावर्तते

धातुवस्था या तत् सत्वमेवेति ॥

तच्च न साधु, व्यवहारयोग्यत्वात् । सर्वेषाञ्च तथा सत्यत्वच्छेद्यत्वं ज्ञानादीनां सत्तामि-
त्रसम्बन्धाविशेषात्प्राप्त्यात् ॥

अथापि ब्रुवीथाः—व्यक्तत्वे सत्यपि कार्याणां कस्यचित्परिच्छेद्यत्वं कालीनं कस्यचि-
न्नेति ॥

तच्च न, न्यायविरोधात् ॥

अथापि प्रत्यवतिष्ठेथाः—ईश्वरसत्वस्य कालापरिच्छेद्यत्वमागमसिद्धमिति ॥

तच्च न, अवद्योतकत्वादागमस्य ॥

अथाप्याचक्षीथाः—विद्यमानस्यैव कालापरिच्छेद्यत्वस्याविज्ञातस्यावद्योतक आगम इति ॥

[...]

[...]

तच्चापि न । निरोधादिसमनुष्ठानिमित्तत्वात् कालानवच्छेद्यो वैमल्यप्रकर्ष इति विरुद्धं
स्यात् ॥

अत्रोच्यते—ईश्वरसत्ववैमल्यप्रकर्षस्य धर्मादिनिमित्तानपेक्षत्वात्कालानवच्छेद्य इत्यदो-
षः । यथान्येषां गुरुणां योगधर्मादिसमनुष्ठाननिमित्तत्वात् कालावच्छेद्यो वैमल्यप्रकर्षस्तथा न
भगवतः । कथम् ? सर्वदात्यन्ततिरोभूतरजस्तमस्सत्वत्वात् । अनपेक्षितधर्मादिनिमित्तं स-
कलात्वाविद्योतकरं कालानवच्छेद्यं सत्वस्वरूपवद्भूगवत्सत्त्वे ज्ञानम् । तथा तत्कार्यमप्युत्कर्षः
कालेन नावच्छिद्यते ॥

यथा चाग्नेरुष्णप्रकाशावुष्णौ कालानवच्छेद्यौ तथा भगवत्सत्वस्य वैमल्यज्ञानप्रकर्षास्तत्सत्त्वे
कालानवच्छेद्यतामुपयान्तीत्येतदपेक्षयाभिहितम् 'यत्रावच्छेदार्थः कालो नोपावर्तते' इति, न
त्वकार्यपेक्षया । गुरुत्वं हि नावधिमत् । तदेतद्विवाह—यथास्य सर्गस्यादौ ज्ञानवैमल्यप्रकर्षग-
त्या सिद्धः, सर्गादिजन्मनामनुमेयतया सिद्ध आगमतश्चाज्ञायि, तथातिक्रान्तसर्गादिष्वपि त-
त्कालजन्मनान्ततः प्राक्तनानामपि सिद्धः, तथा भविष्यत्काले ऽप्यनुमानागमाभ्यामवगम्यते ॥

1 या तत्]em., यत् LMA 2 तथा सत्य°]T_dLMA 3 तथा सत्य° T_m 2 ज्ञानादीनां]conj., ज्ञानादि°
T_m, ज्ञानादि° T_dLMA 4 कालीनं]LM 5 कालीनां A 9 °स्याविज्ञात°]L, °स्यापि ज्ञात° MA, °स्याज्ञात°
8 9 °द्योतक]LMA 8, [. .]तक T_m, . . तक T_d 12 कालानवच्छेद्यो]LMA, काला((न)वच्छेद्यो
8 12 वैमल्यप्रकर्ष इति]conj., वैमल्यानवच्छेद्यश्चेति LMA, वैमल्यादनवच्छेद्यश्चेति 8 14 °प्रकर्ष-
स्य धर्मादिनिमित्तानपेक्ष°]conj., °प्रकर्षपेक्ष° LMA 8 14-15 °च्छेद्य इत्यदोष:]conj., °च्छेद्यस्यादोषः
LMA 8 15 °ष्ठाननिमित्त°]T_dLMA 8, °ष्ठाननि[मि .] T_m 15 कालावच्छेद्यो]em., कालानवच्छे-
द्यो LMA 8 {कालानवच्छेद्यो L} 16 °रजस्तमस्सत्वत्वा°]conj., रजस्तम° स्तमस्तत्वा° L (folio cha-
nge at ¶), °रजस्तमस्त्वा° MA 8 17 °वद्योतकरं]LMA 8, [. .]यातकरः T_m, . . यातकरः T_d
17 ज्ञान°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA 8, ज्ञाने T_m^{ac} 17 °प्युत्कर्षः]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA 8, °प्युत्कर्षः T_m^{ac} 18 कालेन
नावच्छिद्यते]L 8 (em.), कालेना(व)नवच्छिद्यते A 20 °पयान्ती°]T_m^{pc}LMA-
8, पया°न्ती° T_m, पयन्ती° T_d 21 °पेक्षया°]conj., °पेक्षया ह्युच्यते Σ 21 तदेतद्विवा°]LMA, तदेत°
[. . .] T_m, तदेत° . . . T_d, तदेवा 8 22 सिद्धः]T_mLMA 8, सिद्धम् T_d 23 प्राक्तना°]LMA 8,
प्रा°ना° T_m, प्राक्तना° T_d 23 भविष्यत्काले ऽप्य°]T_dLMA 8 {भविष्यत्काले प्य° L}, भविष्यत्कालेरप्य° T_m

21-22 यथास्य सर्गस्यादौ प्रकर्षगत्या सिद्धस्तथातिक्रान्तसर्गादिष्वपि

- 1 अस्य च सूत्रस्येदम् प्रयोजनम्—यथा दृष्टा गुरवो ज्ञानधर्माच्चुपदेशित्वादनन्यशरणैरन-
 2 वरतमुपास्यन्ते तथा भगवानयमपि सर्व्वगुरूणामपि गुरुत्वात्ततो ऽपि विशेषेण नारायणदि-
 3 नान्नामन्यचेतोभि स्वहृदयेनानिश्चन्दारयितव्य इति । यथा दृष्टगुरव उपासनेनाभिमुखीकृता-
 4 स्तदुपासनपराननुगृह्णन्ति तथायम्परमगुरुरप्यभिध्यानमात्रेणानुग्रहं करोति ॥
 5 तथा च श्रुतिः—
 6 यस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा देवे तथा गुरौ ।
 7 तस्यैते कथिता ह्यर्थाः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः॥
 8 इति । स्मृतिरपि—
 9 मत्कर्मकृन्मत्परमो मद्भक्तः संगवर्जितः।
 10 निर्वैरः सर्व्वभूतेषु यस्स मामेति पाण्डव॥
 11 इति ॥ २६ ॥

Critical Text 1.27

- 12 ईश्वरप्रणिधानादित्युक्तम् । स कथम् प्रणिधातव्यः? किञ्च तत्प्रणिधानसाधनं येन प्रणिधाता
 13 प्रणिधत्त इति तत्प्रणिधानसाधनप्रतिपादनार्थमाह—
 14 तस्य वाचकः प्रणव इति ॥ (२७)
 15 तस्येश्वरस्य यथोक्तलक्षणस्य वाचको ऽभिधायकः प्रणवः । सास्त्रादिमत इव गोशब्दः ॥
 16 प्रकर्षेण नूयते स्तूयते जनेनेति प्रणवः । यदि वा प्रणौति स्तौतीश्वरमिति प्रणव ओंकारः ।
 17 प्रणिधीयते चानेनेति—भगवान् प्रणिधातृभिरिति, प्रणिदधाति वानेन चेतो भगवतीति, प्र-
 18 णिधत्ते वानेन भगवन्तञ्चेतसीति—धाजो वकारोपजनं कृत्वा । शब्देन हि परोक्षानामर्थानाम्
 19 मनसि प्रणिधानम्, मेरुरिन्द्र इति यथा ॥

1 °धर्माच्चुपदेशि°]T_dLMA᳚, °धर्मादि उपदेशि° T_m 1-2 °नवरत°]T_d᳚(em.), °नवरगत° T_m, °न-
 वगत° LM, °वगत° A 2-3 °दिनान्नानन्य°]conj., दिनान्नानन्य TL᳚(conj.?), °दीनान्नानन्य° MA,
 °दिनामा(दीनामा)नन्य° ᳚ 4 °प्यभिध्यान°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA᳚, °प्य°भि«ध्यान° T_m 9 मत्कर्म°]T_m^{pc}-
 T_dLMA᳚, सत्कर्म° T_m^{ac} 9 °कृन्म°]T_dLMA᳚, °कृन्म° T_m 9 °वर्जितः]TMA᳚, °वर्जित L
 10 मामेति]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA᳚, मानेति T_m^{ac} 13 तत्प्रणिधानसाधन°]TLM᳚, तत्प्रणिसाधन° A 15
 वाचको ऽभि°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA᳚{वाचकः अभि° T_m^{pc}T_dLMA᳚}, पाचकः अभि° T_m^{ac} 16 प्रणौति
 स्तौती°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA᳚, प्रणौति(त्)स्तौती° T_m 17 चानेनेति]TLMA, चानेन ᳚ 17 प्रणिधा-
 तृभि°]TMA᳚, प्राणिधातृभि° L 17 प्रणिदधाति]conj., प्रणमन्ति Σ 17 वानेन चेतो भगवतीति]conj.,
 वानेनेति[वा अनेनेति ᳚] Σ 18 वानेन]conj., वा तेन Σ 18 धाजो वकारो°]T_m^{pc}T_dM^{pc}᳚, धाजो
 पकारो° T_m^{ac}, धाजो पकारो° LM^{ac}A

6-7 यस्य देवे ... महात्मनः] Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad 6.23. The same stanza appears as
 Subāla-Upaniṣad 16.2 and Yogaśikha-Upaniṣad 2.22.

9-10 मत्कर्मकृन्मत्परमो ... पाण्डव] BhG 11.55.

12 ईश्वरप्रणिधानात्] YS 1.23

14 तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः

तस्य चोकारस्य वाच्य ईश्वरः—अन्वर्थं खल्वपि निर्व्वचनम्। अवते रक्षणाद्यर्थान्मंष्ट्रि-
लोपश्चेति। रक्षति वा प्रणिधातृन् संसारादिति, गमयति वा संसारिणो निर्व्वानमिति, निर-
तिशयं वा प्रीणयति, समाध्याद्यनुग्रहेणावगमयति वा परमार्थमिति, एवमाद्यर्थानुगतम् ॥

सर्व्वथा तु नेदिष्ठम् प्रियन्नाम भगवतः। तेन हि मनसि सततम् प्रणिधीयमानः प्रसीदति।
तथा चानेकशः श्रुतयः—‘ओं खम् ब्रह्म,’ ‘ओमिति ब्रह्मे’त्यादयः। स्मृतयश्च—‘ओन्तत्सदि’ति
‘ओं विश्वं विष्णु’रित्यादयः। ओंशब्दस्य ‘कृदन्तं यन्मान्तमि’त्यव्ययत्वाद्भिक्तिनिवृत्तिः ॥

किमस्य संकेतकृतं वाचकत्वम्, अथ प्रदीपप्रकाशवदवस्थितमिति।

किञ्चातः—यदि तेन भगवतान्यैर्वा संव्यवहारार्थमस्य नामेदमस्त्विति संकेतितम्, ततो
ऽस्य प्रागोशब्दावाच्यत्वात्, ओंशब्देन वा प्रणिधातारो न प्रणयधिषत, अन्येन वा नामान्त-
रेणाधीतवन्तः, तथेदानीमप्यस्तु, किमोकारविशेषवचनेन। अथापि प्रदीपप्रकाशवदवस्थित-
न्तथापि प्रथमश्रवणे ऽपीश्वर उपलभ्येत यथा प्रकाशेन सविता। किञ्च संकेतो ऽप्यनर्थकः,
स्थितसम्बन्धत्वात्। अथापूर्व्वं संकेत्यते पूर्व्वोक्तदोषप्रसंगः—इति मन्यते ॥

अत्रोच्यते—स्थितो ऽस्य वाच्यस्य वाचकेन सम्बन्धो यदि नित्यः शब्दो यदि वानित्यः।
संकेतस्तु तमेव स्थितं सम्बन्धमवज्वलयति ॥

1 °न्वर्थं] T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , °न्वर्थं T_m 1 °वते] T_dL \mathcal{E} , °पते T_m, °वेत MA 1 °र्थान्मंष्ट्रि°]em., °त्थान्म-
निष्टि° Σ 2 रक्षति वा]conj., om. Σ 2 प्रणिधातृन्]° \mathcal{E} (em.), प्रणिधातृ T_m^{ac}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , प्रणिधत्
T_m^{pc}? 2 संसारादिति]TLMA, संसारादवतीति ° \mathcal{E} 2 संसारिणो नि°]em., संसारिणन्नि°[°नं नि° T_dMA-
° \mathcal{E}] Σ 3 प्रीणयति]° \mathcal{E} (em.), प्रणीयति TLMA 5 तथा]T \mathcal{E} (em.), यथा LMA 5 °त्यादयः°]T_m^{pc}T_d-
LMA \mathcal{E} , °त्यादयः°:« T_m 6 °त्वाद्विभक्ति°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , °त्वादिभक्ति° T_m^{ac} 7 वाचकत्वम्]TLM-
° \mathcal{E} , वाच्यवाचकत्वं A 9 °शब्दावाच्य°]° \mathcal{E} (em.), °शब्दवाच्य° TLMA 9 प्रणिधातारो]em., प्रणिधातारः
T_m^{pc}LMA \mathcal{E} , प्रणिधाकारः T_m^{ac} 9 न प्रणयधि°]em., प्रात्यधि° L, प्राणयधि° MA \mathcal{E} 10 °वचनेन।
अथा°]T_dLMA \mathcal{E} {°वचनेनाथा° L}, °वृचनेनाथा° T_m 11 पीश्वर]TMA \mathcal{E} , पीश्व L 11–12 °र्थकः,
स्थित°]MA \mathcal{E} {°र्थकः स्थित° MA \mathcal{E} }, °र्थकस्थित° L 12 °सम्बन्ध°]L \mathcal{E} , [. .]°बन्ध° T_m, . . ब-
न्ध° T_d, °सम्बन्धन° MA 12 °र्व्वं संके°]LMA \mathcal{E} , °र्व्वं स[. .]° T_m, °र्व्वं सं . . ° T_d 13 सम्बन्धो
यदि]L \mathcal{E} (em. ?), यदि सम्बन्धो MA

1–2 अवते रक्षणाद्यर्थान्मंष्ट्रिलोपश्चेति] See Dhātupāṭha 1.631 : अव रक्षणगतिकान्तिप्रीतितृत्यवग-
मप्रवेशश्रवणसामर्थ्ययाचनक्रियेच्छादीस्यवास्यालिङ्गनहिंसादानभाववृद्धिषु; Uṇādisūtra 1.128 (Cintamani
1933)/1.142 (Vasu) : अवतेष्टिलोपश्च.

4 सर्व्वथा तु नेदिष्ठम् प्रियन्नाम भगवतः] Cf. ChUBh 1.1.1: ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत—ओमि-
त्येतदक्षरं परमात्मनो ऽभिधानं नेदिष्ठम्; तस्मिन् हि प्रयुज्यमाने स प्रसीदति, प्रियनामग्रहण इव लोक; BĀUBh
5.1.1: यद्यपि ब्रह्मात्मादिशब्दा ब्रह्मणो वाचकाः, तथापि श्रुतिप्रामाण्याद्ब्रह्मणोनेदिष्ठमभिधानमोकारः। अत एव
ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्ताविदं परं साधनम्। तच्च द्विप्रकारेण, प्रकीतकत्वेनाभिधानत्वेन च। प्रतीकत्वेन—यथा विष्णवादिप्रति-
माभेदेन, एवमोकारः ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपत्तव्यः। तथा ह्योकारलम्बनस्य ब्रह्म प्रसीदति.

5 ओं खम् ब्रह्म] BĀU 5.1.1

5 ओमिति ब्रह्म] TaiU 1.8.1

5 ओन्तत्सत्] BhG 17.23

6 ओं विश्वं विष्णु] Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra k. 14?

6 कृदन्तं यन्मान्तम्] VMBh on AA 1.1.39.

1 तस्य चोकारस्य वाच्य ईश्वरः 7 किमस्य संकेतकृतं वाचकत्वम्, अथ
प्रदीपप्रकाशवदवस्थितमिति 13 स्थितो ऽस्य वाच्यस्य वाचकेन सम्बन्धः 14 सं-
केतस्तु तमेवावज्वलयति

- 1 ननु चोक्तं स्थितश्चेत्प्रथमश्रवणे ऽपि तम् प्रतीयुरिति ॥
 2 उच्यते—न। न हि प्रत्याय्यप्रत्यायकसम्बन्धः शब्दार्थयोः स्थितो ऽपि सन्नन्द्रियेण गृह्यते,
 3 यथेन्द्रियार्थयोः। अप्रत्यक्षे हि वाच्यवाचकशक्तिः। ततश्च येनोच्यते शब्दादर्थो ऽनुमेय इति।
 4 तन्न, सम्बन्धाग्रहणात्, परप्रयोगव्यंग्यत्वाच्च सम्बन्धस्य। न ह्यनुमानम् परप्रयोगमपेक्षते ॥
 5 अथ ब्रूयात्—अनुमितात्सम्बन्धादर्थानुमानमिति। स वक्तव्यः—कथमनुमितः शब्दार्थ-
 6 सम्बन्ध इति। स चेत् ब्रूयात्—कार्यदर्शनात्। अर्थं हि प्रतीय पश्चादनुमिमीत तत्सम्बन्धम्।
 7 यथा चक्षुषा रूपमुपलभ्य चक्षुःसम्बन्धमिति ॥
 8 स प्रतिवक्तव्यः—सिद्धा तर्हि विनानुमानेन शब्दादिव प्रतिपत्तिरिति। यो हि भ्राष्ट्रपाकेनैव
 9 कृतार्थः किन्तस्य कलशिपाकेन ॥
 10 अथासकृत्प्रयोगदर्शनाद्गृह्यते सम्बन्धः यथाग्निधूमयोरिति चेन्नेति ब्रूमः। न हि सहस्रेष्वपि
 11 प्रयोगेषु प्रत्यक्षेण शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धो गृह्यते यथाग्निधूमयोरानुमानादपि सम्बन्धो गृह्यते। वाक्ये
 12 ऽप्ययमेव न्यायः ॥
 13 तस्मादवस्थितमेव वाच्यस्येश्वरस्य वाचकेन प्रणवेन सम्बन्धमवद्योतयति संकेतः, यथा
 14 स्थितम् पितापुत्रसम्बन्धं। संकेतोपायापेक्षत्वात्प्रथमश्रुतान्नार्थः प्रतीयते यथा चक्षुष आलोका-
 15 भावे ॥
 16 ननु च शब्दानित्यत्वपक्षे कथमनित्ये सम्बन्धिनि नित्यः सम्बन्ध इति। न ह्यनित्ययो र-
 17 ज्जघटयोः सम्बन्धो नित्य स्यात् ॥
 18 उच्यते—यथा प्रमाणप्रमेययोरिन्द्रियविषययोश्च क्रियाकारकाणां सम्बन्धः स्थित एवानि-
 19 त्यत्वेष्वपि सम्बन्धिषु, तद्वदत्रापि स्थित एवाव्यभिचारेण सम्बन्धः ॥

2 न। न]em., न LMA 2 °प्रत्यायक°]LM^{pc}, °प्रत्याय्यक° M^{ac}, °प्रत्याक° A 4 तन्न, सम्बन्धा°]em., तदसम्बन्धा° TLMA, तदसत्, सम्बन्धा° 4 ह्यनुमानम्]LM, अनुमानं A 4 °प्रयोगम्°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA-
 8, °प्रयो(परप्रयोग)ग° T_m 6 °दर्शनात्। अ°]L{°दर्शनाद° L}, °दर्शना° MA 6 °नुमिमीत तत्स°]LM,
 °नुमिततत्स° A, °नुमिनोति तत्स° 8 विनानुमानेन शब्दादिव]LMA, [. . . . ने]न शब्दा [. . .]
 T_m, नन शब्दो . . T_d 8 °पत्तिरिति]LMA, °पत्तर . . T_d 8 भ्राष्ट्र°]conj., प्रा-
 8 LMA 9 कलशि°]conj., किलोशि° LMA 10 चेन्नेति ब्रूमः]em., चेन्न तु[चेत्—न तु 8] ब्रूमः
 T_m^{pc}T_dLMA, चेन्न तु ब्रूमः(ब्रूमः) T_m 11 प्रयोगेषु]T_m^{pc}T_d(em. ?), »प्रयोगेषु T_m, योगेषु LMA
 11 शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धो]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA, शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धये[र] T_m^{ac} 11 °धूमयोरानुमानादपि]LMA-
 8, [. . योरादा]वपि T_m, . . योरादावपि T_d 11 गृह्यते]T_dLMA, गृह्य[ते] T_m 11-12 वाक्ये
 ऽप्ययमेव]LMA, [. . . . प्यय . . .] T_m, प्यय . . . T_d 12-13 न्यायः ॥ तस्मा°]em.,
 स्मायस्तस्मा° L, तस्मा° MA 16 ननु च]T_dLMA, [. तु] च T_m 17 नित्य स्या°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA-
 8{नित्यः स्या° MA}, नित्यत्वा° T_m^{ac} 18 सम्बन्धः]MA, सम्बन्ध° TL

14-15 संकेतोपायापेक्षत्वात् . . . यथा चक्षुष आलोकाभावे] Cf. ŚBh 1.1.5: आह—यदि प्रत्यायकः
 शब्दः, प्रथमश्रुतः किं न प्रत्याययति? उच्यते—सर्वत्र नो दर्शनं प्रमाणम्। प्रत्यायकेति हि प्रत्ययं दृष्ट्वावगच्छामः,
 न प्रथमश्रुत इति प्रथमश्रवणे प्रत्ययमदृष्ट्वा। यावत्कृत्वः श्रुतादर्थविरागः। यथा चक्षुर्दृष्टं न बाह्येन प्रकाशेन विना
 प्रकाशयतीत्यदृष्टं न भवति (Frauwallner 1968: 40).

16-17 न ह्यनित्ययो रज्जघटयोः सम्बन्धो नित्य स्यात्] Cf. ŚBh 1.1.5: पृथग्भूतयोश्च यः सम्बन्धः स
 कृतको दृष्टो यथा रज्जघटयोरिति (Frauwallner 1968: 38)

13-14 सम्बन्धमवद्योतयति संकेतः, यथा स्थितम् पितापुत्रसम्बन्धम्

सर्गादिष्वपि वाच्यवाचकशक्त्यपेक्षः संकेतः—यथैव रूपचक्षुषोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकशक्त्यपेक्षयैव 1
सर्गादौ संसर्गस्तथेहापि वाच्यवाचकशक्त्यपेक्षयैव संकेतः—क्रियते। 2

सम्प्रतिपत्तिनित्यतया वृद्धपरम्परयैव गम्यगमकभावेन शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धो नित्यो ना- 3
न्यथेत्यागमिनो वेदवादिनः प्रतिजानते। सम्प्रतिपत्तिश्च शब्दार्थसम्बन्धस्य हेतुस्तेषाम्। तदे- 4
तदुक्तम् भवति—यद्यागमिपक्ष स्यादथास्मत्पक्षः, सर्वथा स्थित एव सम्बन्धः पितापुत्रयोरिव 5
संकेतेनाभिव्यज्यत इति। वाच्यवाचकयोरस्थितसम्बन्धत्वे तु प्रणवजपेनाभिमुखीभवतीश्वर 6
इति नावकल्पते। न हि पाच्यपाचकसम्बन्धे ऽनवस्थिते पाचकाभूयुपादानम् पाकार्थं कल्पते। 7
स्थिते तु वाच्यवाचकसम्बन्धे भगवदाराधनसाधनस्य प्रणवस्योपादानमवकल्पत इति तत्प्रति- 8
पादनार्थं सर्व्वम् भाष्यम् ॥ २७ ॥ 9

Critical Text 1.28

एवमवगतवाच्यवाचकसम्बन्धस्य योगिनः परमेश्वरप्रसादनं कथं क्रियत इति तदर्थमाह— 10

तज्जपस्तदर्थं भावनम् ॥ २८ ॥ 11

तस्येश्वरवाचकस्य प्रणवस्यार्द्धचतुर्मात्रस्य त्रिमात्रस्य वा जपो मनसोपांशु वावर्त्तनन्तज्ज- 12
पः। तदर्थस्य चेश्वरस्य प्रणवेन वाचकेन समर्पितस्य बुद्धौ समारोपितस्य भावनमभिध्यान- 13
न्तदर्थं भावनं। कर्त्तव्यमिति वाक्यशेषः। तदेवमुभयं कुर्व्वतो योगिनश्चित्तमेकाग्रं सम्पद्यते॥ 14

एकाग्रसम्पत्तेश्च तदाराधनफलत्वन्दर्शयति तथा चोक्तम् 'स्वाध्यायाद्योगमातिष्ठेत् स्वा- 15
ध्यायात् प्रणवजपादीश्वरम् प्रत्यवनतचित्तः सन् योगमासीत। तदर्थमीश्वरन्ध्यायेत् ॥ 16

2 संसर्गस्तथे]em., सर्गस्तथे[र्गं T_dMAḥ]° Σ 3 सम्प्रतिपत्ति°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ, सम्(बन्ध)प्रतिपत्ति°
T_m 3 सम्बन्धो नित्यो]conj., सम्प्रतिपत्तिर्नित्या Σ 4 सम्प्रतिपत्तिश्च]T_dLMAḥ, सम्प्रतिपत्तिश्च T_m
4 हेतुस्ते°]TL, हेतुस्ते° MAḥ 5 यद्यागमिपक्ष]T_dMAḥ{°पक्षः T_dMAḥ}, यद्यागदिपक्ष T_m^{ac}, यद्यां-
गमिपक्ष T_m^{pc}L 5 °स्मत्पक्षः]em., °न्यपक्षः Σ 6 °व्यज्यत]Tḥ(em.), °व्यज्यत L, व्यज्यत MA 6
°वाचकयो°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ, वाचकवो° T_m^{ac} 6 °स्थित°]M^{pc}Aḥ, °स्थि° TLM^{ac} 6 °जपेना°]em.,
रूपेणा Σ 7 पाच्यपाचक°]ḥ(conj.), वाच्यवाचक° TLM 7 °सम्बन्धे ऽनव°]T{°न्धे न° T_m}, सम्बन्धे
नच° L, सम्बन्धे न च MAḥ 7 °स्थिते]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ, स्थितो T_m^{ac} 7 पाच°]ḥ(em.), वाच° TLM 7
°काभूयो°]T_dLMAḥ, °का(स्यु)»*° T_m 7 कल्पते]ḥ(em.), कल्पिते TLM 9 भाष्यम्]T_dLMA-
ḥ, भाष्यम् T_m 10 परमेश्वर°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ, परमवर° T_m^{ac} 12 °पांशु वा°]ḥ(em.){°पांशु वा आ°
ḥ}, °पांशुपा° TLM, °पांशु° A 12-13 °नन्तज्जप°]conj., °नज्जप° T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ{°नं ज° T_dMA-
ḥ}, °ज्जपा° T_m^{ac} 13 वाचकेन]TL^{pc}MAḥ, वा(क)चकेन L 13 समारोपितस्य]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ,
सम°]«(र्पितस्य)रो(त्)पितस्य T_m 14 सम्पद्यते]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ, »सम्«पद्यते T_m 15 °सम्पत्तेश्च]em.,
°सम्पत्तिश्च TLM, °सम्पत्तिं च ḥ 15 °फलत्व°]em., °फल° Σ 15 स्वाध्याया°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ, सा-
ध्याया° T_m^{ac} 15 °तिष्ठेत्]TLM, °(तिष्ठेत्)सीत ḥ 16 प्रत्यवनत°]T_m^{pc}T_dLMAḥ, प्रत्यवनत°]em.,
T_m 16 °श्वरन्ध्यायेत्]TL^{pc}ḥ{°रं ध्या° T_dḥ}, °श्वरन्ध्या(य)येत् L, °श्वरस्य MA

1-2 सर्गादिष्वपि वाच्यवाचकशक्त्यपेक्षः संकेतः क्रियते 3-4 सम्प्रतिपत्तिनित्यतया श-
ब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धो नित्य इत्यागमिनो प्रतिजानते 10 एवमवगतवाच्यवाचकसम्बन्धस्य
योगिनः 11 तज्जपस्तदर्थं भावनम् ॥ २८ ॥ 12-14 तस्य प्रणवस्य जपस्तदर्थस्य भावनं।
तत्कुर्व्वतश्चित्तमेकाग्रं सम्पद्यते। 15-16 तथा चोक्तम्—'स्वाध्यायाद्योगमातिष्ठेत्

- 1 तदर्थं ध्यानाच्चाप्रचलितमनाः स्वाध्यायम् प्रणवमामनेत् मनसाभिजपेत्। मानसो ऽभि-
 2 जपः प्रशस्यते, ध्यानस्यासन्नतरत्वात्, मा विषयप्रवणचित्तो भूदिति ॥
 3 एवं स्वाध्याययोगसम्पत्या—तद्विरोधिना प्रत्ययान्तरेणानभिघात स्वाध्याययोगसम्प-
 4 त्तिः ॥
 5 तथा च प्रणवजपपरमेश्वरध्यानसम्पत्या पर आत्मा परमेष्ठी प्रकाशते' योगिन इति ॥ २८ ॥

1 तदं]TL, यत्तदं MA, (रस्ययत्)तदं ४ 1 °र्थं ध्यां]TMA{°र्थं T_dMA}, °र्थंन्ध्यां L 1
 °च्चाप्रचलितं]LMA, °च्च प्रचलितं T 1 स्वाध्यायम्]T{°यं T_d}, स्वाध्यायः LMA 1
 °मामं]TLM, °ममं A 1 मानसो]TLM, मनसो A 2 °सन्नतरं]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA, °त्तन्नतरं T_m^{ac}
 2 °प्रवणं]T, °प्रणवं LMA 2 भू]T_mT_d^{pc}LM^{pc}A, (5)भू T_dM 3 °भिघात]Σ, भिघातः T_mL
 (note the presence of *visarga*) 5 प्रणवं]T_m^{pc}T_dLMA, प्र(प्र)णवं T_m 5 इति॥२८॥]T, इति
 TLMA{इति। T_dMA} (no end of section marker)

1 ध्यानात्स्वाध्यायमामनेत् 3 स्वाध्याययोगसम्पत्या 5 पर आत्मा प्रकाशते' इति

Translation



Commentary on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.23

Does [the acquisition of *samādhi*] come extremely near just as 47,1
a result of this?; is there another means for the attainment of
that [*samādhi*], or is there not?⁸⁹ [The Sūtrakāra] states that there
is another means:

Or by contemplation of Īśvara. (YS 1.23) 47,3

[The Sūtrakāra] will explain the meaning of the word “Īśvara” in the 47,4
next [sūtra].⁹⁰ Here [the Bhāṣyakāra] explains contemplation: [Īśvara,]
Influenced by distinguished devotion—stimulated toward the incli-
nation to helping—**helps him**, the exuberantly devoted yogin, **by [his]**
mere wish, because the intentions of Parameśvara [become] true⁹¹ ef-
fortlessly. **The attainment of *samādhi* and [its] fruit become ex-**
remely near as a result of his help as well.

⁸⁹This introductory question in the Bhāṣya follows discussions in the preceding. However, as to what exactly the Bhāṣya is referring to as “this” is difficult to ascertain due to textual problems of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. Apparently the text of Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.21–22 that the author of our text knew was significantly different from what we can know from the Pātañjalayogaśāstra’s manuscript tradition. It is even probable that he did not consider what we consider as sūtras 1.21–22 as sūtras. See the relevant portion of my earlier edition (Harimoto 1999: 230–1) and Maas’ critical edition of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, as well as his reconstruction of the text known to the author of the YVi based on my earlier edition (Maas 2006: 32–33, 103, 141). Bronkhorst (1985) theorizes that the author of the Bhāṣya was the compiler of the sūtras based on this part of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. He did not consider the possibility that there might have been a significantly different version of the text. All the same, it can still be reasonably assumed that Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.21–22 classifies yogins and teaches that the yogin who works the hardest and/or the most talented achieves *samādhi* the quickest. Hence the masculine singular word modified by *āsannatarah* should be *samādhilābhaḥ* (found in our text, too, to be modified by the word *āsannah*) and the word *etasmāt* should refer to the whole passage that immediately precedes where one cause of quick achievement of *samādhi* was taught.

⁹⁰In the YVi the word *uttara*, when referring to a portion of the root text, is used to refer to the next sūtra. The next sūtra indeed defines Īśvara. Accordingly, I consider the unspecified subject of the sentence to be the author of the sūtra.

⁹¹The characterization of the supreme deity/principle, *satyasamkalpa* (the one whose intentions/plans become true), is, as Śaṅkara in BSBh 1.2.2 says, an old one.



Commentary on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.24

“But who is this Īśvara who is neither *puruṣa* nor *pradhāna*?” 47,8
Since [Īśvara] is unknown in the discipline of Sāṃkhya, and since proof for the existence of Īśvara is necessary, someone who does not understand the meaning of the word “Īśvara” asks [the question].⁹² With regard to this [question] first the [following] thesis (*pratijñā*) is presented:⁹³ 47,10

Īśvara is a special *puruṣa* who is not tainted by deposits of impurities, deeds (*karmans*), and ripening. (YS 1.24)

Ignorance (*avidyā*) and so on are, since they make impure (*kleśa-* 47,11
yanti), the impurities (*kleśas*). Deeds (*karmans*) that are performed dependent on them (the impurities) are good and bad. [The word *kuśalākuśalāni* is] an *ekaśeṣa* [in which only the last word of those that have the same case ending remained], and thus it represents [all of] “good [deeds] (*kuśalāni*),” “bad [deeds] (*akuśalāni*),” and “good and bad [deeds]

⁹²The reading *sāṃkhyaśāstre prasiddhyabhāvāt, īśvarasadbhāve copapatter avāśyatvāt, anavagatēśvaraśabdārthaḥ prcchati* is a result of emendations. The reading preserved in L (and its descendants, including the 1952 edition) *sāṃkhyaśāstre prasiddhyabhāvād īśvarasadbhāve copapattim avāśyam anavagatēśvaraviśeṣo vā prcchati* is hard to construe. Especially problematic are the two particles *ca* in *copapatti°* and *vā* in *vā prcchati*. They serve no purpose in L’s reading. In addition, *īśvaraviśeṣa* appears conspicuously close to *puruṣaviśeṣa* in the sūtra being introduced, but rather unintelligible. Given that the subsequent sūtras are, according to the author of the YVi, a thesis (1.24) and its proof (1.25), the words *upapatti* and *avāśya* are reasonable to be in the sentence. Also, the presence of *ca* is hard to explain as a corruption. Thus I have emended *°papattim a°* to *°papatter a°* and *°vaśyam a°* to *°vaśyatvād a°* (note that in the constituted text I have dissolved sandhi because I insert a comma) to form the second phrase expressing a reason. For the remaining problem with regard to problematic *°īśvaraviśeṣo vā*, I propose to emend it to *anavagatēśvaraśabdārthaḥ*. One consideration here is that the sūtra being introduced (1.24) is expected to explain the meaning of the word Īśvara (see the commentary on the previous sūtra). This explanation of the question is prompted largely by the presence of the word *iti* in the Bhāṣya; it signals that the question comes from a *pūrvapakṣin*. The YVi explains who is asking the question on what ground. A possible explanation of the reading found in the L manuscript is a failed attempt to restore partially illegible text. However, there may be other possibilities.

⁹³The author is consistent in considering that sūtra 1.24 is the thesis and 1.25 is its proof. See passages [48,8] (translated on p. 91), [50,5] (p. 92), and especially [53,3] (p. 99).

(*kuśalākuśalāni*).⁹⁴ [Of these three groups, the last member,] “good and bad” deeds more or less mean mixtures of good and bad.⁹⁵ **Their result is called ripening**—characterized by the birth, length of life, and experiences.⁹⁶ [The compound] *kleśakarmavipākāśayāḥ* is [analyzed as to mean that] they, impurities, and so on, are those that lie around (*āśerata* < *āśī-*) till *nirvāṇa* is reached. Or, [the compound] *kleśakarmavipākāśayāḥ* means heaps of impurities, deeds, and their ripening.⁹⁷

48,3 **They, although present in the mind**,—since they originate from the activities of the mind—**are attributed to *puruṣa***. Why? **Because [people say] “He (*puruṣa*) is the one who experiences their result.” In the same way as victory and defeat, although present among soldiers, are attributed to a king**. The consequence of them (victory and defeat) is bound to the king.

48,5 [The Bhāṣyakāra continues—] **The one who is not tainted (or affected) by this experience (*bhoga*)**... [The reference to past] time is not meant [even though a past participle (*aparāmṛṣṭa*) is used]; because [the past participle] is used in a synecdochic sense, i.e., [the past participle *aparāmṛṣṭa* encompasses all the following:] “[Īśvara] is not tainted, nor will he be tainted, nor has he been tainted.” “Tainted (*parāmṛṣṭa*)” means being fit to have a relationship as the locus of the deposits of impurities, deeds, and their ripening.⁹⁸ For, otherwise, the negation (‘untainted’)

⁹⁴For *ekaśeṣa*, see AA 1.2.64: *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau* ff. The VMBh has a long discussion on that sūtra.

⁹⁵This interpretation alludes to YS 4.7 where yogins’ actions are said to be neither white nor black and for others there are three kinds (white, black, and white and black).

⁹⁶This is an allusion to YS 2.13: “When the root exists, there is ripening, [and the ripening is one or a combination of] the birth, length of life, or experiences.” See p. 48 for the Sanskrit text.

⁹⁷The second interpretation is based on Uṇādisūtra 4.132: *aśipañāygor uḍāyulukau ca* in which the word *rāśi* is said to have derived from the root *aś-* (5th class, “to pervade”). By this, the author of the YVi suggests that the word *āśaya*, too, is derived from *aś-* (1st class, “to pervade”). This is an alternative to the first interpretation where the root *ā-śī-* was mentioned. The purpose of presenting two different interpretations of the compound appears to be to de-emphasize the meaning of the word *āśaya*. In either interpretation *āśaya* is not referred to as an entity. Especially in the second interpretation *āśaya* is replaced with *rāśi*, one of many words that signify multitude often without much meaning of their own (such as *jāta*, *gaṇa*). Either way, the author understands that *kleśas*, *karmans*, and *vipākas* stay around and taint *puruṣa*, but there is no residue they leave or a separate storage for them. I did not mark either of the interpretations of the word *āśaya* in the sūtra as part of the Bhāṣya. All the versions of the YBh Maas (2006) consulted have *tadanugūṇā vāsanā āśayāḥ*, but this version of the Bhāṣya does not reveal how all the words in the compound are related. I cannot determine whether the author of the YVi intentionally replaced the Bhāṣya’s interpretation with his own or the version of the Bhāṣya he had lacked that sentence.

⁹⁸I have adopted the reading in L (*kleśakarmavipākāśayānāśrayasambandhayogī*) with as little change as possible: *kleśakarmavipākāśayānām āśrayasambandhayogyaḥ*. The first emendation is to insert another syllable *mā* between *āśayānā°* and *śraya°* (hence from *śayānāśraya°* to *śayānām āśraya°*). However, the symbol I read as *na* is all but certain. It is dissimilar to ordinary *na* and there appears to be an attempt to make a correction. Another change was from *ogī* to *yogyāḥ*. This part, if we look at the transmission, went through changes every time it was copied (from L to M to the edition). It is somewhat understandable since the original reading in L, if left

would have no effect, since [being tainted by the impurities, etc.] would not apply [even] to the standard *puruṣa* [of Sāṃkhya], who is free from changes, and has no action.⁹⁹

Therefore, the one who is the mass of *sattva*,¹⁰⁰ characterised by 48,8 eternally faultless knowledge and [eternally] unsurpassed sovereignty, **is he, a special *puruṣa*, Īśvara**—this is the thesis [to be proven].

Clarifying the meaning of the sūtra, [the Bhāṣyakāra] states: **But 48,10 then, [emancipated people (*kevalins*),] those who have achieved emancipation (*kaivalya*) [are many, as opposed to the one special *puruṣa*, Īśvara].** Since it is possible to be untainted by impurities etc., even though it may happen only occasionally, **emancipated people are many [as opposed to the one special *puruṣa*, Īśvara].** Are they Īśvaras? No. Because there is also the possibility of [their] being tainted. They are not completely untainted by impurities, etc. They have both [the possibility of] being tainted (*parāmarśa*) and not being tainted (*aparāmarśa*). On the other hand, Īśvara is only untainted. For, [when the sūtra says] “untainted” the word meaning of the two things[, viz., *parāmarśa* and *aparāmarśa*.] that should be taken as the characterization [of Īśvara to allow the emancipated to be Īśvaras], is not revealed.¹⁰¹ Accordingly, someone who is completely untainted is expressed by [the word] “untainted (*aparāmṛṣṭa*).”

[The emancipated people are many] because they, having de- 49,3 stroyed, by means of the right view (*samyagdarsana*), the three [kinds of] bondage, [viz., the bondage] with regard to *prakṛti*, [the bondage with regard to] *vikṛti*, and [the bondage with regard to] *dakṣiṇā*,¹⁰² have reached emancipation (*kaivalya*). But for Īśvara, the connection

unchanged, contains two sets of almost synonyms (*āśaya* and *āśraya*; *sambandha* and *yogin*). My understanding is that normal *puruṣas* have the potential of being attached to *kleśa*, etc., as where they take place.

⁹⁹M and its descendants, A and ℄, lack this sentence and the subsequent text up to the end of the next paragraph in this translation. This is one complete line (line 3 of folio 21 verso) plus three more symbols at the beginning of the next in L.

¹⁰⁰Our author considers the *sattva* to be the material cause of Īśvara. This is based on the phrase in the Bhāṣya *prakṛṣṭasattvopādānāt*. The author understands the meaning of the word *opādāna* as the material cause. This understanding is made clear in the commentary on the portion of the Bhāṣya that includes the phrase *prakṛṣṭasattvopādānāt*. See the paragraph [50,1] that starts with *tatra puruṣa*° translated on p. 92. That Īśvara has *sattva* as his material cause and that it is his mind figure prominent point in much of the following discussions on Īśvara’s omniscience.

¹⁰¹There is a difficulty determining how L reads. The symbol read as a cancelled *t* has somewhat different shape from usual one, and it appears that someone corrected it to *va* or *pa*, but the correction is not inked. This could well be the scribe of M. Since *pa* and *va* are often indistinguishable in L, there is a possibility that the symbol read as *vṛ* might have been meant to be a *pṛ*. My conjecture is based on the fact that often *na* and *sa* look similar, and that the symbol that appears to be a cancelled *t* might have been originally meant to be a *m*, and hence *asaṃvṛtaḥ*. The scribe of M intentionally or by mistake read °*pādeyayoḥ* as °*pādeyah*. The dual is preferable (*lectio difficilior*).

¹⁰²All the commentators (the author of the Yuktidipikā, the one of the Mātharavṛtti, the one of the Jayamaṅgalā, and Vācaspati Miśra) on SK 44d (*viparyayād iṣyate bandhabh*) speak of the same three kinds of *bandha* as the author of the YVi. However, they do not agree on what those *bandhas* mean. See the testimonia on this part of the text.

with them, [viz.,] the connection with the impurities and so on, did not exist, as [it once did] for a liberated person. Because for him (the liberated person), the period of bondage prior [to becoming emancipated] is known [to have existed] by the mere fact of a state of liberation coming into being. Because release is [necessarily] preceded by a [state of] bondage. Also, [Īśvara] will not have [the connection with them], as someone [still] dissolved in *prakṛti* will. Because for him—one who has not yet started the cycle of reincarnation—it is possible that the future period of bondage will come into existence. And it is possible for someone who has started the cycle of reincarnation [but] whose mind is [temporarily] dissolved in *prakṛti*¹⁰³—since he is still entitled/obliged [to consume the effects of previous actions]—to have both past and future periods of bondage.

49.8 The intention of this whole [Bhāṣya passage] here [from “But then, those who have achieved emancipation (*kaivalyaprāptās tarhi*)” to “For this reason, the following was stated: ‘But He is always liberated [and] always Īśvara’ (*etasmād etad bhavati—sa tu sadaiva muktaḥ sadaiveśvara iti*)”] is to show that [the past participle] “untainted (*aparāmrṣṭa*)” [in the sūtra] is not meant to refer to [the past] time[, as evidenced by the following statement in the Bhāṣya]—**But He is always liberated [and] always Īśvara.**

50.1 [The Bhāṣyakāra now] paraphrases the meaning of the next [sūtra], which is already established on the following grounds: Īśvara as *puruṣa* does not have the quality of sovereignty, because it has been stated in that [preceding sūtra] that Īśvara is a special *puruṣa*; furthermore, because the mind *is* endowed with the quality of sovereignty; and finally because an unsurpassed sovereignty implies a connection with an excellent mind. [The paraphrase is the following:] **That eternal excellence of Īśvara is the result of having preeminent *sattva* as the material cause.** [The word] “excellence (*utkarṣa*)” is [to be understood as] eternal increase of unsurpassed omniscience, sovereignty, and power.

50.5 Then [the Bhāṣyakāra] starts [his discussion] preceded by a question, in order to clarify the thesis [that has just been presented, viz., “That eternal excellence,” etc.]: **Is there a reason for that [excellence], or is there not?** The word “reason (*nimitta*)” is a synonym of “cause (*kāraṇa*).” [Thus the question may be paraphrased as] “Does it have a cause or does it not have a cause?”

50.7 Furthermore, if, first, [the excellence] has a cause, then saying “always Īśvara” is inappropriate because [his excellence] will not be eternal. If,

¹⁰³I have emended *cāprakṛtilīnacittasya* to *ca prakṛtilīnacittasya*. As far as the context is concerned, our author should be discussing someone who is temporarily free from the bondages. In that sense, someone whose mind is not dissolved in *prakṛti* is out of place. Considering that YBh 1.19 (and 1.51 to a lesser degree) that our author alludes to by the word *sādhikāra* is about someone who is dissolved in *prakṛti* and experiences as though he is emancipated, this sentence should be about the same kind of people. The idea in YBh 1.19 is that *citta* completes its responsibility (*adhikāra*) when one reaches liberation (*mokṣa/kaivalya*).

then, [the excellence] does not have a cause, since excellence is [always] an effect,¹⁰⁴ there would be the undesirable consequence that it does not exist. Because people do not know of an effect without a cause.

To this [the Bhāṣyakāra] answers—**It is not that [the excellence] does not have a cause, since its cause is *śāstra***—*śāstra* is [Īśvara's] knowledge.¹⁰⁵ [To paraphrase: his excellence is not without a cause] because *śāstra* is the cause. For, [his] knowledge, rooted in [the whole] of goals and their means, including things that are concealed or remote [as evidenced in the Vedas and other *śāstras*], has everything as its object, and is, like the nature of material, eternal.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴This question is based on the premise that excellence (*utkarṣa*) is an effect. However, I am unable to find a relevant passage anywhere that supports the assumption.

¹⁰⁵The discussion here is very brief. Combined with the textual difficulty (see the next note), this part requires some interpretations. Especially peculiar is the equation of *śāstra* with knowledge. With this regard, I find Śāṅkara's first interpretation of BS 1.1.3 (*śāstrayonitvāt*) in the BSBh shed lights on this part of the YVi. Note that the sūtra is similar to the phrase in the YBh *śāstranimittatvāt* now being explained. Note also that Śāṅkara gives two alternative interpretations of the sūtra, like the author of the YVi here. In Śāṅkara's interpretation of BS 1.1.3 *śāstra* is the Ṛgveda, etc. (*ṛgvedādi*). Our author probably understands *śāstra* here in the YBh the same way, viz., all kinds of authoritative teachings. If he understands the *śāstra* here in a restricted sense, such as the discipline of yoga or any specific discipline, the argument will not carry much force. Though problematic (see the next note), the compound *sādhyasādhanavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭa*° obviously refers to all kinds of *śāstra*.

Śāṅkara understands BS 1.1.3 *śāstrayonitvāt* as "Because [Brahman] is the source of *śāstra*." This is different from the interpretation here. The author of the YVi reads *śāstra* as the cause. However, Śāṅkara's first interpretation makes it so that the existence of *śāstra* is the evidence of the existence of an all-knowing personality (*sarvajña*, *puruṣaviśeṣa*). He reasons that any *śāstra* presupposes an intelligence greater than the information given in the *śāstra* (see note 173 on p. 119). Thus he sees *śāstra* (the Ṛgveda, etc.) as the manifestation of the knowledge Brahman has. Again, assuming a similar idea behind the equation of *śāstra* and knowledge helps us comprehend our text. In the equation knowledge (*jñāna*) probably means the knowledge Īśvara has.

¹⁰⁶I have emended *dravyasvabhāvasādhyasādhana*° in the manuscripts to *dravyasvabhāvat sādhyasādhana*°. Main reason is that the author of the YVi never uses the word (*dravya*)*svabhāva/svarūpa* to refer to the object of knowledge whereas the rest of the compound is apparently about the object of knowledge. Rather, when the author discusses the knowledge Īśvara has ([56,16] *etena* . . ., trl. p. 106 ff.; [69,7] *atha cakṣurādi*° . . ., trl. on p. 128 ff., etc.), he emphasizes that it is the nature of (*citta*)*sattva* that it is connected to everything and takes the shape of the object. He regularly uses the similes of light (*prakāśa*) or the space (*ākāśa*) in those discussions. (A similar idea is discussed in BSBh 1.1.5.) He also defends that knowledge of Īśvara may be natural (in the paragraph *kiñ ca* . . . below), in addition to following the Bhāṣya in stating that the *śāstra/jñāna* has a cause. It seems natural that he would have introduced the idea of innate knowledge already here. The expression *dravyasvabhāva* does not appear again in the YVi. Śāṅkara uses it once in BSBh 2.1.24 to refer to the natural process of milk turning into yoghurt or water turning into snow or hail (*yataḥ kṣīravat dravyasvabhāvaviśeṣād upapadyate | yathā hi loke kṣīraṃ jalam vā svayam eva dadhīmahakarakādibhāvena pariṇamate 'nāpekṣya bāhyaṃ sādhanam, tatthehāpi bhaviṣyati*). This is part of the answer to the question whether Brahman needs external means to be the creator. The argument ("because it so happens") is similar to the one in the YVi where the author argues that Īśvara does not need a means to know everything.

I understand the rest, *sādhyasādhanavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭāspadam*, to refer to the content of Īśvara's knowledge or *śāstra*. All the uses of the compound *sādhyasādhana* in the

- 51.2 If it is so, then, since knowledge is [always] preceded by learning something from somewhere else, there would be no excellence prior [to that learning]. Considering this possibility, [the Bhāṣyakāra] says **What does śāstra then have as its cause?** If [Īśvara's] knowledge is innate, then [this knowledge] would be the cause of lack of excellence [rather than that of excellence], like that of a drunkard or an insane person [whose knowledge comes from nowhere]. But if, on the other hand, it (*śāstra*, i.e., knowledge) does have a cause, then it will be thought that there is no excellence [of Īśvara] prior to that cause.
- 51.5 First, it is not that it (*śāstra*, i.e., Īśvara's knowledge) does not have a cause. Because [it] has [Īśvara's] **preeminent *sattva* as its cause.** This means that [the *śāstra*] relies on [his] preeminent *sattva*. For this very reason, there is no fault in knowledge being innate.
- 51.7 Furthermore, even if [his] knowledge is innate, this will not be the cause of inferiority [of Īśvara], like the knowledge of drunkards, etc., [is]. Because it relies on *sattva* eternally detached from impurities (*kleśa*), etc. As to this: knowledge, impressions, memory and recollection¹⁰⁷ have a seed-and-sprout-like connection, without [clear] starting point, due to each other's being cause and the effect. In precisely the same manner, †there is a beginning-less and endless connection between the *śāstra* and excellence, which are active in the mind of Īśvara, in the form of an eternally active process.†¹⁰⁸ In that [series of causes and effects], it is the excellence which

YVi are related to *śāstra* (see paragraphs *sambandho 'pi* . . . [174,3] translated on p. 189, *yogānuśāsanam* . . . [176,5] translated on p. 193, *agnihotrādi*° . . . [56,7] translated on p. 105), and the relationship between the two is one of the matters that one expects to be discussed in a *śāstra*. In addition, the author has the notion that everything in the universe is connected in the form of means and goals (and their relationships are taught in *śāstra*). See the syllogism *sarvam etat* . . . [56,3] translated on p. 105. Expressions based on the same idea using the compound *sādhyasādhana* are found several times in the BĀUBh: 1.4.6 *sādhyasāadhanalakṣaṇasya vyākṛtasya jagataḥ* (Shastri 1986: 66), 1.4.7 *idam iti vyākṛtanāmarūpātmakaṃ sādhyasāadhanalakṣaṇaṃ yathāvarṇitam abhidhīyate* (Shastri 1986: 67), 1.5.2 *sarvo lokah sādhyasāadhanalakṣaṇah* (Shastri 1986: 122), 2.1.1 *sādhyasāadhanalakṣaṇaṃ vyākṛtaṃ jagat* (Shastri 1986: 138). And *vyavahitaviprakṛṣṭa* is more or less a standard expression (usually with *sūkṣma*) to refer to objects that are beyond the reach of sense faculties.

There appear to be several assumptions and steps of logic in this short explanation of the Bhāṣya. First, it is assumed that *śāstra* originates from Īśvara, or at least *śāstra* is a manifestation of Īśvara's knowledge. Otherwise, the author would not paraphrase *śāstra* with *jñāna*. (See the previous note.) And hence Īśvara's knowledge is equal to or greater than *śāstra*. Another assumption is that *śāstra* is about everything. And therefore Īśvara's knowledge covers everything and is eternal. Accordingly, this knowledge gives eternal advantage or excellence to Īśvara. Yet another assumption here is that the greater knowledge results in superiority. It is notable that the author appears to be using the existence of *śāstra* as the evidence of Īśvara's omniscience. Cf. note 173 on p. 119.

¹⁰⁷I have emended the reading *jñānasamskārasmṛtīpratibandhānām* found in the manuscript L and its descendants (no reading from T is available) to *jñānasamskārasmṛtīpratīsandhānānām*, following the usage in YVi 1.4, for example. The word *pratibandha* in this compound does not fit. The words *smṛti* and *pratīsandhāna* form a standard combination in many other texts.

¹⁰⁸I have marked this part of the text as unrepairable. This is not so much as the text is incomprehensible, but in relation to the root text being commented. Having

is the effect of knowledge; the knowledge, too, is its effect.

An interpretation by others:¹⁰⁹ the word “reason (*nimitta*)” expresses 51,11 a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). *Śāstra* is the reason, i.e., the means of knowledge, of that [excellence of Īśvara]. Because his excellence is proven by it. What then proves [the reliability] of *śāstra*? The spotless *sattva* of Īśvara is the proof. For the reliability of *śāstra* results from the fact that it has been propounded by someone with pure *sattva*, as in cases such as the Mānava[dharmaśāstra]. So the *śruti* says, “Anything Manu said was a medicine.”¹¹⁰ Similarly, people say, “The master has said [such and such and therefore it must be true].” **There is a beginningless and endless relationship between these two, *śāstra* and excellence, as the means of knowledge and the object to be known.**

[Objection] It is not at all possible that his excellence is proven by a 51,16

much in common with the text of the Bhāṣya [see Maas (2006: 37)], this part may be meant to embed the words of the Bhāṣya, or it may simply be a close paraphrase. I expect the former since that is our author’s style. There are several problems. Maas’s edition, based on the manuscript tradition of the YBh, reads: *etayoḥ śāstrokarṣayor īśvarasattve vartamānayoḥ anādīḥ sambandhaḥ*. However, our text here does not have *etayoḥ*; it has *śāstraprakaṣayoh* instead of *śāstrokarṣayoh*; it has *īśvaracetasi* instead of *īśvarasattve*; it has *pravartamānayoḥ* instead of *vartamānayoḥ*; and it has *anādyantaḥ* instead of *anādīḥ*. First, we cannot know whether *etayoḥ* was originally in our text or dropped during the transmission. Our author knew the word in the Bhāṣya (see the next paragraph). If this part was meant to be a gloss embedding all the words of the Bhāṣya, then the lack of *etayoḥ* is an error. If, on the other hand, if this is meant to be a close paraphrase, not necessarily so. As for *śāstraprakaṣayoh*, this is clearly an error; it should be *śāstrokarṣayoh* as in Maas’s. That in fact is how our author reads, as seen in the next paragraph. As for *īśvaracetasi*, we could theorize this is a case of eye-skip from the original reading *īśvarasattva īśvaracetasi*. Glossing the word *īśvarasattve* with *īśvaracetasi* is reasonable, for the word is ambiguous (what does *sattva* mean here?). Nonetheless, our author did know the reading *īśvarasattve*, as seen in the opposition two paragraphs below. Similarly, the reading *pravartamānayoḥ* is suspicious of being an error since our author knew the reading *vartamāna*^o (again, see two paragraphs below). As for *anādyantaḥ* against *anādīḥ*, we at least know that our author did not read *anādīḥ* as in Maas’s reconstruction of the Bhāṣya. He read *anādyantaḥ* or *nirādyantaḥ* as found in the next paragraph. Alongside the next paragraph where an alternative interpretation is given, we can be more-or-less certain that our author knew the Bhāṣya that read similarly to other manuscript tradition of the YBh with the difference of *anādyantaḥ* or *nirādyantaḥ*. Considering all these, I could propose the reading of this part as *tathaivaitayoḥ śāstrokarṣayor īśvarasattva īśvaracetasi nityapavṛtāprabandharūpeṇa vartamānayoḥ anādyantaḥ sambandhaḥ*. However, this is only speculative and I keep the text found in our manuscripts in the edition. Note that in the following paragraph, which proposes an alternative interpretation of the same Bhāṣya passage, too, not all the words of the Bhāṣya the author knew were embedded. This may be an indication that our author did not thoroughly follow the principle to embed all the words in the root text in the exact order found there.

¹⁰⁹Cf. this interpretation with the alternative interpretation of BS 1.1.3 that starts with *atha vā*. There Śāṅkara interprets the sūtra as telling that *śāstra* informs of Brahman, just like the interpretation here.

¹¹⁰Note that the reading of the Taittirīyaśaṃhitā quote is not the same as found in its editions. (See p. 51 for the reading.) The difference is probably due rather to changes in the transmission of our text (more classical than Vedic) than to a different version of the Taittirīyaśaṃhitā known to our author. Yet I did not adjust the reading for the small possibility that our author indeed knew the reading found here.

- śāstra* that is present in Īśvara's [own] *sattva* [and not external to it].¹¹¹
- 52,1 [Answer] There is no such fault. Since [*śāstra*] originates from that [*sattva* of Īśvara], it [is said to] exist there. *Śāstra* indeed exists there while it also originates there, for the very reason that [Īśvara] is omniscient.¹¹² Also in our daily life [we find] that when A originates from B, A exists in B, for example: the cloth and so on exists in the thread and so on.¹¹³ That [*śāstra*] originates there is known from inference (*anumāna*) and from reliable testimony (*āgama*). The excellence [of Īśvara] is proven by *śāstra*; the reliability of *śāstra* is due to Īśvara. Accordingly, since they depend on different factors, one [can]not [object] that the excellence and *śāstra* depend on each other [circularly].
- 52,5 [Objection] But if the authority of Īśvara is due to *śāstra*, and if the authority of *śāstra* is due to his authority, there would be [the fault of circular] mutual dependence.
- 52,6 Answer: since the authority of Īśvara is established by inference, there is no such fault.
- 52,7 **For this reason, the following has been stated [previously].**¹¹⁴ For what reason? Because the unsurpassed knowledge and excellence that rely on Īśvara's preeminent *sattva* are eternal, as the process in the form of cause and effect is eternal. [Therefore the following was stated:] **“But he is always liberated [and] always Īśvara.”**
- 52,9 About this [the Bhāṣyakāra] says: **And thus, his sovereignty is without an equal or superior.** This is the conclusion (*phala*) of the proof (*pramāṇa*) about to be stated (viz., inference) or the approximate meaning of this [following] sūtra.
- 52,11 [The Bhāṣyakāra] elaborates what it is [for his sovereignty] to have no superior: **In the first place, it is not surpassed by another sovereignty.** Why? **The superior sovereignty** you think of **is exactly the sovereignty** of his that I have spoken of. This means that if a

¹¹¹The suggestion by the editors of the 1952 edition to read *varṭamāna*^o as *avar-tamāna*^o is possible, because the manuscripts seldom record *avagraha*. However, in order for the objection to have any effect, both parties (the opponent and the proponent) should accept that *śāstra* does not exist in Īśvara's *sattva*. But such an assumption would not be accepted by the proponent who has just said that *śāstra* exists in Īśvara's *sattva*. If this is an argument on the authenticity of *śabda/āgama*, there is another implicit argument we must assume in reading *avartamāna*: a *śāstra* existing outside of the *sattva* of the speaker is not authentic. But such an argument is not found in any text. Rather, the question from the opponent makes sense if the question is based on the assumption that as long as a *śāstra* resides only in Īśvara's *sattva*, it will be invisible and will not serve to inform us of Īśvara's superiority.

¹¹²I have some doubt about the reading *sarvajñatvāt* found in L (and its descendants, M, A, and Ḫ). As it stands, presumably the argument is that since Īśvara is omniscient, he still knows what flowed out as *śāstra*, i.e., producing/emitting *śāstra* does not mean the loss of what he knew. It does not, however, explain why the *śāstra* that originates from Īśvara's *sattva* can still be in that *sattva*. An emendation to *sarvagatatvāt* might be possible. The argument makes more sense if it answers why this *śāstra* that originates from Īśvara's *sattva* can be said to exist there.

¹¹³Note that this is a typical explanation of *satkāryavāda*.

¹¹⁴See page 92.

sovereignty which surpasses another sovereignty is present anywhere, that exactly is Īśvara.

Nor is there sovereignty that equals his; because equal eminence of properties is impossible. For, it is impossible for a kingdom to have two kings, [nor is it possible] for one king to have two kingdoms. [The Bhāṣyakāra] substantiates: **[If it were possible that there is a sovereignty that equals his,] then the undesirable consequence that the two [sovereignties] are equal would follow.** [This is undesirable] because it is impossible for either of the two [sovereignties] to act on the other [sovereignty] without annulling the other's volition[, and this amounts to neither of them being sovereignty].¹¹⁵

Nor is there only effect on two objects simultaneously with one volition. **Because** when [one] object is desired, **this precludes another object** having the same eminence. If A has the same eminence as B, then A is annulled by that B. And this [possibility of A having the same eminence] is annulled by that [B].¹¹⁶ Elsewhere we will state: “[In manifestations of three *guṇas*, one *guṇa*'s] dominances in a characteristic, and [one *guṇa*'s] dominances in a function, do not coexist [with the others' dominance]. But [in all manifestations] commonalities of [the three *guṇas*, either dominant or subsidiary] accompany the dominant ones.”¹¹⁷

Therefore, the one to whom sovereignty, that lacks any equal or superior, belongs is Īśvara. Thus Īśvara, who is neither *pradhāna* nor *puruṣa*, a special *puruṣa*, has been proved.

¹¹⁵These two paragraphs pose difficulties. Difficulties include the fact that the Bhāṣya our author is commenting appears to be quite different from any other versions of it, as well as the fact that there are signs of corruptions in the text.

¹¹⁶The reading *te ca na vācā bādhanam* is not comprehensible. The repeated appearance of *c* and *v*, which look similar in the Malayalam script, makes one suspect a corruption. The conjecture is based on the understanding that annulment should be done on the eminence, not in the sense one object disappears. Still, it is not very clear how this sentence relates to the next quotation.

¹¹⁷While the argument of the Bhāṣya interpreted here is more or less straightforward, I fail to see the exact purpose of the additional information given in the commentary. It does not appear to supply much support to the argument on the impossibility of the existence of two *aiśvarya*s of exactly the same value. The author rather appears to stress that no two things can be equal.

The author of the YD ascribes the fragment quoted in YBh 2.15 (referred to again in 3.13) to Vārṣaganya. The author of our text ascribes this fragment to a *tantra* (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 167). We may naturally assume that this “Tantra” is the Śaṣṭitantra, variously ascribed to Kapila, Pañcaśikha, and Vārṣaganya (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 127).



Commentary on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.25

In order to prove Īśvara about whom the thesis has been thus formulated 53,3
[in the previous sūtra], a form of evidence (*pramāṇa*) is told [by the author
of sūtras]—¹¹⁸

**In him the seed of the omniscient[, present in ev- 53,4
eryone,] has no superior. (YS 1.25)¹¹⁹**

It must be that “In him”, viz., in that [person], i.e., in Īśvara,¹²⁰ whose 53,5
definition has been thus formulated as the thesis [in the previous sūtra],
[“the seed of the omniscient] has no superior.” [To answer the inevitable
the question,] “What is this [seed of the omniscient]?” [the author of the
Bhāṣya elaborates:] **It is this [knowledge of ours, present in every-
one,] infallible knowledge acquired by perception (*pratyakṣa*) and infer-
ence (*anumāna*)¹²¹ that has things of the past as its object, things of
the future as its object, things that are present, at the present time,
as its object, the sum [of the preceding three, viz.,] things of the past
etc., as its object, and things beyond the senses as its object—since
things of the past and the future[, though beyond the senses, as far as
the present is concerned,] can [still] be objects of the senses, [the author**

¹¹⁸As seen in the following discussion, the author considers the sūtra to state the *hetu* (reason) of the thesis presented in sūtra 1.24. See note 93 on p. 89. Also, here the word *pramāṇa* is used in the sense of inference (*anumāna*).

¹¹⁹This sūtra, unlike most other sūtras, is enclosed between small vertical strokes (daṇḍas?) in T_m and L.

¹²⁰Even though it is not evident in this translation, I consider that the author introduces the pronoun *tasmin* to clarify what the word *tatra* refers to, as an intermediate gloss, viz., to show that *tatra*, primarily an adverb, is used in place of the locative of something singular. Another, more common, commentarial style for a similar case is simply to gloss *tatra* with referent without a pronoun following the word *tatra*. The VMBh several times glosses *tatra* with *etasmīn*, followed by its referent. A similar commentarial style, viz., glossing the word *tatra* with the locative of a pronoun (*tasmin*, *tasyām*, etc.) first and specifying the referent of the pronoun, is found several times in the BhGBh and BĀUBh. This is found only once in the YVī (the current case) and not once in the BSBh.

¹²¹The conspicuous omission of *āgama* among the three *pramāṇas* that the YS admits (1.7) is perhaps to avoid that Īśvara obtains his knowledge from *āgama*. Note that since the author accepts *yogipratyakṣa* as *pratyakṣa* [see Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952:20–21)], objects of the past or future, etc., mentioned next are not necessarily in the domain of inference.

of the Bhāṣya additionally mentions objects] beyond the senses.”¹²² And this [knowledge] having objects that are beyond senses [is not limited to knowing the past or the future and] is threefold: having subtle objects; having blocked objects; or having remote objects. [This knowledge of ours, which is discussed in terms of] “small” [or] “large,” as well-known, is the growing,¹²³ viz., as something that [always] has something greater, seed of the omniscient[, and serves as a reason (*liṅga*) for ascertaining his existence] in the way that knowledge of smoke [serves as the reason] for [the expectation of] the knowledge of [real] fire. How [does the seed of the omniscient serve as the reason]? [The seed of the omniscient] [necessarily] reaches the peak of preeminence somewhere—since [any] knowledge belongs to a knower, “somewhere (*yatra*)” refers to someone who holds knowledge. [Thus the word “somewhere (*yatra*)” means] “in a knower”—he is [necessarily] the omniscient[. He is now] established.¹²⁴

¹²²This commentary on the part *atīndriya* of the compound *atītānāgatavartamāna-samuccayātīndriyaviśayam* poses a problem. I have adopted the reading after correction in T_m : *īndriyaviśayayoś cā*°. Since the uncorrected reading in T_m is the same as in L, the reading after correction might have been a conjecture by the scribe. The possible archetypical reading *īndriyayoś cā*° ($T_m^{ac}L$) can hardly be correct, because we have another noun *arthayoḥ* in the same case. The reading *īndriyaviśayayor a*° in the 1952 edition is another attempt to fix the same problem (the edition lacks *ca* because it adopts its reading from M). It is clear that the compound, modifying the word *sarvajñabīja* in the Bhāṣya or its paraphrase *pratyakṣānumānajñāna* in the commentary, has *dvandva* components, but the function of *atīndriya* is not very clear since “beyond the senses” is not in the same semantic domain as the preceding elements related to time. Our author interprets the compound as a whole as a *bahuvrīhi* compound and all the elements before *viśaya* as forming a *dvandva* compound. It seems natural, then, for him to explain why this word, which is not related to time, forms part of the list. Even though I am not entirely certain, the understanding presented here, following the reading in T_m after correction, fulfills the probable intention of the author.

¹²³Following the discussion in the commentary on the previous sūtra, I consider this “growing” refers to the process of shifting the focus from one to another locus (a person) where the quality is greater, rather than the process of one person’s quality becoming greater. The process of comparing a quality in two individuals and moving on to the one with a greater quality has been in discussion since paragraph [52,9] translated on p. 96. The author of the Bhāṣya certainly had the idea of someone whose knowledge consistently increases, as evidenced by the phrase *īśvarasya śāsvatika utkarṣaḥ* in YBh 1.24 (translated on p. 92), and the idea might have been part of his proof of *īśvara*. The argument for omniscience through incessant improvement may have some connection to Dharmakīrti’s argument for the trustworthiness of the Buddha as the person where compassion incessantly grows. See the reference register on p. 53 in the edition. But the author of the YVi, perhaps in order to streamline the logic, interprets “growing” as referring to the quality that the quantity of knowledge differs from person to person, as seen in the next word *sātiśayatvena*. He often refers to this *hetu* (*sātiśayatva*) in the subsequent discussions.

¹²⁴As will be shown more clearly later (in the paragraph starting with *yasya hi* [54,18] translated on p. 102) in the form of *vyāpti*, according to the author, the text of the Bhāṣya understands the sūtra itself as showing an inference, comparable to the ontological argument for the existence of God.

The reasoning in our text is in fact in two stages. The author of the YVi repeatedly refers to the *hetu/liṅga, sātiśayatvāt*. According to the *vyāpti* translated on p. 102), this *hetu* only “proves” the existence of the peak of something that grows. (This problem indeed is pointed out by Maṇḍana. See testimonia register in the edition

In the same way, potency (*śakti*), too, as something that [always] has something greater, while increasing, reaches the peak in someone. He is [necessarily] the omnipotent. In this way, that [Īśvara] is the agent of creating, maintaining, and destroying the universe, has been established. Similarly, sovereignty (*aiśvarya*), too, while increasing [from one person to another], reaches the peak in someone. He is the supreme lord (*parameśvara*). And for the same reason,¹²⁵ it is established that [the person in whom the potency reached its peak] does not have the faults that are opposite of the potency and so on. 54,1

Now there might be an objection: [Objection] It is established that ignorance (*ajñāna*),¹²⁶ too, which is established as having the nature of growing, has reached its peak in that Īśvara. 54,4

[Answer] No. Because [ignorance] is contradictory to knowledge. For, knowledge and ignorance which are mutually contradictory cannot be associated with one entity [at the same time]. Indeed, when knowledge excels [in one person], ignorance cannot coexist in that [person]. For, when the light increases [its intensity], darkness only diminishes.¹²⁷ 54,6

for this part of the text, as well as for paragraphs *kiñ ceśvaraḥ sarvajñō na bhavatīti* [63,5] translated on p. 118 and *aiśvaryasarvajñābījayoḥ* [61,7] trl. on p. 113.) And therefore the proponents of this reasoning should also demonstrate that this peak of knowledge encompasses knowing all/everything. The argument in the YBh seems to try to avoid this problem by having “the seed of the omniscient” as the one that grows. Accordingly, the peak of the “seed of the omniscient” must be the omniscient. This, however, is obviously tautological. The author of the YVi appears to have been aware of this difficulty as evidenced by the discussion that “the peak” of growth means being infinite in the paragraph *aiśvaryasarvajñābījayoḥ* [61,7] translated on p. 113.

This inference for Īśvara/*sarvajña* is unique to the Yoga school, and even in the commentarial tradition on the YS, the YVi is unique in emphasizing the sūtra as an *anumāna*. The Bhāṣya, while it does appear that the author intended to interpret the sūtra as an *anumāna*, without the commentary in the YVi, the intention may easily be overlooked. On the other hand, as far as I am aware, the VidhiV is the only text that criticizes this *anumāna*.

¹²⁵This sentence appears misplaced. See note 128 below.

¹²⁶The word *ajñāna*, translated here as “ignorance” is not limited to the absence of knowledge. Here the author uses this word in a wide sense, as a generic antonym of the word *jñāna*. On the one hand, in this start of the discussion, it is assumed that *ajñāna* has a negative value that can get greater. On the other hand, in the subsequent discussion (*yaś cāpi . . .*, and so on) *ajñāna* is assumed to have a zero value.

Related terms, such as *avidyā*, *viparyaya* appear several times in the YS, and we find discussions on them in the YBh and the YVi. The YS defines *avidyā* as the first of *kleśas* and as the opposite of what one should know (YS 2.3–4). The term *viparyaya* appears as one of *cittavṛttis* (YS 1.6) and it is to perceive something erroneously based not on that object (YS 1.8). The author of the YBh identifies the five *kleśas* of YS 2.3 as *viparyayas* (YBh 2.5). He also clarifies *avidyā*’s relationship with *pramāṇa* (another *cittavṛtti* in YS 1.6) by saying “*avidyā* is neither *pramāṇa* nor the lack of *pramāṇa*, but another knowledge opposite of *vidyā*” (YBh 2.5). The YVi follows and defends these positions. Other related words *bhrānti*/*bhrānta* and *mīthyā*(*jñāna*) are used in the sense of “erroneous” and “untrue (knowledge).” None of them imply a simple absence of knowledge. Here, too, at the beginning of this discussion, the concept behind the word *ajñāna* follows the same pattern, that is, *ajñāna* has a negative value. But since the word is used in the sense of a lack of knowledge, too, it is translated as “ignorance” as the antonym of knowledge.

¹²⁷Note that our author compares light with knowledge and darkness with ignorance. Although here our author’s position appears compatible with the view that darkness is

- 54,8 If one objects “The opposite, too[is possible],” that is not true, either. Because when there is light, darkness is not perceived. For, present darkness is removed by light. It never happens that existing light is overcome by darkness. Even when one does not see the sun because of the cloud cover in the rainy season, it is merely obstruction of sight. But light itself is not removed, like darkness [is]. Therefore, when knowledge increases in someone, there is no presence of ignorance, as [there is no presence] of darkness in the sun. For, [Īśvara] has *sattva* that is eternally and completely devoid of *rajas* and *tamas guṇas* as the material cause.
- 54,13 Furthermore, since ignorance does not take anything real as its object, it is not possible for it to grow. But since knowledge takes [real] things that can be known as its object, it is possible that it grows. Indeed, if ignorance took [real] thing as object, it would be knowledge.
- 54,15 If one says, “ignorance excels in plants, etc.,” there is no such excellence. This [excellence of ignorance in plants] is stated in reference to the complete lack of knowledge. If ignorance excelled, one thousand [instances of] ignorance could not be removed by a single [instance of] knowledge. For, if that were the case, each [instance of] ignorance would have to be removed by a new [instance of] knowledge. Therefore, ignorance inherently cannot excel.
- 54,18 For,¹²⁸ **if something has grades, then** it is observed that **it reaches the peak, as in the case of measurements**, such as *pala*, having its peak at the [size of] the space (*ākāśa*); similarly, it must be that the seed of the omniscient reaches the utmost peak.¹²⁹

a lack of light, he does not explicitly state it. Later in this text, he discusses the issue and explicitly states that darkness is a thing (*vastu*). The ambiguity with regard to darkness, whether it is simply a non-existence or has negative value is common with his position with regard to ignorance (*ajñāna*). See the discussions on whether darkness (*tamas*) is a thing or non-existence of light in paragraphs *athāpi prakāśa*°. . . [70,10] translated on p. 129 to *tasmād vastu* [72,2] (trl. p. 131).

¹²⁸The few paragraphs starting from [54,1] “*tathā śaktir api* . . .” and up to “*prakarṣaḥ svarūpeṇa*” preceding this paragraph might have some corrupted order, or at least some traces of hasty editing. The natural order would be 1) the current sentence follows the paragraph immediately after the sūtra; then 2) the paragraph starting with *tathā śaktir api* up to *parameśvaraḥ*; 3) then the discussion about *ajñāna* before this current paragraph starts; 4) then the last sentence (*tataś ca śaktyādiviparyaya*°. . .) of the paragraph *tathā śaktir api*. Otherwise, the phrase “for the same reason (*tataś ca*)” is unintelligible.

¹²⁹This sentence is a curious one. There are two reasons why I consider parts of this sentence to be from the Bhāṣya. One reason is the presence of the word *hi*. This is disturbing in the context of the YVi. The author is relatively consistent in the use of the word. He uses the word to state a reason of the preceding statement, or to rephrase what has been stated in more detail. I am not aware of a use of this particle to change the subject in the YVi. If we left this whole sentence as part of the YVi, then the use of *hi* would be very peculiar. But as part of the text of the Bhāṣya, the particle *hi* functions very well. It explains the *vyāpti* in inferring the existence of the omniscient. The second reason is that there should be some text of the Bhāṣya here. In all the manuscripts used by Maas (2006), there is a syllogism *asti kāṣṭhāprāptiḥ sarvajñabījasya sātīśayatvāt, parimāṇavat* with minor variations (Maas 2006: 40). In the form of *vyāpti*, the content of the Bhāṣya sentence reconstructed here is very close. While it is inexplicable why we find a syllogism on the one hand, and a sentence that

1. As a whole and as a part, everything, an aggregate of things (*va-* 54,20
stujāta),¹³⁰ is directly perceived (*pratyakṣa*) by someone; because
it is an object of knowledge (*prameya*); like a pot [is an object of
knowledge and directly perceived by someone].¹³¹
2. The same [thesis: As a whole and as a part, everything, a collection 54,21
of things, is directly perceived (*pratyakṣa*) by someone;] because it
serves a person, being an object of knowledge; like a pot[, which
serves a person, being an object of knowledge, is directly perceived
by someone].¹³²
3. Also, the earth has a beginning; because it consists of parts; like a 54,22
pot[, which consists of parts, has a beginning].
4. The universe was created by someone who knows actions of living 55,1
beings and differences in means and results of those [actions];¹³³
because [the universe] has a specific arrangement, such as [differ-
ent] places[, each suitable for] the [living beings] to experience [the
results of their actions]; like a mansion[, which has a specific arrange-
ment, is created by someone who knows actions of living beings and
differences in means and results of those actions].¹³⁴
5. The earth was brought about by someone who has the knowledge 55,3
of what various living beings [should] experience; because [the earth

shows *vyāpti* on the other, this may be counted as one of the unique readings of the text of the Bhāṣya commented by the author of the YVi.

¹³⁰Śaṅkara uses derivatives of the expression “(*sarvam idam*) *vastujātam*” ten times in the BSBh (1.4.19; 2.1.6; three times in 2.3.6; 2.3.15; 2.3.17; 3.2.32; 3.3.17; 4.2.8), I know of no use the compound *vastujātam* in the BĀUBh, BhGBh and ChUBh. It is also interesting that our author assumes that everything (that exists?) is to be known. The same assumption appears again in the syllogism that starts with *svatantratayā* [56,11] (trl. p. 105). There our author states that this is an accepted assumption. Furthermore, when our author introduces his opponent, the reason *prameyatvāt* (to be known) is applied to the omniscient being himself. See n. 146 on p. 109.

¹³¹As a very rare text, the author lists thirty-five syllogisms to argue for Īśvara in the following. Not all of them have all the three components, viz., thesis, the reason and the example. But when certain components are missing, the author signals that they are to be supplied from the previous one by the use of words such as *eva* or *tathā*. Accordingly, in the following translation, they are supplied in the brackets.

¹³²The above two syllogisms, share the thesis and the example. Also, the reason in the second uses the one in the first as the subsidiary reason. These two syllogisms argue for the existence of at least one person who knows everything. Although the intention of the author is clear that this person is Īśvara, it is not specified. The same applies to many subsequent syllogisms in which only the existence of “someone” is argued. There is no explicit attempt to associate these “someone”s in one individual. It may seem that the purpose of this second syllogism is to implicitly lead the idea that the person who knows everything is the creator of it as well, but still it is not explicit. The author’s answer to this obvious shortcoming is, following the Bhāṣya, to state that inference is as good as concluding merely the existence, and other particulars were to be known by *āgama* (see paragraphs *tathā ca darśayati* [75,11] (trl. p. 135) and the following).

¹³³in the BĀUBh Śaṅkara uses the compound *karmaphalavibhāga* twice (3.7.23 and 3.8.9) and *phalavibhāga* once (4.4.22). In the last instance: *phalavibhāgopadeśāc ca | etam evātmanāṃ lokam viditvety anyasmād bāhyāl lokād ātmānaṃ phalāntaratvena pravibhajati*, Śaṅkara uses *phalavibhāga* in the sense of difference in the result. In the first two instances, Śaṅkara describes *ātman* as *karmaphalavibhāgakartṛ* and *karma-*

- is] to be experienced by various living beings[, i.e., where their experiences take place]; like rice and barley, etc.[, which are to be experienced (eaten) by various living beings, are brought about by someone who has the knowledge of what various living beings experience (eat)].
- 55,5 6. The earth was created by someone who seeks [to accomplish] multiple purposes; [the reason is the same as the above]; like a house and so on.
- 55,6 7. All the dwelling places, such as mountains, rivers, oceans, etc., were realized by someone skillful who knows [what is] appropriate to be experienced by [which] inhabitants of those [places]; the reason and the example are the ones that have been mentioned (i.e., the same as the previous proof).
- 55,8 8. The sun was created by someone who knows various living beings' capacities of illumination, etc., [in order to supplement their capacity so that they can see]; because its nature is to illuminate; like a lamp[, whose nature is to illuminate, is created by someone who knows the capacities of illumination, etc., of various living beings in order to supplement their capacity so that they can see].
- 55,10 9. The movement of the sun—rising, setting, and so on—that has a fixed time was devised by someone who knows the purpose of it; because it has fixed time; like agriculture[, which has fixed time, has been deployed motion by someone who knows the purpose of it].
- 55,12 10. The activity of the sun, planets, moon, and constellations is devised by one intelligent lord; because even though their activity has [like all the other activities] a painful nature,¹³⁵ [the activity of the sun, etc.,] follows fixed patterns; like the activity of dutiful disciples or servants[, which has a painful nature but follows fixed patterns, is devised by one intelligent lord].
- 55,14 11. The waning and waxing of the moon were devised by someone who knows time [periods] such as *tithi* (moon day), etc.; because they divide time; like a water clock[, which divides time, is devised by someone who knows time periods].
- 55,16 12. The moon was created by someone who knows the deviation of time; because it is bound to increase and decrease (wane and wax); like a water clock as in the previous proof[, which is bound to increase and decrease, is created by someone who knows the deviation of time].
- 56,1 13. The universe has one intelligent master; because it consists of many areas ruled by many living leaders who either conflict or ally each other; like a kingdom of the sort.

phalavibhāgajñā.

¹³⁴The argument for Īśvara based on the reason that the universe has a particular arrangement is found in many places. Kamalaśīla ascribes an inference based on a similar argument to Aviddhakarṇa. See the TSP on ŚRTS k. 47.

¹³⁵The idea that all the activities are pain in nature is taught in the Sāṃkhya system.

14. This whole thing[, the universe,] in the state of a function to be ac- 56,3
complished by [appropriate] means, is known directly by someone;
since [it, as a whole,] serves one purpose, [while its elements some-
times] contradicting and [other times] helping each other;¹³⁶ like
matters related to war[, which, as a whole, serves one purpose, while
their elements sometimes contradicting and other times helping each
other, is known directly by someone].
15. Because [this whole universe] is a collection; like the matters related 56,5
to pottery; the thesis is the same [as the previous syllogism].¹³⁷
16. Everything is directly known by someone at once; because while 56,6
[they may be considered] to consist of variety of things, they are
mutually related; like [a group of] various things among which rela-
tionships are well-known.
17. The means and the goal of things like Agnihotra ritual are directly 56,7
known (*pratyakṣa*) by someone; because they are means and goal;
like eating and satisfaction[, which are the means and the goal, are
directly known by someone].
18. All the capabilities are directly known (*pratyakṣa*) by someone; be- 56,8
cause they are things (*vastutva*); like a pot[, which is a thing, is
directly known by someone].
19. If there is no intermediate obstruction, [this] whole aggregate of 56,9
things (*vastujāta*) is directly known without being intervened; be-
cause there is a connection for having sound, [touch,] and so on; like
the sound, etc., [are directly known without being intervened] to the
person who is eating an extremely long *śaṣkūlī* cake.¹³⁸
20. Everything is perceived as independent by a certain individual by 56,11
means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*); because [everything] is ac-

¹³⁶I have emended the reading *avāntara*° to *itaretara*°. Cf. the syllogism above. Besides the intelligibility, I do not find any use of *avāntara* and *virudh-* together. The construction, *itaretara-virudh-* adopted here, is not in a wide use, but Śāṅkara uses this several times (BĀUBh 2.1.20, 4.5.15, BSBh 2.2.32). Other constructions, *anyonya-virudh-* and *paraspara-virudh-* in the same meaning are much more widely used.

¹³⁷Śāṅkara has a discussion on a pot existing in the form of function in a potter, etc., before its creation in BĀUBh 1.2.1 (Shastri 1986: 19).

¹³⁸Since the word *śaṣkūlī* has two very distinct meanings, one “the orifice of the ear” and the other “a large round cake,” this *anumāna* poses a difficulty. On the one hand, because of the mention of “the sound, etc.,” it is possible that the word *śaṣkūlī* is used in the sense of “the orifice of the ear.” In ŚBh 1.1.7 and NVTṬ 1.1.4 we find the idea that the sound, the property of *ākāśa*, causes the perception in the orifice of the ear (*karnaśaṣkūlī*). But on the other hand, the word *bhakṣayataḥ* suggests that *śaṣkūlī* is food. The fact that when the word *śaṣkūlī* is used in the sense of the orifice, it is usually prepended with the word *karna* might slightly favor this understanding. I find it also problematic that “the sound, etc.” in the example are not aggregates of things. It is possible that the author was playing on the double meaning of the word *śaṣkūlī*, but it is also possible that the text is corrupt. The translation is based on the interpretation that the example is about the fact that we hear sounds inside our mouth when we eat. The sound apparently does not require the sound to travel through the air.

knowledged as to be known;¹³⁹ like the plot of a theatrical performance (*nāṭya*)[, which is acknowledged as to be known, is perceived as independent by a certain individual by means of direct perception].

- 56,12 21. Without an obstacle, everything is perceived by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) by someone; because even if there are pluralities, they are mutually related; like an actor, etc., that are related to a theatrical performance[; they are mutually related, are perceived by direct perception by someone without an obstacle].¹⁴⁰
- 56,14 22. The omniscient is free from the cycle of reincarnation; because he does not have ignorance (*ajñāna*); like a liberated *ātman* (*muktātman*).
- 56,15 23. Īśvara is free from flaws (*kleśas*), and so on; because he has an unobstructed knowledge; like an accomplished yogin (*siddhayogin*).¹⁴¹
- 56,16 By this [fact that Īśvara] is free from obstructions, viz., *kleśa*, etc., and ignorance, it is established that [Īśvara] has knowledge that does not require a collection of senses, viz., the eyesight, etc., and whose object is everything. For, *sattva* of the mind (*cittasattva*) of Īśvara, being capable of grasping every object, and being present everywhere, is connected to all the objects at the same time. This being so, it cannot be established that there is no instrument to grasp the entire reality.
- 56,19 Nor does [*sattva* of the mind] have a shape, because it pervades everything even when there is an obstruction, just like the space (*ākāśa*). Even though [ordinary] mind[, too,] is connected to every object, because of the instability of the objects, appearing and disappearing of [knowledge],

¹³⁹I assume our author is using the word *jñeyatva* in the same sense as *prameyatva* in the first syllogism in this series on p. 103 (ed. [54,20]). Cf. also n. 146 on p. 109 where a related reason *prameyatva* is used by the opponent.

¹⁴⁰The preceding three paragraphs, including this one, appear to form a progression of arguments. The first one was about aggregates being directly known; the second about presumably the components of an aggregate being directly known; and the third, everything being known without an obstacle. Note that the reason used in the the last syllogism (*anekatve saty anyonyasambandhāt*) is identical with the one used in the paragraph starting with *yugapac ca* above. The syllogism in that paragraph appears to argue for the same thing as this set of three. One possibility is that this set of three is meant to elaborate on the point put forward in that previous one. Also, these three syllogisms appear to argue for the same thing as the very first one in this long series of syllogisms (ed. [54,20] trl. on p. 103). Notable are the uses of the term *vastujāta* and *jñeyatva* in this set. The former was used in the first syllogism and the latter is an equivalent of *prameyatva* of the first syllogism. Considering that in the next syllogism the subject changes to the omniscient being rather than everything's being known by one person, the appearance of these two terms might also signal that this set is a minor conclusion.

¹⁴¹In the above two syllogisms the author refers back to what has been stated in sūtra 1.24, which he claims to be the thesis to be proved. The strategy to *prove* what has been stated in the sūtra appears to be first to prove the existence of *sarvajña*/Īśvara, and then, based on this premise, to prove his being free from *kleśa*, etc., which are stated in sūtra 1.24. Having established that, the author argues that Īśvara does not require instruments (*karana*), such as senses (*indriyas*) in the following paragraphs.

and instability of memory and wish can happen. For, [*sattva* of the mind] acquires activities in the shape of the object, like the ray of the sun.

The reason is as follows: If *sattva* of one's mind is shielded by obstructions (*āvaraṇa*), such as *kleśa*, then he is connected to demerit (*adharmā*), etc. And it follows that the *sattva* [of his mind], though [in principle] omnipresent and takes everything as object, will have its original path of operation blocked by obstructions such as demerit, etc. Thus it is logical that [the *sattva* of his mind] requires gates such as senses. 57.3

A lamp covered by the enclosure (*āvaraṇa*), such as a sleeping chamber (*apavaraka*), illuminates outside through openings in the enclosure; but the same lamp, when the enclosure, i.e., the sleeping chamber, is removed, without requiring the path of the opening, illuminates in all directions. In exactly the same manner, *sattva* of Īśvara, since it does not have a connection with enclosure (*āvaraṇa*) such as *kleśa*, there being no cause of suppressing any particular object, grasps the entire object at the same time. 57.6

For the same reason, [the criticisms] that there is no excellence [of senses] that exceeds [their] own [capability so as to produce the knowledge of everything], and the like, do not apply [to our view], because everything is the object [of *sattva*].¹⁴² 57.9

1. The whole universe has one lord (Īśvara); because it consists of many specific things, such as places, that require a protector; like one kingdom well-known to be that way.¹⁴³ 57.10
2. And similarly, [the whole universe has one lord (Īśvara)]; because it possesses many supplemental devices that are the cause of constant stability; because [it] consists of various regions that conquer each other, of which the more powerful gets [the access to] hardly accessible areas; and because [it] possesses a distinct body that is in the state of not easily destroyed;¹⁴⁴ like one kingdom understood as of that sort. 57.11
3. Practices of *varṇas* (four classes) and *āśramas* (four living phases) [viz., the practices of *dharmā*] were instructed by someone who has the knowledge of specific relationships between varieties of those who make actions, those who receive the result of actions, actions, the means, and results; because they (the practices) are followed 57.13

¹⁴²I have emended the text with the consideration of the criticism by Kumāriḷa with regard to the possibility of omniscience. He, in ŚV Codanāsūtra kk. 111–5, argues the impossibility of knowledge of everything through one kind of perception (*pratyakṣa*). The reason is that one kind of perception, even considering that it may be better (*atiśaya*) in some than others, it does not perceive beyond what they are capable of perceiving (*svārthānatīlaṅghanāt*). (See testimonia in the edition for the Sanskrit text.) Moreover, the compound *svātīlaṅghanānatīlaṅghanadoṣa* found in manuscripts is unintelligible. Something going beyond itself (*svātīlaṅghana*) may be a problem but not going beyond itself is hard to be considered a problem.

¹⁴³In this and the following two syllogisms the theme is Īśvara as the lord of lords.

¹⁴⁴This third reason may refer to some specific condition of a kingdom, but I am not aware of any.

by those who wish to receive rewards and those who are afraid of retributions alike; like the practice of medicine, alchemy, etc.¹⁴⁵

- 57,15 4. Similarly, instructions of those [*varṇas* and *āśramas* were given by someone who has the knowledge of specific relationships between varieties of those who make actions, those who receive the result of actions, actions, the means, and results]; because [they, the instructions on *varṇa* and *āśrama*] are for others, because they are instructions, because they are approved by the wise, and because the meaning of them is incomprehensible to humans without instructions; like instructions of medicine.
- 58,2 5. The body and senses are created by an efficient cause who knows all the purpose of them; because they possess the means to cause specific functions and stability; like a mansion, house or a wooden puppet.
- 58,4 6. Because [they (body and senses)] have specific purposes and arrangements; [the remaining components of the syllogism, viz., the thesis and the example are] the same as above.
- 58,5 7. Similarly, senses [are created by an efficient cause who knows all the purpose of them]; because they are instruments; like an axe, chisel, and so on.
- 58,6 8. Similarly, everything [was created by an efficient cause who knows all the purpose of it]; because [everything] consists of the material cause determined by its effect, because [everything exists] for the sake of the experiencer (*bhoktr*) [of the fruit of their actions], because [everything] is a means to obtain things to be experienced; like a pot, etc.
- 58,7 The following reasons apply to [the argument for the earth] having an origin (the beginning) [as well as for the earth being perishable]—
- 58,8 Because [its] size is in-between [i.e., between having the size zero (the size of *paramāṇu*) and infinite (the size of *ākāśa*)]; because it is fit for having relationships with various causes of destruction; because it is the locale [for living beings] to experience [the fruit of actions]; because it has activities, [their] effects, the means, its shape, and so on.
- 58,10 1. The earth is perishable; because it consists of various parts that are expanding, shrinking, being filled, being removed, being burned, or being split; like a body.
- 58,12 2. Elements, earth and others (viz., water, fire, wind and space), are perishable; because they have potential to perish each other; like a man with a weapon.
- 58,13 3. Exactly the same [thesis and the example are applied]; because of the contradiction, and because they are opposite of *puruṣa*.

¹⁴⁵Although it is not explicit, this and the next syllogisms asserts Īśvara as the teacher of the *dharma*. This is perhaps an implicit assertion that Īśvara is the author of the Vedas since the author shows his familiarity with the Mīmāṃsā teachings, and,

4. The space is subject to originating and perishing; because it immediately functions; like a pot. Also, because it is the foundation of the qualities grasped by the external senses. 58,14

In conclusion, the supreme Īśvara who has unsurpassable capability, sovereignty and knowledge has been established. 58,16

Discourse against sarvajña-Īśvara denier

The opponent

At this point [an opponent] states— 58,17

[Objection] The referent of the word “Īśvara” is not something all-knowing; because [Īśvara] has to be known through [one or more] source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), because [Īśvara] is a thing, because [Īśvara] is signified by word, because [Īśvara] is *ātman*, because [Īśvara] cognizes requiring [some] means; like we.¹⁴⁶ 58,17

Also, the word “Īśvara” does not signify [someone or something] that is associated with unsurpassed knowledge; because it is a word; like the 58,19

according to them, *dharma* is taught in the Vedas. Śaṅkara expresses the idea clearly, with a reference to *varṇa* and *āśrama*, in the introduction to his commentary on the BhG. See testimonia in the edition.

¹⁴⁶This starts the summary of opposition (*pūrvapakṣa*). Accordingly, the sentence here, even though it takes the form of a syllogism, is not meant to be a complete argument by itself. Even the thesis *īśvaraśabdārthaḥ sarvajño na bhavati* in this syllogism represents various views. It encompasses the theses of the following two syllogisms. This is confirmed in the discussions on the opponent’s theses, starting with *prathamam āvat pratijñā* [60,16] translated on p. 113 and ending before the paragraph *kiñ cānyat—parikalpita*° [66,1] (trl. p. 123). Among the five reasons (*hetus*) in this syllogism, the first three (*prameyatva*, *vastutva*, and *śabdābhidheyatva*) do not get independent treatment, but discussed at once as *prameyatvādi* in paragraphs *kiñ ca prameya*° [66,4] (trl. p. 123) to paragraph *nāpi ca* [66,19]. Presumably, the *vyāptis* behind these reasons are: anything that is to be known by a *pramāṇa* is not all-knowing, like we, that are to be known by a *pramāṇa*, are not all-knowing; anything that is a thing is not all-knowing, like we, that are things, are not all-knowing; anything that is signified by word is not all-knowing; like we, that are to be signified by word, are not all-knowing. I do not know of any author who used any of these three *hetus* to disprove Īśvara or *sarvajña*. However, *prameyatva* and *vastutva* are in fact used in syllogisms to argue for Īśvara in the preceding: *prameyatva* in the form of *jñeyatva* in *samastam* . . . [54,20] (trl. on p. 103) and *vastutva* in *sarvāḥ* . . . [56,8] (trl. on p. 105). The validity of these three reasons is discussed in paragraphs *kiñ ca prameya*° [66,4] (trl. p. 123) to *nāpi ca prameyatva*° [66,19] (trl. p. 124). It is conceivable that the author introduced these three *hetus* that cover everything (*prameyatva*, epistemologically; *vastutva*, ontologically; and *śabdābhidheyatva* linguistically) to preclude his opponent from pointing out that his arguments have the problem of *anekāntatva* (that the reason can lead to a different conclusion). The same can be said about the syllogism two paragraphs below whose reason is a variant of the syllogism the author used to argue for Īśvara. There are discussions on the two remaining *hetus*: the paragraph that starts with *athātmatvāt* [66,21] (trl. p. 125) and the next for *āmatva*; and a long portion starting with the paragraph *atha cakṣurādikaraṇavattvāt* [69,7] (trl. p. 128) and ending before *yeṣāṃ punaḥ saṃsāriṇaḥ* [74,6] (trl. p. 134) for *sāghanāpekṣopalaabdḥrtva*.

word “pot”[, which is a word, does not signify something that is associated with unsurpassed knowledge].¹⁴⁷

58,20 The universe is devoid of an all-knowing lord of all (*sarvajñasarveśvara*); because various creatures take refuge in it; like a kingdom [ruled] by mutually opposing chiefs[, where various creatures take refuge, is devoid of an all-knowing lord of all].¹⁴⁸

59,1 As in the case today, neither in the past nor in the future, all the creatures are not perceivers of an omniscient; because they are creatures; like we[, who are creatures, do not perceive the omniscient].¹⁴⁹

59,3 **Īśvara conceived by others** Neither the omniscient nor the lord of all (*sarveśvara*) conceived by other proponents does not exist; because he (the omniscient or the lord of all) is not perceived; like the horn of a hare [conceived by other proponents, which is not being perceived, does not exist].¹⁵⁰

59,4 **Īśvara and his body** Similarly, [your Īśvara] is not all-knowing or the lord [of all];¹⁵¹ because he does not have a body; like a liberated *ātman*[, who does not have a body, is not all-knowing or the lord of all].

59,5 [To elaborate,] if he has a body, then the body will presuppose merit (*dharma*), etc.[, that contributed in forming it]. Similarly, he would incarnate, just like we do. If [you say that he] does not have a body, then it cannot be established that he is the creator of the universe, or that

¹⁴⁷The thesis here is a variant of the thesis of the immediately preceding syllogism, as seen in the discussions on *pratijñā* below. It is examined in the portion that starts with *kiñ cānyat—kāṣṭhāprāpteśvaratvasya* [61,11] (trl. p. 113) and ends before *athāviśeṣyaiveśvaraśabdārthaḥ* [64,10] (trl. p. 120). Again, the *hetu* of this syllogisms has no major role in the discussion.

¹⁴⁸The thesis here functions as another variant of the main thesis of the opponent. It is dealt with in the portion starting with *athāviśeṣyaiveśvaraśabdārthaḥ* [64,10] (trl. p. 120) and ending before *kiñ cānyat—parikalpita°* [66,1] (p. 123). Again, there is no mention of the *hetu* in this syllogism in the following. Note, however, that this is a reverse of the syllogism used to argue for Īśvara (*buddhīmadekesvāmikañ jagat . . .* [56,1]) translated on p. 104.

¹⁴⁹This opposition, perhaps modeled after Kumāriḥ, is dealt with in the portion starting with *bhūtabhaviṣyatkālayor apīśvarasya* [67,1] (trl. p. 125) and ending before *athāśarīratvād asarvajñāḥ* [67,5] (trl. p. 125).

¹⁵⁰This opposition is refuted in the portion starting with *kiñ cānyat—parikalpita°* [66,1] (trl. p. 123) and ending before *athāpi syāt—niravadhikam īśvaram* [66,10] (trl. p. 124).

¹⁵¹The beginning of this statement is typeset as *tathā—asarvajñāḥ* and in the apparatus I have indicated that the reading comes from manuscripts, L, M, A, Td and the edition (p. 59). Although they may appear to be different, some having independent vowel symbol *a*, the underlying text without the *sandhi* is the same (*tathā asarvajñāḥ*). The scribe of M misunderstood the text he saw (*tathāśarvajñāḥ*) as *tathā sarvajñāḥ* and put a space between the two words. The manuscript A inherited the reading. We do not know how the scribe of L understood the text because the custom of using spaces is only a printing convention, non-existent in manuscripts. We cannot determine which of L (*tathāsa°*) or T (*tathā asa°*) had more original reading. If one prefers correct *sandhi*, then the text can become that of L even when what the scribe saw was the other. Similarly, if a scribe wants to remove unambiguity, he can write as in T, even when what he saw was the reading in L.

he helps, among other things[. This is illustrated] by the example of a liberated *ātman* [who has no body and does not create the universe or help].¹⁵²

Arrangements as being natural It is not possible that the universe 59,7 has a special arrangement suitable [for creatures] to experience specific [result of an action (ritual or otherwise)]; precisely because [the arrangement of the universe] is natural; like the sharpness of thorn or the closing of the *kumuda* flower and blooming of the lotus flower [by day].¹⁵³

Also, the setting and rising, etc., of the moon and the sun are natural; 59,9 like [the reaction] between iron and a magnet.¹⁵⁴

Answer to the opponent

[Answer] Against the above, we say—

59,10

On arrangements as being natural First, the arrangement of the 59,11 earth, etc., is not natural. There is not at all an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) for [an inference *anumāna*] that proves that. Furthermore, it is not acknowledged that the sharpness of thorn, etc., is natural.¹⁵⁵

If you say—[Objection] Like the heat, etc., is the nature of fire, etc., 59,13 based on the reason (*hetu*) that [the arrangement of the earth] is a property of a thing, the arrangement of the earth [is natural].

[Answer] [Such an inference] does not lead to a single conclusion (*anaikāntikatva*) because the arrangement of a mansion, etc., [that is known to be created by an intelligent being] is also a property of a thing.

If you say—

[Objection] But [the reason (*hetu*) for arguing that the universe does 59,15 not have a specific origin] is “because [the arrangement] is natural” [rather than “because it is a property of a thing.” Accordingly, your criticism that the reason does not lead to a single conclusion does not apply].

[Answer] [The reason has the defect of] not having been established (*a-siddhatva*). Because [we] acknowledge that the arrangement of the universe is produced in order [for creatures] to receive the fruition of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharmā*). It will be later proved that an agent [always] has merit or demerit.¹⁵⁶

In conclusion, the arrangement of the earth is not natural; because it 59,17

¹⁵²The discussion on whether Īśvara has a body or not, including the authenticity of Upaniṣads, is in the portion starting with *athāśarīratvād asarvajñāḥ* [67,5] (trl. p. 125) and ending before *atha cakṣurādīkaraṇavattvaat* [69,7] (trl. p. 128).

¹⁵³Even though many authors criticize the argument for Īśvara based on the reason that the universe has a specific arrangement (structure *sanniveśa/racanā*), I do not find exactly the same argument as found here, viz., that the arrangement is natural (inherent/innate) to a thing. A relevant argument is found in ŚRTS kk. 110–127.

¹⁵⁴Note that this opposition does not form syllogisms. The “natural” origin view is discussed immediately below.

¹⁵⁵This is the beginning of the answer to the opposition that the arrangement of the universe is its nature (*svabhāva*).

¹⁵⁶I am unable to locate where this is discussed.

exists for creatures to receive [the fruition of their deeds/ritual acts]; as in the case of the arrangement of a mansion.

59,19 The activities of the moon, etc., is not natural; because it is a movement; as in the case of our movement.

60,1 If you say, [objection] “Our activity, too, is natural,” then [our answer] is “No.” Because there would be an undesirable consequence of [our activity] becoming eternal, like the heat of fire. For, the heat of fire, [a property (*dharma*),] being natural [to fire], does not require a certain cause in order to establish itself, except for the presence of the property-bearer (*dharmin*). However, arrangement, etc., that are results of actions require specific causes in order to establish themselves. Accordingly, they are not natural.

60,4 If you say “Requiring a certain cause, too, is the nature of the arrangement of a mansion, etc.”—let that sort of thing be [called] natural! Still, the arrangement of the earth, etc., has the nature of requiring a certain cause, exactly like a mansion. And hence, the difference in how we call [the arrangement of the earth, etc., whether we call it natural or not] does not amount to the defect [in our view]. In addition, your thesis (“the arrangement of the earth is natural”) will have the opposite effect [of what you wish to prove] because [the reason “because it is natural” in the syllogism to argue for the universe not having a specific beginning can be replaced with] “because it requires another participant in the action [of realizing it] (a *kāraṅka*).”

60,7 **Criticism on the opponent’s inferences** The inferences (*anumāna*) stated by you are not inferences [that stand] because they contradict people [who believe in Īśvara], scriptures (*āgama*), and [proper] inferences. First, we state that [your inferences] contradict [correct] inferences based on the reasons such as “because [knowledge/capability/sovereignty] has degrees,” etc., [that prove the existence of Īśvara/sarvajña.] We also declare that [your inferences] contradict scriptures based on [Upaniṣadic statements] such as “that who is omniscient, knowing all (MuU 1.1.9),” “the one ruler (KaU 2.2.12/Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad 6.12),” etc.¹⁵⁷ [We] also [declare] that [your inferences] contradict the whole world. Every single person living their daily life, including women and cowherds, having their mind always fixed upon names such as Śiva or Nārāyaṇa, even when those with crooked minds suppress [them], disregarding the increasing areas they suppress, with their head vowed, by means of handfuls of flowers and so forth, worship the supreme lord (*parameśvara*). The same people also seek for rewards [from Īśvara].

60,13 Then if one may say, [objection] “There is a conflict between our inferences that prove the non-existence of the omniscient and other theses.”

60,14 Against this we answer—they are not [proper] inferences.

60,15 [Objection] In what way?

¹⁵⁷Note that the author cites these Upaniṣadic fragments that in their own context are about *akṣara* and *ātman* as the support of Īśvara. This requires the same understanding

Deficiencies in the theses of opponent's inferences First of all, the thesis is flawed. If, at first, [you say] “The meaning of the word ‘Īśvara’ is not the omniscient,”¹⁵⁸ then the Īśvara you accept is referred. In that case, [your thesis] has the fault of having something already established as to be established (*siddhasādhyatā*).

[Objection] But [Īśvara] is not accepted by us. 61,2

[Answer] Still, you will have the fault of attempting to specify something that has not been established (*asiddhaviśeṣyatā*). 61,3

[Objection] But we are saying that being Īśvara is not being all-knowing. 61,4

[Answer] Still, something that has been established is being established. In the same manner, there is a contradiction with what has been accepted. 61,5

[Objection] How? 61,6

[Answer] It should be accepted that sovereignty and the seed of the omniscient (*sarvajñabīja*) reach the peak because they are increasing, like a measurement. Similarly, it should be acknowledged that the words “Īśvara” and “omniscient” also signify something whose sovereignty and being an all-knowing reached the peak. And reaching the peak is being unlimited. For example, measurement, etc., have their limit in having infinite measurement in such things like *ātman* or the space. Similarly, there will be incompatibilities with inferences [in general], understanding, and your own words [in your thesis].¹⁵⁹ 61,7

Furthermore, if one discards [part of] the word meaning [of the word Īśvara], i.e., “being the lord who has reached the peak,” it will result in 61,11

of the passages as Śāṅkara. See notes in the edition.

¹⁵⁸This is the thesis of the first syllogism in the summary above (p. 109, edition [58,17]).

¹⁵⁹This sentence appears to be out of place. What has been stated in the previous sentence and this sentence do not connect well with *tathā ca* (similarly). Judging from what follows, this sentence summarizes the points the author is going to make. The discussion starting with *kiñ cānyat—kāṣṭhāprāpteśvaratvasya* (the next paragraph) will lead to the criticism on the opponent's view on inference (*anumāna*). After that, the author criticizes that the opponent is contradicting himself by negating what has been understood (from *kiñ cānyat, īśvarasarvajñatvasya* [62,17] (trl. p. 117) to before *athāviśeṣyīaveśvara*^o [64,10] on p. 120 in the translation). This discussion includes the criticism that the thesis is self-contradictory (*svavacanavirodhinī* [63,11] to before *niravadhikau sāvadhikau* [64,2], translated on p. 118 to p. 119). Accordingly, it might be possible that this sentence is part of the next paragraph or an independent sentence that declares the topics that follow. However, starting the next paragraph with *kiñ cānyat* (furthermore) does not settle well if that is the beginning of the discussions just declared. In addition, the discussion started in the paragraph does appear to follow the preceding discussion. The awkwardness in the flow of the text cannot be easily explained as a transmission error, such as transposition or omission. A possible explanation for this awkwardness is that it is a remnant of a substantial editing process. Another peculiarity in this sentence is the reading *numānābhīyupagamaḥ svavacana*^o found both in T_m and L. Not only the reading is unintelligible, but also in Malayalam manuscripts, as a rule, *visarga* does not appear before *sva* even if it is meant to be there. If it appears (*asaṃdhita*), then it is an indication that there is a larger break, a kind of punctuation. This irregular reading intensifies the impression of this sentence being of uncertain provenance. See also note 175.

damaging the word meaning. For, one does not pronounce a word after discarding part of the signified.¹⁶⁰

61,13 [Objection] But it is not acceptable that measurement, etc., reach unlimitedness.¹⁶¹

61,14 [Answer] [That] contradicts [your] doctrine. For, you accept that *ātman*, space (*ākāśa*), etc., are everywhere. If *ātman*, space, etc., were not everywhere, then there would be an undesirable consequence that they have intermediate size, that they are not eternal, and so on.¹⁶²

61,16 [Objection] But *ātman* is everywhere because we observe effects everywhere.¹⁶³

61,17 [Answer] Even in that position, [there will be an undesirable consequence that] *ātman*s of birds, etc., would exist in the domain of human [*ātman*] or in the [entire] space, according to the same [kind of] inference, [i.e., inference] with regard to the universal (*sāmānyatodrṣṭa-anumāna*).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰See n. 147 on p. 110.

¹⁶¹Cf. VidhiV 1.21:

Furthermore—

The space is not in the state of having nothing possibly greater
if it is to be measured

“But it (i.e., the space has nothing possibly greater) is true because it (the size of the space) is infinite.”

Does it not mean that it has no measurement?

If the space is to be measured, why can there be nothing greater [than it in size]? [Objection] Because [the size measured] is infinite. [Answer] What is this infinity? [Objection] Not having a limit. [Answer] Is it not the same as the lack of measurement? For, measurement means being described as “this much” [i.e., being delimited by boundaries]. The man who talks about reaching the limit in this manner has revealed ignorance (*ajñāna*) [instead of all-knowingness of Īśvara]. This is a case of invoking an evil spirit at an exorcism.

For the Sanskrit text, see the note in the edition.

¹⁶²That *ātman* and *ākāśa* are everywhere (*sarvagata/vibhu*) is a Vaiśeṣika doctrine. Kumāriḷa, too, accepts this doctrine (ŚV Ātmavāda k. 20, and 73). (See the edition part for references.) As the subsequent discussions shows, it is most likely that the author of the YVi had Kumāriḷa or his followers (the Bhāṭṭas) in mind as the opponent.

¹⁶³Cf. ŚV Anumāna k. 80cd–81ab (see the edition part for the Sanskrit text):

“Since effects are observed everywhere,
ātman is everywhere.” [But this is not a valid inference because]

For the Buddhists the substratum (*āśraya*) [i.e., *ātman*] is not established;
on the other hand, common people have doubts [in the substratum].

It is unlikely that Kumāriḷa meant the inference to reflect his own position. The inference is used as an example of *āśrayāsiddhatā*, and hence an invalid inference.

¹⁶⁴The point of this answer is not very clear. It appears that the inference mentioned here is: *ātman*s of birds, etc., are everywhere; because they are *ātman*s; like the *ātman* of a person. The conclusion is certainly absurd, but it is not clear whether the author wishes to deny *ātman*, or its being everywhere, or that there are more than one *ātman*. Also, the sudden mention of *sāmānyatodrṣṭa-anumāna*, which becomes the topic in the following, demands some interpretation. Nowhere in the YVi the author explains his view on this type of *anumāna*. This type of *anumāna* is one of the major topics with regard to *anumāna*, but definitions vary from one author to another. See for example

That is, in this case, too, who could deny that [the inference that establishes the everywhere-ness of *ātman*s of birds, etc.,] is a [valid] inference with regard to the universal.

If you say—[Objection] Then we cannot determine [whether either of the inferences is correct] because [the two] inferences conflict [i.e., the conclusion of the second inference is not compatible with the reason in the first. We certainly do not say that the effects observed everywhere are caused by the *ātman* of a bird].

[Answer] [If having an inference that conflicts with another inference is the basis for rejecting either of the inferences,] one may mention that he can produce [all kinds of] conflicts of inferences with regard to *ātman* and others [that you accept], using reasons such as, “because *ātman*, etc., are objects of *pramāṇa*,” “because they are things,” etc., and with the example of the earth[, as you do with the inferences against those that prove the

Frauwallner (1957:128) for Vṛṣagaṇa, the Vṛttikāra’s view in ŚBh 1.1.5 (Frauwallner 1968), SK 6, NBh/NV 1.1.5. Since the author does not mention any other kind of *anumāna*, such as *śeṣavat*, *pūrvavat*, *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭasambandha*, or *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*, it is impossible to determine how he views *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* in relation to other kinds of *anumāna*. He mentions only *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* (here and *anumāna* is discussed in the commentary on YS 1.7). Although not explicitly stated, since it is the only kind of *anumāna* defended (see below) by the author, and since the example of *anumāna* given in YBh 1.7 (*deśāntaraprāpter gatīmac candratāarakam, caītravat*) is usually that of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* (as in the ŚBh, NBh), it may well be that for the author of the YVi *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* was the primary *anumāna*. In the long history on *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna*, the major problem about the concept is discovered in the following simplified mechanism of how it functions: the *liṅga/hetu* that is *sāmānya* and/or *apratyakṣa* produces a notion of another *sāmānya/apratyakṣa*. The problem is the perceptibility (*pratyakṣatva*) of the (relationship of) *liṅga/hetu* (e.g., implied by the opposite notion *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭasambandha* of the Vṛttikāra, or as the author of the YVi states, “*na hi candratāarakādīṣu deśāntaraprāpteh prāptīlakṣaṇasambandhaḥ pratyakṣeṇa gṛhyate*” in the commentary on YS 1.7 [Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952:26)].) and/or that of the thing to be proved (e.g., SK 6 and the YD on SK 5 and 6) since the *liṅga/hetu* and the thing to be learned by it are both *sāmānya*; how can we confirm such an inference when none of *liṅga/hetu* or the result ever comes to the domain of perception? Some schools hold that *sāmānya* is not perceptible.

In the case of the *anumāna* in question (*ātman* of a bird everywhere), the point of the author appears to be that we do not perceive the *liṅga* (“being *ātman*”). According to our author *liṅgalīṅgisambandha* is the same as *liṅga* (“*kaḥ punar asau [sambandhaḥ]? liṅgam eva*” in commenting YS 1.7 [Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952:25)]). He is certainly not interested in whether the conclusion is true. In the sense that the *anumāna* is based on the universal that cannot be perceived, the *anumāna* qualifies as *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* in most definitions. That the *liṅga* (or its relationship with the thing to be proved) does not have to be perceived by *pratyakṣa* and that the conclusion may not be verified by *pratyakṣa* are both understandably important for the author of the YVi. All his *anumānas* rely on the common feature of things to prove the existence of Īśvara, which is not perceived. This is probably why he brings up the issue in our context. Another thing noteworthy is that in the epistemology discussed in YBh 1.7, *sāmānya* is not obtained by *pratyakṣa*. Therefore an inference based on *sāmānya* is automatically based on something that cannot be perceived. And its result is also *sāmānya* that cannot be perceived by *pratyakṣa* (this applies to all the *anumānas*). The author is vague on whether *viśeṣa* perceived by *pratyakṣa* can form a reason to infer something else, leaving some room for other type of *anumāna*, possibly *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭasambandhaanumāna* of the Vṛttikāra, to be accepted.

all-knowing [Śvara].¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, the implication of this does not stop at the conflicts of inferences. For, it result in the denial of inference.

- 62.2 If you say, [Objection] “Then we accept that inference does not exist,” then perception will not be in an easy position.
- 62.3 [Objection] But perception is a valid source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) because it produces a determinate notion.
- 62.4 [Answer] Then since inference too produces a determinate notion, it must be a *pramāṇa*.¹⁶⁶
- 62.5 [Objection] But inference is of only one kind; it concerns smoke, etc., whose relationship [with fire, i.e., to be proved] is directly perceived.¹⁶⁷
- 62.6 [Answer] In that case, too, [your view] certainly denies the existence of inference[. Because if we follow your assertion, the following absurd inference would be formed]: The place that has a smoke does not have fire; because, while we do not observe the relationship [of the place with] fire by perception, it is a place; like a place where we observe the lack of fire.

¹⁶⁵Reasons *prameyatva* and *vastutva* have been used in the first syllogism when the objection was introduced (p. 109).

¹⁶⁶The topic of the preceding two paragraphs involve a definition of *pramāṇa*. Among those who defined *pramāṇa* in general, as opposed to giving a definition to each, Kumārila’s definition in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* includes the word *niscīta* (determinate). For the definitions of *pramāṇa*, see Kataoka (2003).

¹⁶⁷This is a reference to ŚV Anumāna k. 138, but this presentation of the opponent appears to be based on a peculiar understanding of ŚV Anumāna kk. 138 ff. Verse 138 of the Anumānāvāda of the ŚV starts a commentary on the ŚBh where two different kinds of *anumāna*, *pratyakṣaṭodṛṣṭasambandha-anumāna* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭasambandha-anumāna*, are mentioned. If we read only ŚV Anumāna kk. 138–139, which the author of the YVi alludes here, it indeed appears as though Kumārila claims that there is only one kind of inference, which is *pratyakṣaṭodṛṣṭasambandha-anumāna*. However, the next three pādas of k. 140 claim that even the case of smoke and fire (the example for *pratyakṣaṭodṛṣṭasambandha-anumāna* used in the ŚBh) falls in the category of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna*, and hence there is only one category of inference, which is *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. Accordingly, 138a (“There are no two kinds of inference (*dvaividhyaṃ nopapannaṃ tu*)”) may in fact cover both views. In this understanding, the verses from k. 138 to 140 express the view that there is no need to distinguish two kinds of *anumāna*. However, it is unclear whether this position is Kumārila’s own. Kumārila left some ambiguities. After explaining *pratyakṣaṭodṛṣṭasambandha-anumāna* (k. 141–143) according to the view of Vindhyavāsin, most of the rest of the Anumānāvāda of the ŚV is spent on criticizing the view that *anumāna* only deals with *sāmānyā* (probably the view of Dignāga). Again, Kumārila’s position is ambiguous whether he would call this *anumāna* whose sole domain is *sāmānyā* as *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna*, but it is easy for one to make that association. (See note 164.) Even though it is more likely for Kumārila to defend what Śabara (in fact the Vṛttikāra) says, he left further ambiguities: he never explains what he understands as *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna*, differentiated from *pratyakṣaṭodṛṣṭasambandha-anumāna*, nor does he actively defend it as another kind of *anumāna*. Accordingly, it is not impossible to interpret that Kumārila accepted only *pratyakṣaṭodṛṣṭasambandha-anumāna* against the ŚBh, regardless of his true intention. It nonetheless appears that this interpretation was what the author of the YVi read in the Anumāna chapter of the ŚV. Furthermore, the criticism against the view that inferring *sāmānyā* based on *sāmānyā* (cf. Prabhākara’s view on *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna*) may have seemed conflicting with the author’s view of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna*. In that sense, he may have introduced Kumārila’s view in an exaggerated form. Cf. Yamakami et al. (1985) for ŚV Anumāna kk. 13ff.

[Objection] But inference is a valid source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) 62,8 when its object is a [potentially] observable relationship [between the reason and to be proved] because it can be collaborated with another *pramāṇa*.¹⁶⁸

[Answer] We answer—[in some cases] perception (*pratyakṣa*), too, will 62,9 be a valid source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) on the ground that it is collaborated with another *pramāṇa*; because it is a *pramāṇa*; just like inference (*anumāna*). [But in other cases] it will not be a valid source of knowledge on the ground that there is no collaborating *pramāṇa*; like [inference] with regard to the universal (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*), etc. [And therefore perception cannot be an independent source of knowledge.]

In conclusion, it is not possible to deny that [inference] with regard 62,11 to the universal is a valid source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) based on the reason [that *pramāṇa* must produce] a determinate knowledge.

Furthermore, someone who does not accept [inference] with regard to 62,12 the universal as [valid] inference would not have the fear of snakes, etc., since he has not perceived the connection between his body and death. [Also, for him] the application of medicine to counter diseases will not happen because there is no reason [for him] to suspect [his] death. He may also think that his body has not been born because [one's own] birth cannot be perceived. Also, [he] would not be prompted to get rid of something (*hāna*) or to acquire something (*upādāna*).

Conclusion: It is established that the knowledge of Īśvara is unlim- 62,16 ited (*niravadhika*) based on the universal (*sāmānya*) that [knowledge] has grades commonly observed (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) among measurements, etc.¹⁶⁹

Furthermore, [You] accept the existence of [omniscient Īśvara] because 62,17 you deny that Īśvara is omniscient.¹⁷⁰ Because one cannot negate some-

¹⁶⁸I consider that this opponent is alluding to the difference between *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna*. The most common example of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* is to infer that an astronomical body has a movement because it reaches another place. The movement is too slow to be perceived (*parokṣa*) and it is not possible to confirm by perception. (See note 164 above.) On the other hand, there is at least a possibility of verifying the fire on a mountain, an example of *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭasambandha*. In the following answer the author replaces the issue with the definition of *pramāṇa*. The passage from ŚBh 1.1.2 in the testimonia mentions when an inference is not valid, i.e., when it conflicts perception. But one cannot draw the conclusion that Śabara requires an inference to be always collaborated with another *pramāṇa* from this statement. The same can be said about the definition of *pramāṇa* by Kumāriḥ in ŚV Codanāsūtra k. 80. It includes the condition that the resulting notion “does not reach disagreement with another knowledge (*na viśaṃvādam ṛcchati jñānāntareṇa*).” Again, this does not imply that there must be an agreement with another knowledge. An inference can still fill these conditions when there is neither a collaborating nor a conflicting *pramāṇa*. For that matter, the same applies to the definition of *pramāṇa* that includes *aviśaṃvāditva* by Dharmakīrti. I am not aware of any author who held the view that a *pramāṇa* must be collaborated by another.

¹⁶⁹This concludes the discourse started in the paragraph starting with *kiñ cānyat—kāṣṭhāprāpteśvaratvasya* [61,11] (trl. p. 113).

¹⁷⁰This starts a new discussion on another topic (*abhyupagamavirodha*) that has been mentioned in the seemingly misplaced sentence on p. 113. See note 159.

thing whose meaning has not been understood. Certainly, the particle “not” (*nañ*) is not used independently, saying “not.” You do say “Īśvara is not all-knowing.” In this [negation] it is accepted that there is someone who is all-knowing.

- 63,3 Namely, [in negations such as] “A hare does not have a horn,” “There is no son of a barren woman,” “There is no flower in the sky,” horns, sons, and flowers that certainly exist somewhere are negated in relation to a hare, etc. In our case [i.e., “Īśvara is not an omniscient”], too, the same should apply.
- 63,5 Furthermore, when one says “Īśvara is not an omniscient,” he accepts that someone else other than Īśvara is an omniscient because he negates the relationship between the meaning of the word “Īśvara” and being all-knowing. For, it is not possible to negate a relationship without accepting the two constituents in the relationship. This is a case of negating a reasonable relationship and accepting an unreasonable relationship. This is just a [vain] effort because the [relationship] between “Īśvara” and “all-knowing” that have well-known meanings is negated. For, it is not reasonable to deny the well-known fact that the space has infinite size by saying “There is no infinite measurement,” and [try to] establish [infinite size] among those that are not known to have infinite measurement, such as a pot.¹⁷¹
- 63,10 [Objection] But both Īśvara and being an omniscient, the two constituents in the relationship, are being negated.¹⁷²
- 63,11 [Answer] The thesis will be self-contradicting because [you] accept that the meanings of the words “Īśvara” and “all-knowing” are being Īśvara and being all-knowing [respectively]. Namely, no one says that the meaning of the word “fire” is not fire.
- 63,13 [Objection] But the words “Īśvara” and “all-knowing” do not have well-known meanings.
- 63,14 [Answer] Still, it is not [logically] possible to negate those [unknown] meanings because one does not grasp an unknown meaning. Namely, no one can negate [the existence of] a flock of sheep on the not well-known peak of mt. Meru. Furthermore, the use of [those] words [i.e., “Īśvara” and “all-knowing,”] would be pointless because [their] meanings are not well-known [according to you].
- 63,16 [Objection] But someone has postulated a relationship between words whose meanings are well-known, i.e., “Īśvara” and “all-knowing,” and not well-known [meanings, i.e.,] unlimited Īśvara and [unlimited] all-knowing [being respectively], like [a relationship] between the sky and flowers. This [relationship] is negated.

¹⁷¹This sentence may be understood as a generic statement but what our author says unreasonable is what Maṇḍana Miśra does. See p. 63 for the text in the VidhiV. He says, a pot cannot reach the size where nothing else is bigger; if it were possible, by filling everything by itself, there would be no room for anything else.

¹⁷²The discussion from this objection to the paragraph *tathāpy abhyupēārtha*^o has been mentioned in the seemingly misplaced sentence (see note 159) as *svavacanavirodha*. Note that this discussion forms part of a larger discussion on *abhyupagamavirodha*.

Still, since accepted meanings are negated, the thesis will be the same 63,18
 self-contradicting one. For, it is accepted that the universals (*sāmānyas*)
 that pertain to various individuals of lords (*īśvaras*) or all-knowing ones,
 who either have superiors or no superior, are the meanings of the words
 “lord” and “all-knowing.” Namely, it is well-known among people that the
 words “lord” and “all-knowing” produce notions with regard to various
 individuals who are bound to superiority or inferiority. For, saying “The
 head of a village is a lord” does not mean that rulers of two or three
 villages are not lords of higher authority, or that the head of a family is
 not a lord. This word “lord (*īśvara*)” denotes all these. Similarly, when one
 says “The grammarian (Pāṇini) knows everything (*sarvajña*),” it does not
 mean that [the subject, the grammarian] is not someone who is connected
 to excessive knowledge.¹⁷³

It should be accepted that lord (*īśvara*) and omniscient, either [with] 64,2
 unlimited [sovereignty or all-knowingness] or [with] limited [sovereignty or
 all-knowingness], are the meanings of the words “lord (*īśvara*)” and “all-
 knowing (*sarvajña*).” Accordingly, since those [meanings] are negated, the
 thesis will conflict with the understanding, just like negating that the
 greatness of *ātman*, the space, etc., is the meaning of the word “great
 (*mahat*).”

You might say: [Objection] “But neither a lord [with] unlimited [sover- 64,5
 eignty] nor an omniscient [with] unlimited [all-knowingness] does not exist;

¹⁷³A portion of BSBh 1.1.3:

[The source of *śāstra*, such as the Ṛgveda, is Brahman.] For, such *śāstra*,
 defined as the Ṛgveda and others, inheriting the quality of all-knowing,
 does not originate from anything else but an omniscient. Each *śāstra*
 (authoritative text) that discusses the subject matter extensively origi-
 nates from a specific person (*puruṣaviśeṣa*)—for example, the [*śāstra* of]
 grammar, etc., from Pāṇini, etc.—even when the content is a fraction of
 [the whole] domain of knowledge. [And] the person has even more knowl-
 edge than that [*śāstra* he composed]. This is commonly well-known. This
 precisely demonstrates that (how much more should we say than to say
 that) the source of all the knowledge, ... called the Ṛgveda, etc., arises
 from a great being, the root; ... that great being is endowed with the
 unsurpassed omniscient-ness and omnipotent-owning-ness.

(see the critical text part for the original text and reference) forms a proof of a sort of
 omniscient, while Śaṅkara is arguing that *śāstra* (a word in BS 1.1.3, interpreted as the
 Ṛgveda, etc.) comes from Brahman. The logic consists of two stages: (1) any *śāstra*,
 regardless of the area of expertise, comes from a person who has greater knowledge
 than that expressed in the particular *śāstra*, and therefore, the Ṛgveda, etc., must
 come from someone who has greater knowledge than them; (2) also, since the Ṛgveda,
 etc., deal with all areas of knowledge, the source must be an omniscient. A few things
 are interesting in our context: that Śaṅkara alludes to YS 1.24 and YS 1.25 by the
 use of the word *puruṣaviśeṣa* and *nīratīśaya-sarvajñatva*; that he mentions *sarvaśakti*
 parallel to the omniscience as the author of the YVi frequently does; and that Pāṇini
 is exemplified in a proof of omniscient. Also, the logic that the existence of things
 of smaller degrees proves the existence of the thing of the greatest degree is common
 to the proof derived from YS 1.25. Seeing this passage of BSBh 1.1.3, I consider the
 all-knowing *vaiyākaraṇa* referred to as an example of omniscients of smaller degrees in
 our text is Pāṇini.

because they are not perceived; like the non-governing second head.”¹⁷⁴

64,7 [Answer] Still, the thesis conflicts with the understanding of the meanings of the words [‘lord (*īśvara*)’ and ‘omniscient (*sarvajña*)’]. By indicative markers (*liṅgas* = reasons) accompanying sovereignty, the seed of omniscient (knowledge), etc.—one [of the *liṅgas*] being that [sovereignty, etc.] have something superior—we perceive that being the unlimited lord and [being the unlimited] all-knowing person [to be part of the meanings of the words *īśvara* and *sarvajña*], like having the unlimited measurement [is part of the meaning of the word ‘great (*mahat*)’]. Therefore, that we do not perceive is not established.¹⁷⁵

64,10 You may say [Objection] “But the meaning of the word “lord (*īśvara*)” is not all-knowing without specifying [whether it refers to the unlimited lord],” with reasons such as “because it is a thing,” [and with an example] “like we.”¹⁷⁶

64,11 [Answer] Then the thesis will be against all the sources of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) because it is established by all the *pramāṇas* that well known meaning of the word *īśvara* naturally includes all-knowing, as the meaning of the word *īśvara* [covers both the unlimited and limited lords].¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴The example *anīśvaradvitīyaśīras* should be that of things that cannot exist. A very close expression, *dvitīyam anīśvaraśīras*, appears in the Māṭharavṛtti on SK 7 as an example of *atyantābhāva* (absolute non-existence) along with “a third arm (*trtiyo bāhuḥ*),” a “horn of hare (*śaśaviśāṇa*),” etc. (Śarmā and Vaṅgīya 1970: 11). The precise meaning of *anīśvara* in these examples is not clear. The expression in the Māṭharavṛtti suggests that *anīśvara* and *śīras* are in the *karmadhāraya* relationship. The example of the second head appears also in the MMK (7.31) to exemplify how it is impossible for non-existent to disappear.

¹⁷⁵This ends the discussions mentioned in the seemingly misplaced sentence on p. 113 (see note 159). This also marks the end of the criticism on the summary syllogism introduced with *īśvaraśabdō 'pi* [58,19] translated on p. 109. This last discourse again has some awkwardness. It appears to repeat things that have been said earlier, but in more concise form. The criticism returns to *śabdārthābhyupagamavirodha* after *abhyupagamavirodha* and *svavacanavirodha* have been discussed. It appears even possible for this last two paragraphs to replace the seemingly out of place sentence on p. 113 and make a coherent connection with the beginning of the next paragraph starting with *kiñ cānyat*. A conceivable explanation for these awkwardness is that the whole section in between is a result of an expansion of what originally was (more or less) the two paragraphs we have just seen.

¹⁷⁶This (hypothetical?) objection has the same thesis and example as the first summary syllogism of the opponent on page 109 (starting with *īśvaraśabdārthaḥ* [58,17]) and refers to one of its *hetus*. Although the text appears to be a little incoherent (it is uncertain whether this incoherence is due to the damage in transmission or due to haste editing by the author), the following few paragraphs, including the one starting with *ihāpi sarvajñaśūnyañ jagat* [64,14] (translated on page 121), allude to the first and the third summary syllogisms of the opponent. I consider this paragraph starts a new discussion on the opponent’s theses in general while the previous discussion was specifically directed to the second summary syllogism.

¹⁷⁷It is not certain if the constituted text is correct. The editors of the 1952 edition considered that *yatheśvaraśabdārthaḥ* starts a new sentence and supplied *sarvajño na bhavati*. However, since I consider that the next in the text *prameyatvādi° . . .*, starts a new paragraph, I did not adopt their conjecture. Not only is it difficult to explain why *sarvajño na bhavati* disappeared from the text, even with the conjecture, the role of *yathā* is unclear. Furthermore, *ity ukte yad brūyāt* (*brūyās* in my text) is unintelligible if we consider that *īśvaraśabdārthaḥ . . . ghaṭādivat* belongs to the opponent’s view.

[We have] stated [our inferences], using reasons such as “because [ev- 64,13
erything] is an object of knowledge,” [and with examples] “like a pot,” etc.
Against them you may have something to say. Here I will state exactly
what you have to say—¹⁷⁸

“The universe is devoid of the all-knowing,”¹⁷⁹ “Time, directions and 64,14
space, areas where creatures exist, and the creatures, they all are devoid
of an all-knowing,” “And none of the sources of knowledge has the all-
knowing as its object,” “And all those who know correctly (*pramātr̥s*)
are non-knower of the all-knowing,”—In these kinds of statements (the-
ses), the unlimited Īśvara or the all-knowing is being denied. This being
the case, faults in [those] statements, viz., that they contradict the un-
derstanding of the well-known meanings of the words “lord (*īśvara*)” and
‘all-knowing (*sarvajña*)’, must be stated.

[Objection] [Then] the faults in the statement [you have] stated should 64,18
[also] apply if one states the following: “There is no barren woman’s son;
the universe is devoid of him, or time [is devoid of him].”

[Answer] There is no such fault. For, the meaning of the sentence 64,20
that is to be denied, which is characterized by the existence of a son of
a barren woman (*vandhyā-suta*), is not well-known as in the case of the
meanings of the words “lord (*īśvara*)” or “all-knowing (*sarvajña*)” are.
Since the meaning of a [compound] word acquires a function when a clear
idea of [how the constituents of the compound are put] side by side, [the
idea] brought about by [constituting] independent speech units, has arisen,
there is no understanding of the existence of a son of a barren woman or
the non-existence of a son of a barren woman. Therefore, there is no fault
of denying what has been understood.

[Objection] But when one says, “Īśvara is not an omniscient,” only 65,2
the imminent notion [that follows the words] is negated. In no case is it
possible to negate an imminent [real] thing with the particle ‘not (*nañ*)’,
in the way an elephant[, a real thing, can be stopped (negated) only] by

(See the next note.) The text as is, having *yatheśvaraśabdārthaḥ* as part of the answer
from the proponent, appears tautological. I have interpreted it to refer to previous
discussions that the word *īśvara* refers to both regular “lords” and the Lord. If we
assume that the reading is a result of corruption, one possible original reading is *yathā
sarvajñaśabdārthaḥ*.

¹⁷⁸I consider that *prameyatvādibhir hetubhiḥ ghaṭādivat* refers to the series of infer-
ences from the proponent’s position (p. 103 ff.) where the first syllogism has *jñeyatva*
(equivalent of *prameyatva* used here) as the *hetu* and “like a pot (*ghaṭādivat*)” as the
example. Note that the immediately following sentence after this refers to the third
summary syllogism of the opponent (*sarvajñasarveśvaraśūnyam . . .* [58,20], trl. on
p. 110) in which the reason and the example are equivalents of proponent’s syllogisms
(starting with *buddhīmadekasvāmikañ jagat* [56,1] trl. on p. 104). As noted above
(n. 146 on p. 109), the first summary syllogism of the opponent has two *hetus* (*pramey-
atva* and *vastutva*) used by the proponent as well. The topic here is the opponent who
would turn around proponent’s inferences using the same reasons (and examples). Our
author is going to enter a discourse with such an opponent. It is thus natural that the
author focuses on the theses (*pratijñās*) that the opponent has turned around against
him.

¹⁷⁹This paragraph starts the discussion on the summary syllogism stated in the para-
graph *sarvajñasarveśvaraśūnyañ jagat . . .* [58,20] translated on page 110.

counter-elephant[, another real thing]. And if a [real] thing was to be removed by the particle ‘not’, [Īśvara] would be denied of even being the subject of statements of those who support Īśvara by the mere particle ‘not’. Accordingly, in this case, too, the negation [applies] only to the notion. Therefore there is no fault that [we] negate something that has been accepted.

- 65,6 [Answer] It is true [that negation only applies to notion]. However, there is a difference. A notion with regard to a real thing that has been established by a valid source of knowledge is negated with regard to something else or at a particular time, when [the notion is] pending due to the similarity of the thing. For example, “the pot does not exist.” In some cases, even without the object [that a notion is applied to], only the notion, to which an approximation is brought about toward the words [used in an expression],¹⁸⁰ and by which another thing [may] be postulated, is negated. For example, “the son of a barren woman does not exist.” If, on the other hand, one negates a real thing established by a valid source of knowledge, then, there is the fault of negating the referent that has been accepted. For example, “the meaning of the word Īśvara is not omniscient.” That the words “lord” and “all-knowing” indicate the existence of the unlimited lord and omniscient [being] is very much established by the evidence (*līṅga*) that [these two words] express the increasing shared property pertaining to individuals who are lords or all-knowing beings, like the words ‘big’, ‘many’, ‘all’, ‘infinite measurement’, etc. [To paraphrase, the words “lord” and “all-knowing”] are just like these words such as ‘great’, and so on. It is well-known that these words, such as ‘great’, and so on, denote the common meaning pertaining to big [things], etc., that come in various grades. Such as they are, they are the evidence that suggests the existence of individuals that are unlimitedly big, all, or have infinite measurement. For, the universals, such as ‘big’, etc., pertaining to individuals that have superior, have not exhausted their capability until [they reach] the individual that is unlimitedly big, etc. Namely, (a) it is not that real pervading entity does not pervade real entity to be pervaded, (b) while there is nothing to be pervaded beyond unlimited. Accordingly, the universal that pervades disappears at the unlimited individual. For, [pervading universal] is well-known that it has only the to-be-pervaded as the object.

- 65,17 In conclusion, the one who is establishing the non-existence of the referent of the words “lord” and “all-knowing” verily denies the accepted meaning since [the referent of the words] is established by the valid source of knowledge. Therefore, the thesis is faulty. Also, it is not possible to make the words “lord” and “all-knowing” not to mean him (the Īśvara

¹⁸⁰Note that I read *śabdam praty upanītasanihānā*. This involves a small emendation. First of all, the verb *pratyupanī-* is a very rarely, if at all, used word. However, there are some cases where the combination of the adverb *prati* and the verb *upa-nī-* is used. A usage similar to our text is found in BSBh 3.2.22: *tad etat saprapañcaṃ brahmaṇo rūpaṃ samnīhitāmbanenetikaraṇena pratiśedhakaṃ nañcaṃ praty upanīyata iti gamyate*].

we promote) or to mean something else. Similarly, it is not possible to deny that capability, knowledge and sovereignty, which are accumulated in each person and have superior, have their limit when they are unlimited. Therefore, the thesis contradict inference.

Furthermore, the one who is denying Īśvara who is conceived [by others] would not accept [the existence of] mind of others that is not perceivable.¹⁸¹ 66.1

If he says, “[We deny the omniscient Īśvara] because [his existence is asserted by] the statement of others, [and we are not denying everything that cannot be perceived,]” then [our answer is] “no.” For, there is nothing special about the statement of others, like [the statements] that establish the evidence, such as [knowledge always] having superior, that proves [the existence of] the omniscient. Also, when one denies the meaning of such statements, he would be denying what has been accepted, just like in the previous discussion. Also, [denying the statement that asserts the existence of the omniscient Īśvara] contradicts inference. 66.2

Furthermore, the reasons such as “because [Īśvara] is an object of valid source of knowledge,” have [the fault of] being not established (*assidhatva*).¹⁸² Why? Because we accept [an object of valid source of knowledge] that is characterized by unsurpassable knowledge and sovereignty. Now [the opponent] himself, too, should accept such [an object of valid source of knowledge]. Then the omniscient is established, because [he, viz., an object of valid source of knowledge characterized by unsurpassable knowledge,] has been accepted. 66.4

Furthermore, if one denies such a thing that has been accepted, that will be similar to saying “A pot is not a pot; because it is a thing; like a pot.”¹⁸³ 66.6

¹⁸¹This paragraph starts the discussion on the opponent’s summary syllogism *vādyantaraparikalpitaḥ* . . . [59,3] introduced on page 110 in the translation. The reading in the constituted text primarily follows that of the L manuscript. Since the reason in the syllogism was “because we do not perceive,” it appears appropriate for our author to point out the absurdity in that sort of reasoning, i.e., it could lead to the non-existence of mind of others because we do not perceive it, either.

¹⁸²Having criticized the theses (*pratijñās*) of his opponent, the author now starts discussing the reasons (*hetus*) in the opponent’s inferences. The reasons referred here as *prameyatvādi* are *prameyatvāt*, *vastutvāt* and *śabdābhidheyatvāt* found in the summary syllogism on p. 109 ([58,17] ff. in the edition). See note 146. Note that the criticisms against these reasons are naturally in the context of the opponent’s inference. He does not reject the possibility that the same reasons are used in inferences. (See the paragraph *nāpi ca prameyatvādi°* below.) This would be an answer to the possible criticism against his own inferences using those reasons.

¹⁸³The scribe of M manuscript has silently emended *ghaṭavat* to *paṭavat*. His motivation was probably that the example should not be the same as the thing about which a quality is being proved. However, without changing the text the intention of the author can be conveyed. The point he wants to make is that if we allow someone to formulate an inference disregarding accepted fact, he may form an intuitively faulty inference. Having the pot in the example serves that purpose well. Note that the syllogism becomes recursive when we have pot in the example. The reasoning may be formulated as: a pot is not a pot; because it is a thing; like a pot which is a thing is not a pot. I think that “denying what has been accepted” is in the example part of this reasoning.

- 66,8 Furthermore, when one does not accept an unlimited [individual as an object of valid source of knowledge, etc.], [the reasons] such as “being an object of valid source of knowledge” would have [faults of] not being a property of the subject (*apakṣadharmatva*) and having its substratum not established (*āśrayāsiddhatva*). Indeed, when the [unlimited individual] is accepted what is left to be proven? [It is not even necessary to prove.] If one says to someone who is satisfied, “Don’t take any more,” what will be achieved by him?
- 66,10 Now you might say: [objection] Having taken the [possibility that] unlimited lord [may exist] into consideration, I reject his being omniscient.¹⁸⁴
- 66,11 [Answer] That, too, is not reasonable. For, [in him] being omniscient, too, is unlimited. Also, sovereignty and being omniscient, when they have superior, are not the primary meaning of the words “lord” and “omniscient.” For, they fluctuate[, viz., those whose sovereignty and being omniscient have superior are not always referred to by the words “lord” and ‘omniscient’], being subject to superiority and inferiority. For example, words such as “great” do not primarily refer to pot, etc., that have fluctuating greatness, but they do [primarily refer] to space (*ākāśa*), etc. In exactly the same manner, in him (*Īśvara*), too, both sovereignty and being omniscient, having no superior, do not fluctuate. Accordingly, he indeed is the primary referent of [those two] words. And rejecting the primary meaning does not achieve perfection.
- 66,15 Furthermore, you reject omniscience of *Īśvara*, well-known by means of inference and authoritative texts, by conceiving properties such as being an object of valid source of knowledge. In exactly the same manner, one could reach [the conclusion] that [*Īśvara*] is not sentient, like a pot, etc., with the reasons “because he is an object of valid source of knowledge, etc.” For [the inference] does not contradict. In the same manner as [the reason,] being an object of valid source of knowledge is covered by [the property to be proven,] not being omniscient, [the same reason] would be covered also by [other properties to be proven,] such as not being sentient, etc.
- 66,18 You might say, [Objection] “[Admitting the omniscient *Īśvara*] contradicts perception,” In that [argument], too, why do you not even take a glance at [the fact] that [your position] contradicts inference and authoritative texts?
- 66,19 Also, nothing can be attributed, either as sharing the same property or as not sharing the same property, with the universal, “being an object of valid source of knowledge,” etc., in any condition. For, [the properties,] “being an object of valid source of knowledge,” exist in everything with regard to things. The use of [the reasons] such as “being an object of valid source of knowledge,” etc., is not to confuse the thought.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴Note that this objection refers to another possible way to construe the sentence *īśvaraḥ sarvajñō na bhavati*. That can be understood as *Īśvara* is not omniscient.

¹⁸⁵This paragraph clarifies why the author thinks he can use reasons *vastutvāt*, etc., while his opponent cannot. He did not ascribe similar properties to *Īśvara*/*Sarvajña*, but ascribed them to “everything.”

If you say, [Objection] “But [the meaning of the word ‘Īśvara’ is not omniscient] because [Īśvara] is an *ātman*, like a liberated *ātman*,” [answer] there will be an undesirable consequence that your *ātman* is unconscious.¹⁸⁶ 66,21

If you say, [objection:] “[But accepting omniscient Īśvara] contradicts perception, etc.,” in that argument, too, there is a contradiction to inference, etc., just like the previous discussion.¹⁸⁷ 66,22

[Objection:] “In the past or in the future, too, there are no perceivers of Īśvara.” [Answer: The reasons to assert this,] “because they are creatures,” etc., have the fault of not leading to one conclusion because of the perceivers of lords (*īśvaras*) today.¹⁸⁸ 67,1

Furthermore, in the past or in the future, too, the creatures with sound means of knowledge knew and will know [Īśvara] based on the reasons [that knowledge, etc., have] varying grades; because they have sound means of knowledge; as we, and so forth[, who have sound means of knowledge, perceive Īśvara now]. 67,3

Īśvara and his body If you say, [objection:] “But since Īśvara does not 67,5

¹⁸⁶This short discussion refers back to the fourth reason in the summary syllogism introduced on p. 109 ([58,17] in the edition). As the example mentioned here shows, this is another reference to Kumārila (ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra k. 78). Kumārila refers to *ātman* in the discussion how Īśvara can(not) be the supervisor/governor (*adhiṣṭhātr*) of everything, devising two alternatives with regard to Īśvara’s body. The argument for Īśvara Kumārila criticizes is that Īśvara exists because everything originates governed by a wish (k. 76). Kumārila examines two alternatives, viz., either Īśvara has a body or he does not have a body. If he has a body, then the argument is invalid because his body is not created by his wish (k. 77). (The cause that everything originates governed by intelligence/wish will have an exception, viz., his body, that has originated without his wish.) Or, if he does not have a body, then he would not be the supervisor/governor, example being a liberated *ātman* who does not govern his body (k. 78). Kumārila presupposes the view that Īśvara is a special kind of *ātman*. This argument is being referred to by our author here, but not in the same context. Because of the syllogism where the *hetu*, *ātmavāt*, was mentioned and the criticism (*ātman* would be unconscious/ignorant), we should supply the thesis, “the meaning of the word ‘Īśvara’ is not omniscient,” here. Nonetheless, the answer from our author is still applicable to Kumārila’s original argument. An *ātman* does not have to lose its property when liberated.

¹⁸⁷This discussion does not appear to have much relevance to the immediately preceding discussion. Rather, it may be introduced as a transition to the succeeding discussion that more clearly alludes to Kumārila. The discussion referred to as the previous discussion is the one that starts with *pratyakṣavirodha iti cet* [66,18] translated on p. 124.

¹⁸⁸This paragraph starts refutations of the syllogism likewise starting with *bhūta-bhaviṣyatkālayoḥ* [59,1] translated on p. 110. This is a reference to the ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 46, 57cd–59. The reasoning of the author here is, as seen in the use of the plural *īśvarāṇām* and in the next paragraph, closely related to the argument derived from YS 1.25: the existence of varying grades of knowledge/sovereignty necessarily indicate the existence of the knower of all or the lord of all. Although our author makes the opponent’s view as though it is based on the premise that we know of nobody who perceives Īśvara today, the argument by Kumārila is different. He points out the impossibility of the presence of a knower at the time of creation, for, by definition, no creature to perceive creation exists at the time of creation.

have a body, he is not omniscient; like a liberated *ātman*, *ākāśa*, etc.,”¹⁸⁹ [the answer is:] no; because [Īśvara] has a body. For, the whole [universe], either manifested or yet-to-be-manifested, is the body [of Īśvara].¹⁹⁰

67.7 If you say, [objection:] “Since Īśvara has a body, [there would be an undesirable consequence that] Īśvara is not eternal; for, [his body] would be subject to [properties] such as [its formation] being dependent on merit, etc.,” [then the answer is:] no; for he does not have a body.

67.8 If you say, [objection:] “There is a contradiction that [Īśvara] has a body and does not have a body,” then [the answer is:] no; for, it is observed that one *ātman*, who [can either] have been liberated or be being liberated, does not have a body and has a body.¹⁹¹

67.9 If you say, [objection:] “[But] in that case, there is no contradiction because there is a difference in time,” then [the answer is:] no; in the [Īśvara’s] case, too, we accept that there is a difference in time.

67.10 Furthermore, for the very reason that he is Īśvara, [he] can have two states simultaneously. In addition, for the very reason that he is Īśvara, it is appropriate that he has a means [to cognize or to create] while he does not have a means.¹⁹² Namely, the *śrutis* state: “The one without body inside bodies (KaU 1.2.22);” similarly, “The one who is standing in all the things (BĀU 3.7.15);” similarly, “The one who is omniscient, all-knowing (MuU 1.1.9),” and so on.¹⁹³

68.1 **Validity of Upaniṣadic statements** If you say, [objection:] “The Vedas do not inform of Īśvara because their purposes are injunctions and prohibitions,”¹⁹⁴ [the answer is:] no; for, [those statements that speak of Īśvara are] not auxiliary to anything else. For, none of the [six hermeneutical principles,] *śruti*, *liṅga*, etc., does not provide evidence that [those Upaniṣadic statements are] auxiliaries to [Vedic] rituals.¹⁹⁵

68.3 If you say, [objection:] “Since [those statements] are covered by the

¹⁸⁹This paragraph starts the refutation of the thesis presented in the paragraphs starting with *tathā—asarvajño* [59,4] translated on page 110. There is some possibility that the reading *muktākāśādivat* is a corruption from *muktātmādivat*. When this objection was first introduced (p. 110), the example was *muktātmavat*. For the alluded opponent see note 186 above.

¹⁹⁰In BSBh 1.4.1–3 Śaṅkara argues that *avyakta* as well as *vyakta* are the body of Brahman/*ātman*/Īśvara. The theme in the discussion is that the word *avyakta* in the Upaniṣadic statement *mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ* (KaU 1.3.11) is not a separate entity *pradhāna* of Sāṃkhya.

¹⁹¹BS 4.4.12 introduces Bādarāyaṇa’s view that the liberated *ātman* can have a body or not have a body at will. As in many cases in the BS, this view, introduced at last (after the views of Bādari and Jaimini), is the *siddhānta* (final position).

¹⁹²The reading *sakaraṇatākaraṇatve ’pī’* is a result of emendation and I read that as *sakaraṇatā+akaraṇatve+api. . .yuktā*.

¹⁹³None of the Upaniṣadic statements quoted in support of the view that Īśvara may both have and not have a body explicitly refers to Īśvara. The one referred to in KaU 1.2.22 is *ātman*; in BĀU 3.7.15 *antaryāmin/ātman*; in MuU 1.1.9 *akṣara* (Brahman).

¹⁹⁴This portion, arguing for the validity of the Upaniṣads in knowing Īśvara resonates heavily with some portions of the BSBh. See the edition part for parallel passages.

¹⁹⁵The six *pramāṇas* referred here are the hermeneutical principles employed by the Mīmāṃsakas in determining the relationship between two elements. They are listed in

study injunction (*svādhyāyavidhi*) *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ* (Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 2.15), [they are] auxiliary to rituals such as Darśapūrṇamāsa,¹⁹⁶ then [we answer:] no. For, there are different injunctions that [that are not auxiliary to other rituals], like [rituals that are members of] the Jyotiṣṭoma. Rituals, such as Jyotiṣṭoma, etc., since they belong to different contexts (*prakaraṇa*), do not have relationship as [one being] auxiliary and [others being] primary.¹⁹⁷ Exactly in the same manner, since [Īśvara,¹⁹⁸ described in those Upaniṣadic statements] is the object of [injunctions] such as “One should think about him; one should meditate on him,” it is not reasonable that [those statements] are auxiliary to [rituals] such as Agnihotra.¹⁹⁹

If you say, [objection:] “There is no reward (*phala*) [in following that 68.6 injunction],” then [we answer:] no. For, such an injunction is given in reference to the reward such as: “The one who, having realized *ātman*, knows [*ātman*] thoroughly, obtains all the worlds and all the wishes (ChU 8.7.1),”²⁰⁰ etc.

If you say, [objection:] “But even if that is the case, since [those 68.8 Upaniṣadic passages] are auxiliary to the meditation injunction (*upāsanāvidhi*),²⁰¹ [they are] only praise (*stuti*),”²⁰² [we answer:] no. No praise

JS 3.3.14 in the order of higher precedence.

¹⁹⁶The study injunction, *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*, is often mentioned by the Mīmāṃsakas. It is understood to mean that the Vedas should be studied (memorized). In principle, all the Vedic statements may be covered by this injunction. The Darśapūrṇamāsa ritual is known to consist of subsidiary rituals. I understand that the objection here mentions this ritual as an example of rituals that consists of various levels of subsidiaries. The point is that any portion of the Vedas should be auxiliary to one of those hierarchical rituals. I doubt that the opponent has any stronger ground to assert that the Upaniṣadic passages that refer to Īśvara/*ātman* forms part of the Darśapūrṇamāsa ritual in particular, given the answer that follows by the author.

¹⁹⁷Unlike the Darśapūrṇamāsa ritual, which is one ritual accomplished by performing several sub-rituals, the Jyotiṣṭoma is a class of independent rituals. Performing, for example, the Agniṣṭoma, one member of the class, is a performance of a Jyotiṣṭoma ritual. This appears to be the background of our author mentioning the Jyotiṣṭoma. Not all parts of the Veda have to be part of the hierarchy of rituals, but can be independent of any ritual.

¹⁹⁸The subject of the following fragment from the BĀU is clearly *ātman*. However, since the discussion is on Īśvara here, I supply the word “Īśvara.” In BSBh 1.1.4 Śaṅkara refers to the same fragment as referring to Brahman.

¹⁹⁹As mentioned in the note above, Śaṅkara cites the same injunction from the BĀU. The view that cites the injunction, however, is part of the *pūrvapakṣa*. Śaṅkara sees a problem in treating Brahman to be “auxiliary” to this very injunction.

²⁰⁰The first half of ChU 8.7.1 forms an injunction: *ya ātmāpahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyur viśoko vijighatso 'pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasamkalpaḥ so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsītavyaḥ*.

²⁰¹The meditation injunction (*upāsanāvidhi*) most likely refers to injunctions such as BĀU 1.4.7 (*ātmety evopāsīta*), 1.4.15 (*ātmānam eva lokam upāsīta*). These injunctions are also cited in BSBh 1.1.4 (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917:112) in a similar discussion. Śaṅkara also has a long discussion on the function of the very *upāsanāvidhi* on BĀU 1.4.7.

²⁰²The author has Kumārila’s criticism against those who consider the Vedas as the source of knowing Īśvara in mind. Kumārila says that people are confused by words that are meant to praise (ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra k. 63). According to the Mī-

is done by way of something absolutely untrue. When [the Veda says,] “Verily, Vāyu is the fastest deity,” (TaiS 2.1.1.193)²⁰³ it does not mean that Vāyu is not the fastest deity.

69.2 If you say, [objection:] “In some cases praise, etc., might be possible by way of untruth,” [we answer:] no; for, in this case we are dealing with [Īśvara] who is proved by inference.²⁰⁴

69.3 If you say, [objection:] “But since Īśvara is associated with all the result and the means, he would be bound to pleasures and pains of all the creatures,”²⁰⁵ then [we answer:] no; for, the causes are different. [Namely,] the connection with the body of those who reincarnate has merits (*dharma*), etc., as its cause; since [the connection with the body] has merits, etc., as its cause, [they] are bound to pain, etc. However, Īśvara does not have merits, etc.; for, his connection with the effect and means, such as body, etc., has unsurpassed (*niratiśaya*) sovereignty (*aiśvarya*), etc., as its cause; as in the case of a spirit and a person possessed by it.

69.7 If you say, [objection:] “But, [if we follow that position,] since [Īśvara] has the eyes, etc., as means, [he] does not perceive everything, like we [do not perceive everything],” [then we answer:] no; for, there is no cause of obstruction to [the means] that are capable of grasping all the objects. That is, while the means [of perception] are everywhere, the limitation to the own objects is done through the masking by merits (*dharma*), etc. If the masking, viz., the obstruction, such as merits, etc., does not exist for someone, then, since the [masking] does not exist, that the means grasp all of their respective objects has no problem.²⁰⁶

69.11 Or, [Īśvara] experiences everything through the means of all the creatures even though [he] himself does not have a means independently, in the same way as a possessing spirit [experiences what its host experiences through his means]. And there is no sphere that is devoid of a creature [in it]; for, through Vedic revelations such as “the one who resides in earth (BĀU 3.7.3),” “the one who resides in water (BĀU 3.7.4),” we learn that Īśvara, called *antaryāmin*, resides in everything.²⁰⁷

māṃsakas, *Stuti* is a kind of *arthavāda*, which is meant to explain elements employed in a ritual.

²⁰³The sentence cited here is the example Śabara uses when explaining JS 1.2.7. He states that the phrase about Vāyu being the fastest deity serves a purpose in a ritual context by forming one utterance with injunctions.

²⁰⁴This falling back to the authority of inference with regard to the existence of Īśvara marks a stark contrast to otherwise similar discussions in BSBh 1.1.3–4. Śaṅkara states that Brahman (for him indistinguishable to Īśvara) is known only through the Upaniṣads.

²⁰⁵This dialogue might be a result of synthesizing two criticisms by Kumāriḷa: that Īśvara is not capable of creation because he lacks the method, such as *dharma*, etc., at the time of creation (ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 50–1); and that it is not reasonable that Īśvara is exempt from receiving the fruits of actions (ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 68cd–70). The nature of criticism is compatible with that is expressed and answered in BS and BSBh 1.2.8. See the edition part for references.

²⁰⁶A similar argument has been made with regard to the *sattva* of Īśvara in the discussions in between two series of syllogisms. See pages 106–107. Our author refers back to that argument in the second paragraph below.

²⁰⁷Note that our author does not offer any justification for identifying *ātman*, *an-*

Or, [Īśvara's] preeminent *sattva* has eternally unsurpassed capability, 70,2 knowledge and sovereignty as its properties; since it is omnipresent like the space, [it is] connected to everything; since it takes everything as object, [it] illuminates every object; and since it is detached from merits (*dharma*) and demerits (*adharmā*), etc., [it] has the unabated capability. Accordingly, even [when one sides] with the view that [Īśvara] does not have a body or senses, it is established that Īśvara is omniscient.²⁰⁸

If you say, [objection:] "The capability of the mind[, which is entirely 70,5 *sattva*,] to grasp the color/shape, etc., is solely dependent on the eyes, etc.," then [we answer] no; [such a view] has been rejected on the basis [that Īśvara has] the [unsurpassed] sovereignty and [that he has] no [obstruction such as] merits, etc.²⁰⁹

Also, in daily life we observe that [sometimes] even [an object that is] 70,7 to be grasped by the eyes is not grasped by the eyes. The pure darkness, which is to be grasped by the eyes, is cognized by those whose mind is in the original state, even when their eyes are closed. The same darkness is not at all grasped by those whose mind is somewhere else, even when their eyes are wide open, in the same way as the light in the sky is not at all being grasped.²¹⁰

One might say, [objection:] "But still, darkness is merely the non- 70,10 existence of light, not an entity."²¹¹ [Answer:] This, however, is incorrect;

taryāmin, and Īśvara. Śāṅkara argues (following the BS) that *antaryāmin* in BĀU 3.7.3 (one of the passages quoted here) is *paramātman* in BSBh 1.2.18. While explaining that passage (BĀU 3.7.3), Śāṅkara mentions that Īśvara is called Nārāyaṇa. Compare this with our author who also calls Īśvara Nārāyaṇa (see p. 138).

²⁰⁸This alternative answer goes back to the position more consistent with that in the context of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra rather than the markedly Advaita position that has been taken in the preceding discussions. This paragraph refers back to the commentary on YS 1.24 and the paragraphs that discussed how Īśvara cognizes on pages 106–107. See also note 206.

²⁰⁹This refers to the discussions mentioned in the previous note.

²¹⁰The light in the sky in this example is a little vague. It might be the ambient light pervading the sky. However, I am not aware of any source in which such an idea is expressed. The light in the sky not being noticed could also be the light of a firefly in the sky. YBh 4.31 has an analogy *yathākāśe khadyotaḥ* (like a firefly [lit. the light in the sky] in the sky) as something very insignificant. In the current discussion, too, the light of a firefly appears to satisfy as an example of something that is not noticed even with the eyes open when one does not pay attention to it.

²¹¹Whether darkness (*tamas*) is an entity or not is a very popular topic especially among the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. VS 5.2.21 explicitly states that *tamas* is the non-existence of light. The issue is discussed also by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaitins. See the text part for references. Note that for our author the view that darkness is non-existence is not acceptable. This follows two premises: 1) non-existence is known neither by *pratyakṣa* nor by an independent means of knowledge, viz., *abhāva*, but by *anumāna*; 2) but one does perceive darkness by *pratyakṣa*. That non-existence is not an independent source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and that non-existence is not cognized by *pratyakṣa* are discussed in the commentary on YS 1.6–7. In this regard, the context in which Maṇḍana mentions the problem is interesting. He defends the non-existence (*abhāva*) as a *pramāṇa* in the VidhiV and in the BSi (in more detail in the BSi). Maṇḍana mentions the view of the opponent, presumably the Prābhākaras, that the lack of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) is a mistaken knowledge (*jñānavibhrama*), and that the lack of communication (*vyavahārabhāva*) is an erred communication. To

because non-existence is not capable of concealing a thing.

71.1 [The same person] might say, [objection:] “But non-perception of a pot, etc., is caused just by the non-existence of light, the cause of perception. Darkness is not [the entity] that conceals [another] entity.”

71.3 [Answer:] Incorrect. Since the eyesight is the illuminator, it is not possible that [it] requires auxiliary illumination. Where there is no entity of a different kind that is the concealer of [other] entities, certain measure [of something], to a certain degree, would be illuminated by the eyesight because [the eyesight] is the illuminator. For, a lamp does not illuminate, being seconded by another lamp.²¹²

71.6 Furthermore, if the eyesight is the illuminator, and if it required another light as an auxiliary [to grasp shape/color], then there would be the undesirable consequence that even at night, one would grasp shape/color by the eyesight, having the moonlight as secondary, just as by day, given

support this view, the opponent uses the example of mistakenly considering darkness as something that exists, while it in fact is the lack of light. [That the Prābhākaras held the view that *tamas* is the non-existent of light may be supported by the discussion in the Prakaraṇapañcikā.] In his answer, Maṇḍana states that darkness is perceived either as the “shadow of the earth (*bhūchāyā*)” or as the non-existence of light. It is reasonable to assume that Maṇḍana referred to the shadow of the earth (*bhūchāyā*) as an entity. Otherwise, he will not make the point: “Not [all the cases of] seeing darkness is . . . the same (*asamānam*).” Thus Maṇḍana accepts two possibilities as the cause of the perception of darkness. [I consider that Maṇḍana uses the expression “the shadow of the earth (*bhūchāyā*)” as the synonym to Rāhu, following the use of the word by astronomers. “The shadow of the earth (*bhūchāyā/ḷṣiticchāyā/ṣṛthivichāyā*)” is a widely used expression for Rāhu, the invisible planet or the demon that causes both the solar and lunar eclipse. While Āryabhaṭa understood that the cause of the lunar eclipse was the earth projecting its shadow on the moon, and hence the name “the shadow of the earth,” and that of the solar eclipse to be the moon covering the sun (see, Āryabhaṭīya Golapāda 37 ff.), the theory was in conflict with the mythological view that Rāhu (and Ketu) causes eclipses. Bṛhatsamhitā 5.1–13 dedicates a whole chapter on Rāhu and records contradicting (scientific and mythological) views (5.1–13). Despite originating from a different background, astronomers treat the term, “the shadow of the earth,” simply to refer to Rāhu, the invisible planet. Vācaspati, commenting on the version of the statement in the VidhiV, interprets *bhūchāyā* as the “shadow on the ground.” He treats this shadow as a synonym for “darkness (*tamas*),” and has a lengthy discussion to argue that *tamas* (not just the shadow) is an independent entity. However, this interpretation makes the statement of Maṇḍana tautological: “the perception of darkness is the perception of darkness or perception of the lack of light.” Nor does the interpretation explain why Maṇḍana said the perception of darkness is not (always) the same (in the VidhiV). There is another indication that Maṇḍana was familiar with astronomy: he calls the earth as the globe (made) of earth.] Compare the position of Maṇḍana with our author who considers that the only cause of the perception of darkness is the darkness the entity. For him the shadow is only a manifestation of the same entity, darkness, *tamas*. The difference between Maṇḍana and our author arises from the fact that Maṇḍana accepts non-existence as a means of knowledge while our author does not. Two more things are worth noting: that Śaṅkara in his Upadeśasāhasrī refutes the view that the shadow is an entity; and that Kumārila might have accepted the view that darkness is an entity in his Bṛhaṭṭikā, based on the stanzas quoted by Vācaspati (in the NKṛ) and Śrīdhara. Vācaspati ascribes them to a Vārttikakāra.

²¹²The word *dvaitīyaka* in the sense of “a thing that is secondary” is not widely attested. Although the possibility that the word was introduced by a scribe during the transmission of the text cannot be eliminated, the use of this word might be considered an idiosyncrasy of the author.

that there is nothing to conceal [the objects. But since one does not see well at night, there must be something that is preventing the eyesight to see things at night].

Furthermore, if darkness was non-existence, when moon rays exist at night, there should not be even the slightest darkness. For, the [darkness] should be completely eliminated because the rays exist. The difference in being faint, intense, etc., of darkness, however, is possible because darkness is an entity.²¹³ [Being faint, intense, etc., is] not [possible] for the absence of light; for, there is no difference in absence.

Furthermore, the following view deviates[, i.e., the theory does not cover all the cases of non-grasping]: non-grasping [of an object] is caused by the lack of the capability to grasp on the part of the eyesight due to the lack of the auxiliary. For example, even when there is an intense light from a lightning, a person whose eyesight is stunned²¹⁴ by the flash of the lightning does not see [anything]. For, that one does not grasp [an object] due to the stunned eyesight when there is a lightning flash would certainly be not logical [according to the view that non-grasping is caused by the lack of the auxiliary light] since there is no contradiction [in fulfilling the condition that the person should see].

Furthermore, the science of medicine states, “The shadow is pleasantly cool.”²¹⁵ No non-entity has [the quality of] being pleasantly cool. Similarly, [no non-entity would have the quality of] being healthy for the eyes. No one would talk about the healthiness or non-healthiness of non-existence. Also, since we see the shadow of a lamp[, darkness is an entity]. If darkness is non-existence, why would there be the shadow of the lamp in the circle of the light [produced by] the lamp.

If [the opponent] says, [objection:] “Even if [darkness] is an entity, it is not reasonable [that darkness exists in the circle of the light produced by a lamp] because [the presence of both the light and darkness] contradicts,” [answer:] no. Because [the light and darkness] coexist, like the venom and a snake. The venom [of a snake], even though it causes death, does not end up killing the snake; in the same manner, the light and darkness coexist [in the circle of the light around a lamp].

In conclusion, darkness is an entity; [reason 1:] for, it increases and decreases, like the light; [reason 2:] also because it is removed by a contra-

²¹³Note that I have emended the reading *bhāsān tu* to *tamasas tu* at the beginning of this sentence. Otherwise, the sentence would be incomprehensible. The variant may be explained as graphical similarity and by the proximity of the word *bhāsām* in the previous sentence.

²¹⁴I understand that the author means by the word *cakita* the state of the eyesight being blinded by an intense flash of light.

²¹⁵This one pāda is part of a verse often quoted by those who support the view that *tamas* is an entity. Śāṅkara also presupposes this verse in Upad Padya 18.34 when he discusses reflection *ābhāsa*. The view that shadow is real is refuted in Upad Padya 18.41–2. Śāṅkara also mentions Rāhu and considers it to be real but not shadow (Upad Padya 18.40). This may be compared to the position of Maṇḍana mentioned in note 211 above.

dicting substance, like a pot; [reason 3:] also because it causes obstruction to a perceiver, like a wall.²¹⁶

72.4 For the following reason, too, the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) [i.e., mind] is capable of grasping the objects of sense faculties even without requiring sense faculties;²¹⁷ viz., someone who covers his ear openings can hear noise (*ghoṣa*).²¹⁸ And it is not possible to infer that the person whose ear openings are covered has another hearing faculty. For, a deaf person with his ear openings covered does not hear the [noise (*ghoṣa*)].²¹⁹

72.7 Furthermore, we experience that even by an intuitive knowledge, one grasps the shape/color, etc., without requiring sense faculties.

72.8 There is more: It would also be impossible to recollect [what one has seen, etc.] if the mind is not capable of grasping [the objects of sense faculties] without requiring sense faculties. And we have very clear dreamy recollections in shape/color, etc.²²⁰ If perception of shape/color, etc., had previously, too, arisen from the combination of eyesight, etc., and the internal organ, [shape/color, etc.] should be grasped by the same [eyesight, etc., and the internal organ] working together in dream, etc., too. And this is not the case.

73.3 Everybody accepts that the mind is independent in grasping pleasure, etc. Accordingly, sense faculties are equivalent to the light for the basically independent mind.²²¹ This we ourselves have stated: “Through the passage of sense organs[, the mind is colored ...] (YBh 1.6/7)” Also,

²¹⁶This concludes the discussion on the shadow being an entity.

²¹⁷The discussion goes back to the thesis mentioned in the paragraph starting with *caḥsurādyapekṣam* [70,5], translated on p. 129.

²¹⁸YBh 3.22 mentions not hearing *ghoṣa* in one’s body when ears are covered as one of the signs of imminent death. Thus the *ghoṣa* mentioned here should be the deep noise we actually hear when we cover our ears, presumably the sound of blood circulation in our head.

²¹⁹I have emended the text to read *badhirasya pihitaśrotrapuṭasya* rather than *badhirasyāpi pihitaśrotrapuṭasya* that the manuscripts seem to suggest as the original reading. I consider the repetition of *pi* to be a dittography; the presence of *api* disturbs the flow of argument.

There are some assumptions in this argument. The case of someone whose ears are covered is used as an example of *antaḥkaraṇa* being capable of grasping an object of sense faculties. In order to establish this example, our author mentions the fact that we cannot infer another auditory faculty apart from the ears. And the last phrase should be the reason why we cannot infer the existence of another auditory faculty apart from the ears. The assumption is that if we are able to infer the existence of an auditory faculty when ears are covered, a deaf person should hear the noise under the same condition. But since he does not (this we can imagine), we cannot infer another auditory faculty. Here our author should be considering a deaf person to lack any sense of sound.

²²⁰Our author is explicit about dreams being recollections. In the commentary on YBh 1.10, he mentions this, referring to a sentence in YBh 1.11. See references in the edition part.

²²¹The manuscript L records the apparently corrupt reading *ālokasyānīndriyāṇi*. (We have no reading from T manuscripts, and all the rest derive from L.) I have adopted the reading *ālokasthānīyāni*, conjectured by the editors of the 1952 edition. However, this might not be completely satisfactory. I cannot rule out the possibility that he original reading did contain *ālokasya* and some more syllables are missing.

the Veda [states]: “[One] indeed sees with the mind, hears with the mind (BĀU 1.5.3).”

Now one might say: [Objection:] “In the same way as sense faculties[, 73,6 particularly the vision,] require the light, the internal organ, too, grasps [objects], only requiring the assistance from the sense faculties.”

[Answer:] That is not correct. For, there are exceptions [i.e., sense 73,7 faculties do not always require light, or the presence of light does not always cause sense organs to grasp the object]. Nocturnal creatures grasp shape/color [at night] even without the assistance of light.²²² [And] even when the light exists, owls, etc., do not grasp shape/color by day.

Further [evidence of exceptions]: we observe that an expert who [nor- 73,9 mally] uses an instrument [to gain knowledge about something] can tell the weight of [a piece of] gold, etc., just by looking, even without the instrument, such as a pair of scales.

Then [someone] might say, [objection:] “[Then] eyesight, etc., would 73,11 be useless.”

This person should be told thus: just like a pair of scales, sense faculties 73,12 serve purpose in other people. [For example:] Because of [his] excellence in mastery (*vaimalya*)²²³ with regard to the things [measured by] scales, etc., a person can be good at determining [the weight of] materials such as gold, etc., even without instruments such as scales, just by looking. In exactly the same manner, it is not problematic that the internal organ, even without requiring the assistance from the eyesight, etc., can grasp shape/color, etc., because of its excellence in mastery.

For also, it is not that all those various actions that are [usually] ac- 74,1 complished by several things/people cannot be accomplished by one. And we observe certain [lone] elephants or [even] men, etc., raising a [heavy] rock, etc., that is [normally] raised by several [men] without requiring assistance. In exactly the same manner, shape/color, etc.—which those who are not [Īśvara] grasp with the internal organ helped by sense faculties—are grasped by just the *sattva* of the mind of Īśvara, disregarding the activities of eyesight, etc.; for, [his] excellence in mastery, capability and sovereignty have reached the peak.²²⁴ Those who reincarnate have in-

²²²The reading *niśāyāṃ vināpy* is a conjecture. The scribe of the manuscript L left a sign that his exemplar had a difficulty. Perhaps we can be relatively certain that the text contained the text *vināpy ālokadvaitīyakena*. I have supplied the word *niśāyāṃ* since the context expects such a word and since L suggests that there was something missing. It is possible, however, that the word missing was something else that meant “at night” or that no word was in fact missing, but readers were expected to read that meaning from the context. I chose the word *niśā* to match the wording of a similar passage in BhG 2.69.

²²³Our author uses the word *vaimalya* in a somewhat unique way. He uses the word only in the current context; and he uses it to mean the mastery acquired from a long practice/training. Maṇḍana Miśra also uses the word in a similar sense in the BSI (Sastri 1984: p. 71). See also n. 265 on p. 146.

²²⁴It is noteworthy that the author lists the qualities *vaimalya* (translated as “mastery”), *śakti* (capability) and *aiśvarya* (sovereignty). He usually lists *jñāna*, *śakti* and *aiśvarya* as the qualities that have reached the peak in Īśvara. The word *vaimalya* was used in describing the example to know the weight of gold without the scales in the

ferior, in comparison with him, sovereignty, capability, knowledge, etc., due to the contamination by nescience; accordingly, [their] internal organ requires the help from [sense, speech and motor] faculties; like the raising of [a heavy rock] by the weak.

74,6 **Omniscience of Buddha and Rṣabha, et al.** Some, on the other hand, hold that none other than those who reincarnate, viz., Buddha, Rṣabha, etc., become Īśvara; it is impossible for them (Buddha, Rṣabha, etc.) to have unlimited power, knowledge and sovereignty; for, [they] are delimited by time.²²⁵ And those who follow their doctrines accept that they are delimited by time.

74,9 Our Īśvara is not delimited by time. He is certainly to be inferred by both those who belong to time of the [Buddha, etc.] and those who belong to the time of others, having Buddha, etc., as evidence that knowledge, sovereignty, etc., have grades; [and] no one can infer [about our Īśvara] in the following three ways: [Īśvara] was born at that time, is born [at this time], or will be born [at that time].²²⁶

74,12 In addition, there would similarly be the contradiction of unsurpassableness [of Buddha, etc.] For, since Buddha, etc., depend on achievement [of becoming a Buddha, etc.], preceding Buddhas have the advantage of time[, i.e., they have been Buddhas longer]. Accordingly, it is contradictory that later Buddhas, too, have unsurpassed power, sovereignty and knowledge.

74,14 If one says, [Objection:] “But they, who have precisely the equal power, knowledge and sovereignty, occupy different times in the same way as kings of the same kingdom [rule in different times],”

74,16 [Answer:] Still, [Buddha, etc.] cannot have unsurpassed sovereignty, etc., because their [possible] wish to get into the time of other Buddhas can be blocked. Surely a certain [Buddha] wishes to dominate another Buddha, and [wishes] to get into his [temporal] domain; for, there is no limit in wish. If [one Buddha] can dominate another Buddha, then [the idea] that [Buddhas] can dominate everyone is given up.

paragraph *kiñ ca sādhanāpekṣasya* above.

²²⁵The relative pronoun *yeṣām* and its seemingly correlative *teṣām* in this sentence do not refer to the same thing. This is supported by the next phrase in the same clause, *kālaparicchedyatvāt*, which presupposes *buddharṣabhādīnām*. The emendation adopted by the editors of the 1952 edition (*ye* instead of *yeṣām*) might be a good alternative. I have rejected the emendation since the resulting text implies that the author accepts Buddha, Rṣabha, etc., as Īśvara. (This, again, might be justifiable with the consideration that the author thinks them as lesser Īśvaras. Some support for this view might be found in the next paragraph where the author considers them as the *liṅga* to infer the existence of *his* Īśvara.) If the adopted reading is authorial, the correlative appears to show up later in the text in the paragraph starting with *siddheś ca* [75,7] translated on page 135. See also note 230.

²²⁶Some uncertainties whether the reconstructed text is correct remain. One of the difficulties is the use of compounds *tatkālaiḥ* and *tadanyakālaiḥ* (this itself is a result of emendation) as *bahuvrīhi* compounds. Such a use of the compound *tatkāla* appears to be quite rare. Although we have four words whose case ending is the instrumental plural, I have read the first two and the other two to refer to two different things. With this reading, Buddha, etc., are the *liṅgas* to infer the existence of “unlimited” Īśvara.

Now one might say, [objection:] “Since another Buddha does not need 75,2
help, and since a Buddha has no desire, etc., [a Buddha] does not wish to
obtain the domain of other Buddhas,”

We answer: In the same way as having become a Buddha is preceded by 75,3
the wish to remain certain time period, [for a Buddha-to-be,] there must
be a wish to exist at the time of another Buddha[, i.e., the time before the
Buddha-to-be becomes a Buddha].²²⁷ Also, [a real Buddha] should have
the wish to remain in another time period because there are [always] living
beings that are to be saved. Namely, it is not possible that all the living
beings are saved by a future Buddha; for, the purpose of being a Buddha
is to save living beings, despite its essence being suffering, etc., implying
that when all the other living beings are saved, there is one living being
who is still suffering].²²⁸ Accordingly, because he is a Buddha, there must
be a wish to remain in another time period.

In addition, since [Buddha, etc.] were afflicted by nescience (*avidyā*), 75,7
etc., before accomplishing [Buddhahood], also since they [the Buddhists,
etc.] accept that being Buddha means being suffering, empty, etc.,²²⁹
founders of other systems, such as Buddha, R̥ṣabha, etc., cannot have un-
surpassed power, knowledge, or sovereignty.²³⁰ On the other hand, these
problems do not apply to our Īśvara, since he is not delimited by time.
That is, because of the inference [based on the evidence] that power, knowl-
edge and sovereignty [always] have something superior, it is not possible to
suspect problems such as if there is someone who is greater [than Īśvara]
or if [the concept of Īśvara] leads to infinite regression, etc., in the same
way [as the problems may be suspected for] *ātman* or space.

Similarly,²³¹ [the Bhāṣyakāra] expounds: **Inference has been ex-** 75,11

²²⁷In order to understand this argument, it seems necessary to assume that our author considers that the Buddhists hold that one Buddha is in charge throughout all the time periods in succession and without an interruption.

²²⁸Our author is most likely referring to the concept of Bodhisattva here, in combination with one of the four noble truth that the nature of all the existence is painful (*duḥkha*).

²²⁹Our author is again referring to Buddhist doctrines of *duḥkha* (see the previous note) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*). While certain Buddhists might agree that Buddha, too, is empty (cf. chapter 22 of the MMK), it is unlikely that most Buddhists agree that the doctrine of *duḥkha* applies to Buddha. Our author is probably purposely misrepresenting Buddhist doctrines.

²³⁰Note that this sentence appears to go back to the original point that Buddha, etc., cannot have unsurpassed knowledge, etc., with additional reasons. This is done after a brief digression to discuss inherent problems of particularly Buddhist doctrines. An interesting thing about this sentence is that we have a pronoun *taiḥ* without anything being referred to in the vicinity. It may be recalled that I had to understand the word *teṣām* in the paragraph starting with *yeṣām punaḥ* [74,6] translated on p. 134 as referring to *buddharṣabhādayaḥ* rather than treating it as a correlative to the relative pronoun *yeṣām* (see note 225). Now we seem to have the correlative. One possibility is that this is a remnant of editing process.

²³¹It is not clear why our author states *tathā ca darśayati*. This resumes the interpretation of the Bhāṣya after a long discussion of himself. The last mention of the Bhāṣya was on p. 102 in this translation. It is possible that he considers that the statement of the Bhāṣya is related to what he has just discussed. It was a discussion on specific people, such as Buddha or R̥ṣabha, being Īśvara; and the Bhāṣya states that specifics

hausted in concluding only the universal. In concluding only the universal, viz., the existence of a special *puruṣa*, who is endowed with unsurpassed power, knowledge and sovereignty, [the inference] ‘has been exhausted (*kr̥topakṣayam*)’—[this compound is a genitive *bahuvrīhi* compound] modifying [the word] ‘inference (*anumānam*)’, where two constituents “has been made (*kr̥ta*)” and “exhaustion (*upakṣaya*)” [are in the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* relationship], viz., “for whom exhaustion has been made”; [this inference is the one whose reason is] “because [knowledge] has grades/something superior.” It[, i.e., that inference is exhausted in concluding only the universal] has been stated in [the discussion on] inference: when[ever] something reaches [another place], just the motion [is concluded].²³²

75,14 Accordingly, **[inference] is not capable of establishing particulars**, viz., the name, characteristics, etc., of Īśvara even though they exist; for [inference] aims at concluding the universal only. Thus the following is meant: inference, since it is exhausted in establishing the universal, does not establish [certain] attributes[, i.e., particulars] even when they exist; how much less could it convey [attributes] presence of which [in *īśvara*] is completely impossible, and which are contrary to qualities to be inferred, [contrary attributes, such as] incapacity (*anaiśvarya*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharmā*), etc.[, of Īśvara]?²³³

76,4 And for this same reason it is not possible to produce a counter-proof to the contradictory [inference] in the same way as [it is possible for] the inference about the existence of an omniscient being; for, from the start, an inference to establish the non-existence of him does not function. For, inference does not have the characteristic of dependent on²³⁴ what someone else has stated. Surely, when one infers the existence of fire by seeing smoke, he does not depend on someone else’s statement.²³⁵

76,7 Also, one does not wonder about the existence or non-existence of an omniscient being just by himself, [un]like [the way he wonders about the existence or non-existence of] a pot; for, he himself does not accept the

about Īśvara, which our author paraphrases as the name, etc., cannot be known by inference. In that both are about specifics, he might have stated “similarly.”

²³²This is not an exact quote. However, that inference only involves the universal and perception only with specifics has been discussed in YBh 1.7 and its commentary. See also the part where *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* is discussed on pp. 114ff in this translation

²³³Despite the claim that this is the intention of the author of the Bhāṣya, our author reads more than stated in the Bhāṣya. His polemic against those who deny *īśvara* is noteworthy.

²³⁴The word translated here as “dependent on” is *udīkṣā*. The root *udīkṣ-* and its derivatives are used only in this paragraph of the entire YVi as far as I can find. I do not think that the root and its derivatives are used in a particularly different sense as the root *apekṣ-* and its derivatives, which are used very frequently. There, however, might be a slightly derogatory connotation.

²³⁵The point that inferences that presuppose others’ inferences are fundamentally defective has been already raised. See the summary syllogism *vādyantaraparikalpitaḥ* . . . [59,3] translated on page 110 and its refutation, starting with the paragraph *kīñ cānyat—parikalpita*^o [66,1] (trl. p. 123).

existence of an omniscient being. Surely no one who has yet to determine what a hare is wonders whether a hare has a horn or not.

If you say, [Objection:] “[One (person A)], having learned about [a 76,9 concept] from another person(B)’s statement, questions [the validity of the concept],” then[, according to that logic,] the other person (person B), too, should state, “Why [should] the person to whom omniscient Īśvara is unknown (person A) question?”²³⁶

If you say, “[Objection:] But the other person (person B) [might] be 76,11 mistaken,” then [the answer is:] no. When one does not perceive the universal, there is no cause of error. Surely no one mistakes the mother-of-pearl for a cuckoo [although one might mistake the mother-of-pearl for sliver, and a cuckoo for a crow].²³⁷

Accordingly, [the Bhāṣyakāra] states: **The knowledge of [Īśvara’s] 76,13 particulars, such as the name, etc., should be sought through the scripture**, i.e., [the knowledge of Īśvara’s particulars] should be sought through the scripture, such as the Veda, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Yoga[śāstras] and Dharmaśāstras.²³⁸

Even though he does not help himself, since there is nothing for 76,15 himself to be fulfilled, also since beings,²³⁹ who have been immersed in

²³⁶I am not certain if the text is correct. The reading follows the conjecture of the editors of the 1952 edition. They had access only to the reading clearly marked as doubtful in the manuscripts they used (M and A). My understanding presented here is that the author is presenting an argument that if it is possible to refute the outcome of someone’s inference by another inference, then that inference should also be liable to be countered by another. This might lead to an infinite regression, or at least there is no way of determining which side is correct. The idea that no one should question something established by others by inference, which the author appears to be propagating, is hard to maintain in the first place, for, that implies that anything conceptually possible must exist. Accordingly, I have difficulty following the argument.

²³⁷This example refers to two well-known confusions. One is known as *kākapikanyāya*: since both the crow and the cuckoo are black, they are hard to distinguish. The other is the confusion of the mother-of-pearl for silver because of their silvery shine. This argument appears to presupposes a specific definition of error (*bhrānti*), i.e., in order to mistake something for another, they have to share a common feature.

²³⁸There are various lists of the constituents of authoritative texts, comparable to what we find here, *vedetihāsapurāṇayogadharmasāstra*. Such classifications are often found in Śaṅkara’s writings as well. I have only listed those that include *yogaśāstra* in the reference in the edition. (Incidentally they both come from the BhGBh.) Since our author refers to other *yogaśāstras* (in the commentary on YBh 2.29), I have translated the word as plural. The part of the compound *itihāsapurāṇa* is a little unclear. In the ChUBh its author considers *itihāsapurāṇa* to be the Mahābhārata (7.1.1). On the other hand, in BĀUBh 2.4.10, its author interprets *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* appearing in the BĀU itself as referring to parts of the Veda. In the BSBh Śaṅkara uses *itihāsapurāṇa* as plural once (1.3.32), dual once (3.3.32). Each member of the compound is also used as singular referring to texts; the Purāṇa known to Śaṅkara was probably only the common ancestor of the Vāyu- and the Brahmāṇḍa- (cf. BSBh 2.1.1, BĀUBh 1.1.7, and BhGBh 15.11). Regardless of the authorship of our text, it might be better to assume that the author was not particularly strict about the classification of the *āgama*.

²³⁹Note that the Bhāṣya text in my edition is different from that reconstructed from its manuscripts (see Maas (2006:40)) in that the word *bhūta* is not marked as part of it. The translation here reflects the difference in that the word “beings” is not marked as part of the Bhāṣya. I am not absolutely certain if the version of the Bhāṣya the

the mud of nescience, have no one else who is fit to teach the raft, the means to cross the ocean of reincarnation, **his goal is to help** them[, the beings]. **By means of teaching knowledge and *dharma*, at the time of *Kālpa* dissolutions and Great dissolutions**, when [human] teachers—who [each] are endowed with specific knowledge in the form of *āgamas* being helped by *Īśvara*—are in the state of dissolution, [*Īśvara*,] in whom undying compassion is repeatedly generated, ‘sets forth’—this is to be supplied—[, saying] **“I am going to save”** those [beings] who take no other refuge [but him] [and] offer themselves wholeheartedly [to him].

76,20 **Similarly, it has been stated: “The first wise,—‘the first wise’** [is analyzed as] ‘the wise’ ‘in the beginning [of time]’, [thus the compound *ādividvas* is a locative *tatpuruṣa* compound]. It means [someone] whose knowledge is not overpowered by *rajas* and *tamas*. Or, ‘the beginning’ means that from which knowledge, *dharma*, etc., start; [thus the compound] ‘the first wise’ [is analyzed as having] ‘the beginning’ and ‘the wise’ in the same case relationship[, namely a *karmadhāraya* compound]—**having taken possession of a magical mind**, i.e., the mind of *yogin*, created only by wishing, like a spirit that possesses, in order to teach, **the venerable (Bhagavat) supreme sage**—[the word ‘supreme sage (*paramarṣi*)’] means the one who has the supreme vision (*paramadarśana*); also, the supremacy (*paramatva*) [is known] from the *āgama*;²⁴⁰ the verbal root *ṛṣi* that has the meaning of ‘the vision (*darśana*)’ or the meaning ‘understanding (*gati*)’ is used [in the compound *paramarṣi*]; [and the venerable supreme sage refers to] none other than the supreme sage *Īśvara* who is called *Kapila*, *Nārāyaṇa*,²⁴¹ etc.—**related to *Āsuri*.”**

77,5 In conclusion, it is established that *Īśvara*, who is neither *pradhāna* or *puruṣa*, since he vividly knows the conditions, actions, and [their] fruition of all the creatures, is the cause of their help. It should not be asked how

author of the YVi did not have the compound *bhūtānugrahaḥ*, and instead had simply *anugrahaḥ*. However, even without the *bhūta-*, the *Bhāṣya* text is intelligible. Although the word *bhūta* appears in the YVi in the form of *bhūtānām*, since it is part of two reasons why “helping” is *īśvara*’s goal, it is difficult to construe it as part of a compound in the *Bhāṣya* text. With these considerations, I did not mark the word *bhūta* in the YVi as part of the *Bhāṣya*.

²⁴⁰There is a slight possibility that the reading *paramatvañ cāgamataḥ* is a corruption. The sentence, as is, does not offer much function. One would expect, analogous to the following gloss on the etymology of the word *ṛṣi*, a gloss on the meaning of the word *parama*. Also, the sentence is ambiguous and one could consider other interpretations with regard to the word *āgamataḥ*. It could be a paraphrase of the word *darśana*, but being the sentence as is, this understanding is impossible. If that were the case, an analysis of the compound *paramarṣi* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound should be here. Other possible emendations include readings, such as *paramatvañ cāgamam* (*Īśvara*’s supremacy has been understood), or *paramatvañ cāgrataḥ* (being supreme means being the utmost).

²⁴¹Note that the author lists two names as *Īśvara*’s name. The name *Kapila* is probably demanded by the context since the quote in the *Bhāṣya* currently commented is about the lineage of *Sāṃkhya* teachers. The mention of the name *Nārāyaṇa* as one of the names of *Īśvara* is noteworthy. The author is consistent in considering *Nārāyaṇa* as *Īśvara*. See the opening verses. (He mentions *Śiva* as the object of worship as, alongside *Nārāyaṇa*, among people on page 112.)

he, Īśvara, who has the mass of excellent *sattva* as the material cause, is an agent, or how he helps, etc.; for, it has been stated, “[The knowledge of Īśvara’s particulars, such as the name, etc.,] should be sought through the scripture.”²⁴² Also, inference is ineffective in that regard; for, it does not grasp the relationship of particulars. This concludes [the commentary on sūtra 1.25].

²⁴²See page 137.



Commentary on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.26

He,²⁴³ the supreme lord (*paramēśvara*), whose nature has been thus stated, 77,9 **is the teacher even of the past** teachers, i.e., the instructors of the relationship between all [kinds of] means [to attain] prosperity (*abhyudaya*) or the ultimate state (*niḥśreyasa*) and their goals.²⁴⁴ This means that [*īśvara*] is the agent of instructing knowledge even to them. For, all the knowledge originates from him in the same way as sparks²⁴⁵ originate

²⁴³Note that our author does not cite all the words of the sūtra at once as he usually does. This makes one to suspect that he might not have considered the sentence *sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālānavacchedāt* as a sūtra, but as part of the Bhāṣya on sūtra 1.25. However, I discount that possibility. One reason is the word *iti* at the end of the previous paragraph that I translated as “This concludes [the commentary on sūtra 1.25].” The word *iti* in that position does not appear to have any other function than to signal the conclusion of the long commentary on one sūtra the author has written. Another reason is that he has an explanation of the purpose of a sūtra below, the paragraph starting with *asya ca sūtrasyedam prayojanam*. That explanation cannot refer to sūtra 1.25 which our author considers to be an inference. Also, in that explanation he refers to *īśvara* being the teacher of all the teachers. These factors point to a high likelihood that he considered the sentence *sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālānavacchedāt* as a sūtra.

²⁴⁴The compound *abhyudayaniḥśreyasasarvasādhanaśādhyaśāmbandhopadeśin*, especially up to *śāmbandha* is difficult to interpret. I have a slight doubt about the part *sarva* in the compound. It is hard to construe. Nonetheless, our author is alluding to *dharma* in this expression. A similar expression is found in the syllogism starting with *anekakartṛ . . .* [57,13] (translated on p. 107): *anekakartṛbhokṛkriyāsādhanaśāmbandhaviśeṣajñānavad upadiṣṭāni varṇāśramādyanuṣṭhānāni*. As noted in footnote 145, the syllogism is about *īśvara* being the teacher of *dharma*. Similarly, this compound alludes to *dharma* by way of the expression *abhyudayaniḥśreyasa*. It is a typical expression found in works on Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Particularly relevant is VS 1.1.2: *yato ’bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah* in which *dharma* is defined. Śāṅkara expresses a similar view in the introduction to the BhGBh: *prāṇināṃ sāksād abhyudayaniḥśreyasahetur yaḥ sa dharmo brāhmaṇādyair varṇibhir āśramibhiḥ ca śreyo ’rthibhir anuṣṭhīyamānah*. He uses similar expressions in some other places: BSBh 1.2.21; 1.4.6; 4.2.12; BĀUBh 1.4.9; 1.4.10; 1.4.17; BhGBh 3.3; 4.7; 10.18.

²⁴⁵The pairs, flame and sparks and salty water and salt grains, evoke famous similes for the relationship between *brahman/ātman* and phenomenal world in Upaniṣads. For the former, BĀU 2.1.20; 6.2.9; and 6.2.14 may be consulted. For the latter, the famous similes in BĀU 2.4.12 (4.5.13) and ChU 6.13 come to mind. In this connection, I again have a slight doubt about the reading. The manuscripts agree in the reading *’lavaṇajaladhī°* in *jvalanalavaṇajaladhīsamudbhavā(h)*; the reading *’lavaṇakaṇāḥ* in the next word is adopted from a conjecture by the editors of the 1952 edition. While it is understandable that salt grains form as a result of deposition of sea water, there has

from a flame or the grains of salt from salty ocean. Also, we have just mentioned that he is the first wise.²⁴⁶ [The author of the sūtra states:] “For, [īśvara] is not delimited by time.”²⁴⁷

78,1 Other teachers are delimited by time²⁴⁸ that can be differentiated as being past, future, and present,²⁴⁹ but that īśvara—as the eternally liberated lord—should be honored also by them²⁵⁰ in the same way

to be some assumptions made; particularly that salt grain and sea water are essentially the same. (In this regard, stimulating discussions by Slaje (2001a,b, 2002, 2005) may be consulted.) When Śāṅkara uses the compound *lavaṇakaṇa* (BĀUBh 1.6.1), he uses the expression *saindhavācala* (rock salt) as its source. The same idea is expressed in BĀUBh 4.3.33 by *saindhavalavaṇaśakalair iva lavaṇaśailam*. This idea that salt grains, essentially identical to the rock salt (or even the mountain made of salt), appear from the latter is closer to the other simile of the flame and sparks in our text. The pair of ‘rock salt’ and “salt grains” may thus be preferable in the current context. The compound *lavaṇakaṇa* does not appear to be widely used. Our text and the BĀUBh are the only texts I am aware of that use this compound. This somewhat strengthens the view that the expression in our text should be based on the same idea, viz., the pair of “rock salt” and “salt grains.” If one may speculate, one possibility is that one scribe felt that the idea of “a mountain [made] of salt” (*saindhavācala/lavaṇaśaila*) unrealistic and changed it to the “salty ocean.”

Another point of interest in the use of this simile is that the simile of flame and sparks or salt and salty water/rock salt are used to describe the relationship between the mass of consciousness (*viññānamaya/viññānaghana*) and individual consciousness in the BĀU, not necessarily the relationship between knowledges. This might suggest that our author was thinking of the relationship not only in terms of who taught whom but in terms of origin and its manifestations of knowledge/consciousness.

²⁴⁶Note the use of the aorist (*avocāma*) in this sentence to express the immediate past. This refers to the discussions toward the end of the commentary on the previous sūtra, paragraphs starting with *tasyātmānugrahā*°. . . [76,15] translated on pages 137 ff.

²⁴⁷This section of the text poses a significant difficulty. One reason for this difficulty is that the text of the Bhāṣya the author of the YVi was commenting appears to be quite different from what we have today. I consider the word *iti* found after the phrase *kālenānavacchedāt* to mark the end of the commentary on the sūtra itself. It could, on the other hand, function as leading to the interpretation of the phrase. However, such an assumption leads to further difficulty in understanding the following passages. Given that the phrase preserved in the manuscripts of the YVi *kālenānye guravo ’vacchidyante* is very close to *pūrve hi guravaḥ kālenāvachchidyante* in the Bhāṣya (Maas 2006: 42), and that the compound preceding the word *kālena* is a paraphrase of it, it seems preferable to consider the word *iti* to mark the end of the quote from the sūtra.

²⁴⁸As noted above, I consider the phrase *kālenānye guravo ’vacchidyante* to be part of the Bhāṣya. The difference from the text of the Bhāṣya found in its manuscripts is the word order and the word *anye* here and *pūrve hi* in others.

²⁴⁹The part of the compound °*pratyutpanna*° is emended from the reading *pratyupādīyamāna* in T and L (and °*pratyupādīyamāna*° in others). It is clear that a word that signifies the present should be there. However, it is inexplicable why, if °*pratyutpanna*° was original, it became °*pratyupādīyamāna*°, which is a very rare, if at all possible, form.

²⁵⁰I have emended the reading *ivānumeyaḥ* to *iva mānanīyaḥ*. Having the word *anumeyaḥ* is unintelligible. Since this part is an equivalent of the phrase *sa pūrveṣāṃ api guruḥ* found after the relative clause *yatrāvachchedārthaḥ kālo nopāvartate* in other versions of the Bhāṣya (this relative clause appears below in our text), it is most reasonable if *īśvara* is described in a similar term. The choice of the word *mānanīyaḥ* is tentative. There may be a better word that means “to be honored,” ‘to be respected,’ “to be followed,” “to be learned from” and so on. The corruption from *mānanīyaḥ* to *anumeyaḥ* appears to be possible. The problem with this choice of the word is that *mānanīya* usually takes the genitive case as the agent of honoring. That the word is preceded by the instrumental case might account for the corruption. Other possibilities

as [he should be honored] by us. Anticipating the question, “Why does time not delimit [him] when he is existent and is equally a teacher?” [the author of the Bhāṣya] states—[for, *īśvara* is the one] to whom time, which causes delimiting, does not approach.²⁵¹ To that object, i.e., *īśvara*, [time] whose goal is delimiting, i.e., a delimiter like [the unit] *prastha*, etc., does not approach. [To paraphrase,] [time,] as a delimiter, does not make *īśvara* into an object, even though it does delimit all the changeable existence.

Objection:²⁵²

78.6

I have considered include *anuneyaḥ*, *anubhāvyaḥ*, *mahanīyaḥ*, *pūjyaḥ*, etc. I consider the phrase *sa tv īśvaras tair api mānanīyaḥ* (having removed words that are typically explanatory) to be part of the Bhāṣya our author was commenting upon. This phrase is, as stated, an equivalent of *sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ* in the YBh (Maas 2006: 42). Also, since the author of the YVi explicitly mentions the phrase *yatra...* as part of the mūla text, it would be awkward if the mūla text did not have a correlative to that relative pronoun. It is interesting to note that the exact phrase *sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ* constitutes the sūtra. On the other hand, the phrase I consider as part of the Bhāṣya is its equivalent, and therefore it can be a paraphrase of the phrase in the sūtra. This gives the impression that the text of the Bhāṣya reconstructed from our text is a cleaner commentary paraphrasing all the elements of the sūtra without using the same words. Compare the two versions of the Bhāṣya on the sūtra *sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt*: *pūrve hi guravaḥ kālenānavacchidyante | yatrāvachchedārthaḥ kālo nopāvartate sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ* (Maas 2006: 42); *kālenānye guravo 'vacchidyante, sa tv īśvaras tair api mānanīyaḥ, yatrāvachchedārthaḥ kālo nopāvartate* (reconstructed from our text). It would appear that the Bhāṣya text went through several stages of revisions: a marginal gloss to signify which part of the Bhāṣya paraphrases a phrase in the sūtra was incorporated; replacing the original paraphrase; and the order of phrases was changed.

²⁵¹I think the author of the YVi correctly interprets the relative clause in the Bhāṣya as expressing a reason. In my reconstruction of the Bhāṣya the author of the YVi might have been commenting upon, the relative clause functions as a paraphrase of the phrase *kālenānavacchedāt* in the sūtra. This Bhāṣya text rather elegantly expresses how *īśvara* is different from other teachers and thus deserves to be worshiped/honored, using a relative syntax. It is difficult to express the same nuance in a translation, but it should be noted that “that *īśvara*” and “around whom” in this translation are syntactically connected in the original Sanskrit text. The verb *upāvṛt-* used in the Bhāṣya is difficult to understand. A generic interpretation by the author of the YVi is not much helpful. The verb is frequently used in Vedic texts, but not particularly well-attested in philosophical texts. Notably, the YBh uses the word two more times (1.42 and 3.53).

²⁵²I consider that the phrase *nanu ca* starts the long objection that itself is in the form of a dialogue. The answer to this long objection is given in the paragraph that starts with *atrocyate* [79,14] translated on page 147. This evaluation is based mainly on the structure that a long dialogue is surrounded by *nanu ca* and *atrocyate*, the phrase often used to answer to a long objection. This evaluation is not without difficulty. In my evaluation, the views introduced by verbs in the optative second person singular belong to the opponent of the main objector. With such a personal verbal forms one might first consider that the speaker of statements “You might state...” is the author of the treatise himself. However, even though continuous introduction of the opponent’s view in the optative second person singular might be unique to this text, it is not uncommon that an objection is introduced in the form of a dialogue itself. Another difficulty is that the person responding to the objections appears to have the upper hand against his opponent. With my understanding that the answer to the whole objection is given in the paragraph starting with *atrocyate*, I still get the impression that the answer does not adequately address the difficulties raised by the opponent. Further complicating

78,7 Why—since the preeminent *sattva* of Īśvara is an effect of *pradhāna*, and since an effect is delimited by time—is his *sattva* not delimited [by time]?²⁵³ For, *puruṣa* of every single person by nature is not to be suspected of being delimited by time; for *puruṣa* is not changeable[, and hence if Īśvara is special in not being delimited by time, it must be with regard to his *sattva*].

78,10 You might think, “Īśvara does not require *sattva*, like Īśvara well-known in other systems [does not require it].”²⁵⁴

78,11 That is not reasonable; since you accept that the material cause [of Īśvara] is *sattva*.

78,12 Or, you might think, “Time delimits only the effect that arose from the *sattva* of Īśvara, not the *sattva* of Īśvara.”

78,13 That, too, is not reasonable; for, [anything] that is manifest is to be delimited. And the *sattva* of Īśvara is manifest.

78,14 Or, you might mean, “The *sattva* of Īśvara is precisely in the primordial state (*pradhānāvastha*).”

78,15 That is impossible; for, [if that were the case, the presence of] knowledge [there] would be impossible[, but you assert the omniscience of Īśvara].

78,16 Or, you might assert, “Since [we] accept the *satkārya*[*vāda*] (the view that the effect already exists in the cause), in the same manner as the seed, fruit, creeper and flower [are present in their respective cause],²⁵⁵ the primordial state of knowledge,

the matter, the dialogue appears to be a contracted form of larger discussions, i.e., most of the assumptions and details appear to be missing. It may be noted that the position that Īśvara is a special kind of *puruṣa*, and its material cause is *sattva*, is unique to the system of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. In addition, the emphasis on *sattva* being the material cause of Īśvara is very unique to the YVi. The Īśvara theory of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra is not widely criticized. The only possible discussions that might be related to that position I am aware of is BSBh 1.1.5. It is noteworthy that in the *pūrvapakṣa* to introduce BS 1.1.5, its opponent is referred to with the second person pronoun in the singular *tvam*. See the testimonia register in the edition. And the last, but not the least, problem is that some portion of the text appears to have been lost (see note 263). It does appear, nonetheless, that the objector and the *siddhāntin* agree that the sūtra under discussion is about Īśvara’s *sattva* not delimited by time, and that Īśvara himself is, being a special *puruṣa*, not delimited by time. That this is an accepted position is confirmed in the paragraph that starts with *tatra puruṣa*° [50,1] translated on p. 92. The whole discussion here seems to revolve around the same issues discussed in the part following that paragraph.

²⁵³Note that the author holds the view that the material cause/body of Īśvara is *sattva*. See note 100 on p. 91. The expression *prakṛṣṭasattva* (preeminent *sattva*) comes from the Bhāṣya. See p. 92.

²⁵⁴The Īśvara known in other systems is probably that of Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika systems in which Īśvara is the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*). They have their own problem with regard to the body of Īśvara, but at least he does not require *sattva* to be his material cause since *sattva*, as one of three *guṇas*, is a purely Sāṃkhya concept. There is a slight possibility that Īśvara of other schools refers to that of the Advaita. There, when Śaṅkara identifies Īśvara with Brahman, Īśvara is the material cause as well as the efficient cause.

²⁵⁵The order of the component in the compound *bīja-phala-vallarī-kusumādivat* is not intuitive and the compound could be interpreted in several ways. One interpretation is to read “like the fruit, creeper, and flower in the seed.” Another possible (but less

etc., that is precisely the *sattva* [of Īśvara].”²⁵⁶

That, too, is not correct; for, such an assertion is not something one can put forward conventionally [that something is in the primordial state and that it has something yet to be manifest in it as its attribute].²⁵⁷ In addition, if that [the primordial state of knowledge, etc., is Īśvara’s *sattva*] were the case, everything, knowledge, etc., would not be delimited [by time] since they are not differentiated in that they [all] have a connection [with Īśvara’s *sattva*] that they are simply there.²⁵⁸

Or, you might say, “Even if [something] is manifest, some effects are to be delimited temporally, [while] some [others] are not.”²⁵⁹

That, too, is not correct; for, the [position] contradicts the reason.²⁶⁰

Or, you might counter, “That the *sattva* of Īśvara is not delimited by time is established by the scripture.”²⁶¹

That, too, is not correct; for, the scripture reveals [only

likely) interpretation is to read “like the creeper and flower that are the result of the seed.” My translation is based on the assumption that the seed itself is in fact a result of fruit.

²⁵⁶I have emended the reading *yat* found in manuscripts (T manuscripts do not offer readings here) and adopted in the 1952 edition to *yā tat*. It is not impossible to understand what might have been meant, but the sentence is syntactically defective. Since the corruption from *yā tat*, which is obviously meant, to *yat* can easily occur, I have adopted the reading.

²⁵⁷This answer, like most of those in this part, is very terse. My understanding is based on the assumption that the objector (the one follows the Pātañjalayogaśāstra) wishes to maintain that knowledge is an attribute of Īśvara’s *sattva*.

²⁵⁸I have emended the reading *jñānādisattāmātrasambandhāviśeṣāt* to *jñānādīnām sattāmātrasambandhāviśeṣāt*. My understanding is that *jñānādīnām* qualifies *sarveṣām*. As part of a compound, *jñānādi* is hard to construe.

²⁵⁹The word *kālīnam* is difficult to comprehend. Here it is translated as “temporally” as qualifying the word *aparicchedyatvam*. More literally, *aparicchedyatvaṃ kālīnam* may be translated as “the quality of not being delimited with regard to time.” The word *kālīna* is usually not used independently, but as the latter member of a compound (*X-kālīna*) to express something “belonging to the time X.” In fact, the sentence is intelligible without any word in that position. Possible emendations include *kālīnatvam* (as a paraphrase of the previous word *paricchedyatvam*, meaning the quality of belonging to a certain time; but such use is not well-attested); *kālēna* (to clarify the agent of *paricchid-*; but not particularly necessary since the context makes it clear what delimits effects; also, the process of the corruption from an obvious word *kālēna* to more difficult *kālīnam* is hard to account for). Another possibility is that a marginal correction that was meant to correct *jñānādi* to *jñānādīnām* (see the previous note) was misunderstood and applied at the wrong place.

²⁶⁰This is another terse answer. Although there is some possibility that the text omits a significant portion, it rather appears that the author expects the reader to be familiar with a similar, more detailed, discussion. This terse style is consistent in this section. I understand that the answer is pointing out the contradiction to what both parties had previously agreed point in the beginning of the dialogue: the effect is delimited by time. It was mentioned in the paragraph starting with *īśvaraprakṛṣṭasattvasya* [78,7] translated on p. 144.

²⁶¹This counter argument, too, is ambiguous. I somewhat doubt this assertion has a real argument as a model although it is still possible that this counter-argument is

what is otherwise obtainable; it does not communicate anything new].²⁶²

79,9 Or, you might claim, “The scripture reveals the characteristic that [the *sattva* of Īśvara] is not delimited by time, which is very real, but not precisely known.”

79,12 That, too, is not correct. [The preeminence of *sattva*] has a thorough practice of cessation (*nīrodha*), etc., as its cause,²⁶⁴ accordingly, to say that the excellence in mastery²⁶⁵ [of the *sattva* of Īśvara] is not limited by time would be contradictory.²⁶⁶

presented as a very contracted form of more detailed arguments. In the context of the current dialogue, this is a response to the criticism that it is unreasonable to assert certain things are delimited by time while others are not. The author of the YVi lets the objector (the main speaker of this objection) to imagine his opponent to present the view that brings up the alternative *pramāṇa* to maintain the position. The impression that this indeed is a hypothetical counter-argument is reinforced by the fact that it does not mention any *āgama* to support the claim.

²⁶²My understanding of this vague and terse answer is based on the context. The main speaker has stated that it is against reason that certain effects are delimited by time while others are not; the answer to that criticism was that there is another means of knowledge, viz., *āgama*; [this answer]; to counter this, the answer that *āgama* does reveal real, but unknown, is given. The verb (*ava-*)*dyut-* is often used in commentaries to express the role of particles (*nīpātas*, *upasargas*) that do not add new meaning to the sentence but to emphasize the meaning that are obtainable without. In the YVi the verb and its derivatives are used in senses such as “to illustrate,” “to emphasize,” “to reveal.” This criticism appears to suggest that even the statements in the scripture have to be verified in other means of knowledge. Such a view is the opposite of the view held by the Mīmāṃsakas who are the prominent opponent in the YVi.

²⁶³There is a likelihood of one or more exchanges being lost. The following answer does not have much to do with *āgama*, which has been the topic of the immediately preceding exchanges. Instead, now the focus is suddenly the excellence (*prakarṣa* or *utkarṣa*) of Īśvara’s *sattva*. See note 266. It is probable that the repeated expression *tac cāpi na* caused an eye-skip. The lost exchanges might have included some of the following issues:

- that yogins accept that the authority of the scripture comes from the *sattva* of Īśvara (see p. 95) whose permanency is being questioned.
- that there appears to be mutual dependency between the scripture and Īśvara’s *sattva*.

and the response from the yogins perhaps ended with the claim that the authority of the scripture comes from the eternal excellence in mastery (*vaimalyaprakarṣa*) of the *sattva* of Īśvara (see again p. 95 and note 224 on p. 133).

²⁶⁴This is a reference to sūtra 1.2 in which, according to the author of the YVi, the *asamprajñātasamādhi* is defined. The *asamprajñātasamādhi* is the ultimate yoga, again, following the YVi on sūtra 1.1 and 2.

²⁶⁵The word translated as “mastery” here is *vaimalya*. The word *vaimalya* appeared in paragraphs started with *sa vaktavyaḥ* [73,12] (translated on p. 133) ff. The compound *vaimalyaprakarṣa*, too, has appeared in the paragraphs. It was used in the context of someone who is skilled in measuring the weight being able to tell the weight just by looking without the scale. Despite the choice of the translation “mastery,” the word *vaimalya* should still be considered to have the etymologically closer connotations such as “faultlessness,” “pureness,” etc., in reference to the *sattva* of Īśvara.

²⁶⁶I have emended the reading *vaimalyānavacchedyaś cety* (LMA) to *vaimalyaprakarṣa iti*. The reading found in manuscripts is non-sensical. The editors of the 1952 edition also tried to fix it by (silently) emending it to *vaimalyād anavacchedyaś ceti*.

We answer: Since the excellence in mastery that belongs to Īśvara's *sattva* does not require causes such as *dharma*, it is no fault that [it is] not delimited by time.²⁶⁷ The excellence in mastery of other teachers is delimited by time because [it] has the practice of law of yoga (*yogadharma*), etc., as its cause;²⁶⁸ [but] not that of the Bhagavat (Īśvara).²⁶⁹ Why? For, [his] *sattva* eternally and completely rejects *rajas* and *tamas*.²⁷⁰ The

This is not satisfactory since it leaves the masculine nominative singular unaccounted for. In the following passage, almost the same, but contrary, phrase *anyeṣām gurūṇām. . . kālāvacchedyo vaimalyaprakarṣaḥ* appears. That phrase explains why the word *kālānavacchedyaḥ* is in the masculine gender; it modifies the word (*vaimalya*)*prakarṣaḥ*.

²⁶⁷I have introduced a conjunctural reading in this sentence. L, which was the archetype of all the other readings (no reading from T manuscripts is available), reads: *īśvarasattvavaimalyaprakarṣāpekṣatvāt kālānavacchedyasyādoṣaḥ*. This is unintelligible. A minor fix (*°vacchedyatvasyādoṣaḥ*) by the editors of the 1952 edition does not make it any more intelligible. The problem with the reading in L is that it has a wrong word before *apekṣatvāt*. The context reveals that the object of *apekṣā* should be one of *nīrodhādīsamanuṣṭhāna* that is found in the previous paragraph, *yogadharmādīsamanuṣṭhāna* in the next sentence, *dharmādīnīmitta*, or an equivalent of these three. I have tentatively chosen the one that is used in combination with *apekṣā*. After this solution, another solution to the difficult reading, *kālāvacchedyasyādoṣaḥ*, is straightforward because of the graphical similarity between *sya* and *tya* in the Malayalam script. The difficulty in the reading is that the text lacks the substantive that is said to have no fault since *kālāvacchedya* is an adjective. With the introduction of the masculine word *°prakarṣasya*, we have the substantive that is qualified with the adjective. This pair of *°vaimalyaprakarṣa* and *kālānavacchedya* is the same pair arrived as a result of emendation discussed in the previous note.

²⁶⁸Though it appears as though a simple compound, *yogadharma* is a difficult compound to interpret. It is used in the MBh and in some Purāṇas, but rarely in other texts. Śāṅkara in his BhGBh 2.40 glosses the word *dharma* with *yogadharma*. In that interpretation, the compound *yogadharma* is a *tatpuruṣa* compound. I follow that use here.

²⁶⁹This is the first voluntary use of the word “Bhagavat” as the synonym of Īśvara in our text. (The word appeared once when the Bhāṣya quoted an unknown source.) He continues to use this word in the current discussion. This is perhaps an indication that he was thinking of Īśvara more in terms of the Bhagavat of the BhG. The quote from it at the end of the commentary on sūtra 1.26 is another indication.

²⁷⁰The constituted text of this sentence again involves a significant emendation. I have adopted the compound *sarvadātyantatīrohbūtarajastamassattvatvāt* instead of the unintelligible *°rajastamastamastatvāt* in L or *°rajastamastvāt* in MAḪ. The latter reading is a result of an understandable emendation by the copyist of M who thought the reading in L was a result of dittography since *°rajastama* is at the end of a side of a folio in L. This reading subsequently appeared in A and in the 1952 edition. This solution still does not address the difficulty in the text or explain the reason why *°stat(t)va°* is in the compound. The expression *sarvadātyantatīrohitaraajastamogūṇa* referring to the *sattva* of Īśvara appeared in the paragraph starting with *vīparyayo 'pīti* [54,8] translated on p. 102. With that expression here, the author should again be referring to the *sattva* of Īśvara. But the answer here should be why the excellence in mastery of Īśvara is eternal without requiring any practice. Judging from the following argument, the strategy of the author appears to be to establish: (physical side of) Īśvara eternally consists of only *sattva*; knowledge is eternally a quality of *sattva*; and hence the knowledge that belongs to the *sattva* of Īśvara does not require any cause, reveals everything, and is not delimited by time; therefore the excellence in mastery of the knowledge of Īśvara does not require any practice, either. The nominal sentence translated here should be expressing the first point. I understand that the original reading was *°tamassattvatvāt* (the recorded reading was a result of dittography and small copying mistake of *°ssa°* for *°sta°*). This reading might be thought to leave the ambiguity that the whole

knowledge that belongs to the *sattva* of the Bhagavat, like the nature of *sattva* [does not require causes such as *dharma*, etc.],²⁷¹ does not require causes such as *dharma* reveals the entire objects, [and] is not delimited by time since [knowledge] is a nature of *sattva*. Similarly, the excellence [in mastery], too, which is an effect of the [knowledge], is not delimited by time.

79,19 Also, in the same way as heat and light that belong to fire are not delimited by time with regard to fire, mastery, knowledge, and excellence²⁷² that belong to the *sattva* of the Bhagavat are not to be delimited by time in his *sattva*.²⁷³ Having this in mind, [the author of the Bhāṣya] has stated, “to whom time, which aims at delimiting, does not approach,” but not with regard to [Īśvara] not having [any] effect [in time].²⁷⁴ For, [his] being a teacher has no boundary[, i.e., Īśvara does produce effect in time

compound could be construed to mean Īśvara is eternally and completely devoid of all the three *rajas*, *tamas*, *sattva*. My understanding is that the order of the three *guṇas*’ appearance removes the ambiguity. The three *guṇas* usually appear in the order of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Even though the point that the material side of Īśvara is pure *sattva* figures prominently in many discussions such as this, our author never gives an explanation why the *sattva* of Īśvara, which is the material cause of him, is pure *sattva*. It might be that he reads the meaning ‘existence’, the greatest universal (*sāmānya*), in this Sāṃkhya technical term.

²⁷¹I understand the word *sattvasvarūpavat* as an adverb. I feel a slight awkwardness in this sentence since knowledge is a nature of *sattva*. The knowledge being equivalent of its nature appears awkward. It might be possible to read the word as an adjective modifying the word *jñānam* meaning “having the nature of *sattva*.” I have also considered to emend the word *sattvasvarūpavat* to *sattvasvarūpatvāt*. This emendation does not remove the awkwardness, either.

²⁷²The compound *vaimalyajñānaprakaśāḥ* might seem awkward because we have only seen the compound *vaimalyaprakaśaḥ* most of the time. The *dvandva* compound is supported by the verb *upayānti* which is also in plural. Then again, we cannot completely eliminate the possibility that someone might have adjusted the verb ending to fit to the already corrupt reading of the subject. At least, the author has stated that knowledge and excellence are inherent in the *sattva* of Īśvara in the preceding passages. Since I cannot offer a better alternative and an explanation for the corruption, and since the sentence is comprehensible, I retain the reading found in manuscripts.

²⁷³This sentence both in the subordinate clause and in the main clause repeat (essentially) the same word (“fire” and “the *sattva* of the Bhagavat”) in the genitive case and in the locative case. I understand that the author is expressing the idea that the existence of innate properties coincide with the existence of their subject.

²⁷⁴The reading of this and the next sentence recorded in manuscripts appears corrupt. It reads: *na tv akāryāpekṣayā hy ucyate gurutvaṃ hi nāvadhimat* (quoted without punctuation because the manuscripts in the Malayalam script are not punctuated). That two particles *tu* and *hi* appear in one sentence, particularly *hi* in a strange position, suggests a corruption. On the one hand, the part *na tv akāryāpekṣayā* appears genuine since that would make coherently structured sentence *etadapekṣayābhīhitam . . . iti, na tv akāryāpekṣayā*, showing the contrast between what is meant and what is not. Since the sentence appears to end with the second *apekṣayā*, it does appear that *hy ucyate* is a corruption. Some of possible original readings are *ity ucyate, yathā/tathā hy ucyate, or apy ucyate*, but emendation based on such conjecture would involve significant departure from the recorded reading. All of these possible conjectures demand supplying some text that is not in the manuscripts. Since the text is more intelligible and smoother than when it has *hy ucyate* or anything similar to it, I have decided to drop the problematic reading *hy ucyate*. An explanation for the presence of *hy ucyate* might be that a scribe believed that there should be something to that effect after . . . *apekṣayā*. It should, however, be noted that there remains a slight possibility that a

by always being a teacher]. [The author of the Bhāṣya] states exactly this: **In the same way as [Īśvara, or his presence,]²⁷⁵ is established in the beginning of this *sarga* by the understanding²⁷⁶ of excellence in knowledge and mastery, and —[Īśvara, or his presence,] is established as someone who is to be inferred for those who were born in the beginning of [this] *sarga*; also, [Īśvara or his presence] was learned through the scripture—[Īśvara, or his presence, is established] in [times] when the beginning of the *sarga* is in the past[, including the present,] too—[he, or his presence,] is established for those who were born at those times[, viz., when the beginning of the *sarga* is past,] even those who precede the [beginning of the current *sarga*]; similarly [Īśvara, or his presence,] is known by means of inference and the scripture in the future time.**

The following is the gist of this sūtra: In the same manner as observable teachers are, since they instruct knowledge and law, etc., incessantly attended by those who take no other refuge [but them], this Bhagavat, too, since he is the teacher even for all [the other] teachers, should always be held in their heart even more so than the [other visible teachers] by means of the names such as Nārāyaṇa.²⁷⁷ by those who do not deviate their mind. Observable teachers, who turned toward [followers] as a result of [their] attendance, help those eagerly attend them; similarly, this supreme teacher, too, helps just by means of wishing.

Namely, a *śruti* states:

To the person who has the utmost dedication to God; [and is dedicated to] the teacher in the same way as he is to God

significant portion of the text has been lost. The part *gurutvaṃ hi nāvadhīmat*, too, is somewhat hard to comprehend since stating that Īśvara's property of being a teacher has no boundary/limit is abrupt. The wording *nāvadhīmat* appears genuine, given discussions on Īśvara's properties, such as knowledge, etc., being unlimited in the commentary on the previous sūtra. However, how it relates to the following Bhāṣya is not easy to grasp, especially when the author says the following statements in the Bhāṣya states exactly the same thing. My understanding here is that our author expresses the view that although time does not delimit Īśvara, he continuously produces effects in time by being a teacher whose presence is known by inference and the scripture.

²⁷⁵I have supplied “*īśvara*, or his presence” as the subject of the sentence. In our text, the subject modified by the adjective *siddhaḥ* is nowhere explicitly stated. But when the Bhāṣya text is extracted from the YVi, the subject is implicit, but clear. The text goes: *kālenānye guravo 'vacchidyante, sa tv īśvaras tair api mānanīyaḥ, yatrāvachedārthaḥ kālo nopāvartate | yathāśya sargasūyādau prakarṣagatyā siddhaḥ, tathātīkrāntasargādiṣv api*. Although the subject is clearly Īśvara, since the predicate *siddhaḥ* implies being proven to exist, I have supplied “or his presence” alongside the word “Īśvara.”

²⁷⁶The word *gatyā* in the Bhāṣya is ambiguous and the gloss by the YVi *sargādi-jañmanām anumeyatayā* is hard to reconcile with. My understanding is that by the word *gati* the author of the Bhāṣya is referring to the exposition in YBh 1.24 where the eternal mutual reinforcement between *śāstra* and *prakarṣa* was discussed. Thus the “understanding” should be that the varying degrees of excellence indicates the existence of omniscient Īśvara.

²⁷⁷For the name Nārāyaṇa, cf. a similar expression translated on p. 112 and footnote 241 on p. 138.

These things that have been told will shine forth, to the person
with a great soul.²⁷⁸

Also, a *smṛti* [states]:

The one who acts for me; one who holds me as the supreme;
the one who is dedicated to me; the one who is devoid
of attachment

The one who is not hostile to all the creatures; such a person
reaches me, O Pāṇḍava.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad 6.23. This stanza appears in various texts often without ascription. Śaṅkara quotes this stanza in KUPBh 4.32.

²⁷⁹BhG 11.55. The two quotations from a *śruti* and a *smṛti* give the impression that this is the conclusion of our author's discussion on Īśvara. The subject matter of the following two sūtras, though related, is the syllable *om*. Curiously, Śaṅkara says that BhG 11.55 condenses the gist of the entire Gītā (Śaṅkara calls it *gītāśāstra*): *adhunā sarvasya gītāśāstrasya sārabhūto 'rtho niḥśreyasārtho 'nuṣṭheyatvena samuccityocyate. . . .*

Commentary on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.27

[One might ask,] “It has been stated, ‘by contemplation (*praṇidhāna*) of Ī- 80,12
śvara [the acquisition of *samādhi* comes extremely near] (YS 1.23).’ [Then]
how should he be contemplated? Also, what is the means of contemplation
with which the contemplator contemplates?” Thus in order to teach the
means to contemplate him, [the author of sūtras] states [the following]:

His signifier is the Praṇava. (YS 1.27)

80,14

[The word] “his” means Īśvara’s, whose characteristics are as have been 80,15
stated. The “signifier” [means] the agent of expression [and it is] the
Praṇava (the syllable *om*); in the same way as the word *gauḥ* is [the
signifier] of [the creature] that has the dewlap, etc.²⁸⁰

The Praṇava is the one with which [something] is prominently (*praka-* 80,16
rṣeṇa) lauded (*nūyate*), viz., praised.²⁸¹ Or, that which lauds (*praṇauti*),
viz., praises, Īśvara is the Praṇava, the syllable *om*.²⁸² Also, [the word
‘*praṇava*’] stands for “the thing with which X is placed (*praṇidhīyate*)²⁸³”:
[this presupposes the whole analysis,] “[by which] the Bhagavat [is placed]
by those who place”; [this in turn means] either “the thing with which
one fixes (*praṇidadhāti*) his mind toward the Bhagavat,” or “the thing
with which one directs himself (*praṇidhatte*) toward the Bhagavat in his
mind.”²⁸⁴ [The form *praṇava* is achieved,] having attached the syllable *va*

²⁸⁰This is an allusion to the well-known opening of the VMBh, *atha gaur ity atra kaś śabdah? . . . yena uccāritena sāsṅālāṅgulakakudakhuraviṣāṇinām sampratyaḥ bhavati sa śabdah*, that became the starting point of later discussions on *śabda*.

²⁸¹This is the first of a series of etymologies (*nirukti*) of the word *praṇava*. The author etymologizes the verbal prefix *pra-* to mean prominently (*prakarṣeṇa*) and the *nava* part comes from the verb *nu-*, “to praise/laud.” And in this etymology the word *praṇava* refers to *karaṇa* (the means), one of the six *kāraṇas*.

²⁸²Even though similar to the previous etymology, in this the word *praṇava* is etymologized as to refer to the *karṭṛ*, the agent.

²⁸³Note that the root *praṇidhā-* translated here as “to place” is the same root that has been translated as “to contemplate” in the preceding passages. The use of a different translation reflects the author’s usage of the word in a wider sense in the following discussion.

²⁸⁴As I have marked the text as uncertain, I believe the text that etymologizes the word *praṇava* as derived from the verb *praṇidhā-* is, as transmitted in manuscripts, corrupt. It reads *praṇidhīyate cāneneti bhagavān praṇidhātrbhīriti praṇamati vāneneti praṇidhatte vā tena bhagavantañ cetasīti dhāño vakāropajānaṇ kṛtvā*. However, it is

in place of the root *dhā-*.²⁸⁵ Surely one places in mind things that are beyond senses using word, for example, Mt. “Meru” or “Indra.”

81,1 **Īśvara is the to-be-signified (*vācya*) by this syllable *om*.**²⁸⁶ The etymology should be equally straightforward: [The word *om* is formed] by adding the suffix *man* to the verb *av-*, which has the meanings such as “to protect,” and eliding the last vowel and the subsequent consonants.²⁸⁷

difficult to conjecture how it is corrupt. I am not satisfied with the small emendation silently introduced in the 1952 edition. It removes *iti* from *cāneneti bhagavān* and makes the text to give three alternative etymologies. With this emendation, the text on the surface appears acceptable except that the number of the particle *vā* seems inconsistent (just two while alternatives are three). This inconsistency might not be unacceptable since the use of the particle *vā* is not always precise among Sanskrit authors. However, that text still leaves problems. One is that the second alternative etymology uses the verb *praṇam-* instead of *praṇidhā-* while the author is clearly attempting to show that the word *praṇava* derived from *praṇidhā-*. Also, the first alternative, being in the passive construction, does not offer any semantic alternative to the other two that are in the active construction. My emendation is based on the following understandings: the phrase *praṇidhīyate cāneneti* offers an additional (*ca*) etymology to the word *praṇava*; and the author supplies additional elements in the etymology, the agent (*praṇidhātṛbhiḥ*) and the object of the action *bhagavān*; since the verb *praṇidhā-* can have both the *parasmaipadam* and the *ātmanepadam* constructions, he offers the two alternative possibilities from which the passive construction may have derived from; the first is the *parasmaipadam* construction (*praṇidadhāti*); and the second the *ātmanepadam* construction *praṇidhatte*. Not only that the root in *praṇamanti* (*pra-ṇam-*) is probably not the one intended but also that it has the plural form provoke the suspicion that something went wrong in that verb; in such etymologies usually the generic singular form is used. Perhaps the use of the word *praṇidhātṛbhiḥ* made a scribe to consider that the verb should also be in the plural. The second conjecture that the words *praṇidadhāti ceto bhagavaty iti* was dropped is, although significant, might be explained as an eye-skip, or a false emendation by a scribe who thought it was a dittography because of the similar following phrase.

²⁸⁵I am not aware of any grammatical operation that allows the substitution of the root *dhā-* with the syllable *va*.

²⁸⁶I have marked *tasya coṃkārasya vācya īśvaraḥ* as the reading of the Bhāṣya here. This deviates from the reading adopted in Maas (2006: 42): *vācya īśvaraḥ* supported by all the recensions of the YBh. Although it is not completely incomprehensible, the reading the YBh tradition kept does not give a very good impression stylistically when read continuously with the sūtra, *tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ*. It would appear as though it reads *tasya vācya īśvaraḥ* when *tasya* is apparently *īśvarsya*. One may want to interpret the Bhāṣya to be giving the word being referred by the pronoun *tasya* in the sūtra, but it is a little forced. On the other hand, while it is more verbose, if we read the Bhāṣya *tasya coṃkārasya vācya īśvaraḥ* there is no need for a forced interpretation. Thus it is conceivable that the Bhāṣya known to the author of our text continued with that text. Note that the vulgate Bhāṣya reads *vācya īśvaraḥ praṇavasya*, for example, in the 1952 edition, that avoids the same difficulty when simply read *vācya īśvaraḥ*.

²⁸⁷This etymology refers to the Dhātupāṭha and the Uṇādisūtra. The part “the verb *av-* that has the meanings such as ‘to protect’ (*avate rakṣaṇādyarthāt*)” is a reference to Dhātupāṭha 1.631 (*ava rakṣaṇagatikāntipṛīṭīṭṛṭyavagamapraveśaśravapaṇa-sāmarthyayācanakriyechhādīṭyavāṇīṅganahīṃsādānabhāvavṛddhiṣu*); and *avater maṃṣ ṭilopaś ca* is a reference to Uṇādisūtra 1.128 that is governed by 1.127. Uṇādisūtra 1.127 starts to give formations of words that have the suffix *-ma(n)* at the end; 1.128 prescribes that the word *om* is formed by adding the *man* suffix and losing the last vowel and its following consonants (thus *om*). Our author is referring to these rules. Note that I have emended the reading *maniṣ* to *maṃṣ*, following the Uṇādisūtra available today. With the reading *maniḥ*, it appears that the rule governs the suffix *man*, while the rules in fact dictate formations of words that have *-ma* at the end, such

[The word *om*] bears the meanings such as: [the one who] protects (*rakṣati*) those who contemplate him from reincarnation; [the one who] lets those who reincarnate reach (*gamayati*) *nirvāṇa*; [the one who] infinitely pleases (*prīṇayati*); [the one who,] by helping [yogins to obtain] *samādhi*, etc., lets [them] understand the ultimate truth, etc.²⁸⁸

Whatever [meaning the syllable *om* may convey], however, [it] is the 81.4 closest [and] the favorite name of the Bhagavat.²⁸⁹ For, [the Bhagavat] who is consistently held in mind with the [syllable *om*] becomes gracious. Namely, various *śrutis* [state that the syllable *om* is the name of the Bhagavat]: “*om* is space, Brahman” (BĀU 5.1.1); “[The syllable] ‘*om*’ is Brahman,” etc.²⁹⁰ Also, *smṛtis* [testify that the syllable *om* is the name of the Bhagavat]: “[The name of Brahman is traditionally known in three ways, viz.,] ‘*om*’, ‘that (*tat*)’, [and] ‘the existence (*sat*)’” (BhG 17.23);²⁹¹ “*om*, the whole (*viśvaṃ*), the pervader (*viṣṇuḥ*), . . .” (MBh 13.135.14), etc.²⁹² Since the word *om* is an *avyaya* (indeclinable), by application of as *somaḥ*, *padmam*, etc.

²⁸⁸I have introduced a few emendations in this sentence. The first is to supply *rakṣati vā* that is not found in any manuscript. The subsequent three alternative etymologies closely follow the meaning entries in Dhātupāṭha 1.631 that starts with *rakṣaṇa*, and the ablative case strongly suggests a verb that means “to protect/save.” The second emendation is *praṇidhātṛṇ* from *praṇidhātṛ*. This is adopted from the 1952 edition. The last is the reading *samsārino ni°* instead of the singular *samsārīṇan ni°*. Our author here explains what the word *om* can mean, based on the Dhātupāṭha. It may be noted that while he obviously follows the order of meanings appearing in Dhātupāṭha 1.631, he skips *kānti* and *ṭṛpti* in it (see note 287). It is conceivable that the Dhātupāṭha he knew did not have *kānti* between *gati* and *prīti* or *ṭṛpti* between *prīti* and *avagama*. Given that the words *kānti*, *prīti*, *ṭṛpti* have some overlap in the meanings, the reading of the Dhātupāṭha we have today with *kānti* and *ṭṛpti* appears secondary. Another point of interest in this sentence may be the word *nirvāṇa*. The word is used several times in our text, for example in the commentary on sūtra 1.24 (see p. 90). While the word sounds typically Buddhistic, the BhG uses the word a few times (2.72, 5.24–6, 6.15). While in the BhG itself the word is compounded with other words, such as in *brahmanirvāṇa*, Śaṅkara commenting on the BhG uses the word independently, and paraphrases it with the word *mokṣa*. The word is used a few times in the BĀUBh, too.

²⁸⁹The expression *nediṣṭham priyaṃ nāma* appears formulaic. Particularly the word *nediṣṭha* is mainly attested in Vedic literature. Although I am not certain if this expression derives from any particular text, Śaṅkara uses similar expressions in the BĀUBh (*brahmaṇo nediṣṭham abhidhānam oṃkāraḥ*) and the ChUBh (*om ity etad akṣaraṃ paramātmano bhidhānam nediṣṭham*). See the edition part for references.

²⁹⁰Note that the first quote from the BĀU is the one in whose commentary Śaṅkara uses the expression mentioned in the previous note (*brahmaṇo nediṣṭham abhidhānam oṃkāraḥ*). Note also that our author chose quotes from the Upaniṣads that explicitly mention, and identify, the syllable *om* with Brahman. The concept of Brahman has not been discussed in our text so far, but our author clearly identifies the Bhagavat/Īśvara with Brahman.

²⁹¹The whole two pādas of BhG 17.23 (*om tat sad iti nirdeśo brahmaṇas trividhaḥ smṛtaḥ*) clearly convey what our author means. Hence I have translated including the words not quoted in our text. Again, this quote shows that our author identifies the Bhagavat/Īśvara with Brahman.

²⁹²The editors of the 1952 edition refer to Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra 14 for the fragment *om viśvaṃ viṣṇuḥ*. The Viṣṇusahasranāma is a name given to MBh 13.135. However, the word *om* does not constitute the text of MBh 13.135.14. Even the critical apparatus to the Poona critical edition does not cite any manuscript of the MBh that has the word. Since the presence of *om* in the beginning makes the stanza hypermetrical, it

the statement “that which has a *kṛt* affix and ends with *m*,” the declension [of the word *om*] is suppressed.²⁹³

81.7 [Objection:] **Did the [syllable *om*] become the signifier [of Īśvara] by convention, or is [its being the signifier of Īśvara inherently] established as in the case of the lamp and light?**²⁹⁴ To elaborate: If [the word *om*] was conventionalized by the Bhagavat himself

is understandable that it tends not to be considered part of the text. (The entire stanza runs as follows: *viśvaṃ viṣṇur vaṣaṭkāro bhūtabhavyabhavatprabhuḥ | bhūtakṛd bhūtabhṛd bhāvo bhūtātmā bhūtabhāvanaḥ*.) On the other hand, it is also conceivable that the syllable *om* was included as part of the speech by Bhīṣma as he starts to recite the names; the stanza is the beginning of the Viṣṇusahasranāma proper in the sense that it starts to list names. Outside the series of stanzas, the role of *om* might not have been dissimilar to speaker indications. Because of the popularity of the Viṣṇusahasranāma among the Hindus, there are various versions independent of the whole of the MBh. They include the syllable *om* as the beginning of the stanza even though that breaks the meter. A commentary on the Viṣṇusahasranāma, ascribed to Śaṅkara (see for example Avalon 1929), also comments on the syllable *om* in the stanza. (I doubt that the author is the same person as that of the BSBh or the BhGBh. The author of the commentary refers to the Viṣṇupurāṇa, while Śaṅkara the author of the BSBh probably was aware of only one Purāṇa [see note 238 on page 137.] Also, terminology such as *śrīgītōpaniṣad* does not appear to be compatible with that of the author of the BSBh and the BhGBh, or even with the author of the YVi. Śaṅkara does not consider the BhG as an Upaniṣad. Such is the case with our author who quotes the BhG under the classification *smṛti* after quoting from Upaniṣads here.) Even though the phrase *viśvaṃ viṣṇuḥ* occurs frequently in other texts, the identification of this fragment with the Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra by the editors of the 1952 edition may be justified since the context is the syllable *om* being a name of the Bhagavat/Īśvara. This might be an indication that 1) MBh 13.135 had acquired an independent status, and that 2) *om* was considered the part of the Viṣṇusahasranāma by the time of our author. In relation to the preceding quotes and in terms of religious affiliation, it is noticeable that the author picks up this particular passage where the name Viṣṇu is explicitly mentioned.

²⁹³This sentence explains why the word *om* does not decline, citing the VMBh. It is curious that our author does not quote Pāṇini’s sūtra itself, while it should equally serve his purpose and is more authentic. The statement of the VMBh cited here is one of two alternative analyses of Pāṇini’s sūtra: *kṛṇmejantaḥ* (1.1.39). Patañjali poses a question how this sūtra should be analyzed: whether “*kṛt* affix that ends with *m* (*kṛd yo māntaḥ*)” or “[something] that has *kṛt* affix and ends with *m* (*kṛdantaṃ yan māntam*).” Patañjali certainly adopts the second analysis, but it is inexplicable why our author decided to cite the analysis, but not the sūtra.

²⁹⁴Here the author of the Bhāṣya brings up the oft-discussed question whether the connection between word and its meaning is eternal or it is an arbitrary agreed upon convention. The first attestation of this question may be sought in the VMBh where Patañjali discusses the interpretation of the very first Vārttika: *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe*. Note that Patañjali analyzes the compound *śabdārthasambandha* as a *dvandva* compound, namely *śabda*, *artha*, and *sambandha*, in the VMBh. Patañjali discusses several interpretations of the word *siddha* and the question surrounds the issue whether it means *nitya* (eternal). Despite that, Patañjali does not appear to take sides in the issue whether word (*śabda*) is eternal (*kim punar nityaḥ śabda āhosvit kāryaḥ? sañgraha etat prādhānyena pariṅgītaṃ nityo vā syāt kāryo veti | tatra uktā doṣāḥ prayojanāny api uktāni | tatra tv eṣa nirṇayo yady eva nityo ’hāpi kāryaḥ, ubhayathāpi lakṣaṇam pravartyaṃ iti*). Most later philosophers did not hesitate to take a position. First, in our context it is necessary to distinguish two problems: the permanence of *śabda* and that of the relationship (*sambandha*) between *śabda* and *artha* (meaning). Even grammarians, most prominently Bhartṛhari took the position that both *śabda* and *sambandha* are eternal. The same position was taken by the Mīmāṃsakas (JS 1.1.5 ff.). The Vaiśeṣikas for example, were not interested in the permanence of *śabda*, but they held the view that the relationship between *śabda* and *artha* is conventional

or by some others for the sake of communication, [saying] “Let this be his name,” [then,] before that [happened], since he is not to be signified by the word *om*, those [who would] place [him] in mind would not have placed him in mind by means of the word *om* [but would have had a different effect with the use of the word *om*], or, they recited [his name] by means of another name.²⁹⁵ Things could be the same today as well. What is the use of pronouncing specifically the syllable *om*? Or, also, [if that the word *om* is the signifier of the Bhagavat] is [eternally] established as in the case of the lamp and fire, in that case, too, when [the word *om*] is first heard, one would [immediately] recognize Īśvara, as in the case of [one immediately recognizes] the sun by light[, but such is not the case].²⁹⁶ In addition, convention would be pointless since the relationship [between the signifier and the to-be-signified] is fixed. Or, if convention is made as something

(*sāmayika*; VS 7.2.24 in the numbering with Candrānanda’s commentary). Perhaps the two views that represent the either side are: that of the Mīmāṃsakas who hold that *śabda* as well as its connection (*sambandha*) with its object are eternal; and that of the Buddhist relationship between *śabda* and *artha* is nothing but a convention (*saṃketa*), and there is nothing real about it. Also, some Buddhists, those who follow Dignāga, did not admit *śabda* as an independent source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The YBh itself, as seen below, takes the position that the relationship between *śabda* and *artha* is eternal, but convention (*saṃketa*) is made nonetheless. The author of the YBh discusses the nature of verbal communication in more detail in the commentary on YS 3.17. There the author of the Bhāṣya discusses that *saṃketa* is made with regard to the identification of *śabda*, the thing signified by it (*artha*), and the notion (*pratyaya*) produced by *śabda* and corresponding to the thing signified by *śabda*. He further says *saṃketa* is superimposition (*adhyāsa*) between *śabda*, *artha* and *pratyaya*. These issues are presupposed by our author in the discussions below.

²⁹⁵Note that *na praṇyadhīṣata*, translated here as “would not have placed him in mind” is a result of emendation. It is a little surprising that the editors of the 1952 edition, who usually correct unintelligible text (silently), left the reading *praṇyadhīṣata* in M, their main source, untouched. Since the most authentic manuscript, L, (readings from T manuscripts are not available here) reads *praṇyadhīṣata*, it is obvious there is a corruption. Hence it is natural to correct it to *praṇyadhīṣata*. I have, however, introduced the negative particle *na* as well, because in the immediately preceding phrase it has been postulated that the syllable *om* was not the signifier of the Bhagavat. (That phrase, too, in fact is a result of an emendation adopted from the 1952 edition.) Even with the emendations, the sentence appears slightly illogical. Especially, saying that “those who do *praṇidhā-* would not have done *praṇidhā-* (*praṇidhātāraḥ na praṇyadhīṣata*)” appears self-contradictory. However, since having the main verb *praṇyadhīṣata* negated is less illogical, I have introduced the emendation. With this emendation, we can interpret that part of the sentence, which states one of two possible consequences of the word *om* not being the signifier of the Bhagavat, as to mean that the word *om* may have had other significances. This interpretation forms a coherent pair with the other alternative that the Bhagavat may have been called with some other name. I have supplied this interpretation in the bracket in the translation. We might speculate that this perceived illogicalness led to the corruption of the text. Another possible, but less likely, emendation is to read *omśabdena vinā* instead of *omśabdena vā*. In that case, the part may be translated as “without the word *om*, those [who would] place [him] in mind could not have placed him in mind.”

²⁹⁶This objection, based on the fact that we do not understand a meaning when we first hear a word is the main argument against the view that the relationship between word and meaning is eternal in the ŚBh: *yadi pratyāyakaḥ śabdaḥ, prathamaśrutaḥ kiṃ na pratyāyayati? . . . yadi prathamaśruto na pratyāyayati, kṛtakas tarhi śabdasya arthena sambandhaḥ* (Frauwallner 1968: 36).

new, the aforementioned fault [with regard to before the convention was made] would apply—thus one may think.

- 81,13 [Answer:] We answer: **The relationship between him [Īśvara,] the to-be-signified, and the signifier is [inherently] fixed**, regardless of whether word (*śabda*) is eternal or not.²⁹⁷ **Convention, on the other hand, set exactly that fixed relationship alight.**²⁹⁸
- 82,1 [Objection:] Has it not been stated that if [the relationship] is fixed, [people] should understand him even when they hear [the word *om*] for the first time?
- 82,2 [Answer:] That is not correct.²⁹⁹ For, the relationship between word and meaning as that informs and that is informed³⁰⁰ is not grasped by

²⁹⁷It is interesting that our author does not take side in the issue whether *śabda* is eternal or not. The author of the YBh, too, does not clearly state which position he takes in the following, or in YBh 3.17, where his view on language is elaborated. Perhaps our author clarifies the position of the YBh: it does not participate in the discussion on the permanence of *śabda*. This might be comparable to the position expressed in the VMBh (see note 295). Also, when read as one sentence, this sentence echoes a sentence in the ŚBh 1.1.5: *naiva śabdasya arthenāsti sambandhaḥ, kuto 'sya pauruṣeyatā apauruṣeyatā vā iti* (Frauwallner 1968: 36).

²⁹⁸Note that I have marked the text *saṃketas tu tam evāvajjalayati* as the text of the Bhāṣya. Maas (2006: 43) adopts the reading *saṃketas tu tam evārthaṃ jvalayati*. Aside from the confirmation that the verb in this sentence was originally *jvalayati* or some derivative, it is significant that many manuscripts of the YBh read *artham* as adopted by Maas. (Many manuscripts also read *sthitam* in this sentence as well, and the word also exists in our text. I did not mark the word, although present in our text, as part of the Bhāṣya because the text is most smoothly read when we consider *sthitam sambandham* as the gloss for *tam eva* (exactly that), by referring to the previous sentence.) I think the reading *artham* (along with the word *sthitam*) in the Bhāṣya are corruptions, most likely as a result of interpolation. Obviously our author did not find that word in his text of the YBh; otherwise, he would not have glossed *tam eva* with incompatible *sthitam sambandham*. That interpretation is in fact the most natural one (to interpret a masculine singular pronoun with the particle *eva* (the same) attached as referring to the masculine singular noun that has just appeared in the previous sentence) for the text he had. Now we have two texts: the one that lacks the word *artham* but allows a natural interpretation; and the one that has the word, which in comparison to the other, requires a forced interpretation. That reading also contradicts the immediately following sentence of the Bhāṣya itself. The sentence refers to the fixed *sambandha* between the father and the son revealed by *saṃketa*. The author of the YBh clearly means that *sambandha* is revealed by *saṃketa*.

²⁹⁹I have emended from one *na* recorded in manuscripts and adopted the reading in the 1952 edition with two *nas*. If left without emendation, the text would have a sentence that has the particle *hi* in the beginning without anything to support (as a reason or as an elaboration) before it. Either to state a reason or to elaborate, the particle *hi* is placed in the beginning of a sentence that supports what has just been stated. Our author is consistent in the use of the particle in that he almost always starts to answer to an objection by giving a short answer, followed by a sentence that has *hi* as the second part. Here it is possible that even a longer text, such as *naīṣa doṣaḥ*, was lost. However, supplying just one more *na* is enough for the text to conform to the style; perhaps a simple haplography or false conjecture by a scribe that a repetition of *na* was a result of dittography.

³⁰⁰To define the relationship between *śabda* and *artha* as that between *pratyāyaka* (informer) and *pratyāyaka* (to be informed) is typical of the Mīmāṃsakas. Śābara defines the *sambandha* as that between *pratyāyaka* and *pratyāyaka*, characterized as the referrer and the referent (*pratyāyasya pratyāyakasya ca yaḥ saṃjñāsamjñīlakṣaṇaḥ sambandhas* (Frauwallner 1968: 36)).

the sense faculty even though it is fixed, [un]like [the relationship] between a sense faculty and [its] object [is grasped by the sense faculty]. For, the potential of the to-be-signified and that of the signifier³⁰¹ are not

³⁰¹The compound *vācyavācakaśaktī* (dual) is an interesting one. The most natural analysis of this compound is that it consists of *vācyaśakti* and *vācakaśakti*. The second concept, the ability (*śakti*) of the signifier (*vācaka*), the speech, is a familiar and intuitive one. However, the first concept, the potential of to-be-signified (*vācyaśakti*), appears peculiar and difficult to comprehend. Yet the terminology does appear to have some backgrounds. For example, the same compound *vācyavācakaśaktī* is used in the Bhāṣya below as part of a compound (*vācyavācakaśaktiyapekṣaḥ saṅketah*), but there is no further discussion on it in the YBh, even when the nature of language is the main topic in YBh 3.17. Kumārila, whose ŚV may have been the inspiration for the YVi's discussion below (note that our author quotes stanzas from the ŚV in the commentary on YS 3.17) gives some insight into what sort of discussions were behind the dual compound *vācyavācakaśaktī*. He uses the expression *vācyavācakaśaktikau* in ŚV Sambandhākṣepa k. 24ab: *tena nūnam imau siddhau vācyavācakaśaktikau* (Citrākṣepa k. 39 in the edition with Uṃveka's commentary; Sucaritamiśra has a different reading for the two pādas: *tena nūnam imau loke siddhau vācakaśaktikau*). While commentators do not elaborate on this (only Uṃveka paraphrases *-śakti* as *-bhāva*; this interpretation is in fact in line with the concept of *śakti* in Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika or Sāṃkhya), Kumārila's discussion in the Pratyakṣasūtra further informs us of what might have been the theory behind the compound *vācyavācakaśaktikau*. There, while refuting the view that *pratyakṣa* is without conceptualization (*nirvikalpaka*), Kumārila examines the position that the notion of a class (*jāti*), etc., is faulty when the class, etc., are identified with a word (k. 171). The following discussion surrounds the opponent's view that a cognition accompanied by a concept is nothing but a superimposition of word on an object, and therefore faulty. Here Kumārila introduces several issues, such as whether concepts are inseparable from word; whether expressing something by word (superimposing word on something) means departure from the reality. When addressing the problem that one would not have a concept of a class, such as the cow, before learning the word "cow" (kk. 173–4), he states that just like shape, etc., of something are cognized even before learning words to express them, being able to be named is simply an additional quality (k. 175: *yathā rūpādayo bhīnnāḥ prak śabdāt svātmanaiva tu | gamyante tadvad evaitat samjñitvaṃ kevalaṃ param*||). Here we observe that Kumārila was thinking that things have a property to be named. Since the issue is before learning the word to express something, this property should exist in the thing in the form of potential. Also later in the discussion when Kumārila points out the absurdity of the position that superimposing word has no basis in the reality, he mentions that a *vācaka* is a *vācaka*, being dependent on its *vācya* (kk. 192cd–193: *... kathaṃ ca mūrthārtho vācaka mūrthivarjite | gavāśvaśuklaśabdāder vācyarūpānapekṣaṇe | vācakatvavyavasthāṃ kathaṃ jātiguṇādīṣu*||). Here, again, some potential on the side of *vācya* is presupposed. In a broader context, Kumārila is consistent in maintaining that a cognition involves potentials of both the faculty and its object (k. 168: *tasmā jñānānusāreṇa vyavasthāsaṅkarau kvacit | grāhyagrāhakaśaktibhyaḥ kāryadvāreṇa kalpitau*||). Furthermore, when Sucaritamiśra comments on Sambandhākṣepa kk. 14–15, he lists positions of Kumārila with regard to *sambandha*. Among them is a half śloka, *vācyavācakaśaktiyoś ca niyamaḥ phalalakṣaṇaḥ*, which cannot be traced in the ŚV (the Bṛhaṭṭikā?). It is therefore possible that Kumārila had further discussion on *vācyaśakti* and *vācakaśakti* somewhere. We may consider that behind the dual compound *vācyavācakaśaktī* in our text, such discussions are presupposed. Thus following the context of ŚV Pratyakṣasūtra, the "potential of the to-be-signified" is the potential of something being referred to in various ways, such as an object with dewlap, etc., being called an animal or a cow or spotted, etc. It is conceivable that, even though I have not found many instances of such discussions, it was a widely discussed topic, evidenced by the casual use of the compound *vācyavācakaśaktiyapekṣā* in the YBh.

[directly] perceived. For the same reason³⁰² [that the potential of the to-be-signified and that of the signifier are not directly perceived], one asserts that the meaning is inferred from word; that is not correct;³⁰³ for, the relationship [between *śabda* and *artha* as the *liṅga* and the property to be inferred] is not grasped;³⁰⁴ for, also, the relationship [between *śabda* and *artha* that one might consider to be the *liṅga* and the property to be inferred] is to be revealed by the use by others.³⁰⁵ Because, inference does no presuppose the use of others[, i.e., one can observe the relationship between the inference marker and the property to be proven by oneself].

³⁰²Here our author starts a small digression to examine the theory that comprehending meaning from word is an inference. This is a well-known position by those who do not accept *śabda* as an independent *pramāṇa*, such as Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika. Kumāṛila, for example, criticizes that position in ŚV Śābdapariccheda kk. 1ff. Our author, too, refers to such a view briefly in the commentary on YS 1.7 when he deals with the *pramāṇa*, *āgama* (p. 30 in the 1952 edition).

³⁰³I have adopted the emendation, *iti, tan na*, similar to that in the 1952 edition, *yenocyate . . . iti, tad asat*. The reading recorded in the manuscripts *yenocyate . . . iti, tadasambandhāgrahaṇāt* is incomprehensible. Since the following argument, particularly the sentence *na hy anumānam paraprāyogam apekṣate*, is against the view that meaning is inferred from word, it is appropriate that the view has been already negated before stating any reason. Slightly awkward in the emendation is that the referents of the relative pronoun *yena* (apparently a masculine singular, referring to a person) and its correlative *tat* (neuter singular) do not grammatically correspond. When an opposing view is introduced with a relative pronoun such as *yena* or *yasya*, one usually expects the view is refuted in the form of *sa vaktavyah* or something similar. Confusing is that such a syntax is found twice in the following discussions. Nonetheless, I consider the word *tat* corresponding to the content of a quote introduced by a relative pronoun that is not strictly in the same gender is still inside the acceptable use. I have favored a smaller emendation compared to that of the 1952 edition. The corruption from *tan na sa°* to *tad asa°* is more likely to occur than from *tad asat sa°*.

³⁰⁴By the expression *sambandhāgrahaṇāt* I understand that the author here means that the relationship between word and meaning is not observed from themselves in the same manner it is observed in the case of inference; for example in the case of smoke and fire, or in the case of reaching somewhere and moving. The use of the expression *sambandhāgrahaṇāt* is a little confusing because the same reason is used by the *siddhāntin* to explain why one does not understand the meaning when the person hears a new word. Perhaps this is intentional to illustrate that the holder of the view that the understanding of the meaning from word is an inference has gone too far. In our discussion the antagonist came up with the view because of the fact that the potentials of the to-be-signified and the signifier are not grasped by perception. But our author has mentioned that fact to explain why the relationship between word and the meaning is not perceived. I think the author is presenting the view that the same reason that the relationship between word and the meaning is not perceived serves in explaining both why we do not understand the meaning from the first hearing of a word and when we understand it, why it is not an inference.

³⁰⁵This is probably an allusion to the well-known concept of *vṛddhavyavahāra* (the use by adults) with which the process of a child learning language is explained. For example, Śābara brings up the topic when defending the thesis (similar to here, but in a slightly different context) that there is no person who fixed the relationship between word and the meaning (Frauwallner 1968:46). He uses our experience that children naturally understand the meaning by observing the use of adults to deduce that things must have been the same since the beginning-less time; and hence there was no one person who bound word with the meaning. In our case here, the author brings up the concept in order to illustrate that the process of conceiving a meaning does not qualify as inference.

[The same opponent] might say, [Objection]: “the meaning is inferred 82.5 from the inferred relationship.” He should be asked, “How was the relationship between word and meaning inferred?” He may [then] answer, “Because we see the effect [that we comprehend the meaning from word]. That is, having comprehended the meaning, one would later infer³⁰⁶ the relationship between the [word and the meaning]; in the same way as having perceived the shape/color, [one infers] the relationship of the visual faculty [with the shape/color].”

Here is [our] answer to him: It is then established that without in- 82.8 ference [one] comprehends [meaning] only from the word. If one has accomplished the purpose by cooking with a frying pan, what purpose does cooking by a pot serve?³⁰⁷ [Therefore, if it is necessary to infer the *sambandha* between *śabda* and *artha* in order to establish that *artha* is

³⁰⁶The verb I have adopted in the text here is *anumimāta*, 3rd person singular, present optative, from the root *anu-mā-* (3rd class, *anumimāte*). While the form is the reading in L (this portion is missing in T) and preserved in the M manuscript, which was the basis of the 1952 edition, the editors of the 1952 edition adopted *anuminoti*, 3rd person singular present indicative from the root *anu-mi-* (5th class). This is an interesting (but unnecessary) emendation. One might think that since the most natural etymology for the word *anumāna* is that it derived from the verb *anu-mā-*, we should in principle encounter inflections of the verb. However, the use of the verb *anu-mi-* (*anuminoti*) is found far more often than that of the verb *anu-mā-*. The word *anumāna* has, among others, a synonym *anumiti*, which may be seen as a derivation from the verb *anu-mi-* rather than *anu-mā-*. This is a result of the confusion between the roots *mi-* and *mā-*. See Gonda (1936: 171–2), Mayrhofer (1963: 636–7, 638). Reflecting the possible historical development, I observe that the use of the verb *anu-mā-* is distributed toward the earlier works, while the verb *anu-mi-* is widely used by later authors. (The same generally applies to other verbs, such as *pra-mā-/mi-*, *upa-mā-/mi-*, but not with *nir-mi-*.) For example, the VMBh uses only *anu-mā-*; the verb *anu-mi-* is not used there. The same applies for the ŚBh. In later works it becomes harder to find the use of the verb *anu-mā-*. Still, some authors preferred the verb *anu-mā-* even after the use of the verb *anu-mi-* had become widespread; for example, Vācaspatimīśra appears to use the verb *anu-mā-* exclusively. Thus the choice between *anu-mā-* and *anu-mi-* may be considered an authorial style, given that few authors appear to have mixed the use of those verbs. Similar observations are possible for the verbs *pra-mā-/pra-mi-*, and to a lesser extent for the verb pair *nir-mā-/nir-mi-* (the verb *nir-mi-* is used in a specific sense in Buddhist literature). Thus it is noteworthy that our author uses the verb *anu-mā* here. Śāṅkara does not use any verbal form of *anu-/nir-/pra-mi-* in the BSBh. There are some uses of those verbal forms in some commentaries on Upaniṣads; however, without any critical edition, given a case like ours where editors silently emended *-mimāta* to *-minoti*, it is hard to be certain if those verbal forms are authorial. As far as the BSBh is concerned, we may consider that Śāṅkara favored the verbal root *mā-*. It is not even certain if he considered the verb *mi-* was synonymous to *mā-*. Except one suspicious case (a compound *pramāṇaprameyapramāṭṭipramitiṣv* in BSBh 2.2.33) the BSBh uses none of *anumiti*, *pramiti*, or *nirmiti*, either. The author of the YVi shares the same style in this regard. It is also noteworthy that the author of the Upad uses the word *anumiti* twice (Gadya 15.54; 19.133).

³⁰⁷I have emended the readings *grāṣṭra* and *kilośa* found in L, M, A manuscripts and the 1952 edition to *bhrāṣṭra* and *kalaśi*. T manuscript do not offer readings for this part. I am not very certain if these emendations are fully justified. Note that the corruption from *bhrāṣṭra* to *grāṣṭra* is unlikely in the Malayalam script. On the other hand, such a corruption can easily happen when the exemplar is in Devanagari script. Also, the corruption from *kilaśi* to *kilośi* is also quite unlikely in the Malayalam script because it requires addition of two signs. It is also puzzling that none of the copyists of M and A manuscripts or the editors of the 1952 edition found these readings odd,

understood from *śabda* by inference, based on the fact that we understand *artha* from *śabda*, we can simply say *artha* is understood from *śabda*.]

82,10 [Objection:] Then, the relationship [between a word and a meaning] is recognized through observing the use [of the word] repeatedly, in the same way as [the relationship] between fire and smoke [is recognized through repeatedly observing that smoke always accompanies fire; and therefore the acquisition of the meaning from word is inference].³⁰⁸—If [the opponent says thus] then our answer is “no.” For, the relationship between *śabda* and the meaning is, even if [one observes] the use one thousand times, not grasped by perception; [un]like the relationship between fire and smoke is grasped even when [they are observed] for the first time. This same principle applies also to the utterance.³⁰⁹

82,13 Therefore, **convention illuminates** the firmly established relationship between Īśvara, the to-be-signified, and the signifier, Praṇava, **in the same way as [convention illuminates] the established [relationship] between the father and a son.** Since [the understanding of the relationship] presupposes a method, viz., convention, the meaning is not understood at the first hearing [of a word]; in the same way as the faculty of vision [does not see] when there is no light.³¹⁰

82,16 [Objection:] If one holds the view that *śabda* is not permanent, how could the relationship be permanent when the participant in the relationship is not permanent? For, the relationship between impermanent rope and pot would not be permanent.

82,18 We answer: Even when the participants in relationships are impermanent, the relationship of action and constituents in the action is established between the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the object of knowledge (*prameya*), or between the sense faculty and their object; likewise, in this case [of between *śabda* and meaning], too, the relationship [is stable] without deviation.

83,1 **At the beginnings of world creations, too, the convention**

judging from the fact that the readings *grāṣṭra* and *kilōśi* are preserved in all of them. Nonetheless, since I do not find any attestation of the words *grāṣṭra* and *kilośa*, some emendations are probably necessary. The words *bhrāṣṭra* and *kalaśi* appear to fit in the context.

³⁰⁸Note that the focus of the dialogue has returned to how the relationship between *śabda* and meaning as *liṅga* and the property to be inferred is obtained. Specifically the opponent is answering the criticism from the proponent, *sambandhāgrahaṇāt* translated at the end of the fourth paragraph above. The proponent’s reasoning was that the acquisition of the meaning from word is not inference because we do not directly perceive the relationship between them, but it is revealed (*vyaṅgya*) by the use of others. Now the opponent is answering that we do cognize it that way. The keyword here is the use of the word *grhyate* instead of *vyaṅgyatvāt*.

³⁰⁹Note that the reading *vākye ’py ayam eva nyāyaha* involves an emendation. Since the result of the emendation still makes a very terse sentence that demands much interpretation, it is possible that the corruption was a loss of more significant portion. As it stands, I understand that the author is extending the argument against the view that meaning is inferred from speech over to the sentence, not just words.

³¹⁰A contextually similar argument to explain why we do not acquire a meaning when we hear a word for the first time appears in the ŚBh (see the edition for the exact quote).

that presupposes the potential of the to-be-signified and that of the signifier—exactly the same way as the contact³¹¹ between the shape/color and the faculty to see [is materialized] at the beginning of a world creation, only presupposing the capability of the to-be-grasped and that of the grasper, in this case [of between word and meaning], too, the convention, only presupposing the capability of the to-be-signified and that of the signifier³¹²—is created.

“In³¹³ the form of the consistent agreement [among the users 83.3 of speech]—precisely as a series of elders, the relationship³¹⁴ between

³¹¹Note that the word *saṃsargaḥ* here is a result of emendation. All the manuscripts have the unintelligible reading *sargaḥ* at this position. The word *saṃsarga* typically appears in discussions on the mechanism of perception. It is conceivable that this word becomes corrupted to *sargaḥ* by the influence of the preceding word, *sargādau*.

³¹²On the potentials of the the to-be-signified and that of signifier, see note 301 above.

³¹³This paragraph, already at the level of the YBh, most likely refers to the part of the Vṛttikāra’s discussion on the origin, viz., no human involvement (*apauruṣeya*), of the relationship between word and meaning in the ŚBh (Frauwallner 1968: 42–44). The terminology *āgamin* in the YBh and its paraphrase *vedavādin* in the YVi suggest that their authors were referring to the Mīmāṃsakas (although I do not consider the concept of the Mīmāṃsakas was not exactly the same as we have today; see the note on the word *vedavādin*, n. 316). Also, the phrase *śabdārthayoḥ . . . nityaḥ* (for which word should be supplied in place of dots, see note 314) also strongly resonates with the famous part of JS 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ* on which the ŚBh has a long discussion. There the relevant argument may be summarized as: there is no creator of the relationship between word and meaning because he cannot be recalled (*≈ tasmād asmaraṇād avagacchāmaḥ* “na kṛtvā sambandhaṃ vyvahārthaṃ kenacid vedāḥ praṇītāḥ” *iti*). One of the arguments runs as thus: *yadi hi puruṣaḥ kṛtvā sambandhaṃ vyvahārayet, vyvahārakāle ’vaśyaṃ smartavyo bhavet| sampratipattau hi kartṛvyavahartror arthaḥ sidhyati, na vipratipattau* | (If a person, having made the relationship [between word and meaning], communicated, it would necessarily follow that, at the time of communication, he is remembered. For, the meaning establishes [itself] when the creator and the user agree; not when they disagree.) This argument can easily be construed to mean as the following: we successfully communicate; this means that we have an agreement with regard to which word means what; however, we do not remember the person who proposed the association; if the association has been proposed by someone, we should recall who did it; accordingly, there is no one who proposed the association. Perhaps more relevant passage is the explanation given by the Vṛttikāra why we do not understand the meaning if the relationship between word and meaning is “not made (*akṛtaka*),” namely inherent (Frauwallner 1968: 44–46). The answer is that no beginning is conceived in the process of children learning word-meanings by observing adults (*vṛddhas*) who, as children, learned them the same way; thus there is no necessity to postulate the existence of someone who created the relationship; it is either nobody made the connection or someone (merely) set the relationship in motion. The author of the YVi perhaps understood the passage of the YBh under discussion to be referring to this part of argument since he paraphrases the word *sampratipattinīyatayā* with *vṛddhaparamparayāiva* (“as nothing but the series of elders”).

³¹⁴The reading *sambandho nityo* is a result of emendation. All the manuscripts, including the edition, reads *sampratipattir nityā*. This reading is hardly intelligible, even with the consideration of possible different sentence boundaries. In addition, there is no indication in the YBh manuscripts that such a reading was part of the YBh transmission (Maas 2006: 43). On the other hand, this reading is not purely accidental if it is a corruption from the reading *sambandho nityo* as the YBh manuscripts transmit; the adjective *nityā* corresponds in gender with the word *sampratipatti*. Nonetheless, since the reading *sambandho nityo* fits in the context in the YVi, I adopt the reading

word and meaning, as the to-be-understood and as the one that causes understanding,³¹⁵ **is eternal**, not the other way around.” **This is the thesis of the followers of the scripture (*āgamins*)**, i.e., those who hold the Vedas (*vedavādins*).³¹⁶ Also, [the fact that] agreement [among

here. I consider the correspondence of gender as the sign that the a scribe tried to clean up he grammar, having found the reading *sampraiṣṭi*°.

³¹⁵The Vṛttikāra defines the relationship between *śabda* and *artha* as: *pratyāyasya pratyāyakasya ca yaḥ samjñāsamjñūlakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ* (the relationship between the informed and the informant, characterized by the name and the bearer of the name) (Frauwallner 1968: 36). The expression *gamyagamakabhāvena* found here is a very close expression to this. This is another factor why I consider that the author of the YVi had the YBh with the reading *sambandho nityo*. See the note above.

³¹⁶Even though both the authors of the YBh and the YVi probably had the ŚBh in mind in this discussion, I am reluctant to declare the word *vedavādin* here is completely exchangeable with the word “*mīmāṃsaka*” in the sense we use today; there might not have been a strict distinction between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins. The word is used to refer to both what we may call the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins in various texts. Śāṅkara uses the word *vedavādin* in BSBh 2.1.17: *ayaṃ tu paramāṇukāraṇavādo na kaiścid api śiṣṭaiḥ kenacid apy aṃśena parigrhīta ity atyantam evānādarāṇīyo vedavādidbhiḥ* (This view that the cause [of the universe] is the atoms is not accepted by any learned person in any part of it; thus [the view] is not at all to be held by the *vedavādins*). Here three things can be noted. The first is that Śāṅkara uses the word *vedavādin* to refer to his position. That is, the views Śāṅkara expounds in the BSBh belongs to the *vedavādins*, according to him. The second point we may note is that the word *vedavādin* is used in the sense of those who hold the Vedas in general. This derives from the fact that the word *vedavādin* is used alongside a similar word *vedavid* in the immediately preceding sentence: *pradhānakāraṇavādo vedavidbhir api kaiścin manvādidbhiḥ satkāryatvādyaṃśopajīvanābhīprāyeṇopanibaddhaḥ* (The view that *pradhāna* is the cause [of the universe] is adopted even by some of those who know the Vedas, such as Manu, etc., with the intention to support [only] some part [of such a view] such as the *satkāryavāda*). Here we find the word *vedavid*. The word is more or less synonymously used with the word *śiṣṭa* in the sentence cited above, and the *veda* part of the compound is used rather in a generic sense. Thus I doubt Śāṅkara had special emphasis on certain part of the Veda, such as the Saṃhitā part or the Upaniṣads, in mind when he used the word *vedavid* or *vedavādin*. The third point we may note is that the word *vedavādin* is used in the sense of a school of thought. This is because of the fact that it is used in comparison to other schools of thought alluded in the discussion: Sāṃkhya (*pradhāna*) and Vaiśeṣika (*paramāṇu*). In the commentary on the Praśna-upaniṣad the author, who may or may not be Śāṅkara, calls his position to be of a *vedavādin*, again in contrast to the Sāṃkhyas and the *tārkikas* (6.3). In that passage *vedavādins* are identified with the *vedavid*, the word that appears in a stanza the author quotes from an unknown source. It is not clear if Śāṅkara thought his school of thought is distinguished from the Mīmāṃsakas. On the one hand, his exposition in BSBh 3.3.53 strongly suggests that he did not consider what we call the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Uttaramīmāṃsā/Vedānta/Śārirakamīmāṃsā separate schools. On the other hand, he uses the term *mīmāṃsakāḥ* in the BĀUBh (1.1.1; 2.1.20) as a school that does not share the same position as he does. Nonetheless as far as the word *vedavādin* is concerned, the distinction into the two schools is not intended; and Śāṅkara identifies himself as one.

Some other authors also use the word *vedavādin* to refer to a school of thought. Śālikanātha ascribes the view that the *sambandha* between *śabda* and *artha* is created by Īśvara to certain *vedavādins* (Prakaraṇapañcikā 7.2): *tatra śabdārthasambandhaṃ pauruṣeyaṃ pracakṣate | jagadīśvaranirmāṇaṃ vadanto vedavādinah ||*. From the phrasing (“the *vedavādins* who uphold the creation of universe by Īśvara. . .”), Śālikanātha appears to be referring to certain fraction inside a larger group, the *vedavādins*. It is conceivable that Śālikanātha considers himself to be a *vedavādin* because of the literal meaning of the word. Apparently, the view that the relationship between *śabda* and

the speakers and listeners exists] is the reason for them [to postulate] the [eternal] relationship between word and meaning.³¹⁷ This comes to mean the following: If the position of the *vedavādins* [is established], then our position³¹⁸ that the always stable relationship [between word and meaning] is revealed by convention in the same way as [the relationship] between the father and the son [is revealed by convention] [is established]. On the other hand, if the relationship between the to-be-signified and the signifier were unstable, it would not be conceivable that Īśvara turns to [the speaker] by means of muttering the Praṇava.³¹⁹ For, if the relationship between the to-be-cooked and the cooker were unstable, one would not conceive of using fire in order to cook. If, however, the relationship between the to-be-signified and the signifier is stable, it is conceivable to use the Praṇava, the means to propitiate the Bhagavat. The purpose of the whole Bhāṣya [on this sūtra] is to teach this.

artha is man-made is not compatible with his, who belongs to the Prābhākara school of the Mīmāṃsā. It is possible that Śālikanātha was referring to the group of scholars whom we may call the Vedāntins. Sucaritamīśra, a commentator on Kumāṛila's ŚV, calls his position *vedavādin* (see his commentary on ŚV Codanāsūtra kk. 94, 116, 120, 133, and 139). Kamalaśīla (on ŚRTS k. 153) introduces the view that we may consider to be Vedāntic, ascribing it to *vedavādins*. On the other hand, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla uses the word *vedavādin* to refer to those who uphold the view that there is no author of the Vedas (TSP on ŚRTS k. 2097; ŚRTS kk. 2100 and its modification spoken from the Buddhist position, 2429). This is a typical view of the school that we would call the Mīmāṃsakas. ŚRTS kk. 3153 and 3155, possibly a reproduction of Kumāṛila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā (Frauwallner 1962), uses the word *vedavādin*, referring to the position of the speaker of the verses, i.e., the position of Kumāṛila. (Śāntarakṣita rewrites stanza 3155 to suit his position in stanzas 3374 and 3376.) ŚRTS k. 3225, which also could be from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, refers to Manu, etc., as the teachers who gave instructions to *vedavādins*. Kamalaśīla glosses the word with *brāhmaṇa* or *vidvat*. Overall, the word *vedavādin* was used to refer to both what we may today call the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins. Such a use appears to gradually disappear after the time of authors mentioned in this note.

³¹⁷This is a terse statement; the author presumes the readers to understand what is being referred to. From the context in which this whole discussion is situated, I think our author is referring to the first argument by the Vṛttikāra mentioned in note 313 (*yadi hi puruṣaḥ . . .*).

³¹⁸I have emended the reading *anyapakṣaḥ* found in all the manuscripts, including the 1952 edition to *asmatpakṣaḥ*. The corruption is probably explained as due to the graphical similarity between *sma* and *nya* in the Malayalam script.

³¹⁹This alludes to YS/YBh 1.23 where Īśvara is said to help yogins who contemplate him. In its commentary our author paraphrases the word *bhaktiviśeṣād āvarjitah (iś-varaḥ)* with *anugraham praty abhimukhībhāvam āpāditah*. See also the beginning of the commentary on sūtra 1.27 where the sūtra 1.23 is referred and the word *praṇava* was etymologized as having the element of the verb *pra-ṇi-dhā-*.

Note that the reading *praṇavaḥ* is conjectural. All the manuscripts, including the edition, have *praṇavarūpeṇā°*. This is hard to construe with the rest of the sentence; and no concept as this is mentioned in our text. The concept of *praṇavaḥ* appears in the next sūtra, and in the commentary the word itself is used. I attribute the possible cause of the corruption to the relative rare use of the symbol *ja* in our text.



Commentary on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.28

How does the yogin who has understood the relationship between the signifier and the to-be-signified as taught above propitiate the supreme lord (Parameśvara)? To answer this question,³²⁰ [the author of the sūtras] states:

Its low-voice muttering; the visualization of its meaning. (YS 1.28)³²¹ 83,11

Its, i.e., Īśvara's signifier's, i.e., **Praṇava's**, which is either three-and-a-half or three moras long,³²² **low-voice muttering**, i.e., recitation in the mind [without pronouncing] or [pronouncing] secretly,³²³ is "its low-voice muttering" [in the sūtra].³²⁴ And **its meaning's**, i.e., Īśvara's—brought up by the signifier, mounted in the intellect—**visualization**, i.e.,

³²⁰While I have adopted the reading *evamavagatavācyavācakasambandhasya yoginaḥ* as the introductory phrase in the Bhāṣya known to the author of the YVi, Maas (2006: 44) adopts *viññātavācyavācakatvasya yoginaḥ*. (The readings of the YBh manuscripts reported in the apparatus appear to support it.) On the other hand, Maas (2006: 146) considers that up to *parameśvaraprasādanaṃ kathaṃ kriyate*, thus *evamavagatavācyavācakasambandhasya yoginaḥ parameśvaraprasādanaṃ kathaṃ kriyate* in its entirety, introduced the sūtra in the Bhāṣya known to the author of the YVi. I have some reservation that the author of the YVi knew that long phrase as part of the Bhāṣya. I do not, however, exclude the possibility that our text originally had *viññātavācyavācakatvasya* before *evamavagatavācyavācakasambandhasya*, as the word from the Bhāṣya and its paraphrase. Such a repetition can be easily lost during the transmission, especially by a scribe who did not understand the nature of the superficial repetition.

³²¹I think the original intention of the sūtra was for the two elements to be construed in apposition, forming a sentence, "Its low-voice muttering is the visualization of its meaning." Yet the following commentaries, especially the *vivaraṇa* demand one to read the two elements to be in apposition but as part of a longer sentence. For the text of the Bhāṣya being commented upon by the author of the *vivaraṇa*, see following notes.

³²²Usually the syllable *om* is said to have three moras. Almost the entire Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad is based on this premise. I have not found any text where the syllable *om* is said to have three-and-a-half moras. Probably the author presupposes the *pluta* form of the syllable, *o3m*.

³²³I have adopted the conjecture by the editors of the 1952 edition with only change in *sandhi*. The word *upāvartana* is not likely to be used in this context.

³²⁴I consider this sentence to explain the Bhāṣya segment *tasya praṇavasya japaḥ* as a compound analysis of the word *taj-japaḥ* in the sūtra. Note that the last word in this sentence is a result of emendation. Our manuscripts and the edition read simply *japaḥ*. This, if read continuously, appears redundant since it follows the explanation of what

realization, is “its visualization” [in the sūtra].³²⁵ The rest of the sentence “should be performed” is to be supplied.³²⁶ **The mind of the yogin who is performing this in such both ways becomes focused (*ekāgra*).**

83,15 In addition, [the author of the Bhāṣya] shows that [the mind’s] becoming focused is a result of propitiating him:³²⁷ **Namely, it is said—“By means of low-voice recitation (*svādhyāya*) [one] should establish**

japa is, which itself follows the word. It might be possible to consider to have a sentence division after the first *japaḥ* so that the explanation of what *japa* is becomes an independent sentence. However, doing so would leave the preceding appearing incomplete. Also, we see the parallel construction in the immediately following explanation of the word *tadarthabhāvanam*; the sentence concludes with the word in the sūtra itself. The loss of *tat* from the last word of this sentence may be explained as an erroneous emendation on part of a scribe who, without understanding the whole construction, thought that *tat* after *āvartana* was superfluous; *āvartana* applies only to *japa*, not “its *japa*.” The next question is whether the word *tajjapaḥ* was part of the Bhāṣya or only that of the *vivaraṇa*. I consider it to have been supplied by the author of the *vivaraṇa* to show that the part of the Bhāṣya he was commenting on was a compound analysis. It is possible to have the compound in question in the analysis itself (viz., in the Bhāṣya), but then the flow of the sentence in the Bhāṣya would be disturbed. Compare *tasya japaḥ tadarthasya bhāvanam* (my reconstruction of the Bhāṣya) with *tasya japaḥ tajjapaḥ, tadarthasya (ca) bhāvanam tadarthabhāvanam*. (See also the next note on whether the particle *ca* is part of the Bhāṣya.) In the latter reading the Bhāṣya does not reveal how the two words *tajjapaḥ* and *tadarthabhāvanam* are related in the sūtra.

³²⁵This sentence, too, poses difficulty determining what text of the Bhāṣya was being commented upon although it is clear because of the series of paraphrases that the author of the YVi was commenting on some text of the Bhāṣya. As stated in the previous note, I do not consider the particle *ca* to be part of the Bhāṣya, but rather as part of the *vivaraṇa* to connect two sentences. If it were part of the Bhāṣya, the text of the Bhāṣya would be superimposing the view that is not the most natural interpretation of the sūtra. The sūtra does not have *ca* and hence the most natural way to take it is that the two compounds *tajjapaḥ* and *tadarthabhāvanam* to be in apposition. (Cf. note 321 above.) If the Bhāṣya had *ca*, then it would be expressing *tajjapa* and *tadarthabhāvana* to be two different things. In the following text, both the Bhāṣya and the *vivaraṇa* consistently refer to the subject in neuter singular (*kartavyam, tat*), not in dual, making it hard to conceive that the Bhāṣya expressed *tajjapaḥ* and *tadarthabhāvanam* as two different things. Apparently the author of the YVi had some difficulty deciding whether they refer to the same thing or two different things. Observe *tad ubhayam* below where he stays with the neuter singular grammatically, but adds *ubhayam* to express its twofoldness.

Another concern is that the portion *vācakena samarpitasya* appears to be paraphrased by immediately following *buddhau samāropitasya*. This could imply that *vācakena samarpitasya* is part of the Bhāṣya. However, I consider its being part of the *vivaraṇa* is more likely; the Bhāṣya text would lose the force of being the analysis of the sūtra where simply the compounds are resolved and the two elements of the sūtra being in the apposition.

³²⁶According to this statement, the Bhāṣya should be read as *tasya praṇavasya japas tadarthasya bhāvanam kartavyam*. I doubt that the original nuance of both the sūtra and the Bhāṣya was as thus. Cf. note 321. The reason why the author of the *vivaraṇa* included this statement might be to make the whole sūtra and the Bhāṣya consistent with the introductory sentence just prior to the sūtra. On the introductory sentence, see note 320.

³²⁷Two emendations (*ekāgrasampattiś ca* to *ekāgrasampatteś ca* and *°phalan darśayati* to *°phalatvan darśayati*) are involved in this sentence. The manuscripts read *ekāgrasampattiś ca tadārādhanaḥ phalan darśayati*. Note that since there is no punctuation in the original Malayalam manuscripts, that the sentence starts with *ekāgra°* is also part of judgement. This, however, may be warranted because of the lack of *sandhi* between the preceding *sampadyate* and *eka°* in the Malayalam manuscripts. The so-

(*ātiṣṭheta*) yoga³²⁸—by means of low-voice recitation (*svādhyāya*), i.e., low-voice muttering (*japa*) of the Praṇava, the one who has his mind bowed to Īśvara should stabilize (*āsīta*) yoga. [That is to say,] the person should concentrate on its meaning, Īśvara.

By means of meditating on its meaning, the one with unmovable 84,1 mind should recite the recitation (*svādhyāya*), i.e., the Praṇava—that is to say, [the person] should repeatedly recite [the Praṇava] in the mind. [This segment of the stanza] teaches the repeated recitation (*abhi-japa*) in the mind—for, meditation (*dhyāna*) is closer—lest the mind be directed toward the object.³²⁹

Thus, by accomplishing the low-voice recitation and yoga³³⁰— 84,3 not being obstructed by another notion that contradicts the [notion of Īśvara] is the attainment of the low-voice recitation and yoga.

In this manner—by accomplishing the recitation of the Praṇava and 84,5 meditating on Īśvara—the supreme *ātman*, the supreme being, shines forth to the yogin.”³³¹

lution of the editors of the 1952 edition to the unintelligible sentence was to change *ekāgrasampattiś* to *ekāgrasampattim*. Although interpretable, I find this solution to be still clumsy. I have adopted emendations that make the sentence more natural.

³²⁸Although it is not apparent from the commentary, the quotation in the Bhāṣya is a śloka. This paragraph is the commentary on the first pāda.

³²⁹The last phrase here, *mā viśayapraṇacitto bhūd iti* is elliptic and demands interpretation. My understanding is that this is mentioned in order to explain why this pāda of the stanza is about ‘mental (*mānasa*)’ *abhi-japa*. The assumption might be that even the recitation of the Praṇava involves external object, viz., the sound, when the Praṇava is pronounced.

³³⁰Apparently the intention of the original stanza is that both *svādhyāya* and yoga mutually help accomplish the other, but our author interpreted the *svādhyāya* in the second pāda (*dhyānāt svādhyāyam āmanet*) as different *svādhyāya* from that in the first pāda. Here I follow what was originally meant in translating the compound *svādhyāyogasampatti*; I read *svādhyāya-yoga* in that compound as a *dvandva* compound.

³³¹One may note the seeming indifference to this very Vedāntic stanza by our author. The word used to gloss *para ātmā*, *parameṣṭhīn*, is not often used by Śaṅkara. As far as I can see, the word appears in his commentaries only when the root text has it.



Appendices



Critical Text 1.1

*

यस्मिन्न स्तः; कर्मविपाकौ यत आस्तां
 क्लेशा यस्मै नालमलंघ्या निखिलानाम् ।
 नावच्छिन्नः कालदृशा यः कलयन्त्या
 लोकेशन्तं कैटभशत्रुप्रणमामि ॥ १ ॥
 यस्सुर्व्ववित् सूर्व्वविभूतिशक्तिर्व्विहीनदोषोपहितक्रियाफलः ।
 विश्वोद्भवान्तस्थितिहेतुरीशो नमो ऽस्तु तस्मै गुरवे गुरोरपि ॥ २ ॥

1
2
3
4
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6
7

1 *]Before the beginning: [ह]रि श्रीगणपतये नमः [अविघ्न]मस्तु ॥ T_m, पतञ्जलये नमः LMA 2
 यस्मिन्न स्तः; कर्मविपाकौ यत आस्तां]LM^{pc}Aḥ, [य . . . कर्मवि(वा)]पा[कौ यत . . .] T_m, . .
 . स्तः कर्मविपाको यत आस्तां T_d, यस्मिन्नन्तः कर्मविपाकेन यत आस्तां M^{ac} 3 क्लेशा यस्मै नालमलंघ्या
 निखिलानाम्।]LMAḥ, [. . . । य ।]नाम् T_m, क्लेशा यस्मै निखिलानाम् T_d 4
 कालदृशा]LMAḥ, कालदिशा T 5 लोकेशन्तं]TL, लोकेशन्तं MAḥ 6 °दोषोपहित°]T_m^{pc}LMAḥ,
 °दोषो»प«हित° T_m, °दोषो ऽपि हि तत् T_d 6 °फलः]M(em.?)Aḥ, °फलम् TL 7 °न्त-
 स्थिति°]T_mLMAḥ, °न्तः स्थिति° T_d 7 नमो ऽस्तु]TL{नमो स्तु T_mL}A(em.?)ḥ(em.), नम स्तु
 M 7 गुरवे]T_dLMAḥ, गुरवे T_m

2–5 यस्मिन्न स्तः . . . कैटभशत्रुप्रणमामि] Cf. the salutatory stanza of the NKṇ: परामृष्टः
 क्लेशैः कथमपि न यो जातु भगवान्न धर्माधर्माभ्यां त्रिभिरपि विपाकेर्न च तयोः । परं वाचां तत्त्वं यमधिगमयत्योमिति
 पदं नमस्यामो विष्णुं तममरगुरुणामपि गुरुम् ॥ See also Parameśvara's commentaries (the Juṣa-
 dhvaṃkaraṇī and the Svaditāṃkaraṇī, especially the latter) on the NKṇ where the YVi
 is referred to (Stern 1988: 106–25). Cf. also Halbfass (1991: 207).

2–3 यस्मिन्न स्तः . . . निखिलानाम्] See YS 1.24: क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥
 Cf. ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 69–72: सर्वेषां तु फलापेतं न स्थानमुपपद्यते । न चाप्यनुपभोगो
 ऽसौ कस्यचित्कर्मणः फलम् ॥७०॥ अशेषकर्मनाशे वा पुनःसृष्टिर्न युज्यते । कर्मणां वाप्यभिव्यक्तौ किं निमित्तं तदा
 भवेत् ॥७१॥ ईश्वरेच्छा यदीष्येत सैव स्याल्लोककारणम् । ईश्वरेच्छावशित्वे हि निष्फलाकर्मकल्पना ॥७२॥ 75:
 कस्यचिद्धेतुमात्रत्वं यद्यधिष्ठातृतेष्यते । कर्मभिः सर्वजीवानां तत्सिद्धेः सिद्धसाधनम् ॥

4 नावच्छिन्नः कालदृशा यः कलयन्त्या] See YS 1.26: स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥ Cf.
 BhG 10.30b: कालः कलयतामहम् and BhGBh on it: कालः कलयतां कलनं गणनं कुर्वतामहम्.

6 यस्सुर्व्ववित् सूर्व्वविभूतिशक्तिः] See 53,9–54,3.

6 विहीनदोषोपहितक्रियाफलः] See 59,4–59,6; Cf. 67,5–67,12.

7 नमो ऽस्तु तस्मै गुरवे गुरोरपि] See YS 1.26: स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात्.

1 अथ योगानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

2 अथेत्यादि पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रम्; तस्य विवरणमारभ्यते। तत्रानाख्यातसम्बन्धप्रयोजन-
3 न्न पुरुषप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्याम्पर्याप्तोतीति सूत्रकाराभिप्रेते पुरुषप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनिमित्तभूते सम्ब-

1 अथ योगानुशासनम्] TLMA, om. ४ 2 °शास्त्र°] TLMA, °शास्त्र[सूत्रभाष्य]° ४ 2 °म्; तस्य] conj.,
om. ५ 3 °निवृत्तिनिमित्त°] conj., °निमित्त° ५ 3 °भूते] TMA ४, °भूतैः L

2 अथेत्यादि पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रम्; तस्य विवरणमारभ्यते] Cf. the openings of the BhGBh: त-
दिदं गीताशास्त्रं समस्तवेदार्थसारसंग्रहभूतं दुर्विज्ञेयार्थं तदर्थाविष्करणायानेकैर्विवृतपदपदार्थवाक्यवाक्यार्थन्यायम-
प्यत्यन्तविरुद्धानेकार्थत्वेन लौकिकैर्गृह्यमाणमुपलभ्याहं विवेकतो ऽर्थनिर्धारणार्थं संक्षेपतो विवरणं करिष्यामि। (Pa-
ṇśīkar 1978: 5-6); ChUBh: ओमित्येतदक्षरमित्याद्यष्टा(°दिरष्टा° or °द्याष्टा°?) ध्यायी द्धान्दोयोपनिषत्।
तस्याः सङ्घेपतो ऽर्थजिज्ञासुभ्यः ऋजु विवरणमल्पग्रन्थमिदमारभ्यते। (Shastri 1982: 1); BĀUBh: 'उषा
वा अश्वस्य' इत्येवमाद्या वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणोपनिषत्। तस्या इयमल्पग्रन्था वृत्तिरारभ्यते। (Shastri 1986: 1);
KeUBh: 'केनेषितमि'त्याद्योपनिषत्परब्रह्मविषया वक्तव्येति नवमस्याध्यायस्यारम्भः। (Shastri 1979: 17);
KaUBh: अथ काठकोपनिषद्ब्रह्मलीनां सुखेनार्थप्रबोधनार्थमल्पग्रन्था वृत्तिरारभ्यते। (Shastri 1979: 55); Mu-
UBh: 'ओं ब्रह्मा देवानामि'त्याद्याथर्वणोपनिषत्। (Shastri 1979: 127); MaUBh: 'ओमित्येतदक्षरमिदं
सर्वं तस्योपव्याख्यानम्' वेदान्तार्थसारसंग्रहभूतमिदं प्रकरणचतुष्टय'मोमित्येतदक्षरमि'त्याद्यारभ्यते। (Shastri
1979: 212)

3-173,1 सम्बन्धप्रयोजने प्रकटीक्रियेते] Cf. ŚV Pratijñāsūtra kk. 11-25: 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा'
सूत्रमाद्यमिदं कृतम्। धर्माख्यं विषयं वक्तुं मीमांसायाः प्रयोजनम् ॥ ११ ॥ सर्वस्यैव हि शास्त्रस्य कर्मणो वापि कस्य-
चित्। यावत् प्रयोजनं नोक्तं तावत् तत् केन गृह्यते ॥ १२ ॥ मीमांसाख्या तु विद्येयं बहुविद्यान्तराश्रिता। न शुश्रूषयितुं
शक्या प्रागनुक्ता प्रयोजनम् ॥ १३ ॥ विद्यान्तरेषु नाप्येतद्यद्यभीष्टं प्रयोजनम्। अनर्थप्रापणं तावत् तेभ्यो नाशङ्क्यते
क्वचित् ॥ १४ ॥ मीमांसायां त्विहाज्ञाते दुर्ज्ञाते वाविवेकतः। न्यायमार्गे महान् दोष इति यत्रोपचर्यता ॥ १५ ॥ तस्मा-
त्प्रयोजनं पूर्वमुक्तं सूत्रकृता स्वयम्। यत्त्वेनोक्तं वदेयुस्तद्भाष्यकारादयः कथम् ॥ १६ ॥ सिद्धार्थं ज्ञातसम्बन्धं श्रोतुं
श्रोता प्रवर्तते। शास्त्रादौ तेन वक्तव्यः सम्बन्धः सप्रयोजनः ॥ १७ ॥ शास्त्रं प्रयोजनं चैव सम्बन्धस्याश्रयावुभौ त-
दुक्त्यन्तर्गतस्माद्भिन्नो नोक्तः प्रयोजनात् ॥ १८ ॥ सिद्धिः श्रोतुप्रवृत्तीनां सम्बन्धकथनाद्यतः। तस्मात्सर्वेषु शास्त्रेषु
सम्बन्धः पूर्वमुच्यते ॥ १९ ॥ यावत्प्रयोजनेनास्य सम्बन्धो नाभिधीयते। असम्बद्धप्रलापित्वाद्भूवेत्तावदसंगतिः ॥ २० ॥
इह त्वाक्षिप्य सम्बन्धं भाष्य एवाभिधास्यते। धर्मप्रसिद्धसिद्धिभ्यां तस्मान्नान्यो ऽभिधीयते ॥ २१ ॥ न चाप्यत्राथ-
शब्देन शास्त्रसम्बन्ध उच्यते। सम्बन्धक्रिययोर्होष ब्रूते शास्त्राच्च ते पृथक् ॥ २२ ॥ यो ऽप्ययं शास्त्रसम्बन्धो वर्णयते
कैश्चिदादितः। क्रियान्तररूपो वा गुरुपूर्वक्रमो ऽपि वा ॥ २३ ॥ तदतद्भावोयस्तस्य विशेषो नोपलभ्यते। श्रोतुर्विधौ
निषेधे वा ज्ञाने वा शास्त्रगोचरे ॥ २४ ॥ तस्माद्भाष्याङ्गमिच्छद्भिः सहेतुः सप्रयोजनः। शास्त्रावतारसम्बन्धो वाच्यो
नान्यस्तु निष्फलः ॥ २५ ॥ NBh/NV 1.1.1, and the opening discussion of the VMBh. Cf. also
the introduction to the BhGBh: विशिष्टप्रयोजनसंबन्धाभिधेयवद्गीताशास्त्रं यतस्तदर्थविज्ञानेन समस्त-
पुरुषार्थसिद्धिरतस्तद्विवरणे यत्रः क्रियते मया। (Paṇśīkar 1978: 7); MaUBh 1.1: वेदान्तार्थसारसंग्रहभूत-
मिदं प्रकरणचतुष्टयमोमित्येतदक्षरमित्याद्यारभ्यते। अत एव न पृथक्सम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनानि वक्तव्यानि। यान्येव
तु वेदान्ते सम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनानि तान्येवेह भवितुमर्हन्ति। तथापि प्रकरणव्याचिख्यासुना संक्षेपतो वक्तव्यानि।
तत्र प्रयोजनवत्साधनाभिव्यञ्जकत्वेनाभिधेयसम्बद्धं शास्त्रं पारम्पर्येण विशिष्टसम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनवद्भवति। किं
पुनस्तत्प्रयोजनमित्युच्यते। रोगार्तस्येव रोगनिवृत्तौ स्वस्थता। तथा दुःखात्मकस्यात्मनो द्वैतप्रपञ्चोपशमे स्वस्थता
अद्वैतभावः प्रयोजनम्। (Shastri 1979: 212-3); KaUBh 1.1.1: प्रयोजनं चास्या उपनिषद आत्यन्तिकी
संसारनिवृत्तिर्ब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणा। सम्बन्धश्चैवभूतप्रयोजनेनोक्तः। (Shastri 1979: 58); and MuUBh 1.1.1.
Cf. also the beginning of the VMBh where the purpose (*prayojana*) of the *śābdānu-
śāsana* and the relationship between the speech (*śabda*) and the meaning (*artha*) are
discussed in succession.

1 अथ योगानुशासनम् ॥

न्धप्रयोजने पूर्वम्प्रकटीक्रियेते ॥

तत्र प्रयोजनन्तावत्—

चिकित्साशास्त्र इव तच्चतुर्व्यूहत्वप्रदर्शनद्वारेण व्याख्यातम् । तद्यथा चिकित्साशास्त्र-
तुर्व्यूहम्—रोगो रोगहेतुरारोग्यम्भैषज्यमिति—विधिप्रतिषेधनियमद्वारेण चतुर्व्यूहविषयव्या-
ख्यानपरम् । एवमिहापि 'परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्व्वं विवे-
किन' इत्यारभ्य चतुर्व्यूहत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम् । तद्यथा—दुःखप्रचुरः संसारो हेयः; तस्या-
विद्यानिमित्तो द्रष्टृदृश्यसंयोगो हेतुः; विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः; विवेकख्यातौ च स-
त्यामविद्यानिवृत्तिः, तन्निवृत्तावात्यन्तिको द्रष्टृदृश्यसंयोगोपरमो हानम्; तदेव कैवल्यमिति ।
आरोग्यस्थानीयकैवल्यप्रयुक्तत्वादस्य तदेव कैवल्यम्प्रयोजनम् ॥

ननु च हेयतद्धेतू न प्रस्तोतव्यौ, निष्प्रयोजनत्वात् । हानप्रयुक्तं हि शास्त्रम् । तदुपायभूता
विवेकख्यातिरेव वक्तव्या । न हि कण्टकविद्धचरणतलस्य तदपनयनम्मुक्त्वा दुःखतद्धेतू चोद्येते ॥

नैतदेवम् । हेयतत्कारणापेक्षत्वाद्धानोपायस्य । यावदिदमनेनोपायेन हातव्यं संसारचक्रम्,
अस्य चाविद्यानिमित्तो द्रष्टृदृश्यसंयोगो हेतुरिति नाख्यायते, तावन्नाविद्याप्रतिपक्षभूता विवेक-

3 °शास्त्र इव तच्चतुर्व्यूहत्व°]em., °शास्त्रेवतच्चतुर्व्यूहत्व° T_mL, °शास्त्रवत्तच्चतुर्व्यूहत्व° T_d, °शास्त्रे तच्च-
तुर्व्यूहश्च MA, °शास्त्रे तच्चतुर्व्यूहत्व° ४ 3 °द्वारेण]T४, °चारेण LMA 4 °नियमद्वारेण]em., °नि-
यमचारेण TLMA, °नियमद्वारेण [च तत्] ४(conj.) 4 °विषय°]T_dLMA४, °विषया° T_m 5
एवमिहापि]TMA४, एवमिहापि L 5 °संस्कारदुःखै°]TLM^{pc}A४, °दुःखसंस्कारै° M^{ac} 6 °प्रचुरः
संसारो]M(em.)A४, °प्रचुरसंसारो TL 7 °दृश्य°]TMA४, °दृश्यं L 9 °प्रयुक्तत्वा°]T_dLM४, °प्रयुक्तत्वा°
T_m, °प्रयुक्तत्वा° A 10 प्रस्तोतव्यौ]TL^{pc}, प्रस्तोतव्येन L^{ac}MA, प्रस्तोतव्ये ४ 11 तदपनयन°]TLM^{pc}-
४, तदुपनयन° M^{ac}A 11 °तद्धेतू]TLM^{pc}A४, °तद्धेतु M^{ac} 13 °निमित्तो]LMA४, °निमित्तो T_m,
°निमित्तौ T_d

3-4 चिकित्साशास्त्र-चतुर्व्यूहम्—रोगो रोगहेतुरारोग्यम्भैषज्यमिति] YBh 2.15.

5-6 'परिणामः... विवेकिन'] YS 2.15. See also Wezler (1984b).

6-8 दुःखप्रचुरः संसारो... तद्दुःखैः कैवल्यम्] Cf. YBh 2.15: तत्र दुःखबहुलः संसारोहेयः । प्रधानपुरुष-
योः संयोगो हेयहेतुः । संयोगस्यात्यन्तिको निवृत्तिर्हानम् । हानोपायः सम्यग्दर्शनम् । Cf. also NBh 1.1.1: हेयम्,
तस्य निर्वर्तकम्, हानमात्यन्तिकम्, तस्योपायो ऽधिगन्तव्य इत्येतानि चत्वार्यर्थपदानि सम्यग्बुद्ध्या निःश्रेयसमधि-
गच्छति । (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985: 33); NV 1.1.1: हेयहानोपायाधिगन्तव्यभेदाच्चत्वा-
र्यर्थपदानिति । हेयं दुःखं तद्धेतुश्च । दुःखमुक्तं । हेतुरविद्यातुष्णे धर्माधर्माविति । हानं तत्त्वज्ञानम् । तत् पुनर्यथाथाव-
स्थितपदार्थाधिगतिस्तच्च प्रमाणम् । उपायः शास्त्रं तदप्युक्तम् । अधिगन्तव्यो ऽपवर्गः स पुनरात्यन्तिको दुःखाभावः ।
(Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985: 11-2).

6 दुःखप्रचुरः संसारो हेयः] Cf. YS 2.16: हेयं दुःखमनागतम् ॥

6-7 तस्या... संयोगो हेतुः] Cf. YS 2.17: द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥

7 विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः] Cf. YS 2.26: विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥

8 तन्निवृत्तावात्यन्तिको द्रष्टृदृश्यसंयोगोपरमो हानम्; तदेव कैवल्यमिति ।] Cf. YS 2.25: तदभावात्सं-
योगाभावो हानम्, तद्दुःखैः कैवल्यम् ॥

11 न हि कण्टकविद्धः... चोद्येते] Cf. BĀUBh 4.3.7: कण्टकविद्धस्य हि कण्टकवेधज-
नितदुःखनिवृत्तिः फलं, न तु कण्टकविद्धमरणे तद्दुःखनिवृत्तिफलस्याश्रय उपपद्यते!; NV 1.1.1: श्रेयः
पुनः सुखमहितनिवृत्तिश्च, तच्छ्रेयो भिद्यमानं द्वेषा व्यवतिष्ठते दृष्टादृष्टभेदेन । दृष्टं सुखमदृष्टमहितनिवृत्तिः ।
अहितनिवृत्तिरप्यात्यन्तिकी अनात्यन्तिकी च । अनात्यन्तिकी, कण्टकादेर्दुःखाधनस्य परिहारेण । आत्यन्तिकी
पुनरेकविंशतिप्रभेदभिन्नदुःखहान्या । (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985: 5-6).

- 1 ख्यातिराख्यातुं शक्यते। हेयतद्धेतुमतो ऽपि हानोपायात्थिनो रोगिणो भैषज्यात्थित्वदर्शनात्।
 2 न हि रोगं रोगहेतुञ्चानपेक्ष्य चिकित्साशास्त्रमुपदिश्यते ॥
 3 सम्बन्धो ऽपि—
 4 विवेकख्यातेर्हानमेव फलं साध्यम्, हानस्यापि विवेकख्यातिरेव साधनमिति साध्यसाधन-
 5 योरितरेतरनियम एव, नान्यः सम्बन्धः। तद्यथा—भैषज्यस्यारोग्यमेव फलम्, आरोग्यस्यापि
 6 भैषज्यमेव साधनमितीतरेतरनियमः। स च शास्त्रादिति ॥
 7 तस्मात्सत्सम्बन्धप्रयोजनं योगानुशासनम् ॥
 8 ननु च यदि हानम्प्रयोजनम्, तदुपायश्च विवेकख्यातिरिति, तत्र वक्तव्यम'थ विवेकख्या-
 9 त्यनुशासनमि'ति। किमर्थम'थ योगानुशासनमि'ति सूत्रितम्?
 10 तदुपायत्वाद्योगस्य। उपाय एव वक्तव्य स्यात्—उपेयप्रदर्शने ह्युपेयमुपायम्प्रति साकांक्ष-
 11 मेवेत्युपायः सांगकलापः पुनरपि वक्तव्य स्यात्। तस्मिंस्त्वभिहिते सर्व्वमभिहितमिति ॥
 12 कथन्तदुपायत्वम्?
 13 यत आह सूत्रकारः—'योगांगानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिरा विवेकख्यातेः'; 'निर्व्विचा-
 14 रवैशारद्ये ऽध्यात्मप्रसादः'; 'ऋतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञे'ति च। तथा भाष्यकारो ऽप्याह—'यस्त्वेका-
 15 ग्रे चेतसि स भूतमर्थम्प्रद्योतयती'ति। भूतात्थावगतिश्च विवेकख्यातिः। तस्माद्युक्तन्तदुपाय-
 16 योगानुशासनमेवादी, सूत्रितमिति ॥
 17 ननु च योगांगानुष्ठानाद्विवेकख्यातिः। तत्र वक्तव्यम'थ योगांगानुशासनमि'ति ॥
 18 न। फलेनोपक्रमात्। योगांगानुष्ठानस्य हि फलं योग इति तदुपक्रमो युक्तः ॥
 19 यद्येवं हानेनोपक्रम्येत ॥

1 °मतो ऽपि हानो]em., °मतो हि हानो T_m^{pc}T_dL^{pc}, °मतोर्व्विहानो T_m^{ac}, °मतो हि (ना)हानो L,
 °मतो हानो MA 1 रोगिणो]TMA 2 °हेतुञ्चा]T_d^{pc}M^{pc}MA 3 {°हेतुं चा° M^{pc}MA 4},
 °हेतुस्त्वा T_m, °हेतुश्चा° T_d^{ac}, °हेतुत्वा L, °हेतुं त्वा M^{ac} 2 °पेक्ष्य]T_dLM 3, °पेक्ष्या T_m, °पयदय°
 A 4 हानस्यापि ... साधनमिति]TMA 4, हानस्या[.]मिति L 5 नान्यः
 सम्ब°]T, नान्यसम्ब°{°संब° MA 4}LMA 4 5 भैषज्य°]T_dLMA 4, भैषज्या° T_m 6 °तरेतरनियमः। स च
 शास्त्रादिति ॥]TMA 4, °तरेतर[.]श्चादिति L 7 तस्मात्सत्सम्ब°]TLMA, तस्मात्सत्संब°
 8 10 उपेयप्रदर्शने]em., उपेयोपप्रदर्शने TLM^{pc}MA 4, उपेयोप°प्र°दर्शने M 10 ह्युपेय°]T, हि उपेय°
 LMA 4 11 वक्तव्य स्यात्]TMA 4 {°व्यः स्या° MA 4}, वक्तव्यः [.]त् L 11 तस्मिंस्त्वभि°]TL,
 तस्मिंश्चाभि° MA 4 13 °ख्यातेः'; 'निर्व्विचार°]TLMA, °ख्यातेः' इति। 'निर्व्विचार° 15 °स्माद्युक्त°]T_d-
 MA 4, °स्माद्युक्त° T_m, °स्माद्युक्त° L 17 °ख्यातिः। तत्र]TM(em.)A 4 {°तिस्त° TMA}, {°तिः, त°
 8}, ख्यातिस्यत्र L 17 योगांगानु°]T_mLMA 4, योगानु° T_d 19 यद्येवं हानेनो°]T_mLMA 4, यद्येवमाह
 अनेनो° T_d

13 'योगांगानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिरा विवेकख्यातेः'] YS 2.28.

13-14 'निर्व्विचारवैशारद्ये ऽध्यात्मप्रसादः'] YS 1.47.

14 'ऋतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञे'ति] YS 1.48.

14-15 'यस्त्वेकाग्रे चेतसि स भूतमर्थम्प्रद्योतयती'ति] YBh 1.1. Cf. the reading सद्भूतमर्थम्
 instead of स भूतमर्थम् (Maas 2006: 5). See 183,1-183,7 in this edition.

न। तस्योपेयत्वात्। उपेयमेव हि तत्, योगः पुन स्वांगानामुपेयश्चोपायश्च विवेकख्यातेर-
णिमादिप्राप्तेश्चेत्यभ्यहिततरः, फलद्वयनिमित्तत्वात् ॥

उत्तरसूत्रार्थत्वाच्च। न ह्य'थ योगांगानुशासनमि'त्युक्ते 'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध' इति युक्तं
वक्तुम्। तदा हि यमनियमादि सूत्रमेव पठितव्यं स्यात् ॥

अथ तदेव पठितव्यमिति चेत्—न। योगोपायाया हानोपायभूताया विवेकख्यातेः फलस्य
च हानस्य सम्बन्धदर्शनार्थत्वा'द्योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध' इत्यस्य ॥

कृत्स्नपुनरेतत्सम्बन्धदर्शनार्थम्, यावता निर्बीजसमाधिलक्षणाभिधानमेतत् ॥

सत्यमेवम्। तथापि हानतदुपायसम्बन्धमवद्योतयदेव सूत्रनिर्बीजसमाधिर्लक्षणतामाद्यते।
न हि निरोधलक्षणात्समाधेरर्थान्तरं हानम्। किन्त्वैतावान्विशेषः—निरोधलक्षणसमाधौ पु-
नःप्रवृत्तिः, हाने त्वात्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिरिति। समाध्यवस्थायान्तु हानाविशेष एव ॥

तथा चाह 'तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपे ज्वस्थानम्'; 'स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिः' कैवल्यमिति।
स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्वं हि कैवल्यं हानम्। ततश्च निर्बीजसमाधिना कैवल्यमेव शास्त्रार्थप्रत्ययद्रष्टिभ्ये
साक्षात्क्रियते ॥

तस्माद्यदुच्यते कैश्चिन्निर्बीजसमाधिः कैवल्यसाधनमिति, तन्न। किन्तर्हि ख्यातिरेव सा-
धनमविद्यानिवृत्तिद्वारेण। अविद्यानिमित्तो हि बन्धः। तस्माद्यद्यपि योगानुशासनं सूत्रितम्,

2 °त्यभ्यहिततरः] T_mT_d^{pc} (conj. ?), °त्यभ्यक्ततरः T_d^{pc}, °त्यह्यहिततरः L, °त्य (इ) » हि » ततरः M, °त्य-
हिततरः A, °[°त्यभ्य] » हिततरः ४ 2 °द्वयनिमित्तं] conj., °वन्निमित्तं T, °(प/व)यनिमित्तं L, °पयनिमित्तं
M (प copiest marks as uncertain), °पयनिमित्तं A, °तदुपायरूपं ४ 3 °सूत्रार्थत्वाच्च] LMA ४ {°र्थं
MA ४}, °सूत्रत्वाच्च T 4 वक्तुम्। तदा] M(em.) {वक्तुं तदा M} A ४, वक्तुन्ता [°क्तुम्। तां T_d] दा TL 5
चेत्—न] ४(em.), चेत् न [°न्न MA] हि TLMA 5 योगोपायाया] TLMA, योगोपे((पा))याया ४ 5 विवेक-
ख्यातेः] TMA ४, विवेक [. .] तेः L 6 सम्बन्धं] TMA ४, यम्बन्धं L 6 °दर्शनां] TLMA, °[°प्र] दर्शनां
४ 6 °त्वा'द्योग'] TL ४(em.), त्वायोगं MA 7 कथम्पुं] T_d ४(em.) {((स)) कथं पुं ४}, स कथम्पुं LMA
7 °तत्सम्बन्धं] TMA, °तत्समबन्धं L, °तत्संबन्धप्रं ४ 7 °र्थम्] TLA ४ {°र्थं TL}, °र्थं M 7 या-
वता] LMA ४, यावतां T 8 °मवद्योतयदेव] T_d(em.) A(em.) ४(em.), °मपद्योतयदेव T_m, °मवद्योतयातिव
L, °मवद्योतयादेव M 8 सूत्रं] TL ४(em.), सूतं MA 8 लक्षणतां] LMA^{pc} ४, लक्षण(भिधानमेतत्सत्यमेवं
तथापि)तां A 9 °वान्वि] T, °वात्वि L, °वता विं MA ४ 9 °समाधौ] ४(em.), °समाधौ न T,
°समाधेरर्न[°र्नं MA] LMA, °समाधौ((धेरर्नं)) ४ 11 तदा] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA ४, त(था)दा T_m 11 द्र-
ष्टुः] T_m^{ac}T_dLMA ४, द्रष्टुं T_m^{pc} 11 स्वरूपे ज्वस्थानम्] TLMA, स्वरूपेज्वस्थानम् [इति] ४ 11
वा] em., च Σ 12 °प्रतिष्ठत्वं हि] ४(em.), °प्रतिष्ठं हि TLMA 12 कैवल्यं हानम्] conj., कैवल्यमाह
Σ 14 कैश्चिन्निर्बीजं] TL, कैश्चिद्बीजं MA, कैश्चित् [स] बीजं ४

2 अणिमादिं] See YS 3.45: ततो ऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसंपत्तद्धर्मानभिघातः ॥ and the YBh on
it: तत्राणिमा भवत्यणुः। लघिमा लघुर्भवति। ... एतान्यष्टावैश्वर्याणि (Āgāṣe et al. 1919: 164–5).

3 'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध' इति] YS 1.2.

4 यमनियमादि सूत्रं] YS 2.29: यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयो ऽष्टावङ्गानि।

11 'तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपे ज्वस्थानम्'] YS 1.3

11 'स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिः' कैवल्यमिति] Part of YS 4.34 (the last sūtra): पुरुषार्थगु-
न्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति.

14 कैश्चिन्निर्बीजसमाधिः कैवल्यसाधनमिति] Cf. Vācaspati on YS 1.3: निःश्रेयसस्य हेतुः समाधि-
रिति हि श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेषु प्रसिद्धम् ॥ (Āgāṣe et al. 1919: 2,4–5).

1 तथापि ख्यात्यर्थत्वाद्योगस्य तद्वारेण ख्यातिहानसम्बन्धमपि दर्शयतीति सुषूच्यते । उत्तरसू-
2 त्रसम्बन्धार्थञ्च योगानुशासनमिति सूत्रयितव्यमिति ॥

3 यद्यपि फलार्थिनान्तत्फलसाधनप्रत्युत्पन्नाकांक्षाणां साधनोपदेशो ऽप्यस्ति, तथापि न
4 तत्प्रयोजनम् । सर्वस्य फलोद्देशेन प्रवृत्तेस्तदेव प्रयोजनमिति ॥

5 'योगानुशासनमिति—

6 यथा शिष्यो ऽनुशिष्यते विशिष्टप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनियमद्वारेण तथा विशिष्टसाध्यसाधनतदंग-
7 नियममात्रसादृश्यादन्तेवास्यनुशासनवद्योगानुशासनमित्युच्यते । अनुशिष्टिरनुशासनम् । यो-
8 गो ऽनुशिष्यते जनेनास्मिन्निति वा योगानुशासनं शास्त्रम् ॥

9 अथेत्ययमधिकारार्थः—अधिकार आरम्भः प्रस्तावः, अर्थो ऽभिधेयो ऽस्य । शिष्टस्मृति-
10 प्रामाण्यात् ॥

11 ननु चानन्तर्यार्थस्याथशब्दस्य स्मरन्ति शिष्टाः । तथाचाह—'वृत्तादनन्तरस्य प्रक्रियात्थो
12 दृष्ट' इति ॥

3 फलार्थिः] T_dL^{PC}MA \mathcal{E} , फलाति° L^{ac} 3 °व्युत्प°] T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , °व्युत्प° T_m 3 तथापि] TMA \mathcal{E} ,
[.]थापि L 4 प्रवृत्ते°] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , प्रवृत्ति° T_m^{ac} 6 °प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनियम°] TMA \mathcal{E} , °प्रवृत्ति-
नियम° L 7 °न्तेवास्य°] T_dLA \mathcal{E} , °न्तेवास्या° T_m, °न्तेनास्य° M 7 °शासनवद्योगा°] LMA \mathcal{E} , °शासनवि-
द्योगा° T 8 °नास्मिन्निति] T_dLM \mathcal{E} , °नास्तिन्निति T_m, °नान्यस्मिन्निति A 8 शास्त्रम्] T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , सस्त्रम्
T_m 9 °धिकारा°] LMA \mathcal{E} , °धिकारो T 9 शिष्टस्मृति°] TL \mathcal{E} , शिष्यस्मृति° MA 9–11 °माण्यात् ॥
ननु] TM(em.)A \mathcal{E} {°ण्यान्ननु T_mMA}, °प्रामण्यन्ननु L 11 चाह] T_m^{PC}T_dLMA \mathcal{E} , चा(न)»ह« T_m

6–7 यथा शिष्यो ऽनुशिष्यते ...°नुशासनमित्युच्यते।] Cf. TaiU 1.11.1: वेदमनूच्याचार्यो ऽन्तेवासि-
नमनुशास्ति and the TaiUBh on it: वेदमनूच्येत्येवमादिकर्तव्यतोपदेशारम्भः प्राग्ब्रह्मविज्ञानान्नियमेन कर्त-
व्यानि श्रौतस्मार्तकर्माणीत्येवमर्थः । अनुशासनश्रुतेः पुरुषसंस्कारार्थत्वात् । संस्कृतस्य हि विशुद्धसत्त्वस्यात्मज्ञानम-
ञ्जसैवोत्पद्यते । 'तपसा कल्मषं हन्ति विद्ययामृतमश्रुते' (Manu 12.104) इति हि स्मृतिः । वक्ष्यति च—'तपसा
ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व' (TaiU 3.3.1) इति । अतो विद्योत्पत्त्यर्थमनुष्ठेयानि कर्माणि । अनुशास्तीत्यनुशासनशब्दात् । अ-
नुशासनातिक्रमे हि दोषोत्पत्तिः । प्रागुपन्यासाच्च कर्मणाम्, केवलब्रह्मविद्यारम्भाच्च । पूर्वं कर्माण्युपन्यस्तानि । उदि-
तायां च ब्रह्मविद्यायां, 'अभयं प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते' (TaiU 3.3.1) 'न बिभेति कुतश्चन' 'किमहं साधु नाकरवम्' (TaiU
2.9.1) इत्येवमादिना कर्मनेष्किञ्चन्यं दर्शयिष्यतीत्यतो ऽवगम्यते—पूर्वोपचितदुरितक्षयद्वारेण विद्योत्पत्त्यर्थानि क-
र्माणीति । मन्त्रवर्णाच्च—'अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्रुते' (IU 11) इति । ऋतादीनां पूर्वत्रोपदेशः आन-
र्थक्यपरिहारार्थः । इह तु ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यर्थत्वात्कर्तव्यनियमार्थः । वेदमनूच्याध्याप्याचार्यो ऽन्तेवासिनं शिष्यमनुशास्ति
ग्रन्थग्रहणादनुपपन्नाच्छास्ति तदर्थं ग्राहयतीत्यर्थः । अतो ऽवगम्यते ऽधीतवेदस्य धर्मजिज्ञासामकृत्वा गुरुकुलान्न समा-
वर्तितव्यमिति । 'बुद्ध्वा कर्माणि कुर्वीत' (Āpastambadharmasūtra 9.21.5?) इति स्मृतेश्च । (Shastri
1979: 420).

9–10 शिष्टस्मृतिप्रामाण्यात्] The *śiṣṭasmṛti* here is the VMBh. See the beginning of
the VMBh: अथ शब्दानुशासनम् । अथेत्ययं शब्दो ऽधिकारार्थः प्रयुज्यते ।

11–12 'वृत्तादनन्तरस्य प्रक्रियात्थो दृष्ट' इति] ŚBh 1.1.1. See also BSBh 1.1.1: अत्राथशब्द
आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते, नाधिकारार्थः, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकारत्वात् । मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात् ।
अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति । पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्यार्थतिरेकात् । सति
चानन्तर्यार्थत्वे यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते
तद्वक्तव्यम् । स्वाध्यायनान्तर्यं तु समानम् । ... (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 47–51).

5–8 योगानुशासनं शास्त्रम् । 9–10 अथेत्ययमधिकारार्थः ।

न। सर्वत्रारम्भार्थत्वात्, आनन्तर्यस्य च गम्यमानत्वात्। यथा 'पुत्र' इत्युक्ते पिता ग- 1
म्यते, न च पुत्रशब्दस्यार्थः पिता। तथेहाप्यारम्भ एवाभिधीयते, आनन्तर्यन्तु प्रतीयते। अत 2
एव च 'वृत्तादानन्तरस्य प्रक्रियात्थो दृष्ट' इत्युच्यते। यदि चानन्तर्यात्थो ऽभविष्यत्तदा 'वृ- 3
त्तादानन्तर्यात्थे प्रक्रियाया' इत्यवदिष्यत् ॥ 4

अनन्तरस्येति चानन्तरभाविन एवाभिधानम्। अपि चैवं हि स्मृतिः—'किञ्चिदव्ययं वि- 5
भक्त्यर्थप्रधानं किञ्चित्क्रियाप्रधानम्। उच्चैर्नीचैरित्यादि विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानम्। हिरुक्युथगि- 6
त्यादि क्रियाप्रधानम्। न चैतद्व्यतिरेकेणाव्ययानामर्थो विद्यत' इति। तत्राथशब्दस्यानन्तर्या- 7
त्थत्वे सति विभक्तिश्रवणं युक्तम्, सत्वप्रधानत्वात्। आरम्भक्रियात्थत्वे तु सति विभक्त्यश्रवणं 8
युक्तम्, असत्त्वप्रधानत्वादिति ॥ 9

तस्मादथशब्दः प्रस्तावार्थ एवेति युक्तम् ॥ 10

'अथेत्यधिकारार्थ' इति—स्वरूपावद्योतनार्थ इतिशब्दः। यथा 'गौरि'त्याहेति। प्रसिद्धो 11
ऽप्यथशब्दार्थो ऽधिक्रियमाणविषये शिष्यबुद्धिसमाधानार्थ कीर्त्यते। सिद्धो ह्ययन्यायः श्रुतौ 12

2 न च [T_m^{pc}T_dLMA_z, न व T_m^{ac} 2 पुत्रशब्दस्यार्थः] LMA_z{^{र्थः} MA_z}, पुत्रस्या[.]^{र्थः} T_m, पु-
त्रस्यार्थः T_d 2 तथे°] T_dMA_z, तथै° T_mL 2-3 अत एव च [T_dL^{pc}MA_z, अत वेच T_m, अत एचव L^{ac}
3 यदि चा°] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA_z, यदि वा° T_m^{ac} 4 °नन्तर्यात्थे]em., °नन्तर्ये त्थे T_m^{ac}, °नन्तर्यो त्थे T_m^{pc},
°नन्तर्यो ऽथे T_d, °नन्तर्यत्थे L, °नन्तर्यो ऽथे M, °नन्तर्ये ऽथे A_z 4 प्रक्रियाया] T_dLMA_z{°यायाः z},
प्रक्रियाया T_m 6 °र्थप्रधानं] T_dLMA_z, °र्थ्य प्रधानं T_m 7 क्रियाप्रधानम्] TLMA, क्रियाप्रधानम् [[इति]
z 7 °व्ययाना°] TM(em.)A_z, °प्रयाना° L 7 °त्थो] T_dLMA_z, °र्थ्य° T_m 7 विद्यत' इति]em. वि-
द्यते Σ. 8 विभक्तिश्रवणं युक्तम्] T, विभक्तिश्रवणमयुक्तं L, विभक्तिश्रवणमयुक्तं M, विभक्तिश्रवणमयुक्तं A,
विभक्त्यश्रवणम्। विभक्तिश्रवणमयुक्तम् z 8 सत्वप्रधानत्वात्] T_mL_z{°सत्व° z}, सत्वप्रधानत्वात् T_dMA
8 °र्थत्वे तु सति]em., °र्थत्वे तु स तु T_mL, °र्थत्वे तु T_d, °र्थत्वे तु न MA_z 8 विभक्त्य°] T_mL, विभक्त्यर्थ°
T_dMA, विभक्त्य(र्थ)° z 8-9 °श्रवणं यु°] T, °श्रवणमयु° LMA_z{°श्रव(न)णमयु° L} 10 एवेति यु-
क्त°] TMA_z, एवेति[. .] L 11 °थेत्यधिका°] TMA_z, °[थे]त्यधिका° L 11 °वद्योतना°] TMA_z,
°वद्योतन(त्)° L 11 शब्दः] T_dLMA_z, [.]ब्दाः T_m 11-12 °सिद्धो ऽप्यथ°] TLM_z{°द्धो प्य° T_mL},
°सिद्धोप्यथ° A 12 °विषये] T_dLMA_z, विषय° T_m 12 ह्ययन्यायः श्रुतौ] z(em.), ह्ययन्या[. .]तो L,
ह्ययन्यायः श्रुतो M, (ह्य)यं ना(न्य)यः। श्रुतो A

1-2 यथा 'पुत्र' इत्युक्ते ... पुत्रशब्दस्यार्थः पिता] Cf. BSBh 2.2.17: यथैको ऽपि सन्देवदत्तो लोके
स्वरूपं संबन्धिरूपं चापेक्ष्यानेकशब्दप्रत्ययभागभवति—मनुष्यो ब्राह्मणः श्रोत्रियो वदान्यो बालो युवा स्थविरः पिता
पुत्रः पौत्रो भ्राता जामातेति, यथा चैकापि सती रेखा स्थानान्यत्वेन निविशमानेकदशशतसहस्रादिशब्दप्रत्ययभेदम-
नुभवति (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917:521). This in turn alludes to YBh 3.13: यथैका रेखा
शतस्थाने शतं दशस्थाने दशैका च एकस्थाने। यथैवैकत्वे ऽपि स्त्री माता चोच्यते दुहिता च स्वसा चेति।

5-7 किञ्चिदव्ययं ... विद्यत इति] VMBh ad AA 1.1.38 or 1.2.47. Cf. the readings in
Kielhorn's third edition (p. 95): किञ्चिदव्ययं विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानं किञ्चित्क्रियाप्रधानम्। उच्चैर्नीचैरिति वि-
भक्त्यर्थप्रधानं हिरुक्युथगिति क्रियाप्रधानम्। तद्धितश्चापि कश्चिद्विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानः कश्चित्क्रियाप्रधानः। तत्र यत्रेति
विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानो नाना विनेति क्रियाप्रधानः। न चैतयोरर्थयोर्लिङ्गसंख्याभ्यां योगो ऽस्ति ॥ and (p. 223) अव्ययं
हि किञ्चिद्विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानं किञ्चित्क्रियाप्रधानम्। उच्चैर्नीचैरिति विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानं हिरुक्युथगिति क्रियाप्रधानम्। ति-
बन्तं चापि किञ्चिद्विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानं किञ्चित्क्रियाप्रधानम्। काण्डे कुचे इति विभक्त्यर्थप्रधानं रमते ब्राह्मणकुलमिति
क्रियाप्रधानम्। न चैतयोरर्थयोर्लिङ्गसंख्याभ्यां योगो ऽस्ति।

1 'व्याख्यास्यामि ते व्याख्यानस्य तु मे निदिध्यासस्वे'ति ॥

2 कः पुनर्योगो यस्यानुशासनम्प्रस्तुतमित्याह—योगः समाधिरिति । समाधिग्रहणाद्युजि-
3 र्योग' इति निवर्त्य 'युज समाधावि'त्ययंगृहीतः । योगः समाधानम् ॥

4 ननु च 'योगः समाधिर'त्येवमन्तेन व्याख्याते सूत्रे 'स च सार्वभौम' इत्यादि भाष्यम-
5 सम्बन्धदृश्यते ?

6 नैष दोषः । इह 'समाधिर'त्युक्ते समाधीयमानापेक्षत्वात् ; समाधीयमानानाञ्च बहुत्वात् ;
7 किमात्मा समाधीयते, किं वा शरीरम्, आहोस्विदिन्द्रियाणिति बहुविदां विप्रतिपत्तेः ; स्ववि-
8 शेषणाकांक्षत्वाच्च समाधेः ॥

9 कस्यायं किंविशेषणक इत्यनुषक्ते प्रश्न इदमाह—स च सार्वभौमश्चित्तस्य धर्म इति ।
10 चित्तस्य धर्मो नात्मादीनाम् । तच्च चित्तं स्वयमेव समाधीयते कर्तृन्तुरनिरपेक्षत्वात् ॥

11 काः पुनर्भूमय इत्यत आह—क्षिप्तमूढमित्यादयो भूमय इति । क्षिप्तमिति कर्मकर्तरि निष्ठा ।
12 यथा भिन्नः कुसूलः स्वयमेवेति । क्षिप्तमनिष्टविषयासञ्जनेन स्तिमितम् ; मूढन्नित्विवेकम् ; वि-
13 क्षिप्तज्ञानाक्षिप्तं कर्मकर्तृव्येव ; विवेकाक्षमञ्च विक्षिप्तत्वादेव ; एकाग्रन्तुल्यप्रत्ययप्रवाहम् ; नि-
14 रुद्धमिति प्रत्ययशून्यम्—चित्तम् ॥

15 ननु च भूमिषु धर्मेषु विवक्षितेषु किमर्थं क्षिप्तमित्यादिना धर्मर्युच्यते ?

16 नैष दोषः । धर्मिणा धर्म एवोपदिश्यते । धर्मिणान्धर्मिविषयत्वात् । यथा गोत्वे किं
17 लिंगमिति पृष्टे विषाणी ककुद्धान्प्रान्तवालधिरिति धर्मिणा धर्म एवोपदिश्यते । तस्माद्विक्षे-
18 पादयश्चित्तस्य भूमयो धर्मा इत्यर्थः ॥

19 ननु च भूमीनाञ्चित्तधर्मत्वे समाधेश्च, कथम्भूमिभिः समाधिराधारत्वेन विशेष्यते सा-
20 र्वभौम इति—न । सामान्यभूतत्वात्समाधेः, भूमीनाञ्च विशेषत्वात्—यथा क्षिप्तमिति, मू-

1 व्याख्यास्यामि] T_dMA₈, [. . .]याख्या(व्याख्यादि) » स्या « मि T_m, व्याख्यास्यास्यादि L 1 *क्षणस्य] T-
2 8, *क्षणस्य LMA 1 निदिध्यासस्वे'ति] T_m^{pc}8, निदिध्यासत्वेति T_m^{ac}, निदिध्यासस्येति T_d, निदिध्यास-
3 ञ्चे[*सं चे° A] ति LMA 3 समाधावि'त्ययं] T_dMA₈, समाधामित्ययं T_mL 4 *त्येवमन्तेन] TL₈, *त्ये-
4 वमर्थेन M^{ac}, *त्येव मतं तेन M^{pc}A 4-5 भाष्यमसम्ब°] TM^{pc}A₈, भाष्यसम्ब° L, भाष्यं सम्ब° M^{ac}
5 7 शरीर°] T_dLMA₈, शरीर° T_m 7 बहुविदां] TLMA, बहु(विदां)धा 8 9 प्रश्न] em., प्रश्ने Σ 10
6 कर्तृन्तुर°] T_d, वेन्तर° L, न्तर° M, . . वेन्तर° A, [समाधात्र] न्तर° 8 12 *सञ्जनेन] T_d-
7 LMA₈, *सञ्जनेने T_m 13 *प्रवाहम्] 8(em.), *वाहम् TLMA 16 *त्वात् । यथा] T_dLMA₈{ त्वाद्यथा
8 T_dLMA }, त्वात् यथा T_m 18 भूमयो] T_m^{pc}T_dL^{pc}MA₈, भूमय T_m^{ac}, भूयो L^{ac} 19-20 सार्व-
9 भौम] 8(em.), सार्वभूम TLMA 20 न] TLM, om. A₈ 20 क्षिप्त°] 8(em.), विक्षिप्त° T_dMA,
10 विक्षिप्ता° T_mL

1 व्याख्यास्यामि . . . निदिध्यासस्व] BÄU 2.4.4 (4.5.5).

2-3 'युजिर्योगे' . . . 'युज समाधावि'] Dhātupāṭha 7.7 and 4.68.

10 कर्तृन्तुर°] Cf. note 34 of Wezler (1983).

11-12 क्षिप्तमिति कर्मकर्तरि निष्ठा । यथा भिन्नः कुसूलः स्वयमेवेति ।] See VMBh 3.1.87, Vārtti-
kas 5-7, esp. 7: . . . क्त । भिन्नः कुसूल इति कर्म । स यदा स्वातन्त्र्येण विवक्षितस्तदास्य कर्मवद्भावः स्यात् ।
तस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यस्तस्मिन्प्रतिषिद्धे उक्तकाणां भावे क्तो भवतीति भावे क्तो यथा स्यात् । भिन्नं कुशूलेनेति । क्त ॥
(Kielhorn and Abhyankar 1972: 68).

2-3 योगः समाधिः । 9-10 स च सार्वभौमश्चित्तस्य धर्मः । 11-14 क्षिप्तमूढं विक्षि-
प्तमेकाग्रन्निरुद्धमिति भूमयः ।

ढन्तिष्ठति, विक्षिप्तमेकाग्रनिरुद्धञ्चेति क्षिप्तादिभूमिषु स्थितिरनुवर्तते सामान्यम्। स्थितिश्च
समाधिः। तस्मात्सामान्यरूपः सर्वासु भूमिषु साधारण्येन वर्तते इति ॥

‘सर्वभूमिपृथिवी’ त्वैश्वर्यार्थीयो ऽण्प्रत्ययः। ‘अनुशतिकादि’ त्वादुभयपदवृद्धिः॥

अन्ये पुनर्बाह्याध्यात्मिकान् संयमविषयान्भूमय इत्याचक्षते। तेषां ‘विक्षिप्ते चेतसी’ति सा-
मानाधिकरणानुपपत्तिः, स्ववचनविरोधश्च। कथं? क्षिप्यते ऽस्मिन्निति क्षिप्तम्, मुह्यते ऽस्मि-
न्निति मूढम्, विक्षिप्यते ऽस्मिन्निति च विक्षिप्तम्। यदा चैवन्न तदासंयमविषयता, तत्र क्षेपा-
द्यसम्भवात्। एकाग्रावस्थायां हि संयमो भवति ॥

किञ्चान्यत्। क्षिपेश्च ध्रौव्याद्यर्थाभावादधिकरणे [निष्ठाप्रत्ययो]भावः॥

किञ्च निरुद्धे चेतसि संयमस्यापि तत्राभावादृत्तिशून्यत्वात्संयमविषयाभावः। न हि निरोधे
विषयविशेषे चित्तनिरुध्यते। तदा हि विषयित्वान्निवर्तते। परिगणनानुपपत्तिश्च। न हि क्षि-
प्तादयः पञ्चैव संयमस्य विषयास्तेषामानन्त्यात् ॥

ननु चान्यथा योगं केचिदिच्छन्ति? तथा चाहुः—

इन्द्रियमनोर्थसन्निकर्षात्सुखदुःखे। तदनारम्भ आत्मस्थे मनसि स-

1 विक्षिप्त°] ङ(em.), क्षिप्त° TLMA 1 °निरुद्ध°] conj., om. Σ 2 साधारण्येन] em., साध्यायेन T_m^{ac};
प्राधान्येन T_m^{pc}T_dLMA ङ 4 संयम°] T ङ, समयम° LMA 6 विक्षिप्यते ऽस्मिन्निति च विक्षिप्तम्] conj.,
om. Σ 6 संयम°] T_m^{pc}T_d ङ, समयम° T_m^{ac}LMA 7 संयमो] T ङ, समयमो LMA 8 किञ्चा-
न्यत्] T ङ(em.), किञ्चान्य LMA 8 प्रत्ययो]भावः] LMA ङ, [. . .]भावः T_m, . . . मानः T_d 9
संयम°] T ङ(em.), समयम° LMA 9 °त्वात्संयम°] T ङ(em.), °त्वात्संयम° LMA 10-11 क्षिप्ता-
दयः] ङ(em.), विक्षिप्तादयः TLMA 11 संयमस्य] T ङ(em.), समयस्य LMA 12 चान्यथा] TMA ङ,
चान्यथा L 13-180,1 सशरीरस्य] T_d ङ(em.), स सशरीर[.] T_m, शरीरस्य LMA, [स]शरीरस्य ङ

3 ‘सर्वभूमिपृथिवी’ त्वैश्वर्यार्थीयो ऽण्प्रत्ययः। ‘अनुशतिकादि’ त्वादुभयपदवृद्धिः] See AA 5.1.41-2:
सर्वभूमिपृथिवीभ्यामणञौ। तस्येश्वरः। and AA 7.3.20: अनुशतिकादीनां च.

4 अन्ये पुनर्बाह्याध्यात्मिकान्संयमविषयान्भूमय इत्याचक्षते।] Cf. YS 3.6: तस्य भूमिषु विनियोगः and
the YBh on it. The objects (*viṣaya*) of *saṃyama* are described in YS 3.16 ff.

4 ‘विक्षिप्ते चेतसी’ति] See p. 182

8 क्षिपेश्च ध्रौव्याद्यर्थाभावादधिकरणे [निष्ठाप्रत्ययो]भावः] See AA 3.4.76 को ऽधिकरणे च ध्रौव्यगत-
प्रत्यवसानार्थेभ्यः ॥

13-180,1 इन्द्रियमनोर्थसन्निकर्षात्सुखदुःखे। तदनारम्भ आत्मस्थे मनसि सशरीरस्य सुखदुःखाभावः प्रा-
णमनोविनिग्रहापेक्षः संयोगः] VS 5.2.16-7. See Wezler (1982). Cf. Carakasamhitā (Āchā-
rya 1981) Śāriṣṭhāna 2.138-139: आत्मेन्द्रियमनोर्थाणां सन्निकर्षात्प्रवर्तते। सुखदुःखमनारम्भादा-
त्मस्थे मनसि स्थिरे ॥ निवर्तते तदुभयं वशित्वं चोपजायते। सशरीरस्य योगज्ञाः तं योगमृषयो विदुः ॥;
NBh 4.2.38: स तु प्रत्याहृतस्येन्द्रियेभ्यो मनसो धारकेण प्रयत्नेन धार्यमाणस्यात्मना संयोगस्तत्त्वबुभुत्सा-
विशिष्टः। सति हि तस्मिन्निन्द्रियार्थेषु बुद्धयो नोत्पद्यन्ते, तदभ्यासवशात्तत्त्वबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते ॥; PDhS (Dvive-
din 1984: 187): अस्मद्विशिष्टानान्तु योगिनां युक्तानां योगजधर्मानुगृहीतेन मनसा स्वात्मान्तराकाशदिक्पाल-
परमाणुवायुमनस्सु तत्समवेतगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषेषु समवाये चावितथं स्वरूपदर्शनमुत्पद्यते। वियुक्तानामुप-
नृत्तुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद्योगजधर्मानुग्रहसामर्थ्यात्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टेषु प्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यते। तत्र सामान्यविशेषेषु स्वरूपा-
लोचनमात्रम्प्रत्यक्षम्प्रमाणम्प्रमेया द्रव्यादयः पदार्थाः प्रमानात्मा प्रमितिर्द्रव्यादिविषयञ्ज्ञानम्। सामान्यविशेष-
ज्ञानोत्पत्तावबिभक्तमालोचनमात्रम्प्रत्यक्षम्प्रमाणमस्मिन्नात्यत्रमाणांतरमस्यफलरूपत्वात्। अथ वा सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु
चतुष्टयसन्निकर्षादवितथमव्यपदेशं यञ्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत्प्रत्यक्षम्प्रमाणम्प्रमेया द्रव्यादयः पदार्थाः प्रमातात्मा प्रमिति-
र्गुणदोषमाध्यस्थ्यदर्शनमिति ॥; PāSū (Ananthakrishna Sastri 1940: 6): किं तदित्युच्यते योगम्। अत्रा-

- 1 शरीरस्य सुखदुःखाभावः प्राणमनोविनिग्रहापेक्षः संयोगः॥
- 2 तदिति प्रकृतापेक्षम् । यो ऽसौ सुखदुःखयोराम्नेन्द्रियमनोर्त्थसन्निकर्षो हेतुः, त-
- 3 स्यान्नारम्भस्तदनुत्पत्तिः । स कथम्भवति ? आत्मस्थे मनसि नेन्द्रियस्थे। सश-
- 4 रीरस्याविशीर्णशरीरस्य । तदा 'कारणाभावात्कार्याभाव' इति सन्निकर्षाभावे
- 5 सुखदुःखयोरप्यभावः । तस्यामवस्थायां यो ऽसौ विभोरात्मनो मनसा संयोगः,
- 6 स प्राणमनोविनिग्रहापेक्षः संयोगविशेषो योगः
- 7 —इति ॥
- 8 अत्रोच्यते—
- 9 'आत्मस्थे मनसी'त्ययुक्तम्, सर्व्वदात्मस्थत्वात्मनसः ॥
- 10 इन्द्रियादिसन्निकर्षानारम्भापेक्षया'त्मस्थ' इति—इति चेत्—'तदनारम्भ' इत्येव सिद्ध-
- 11 त्वादा'त्मस्थे मनसी'त्यनर्थकं स्यात् ॥
- 12 किञ्चान्यत्—मुक्तस्यापि मनस आत्मस्थत्वादिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावाच्च योगः प्राप्नोति । त-
- 13 स्यापि हि सर्व्वगतत्वान्मनसश्च नित्यत्वात्सर्व्वदात्मस्थत्वमेव ॥
- 14 किञ्चात्मनः प्रदेशाभावादात्मस्थ इत्ययुक्तम् । न चाप्युपचरितात्मप्रदेशसंयोगः परमार्थस्य
- 15 योगस्य हेतु स्यात् । उपचरितस्य मिथ्यात्वात् ॥

1 °भावः] TL \mathcal{E} , भावं MA 1 संयोगः] TLMA, संयोगो [[योग] इति \mathcal{E} 3 नेन्द्रियस्थे] TMA \mathcal{E} , ने[. . .] L 5 °योरप्यभाव°] TL p MA \mathcal{E} , °योरप्यवा° L ac 5 तस्यामवस्थायां] MA \mathcal{E} , तस्यावस्थायां T $_m$, तदवस्थायां T $_d$, तस्यामवस्थायां L 5 संयोगः] TMA \mathcal{E} , सायोगः L 6 °पेक्षः] MA \mathcal{E} , °पेक्ष° TL 7-8 इति ॥ अत्रो°] LMA \mathcal{E} {इत्यत्रो° LMA}, इत्यन्तो° T 9 सर्व्वदात्म°] TLMA, सर्व्वदा आत्म° \mathcal{E} 10 °नारम्भा°] T $_m$ p T $_d$ L p MA \mathcal{E} , °दारम्भा° T $_m$ ac , °(द)नारम्भा° L 10 °क्षया'त्म°] LMA, °क्षया आत्म° T \mathcal{E} 10 °स्थ' इति—इति] em., °स्थ इति TLMA, °स्थे इति \mathcal{E} 13 °र्व्वदात्म°] LMA \mathcal{E} , °र्व्वन्त[°र्व्वं त T $_d$]दात्म° T 14 इत्ययुक्तम्] TMA \mathcal{E} , इत्य[. . .] L 15 स्यात् । उप°] T $_m$ L p MA \mathcal{E} {स्यादुप° T $_m$ MA}, स्यात् अप° T $_d$, °त्वादुप° L ac

त्मेश्वरसंयोगो योगः ।

4 'कारणाभावात्कार्याभाव' इति] VS 1.2.1.

12-13 तस्यापि हि सर्व्वगतत्वात्] See PDhS (Dvivedin 1984: 70): तथा चात्मेतिवचनात्परम-
महत्परिमाणम्, Cf. VS 7.1.28-9: विभवान्महानाकाशः । तथाचात्मा ।

13 मनसश्च नित्यत्वात्] See VS 3.2.2: द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते; PDhS (Dvivedin 1984: 130): नित्यं परमाणुमनसु तत्परिमाणुलुपम्.

14-15 किञ्चात्मनः . . . मिथ्यात्वात्] Cf. NS/NBh 2.2.13-17: अनित्यः शब्द इत्युत्तरम् । कथम्?—
आदिमत्त्वादेन्द्रियकत्वात्कृतकवदुपचाराच्च ॥ . . . इतश्च शब्द उत्पद्यते नाभिव्यज्यते—कृतकवदुपचारात् । तीव्रं म-
न्दमिति कृतकमुपचर्यते, तीव्रं सुखं मन्दं सुखं तीव्रं दुःखं मन्दं दुःखमिति, उपचर्यते च तीव्रः शब्दो मन्दः शब्द इति ।
. . . तस्मादुत्पद्यते शब्दो नाभिव्यज्यत इति । . . ॥ १३ ॥ न, घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वात्त्रित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचारा-
च्च ॥ १४ ॥ . . . यदपि कृतकवदुपचारादिति, एतदपि व्यभिचरति ; नित्येष्वनित्यवदुपचारो दृष्टः—तथा हि भवति
वृक्षस्य प्रदेशः कम्बलस्य प्रदेशः, एवमाकाशस्य प्रदेशः आत्मनः प्रदेश इति भवतीति ॥ १४ ॥ . . . यदपि नित्येष्वप्यनि-
त्यवदुपचारादिति । न—कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात् ॥ १७ ॥ नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचार इति । एवमाकाशप्रदेश
आत्मप्रदेश इति नात्राकाशात्मनोः कारणद्रव्यमभिधीयते यथा कृतकस्य । कथं ह्यविद्यमानमभिधीयते ? अविद्यमानता
च प्रमाणतो ऽनुपलब्धेः । किन्तर्हि तत्राभिधीयते संयोगस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वम् । . . सामान्यकृता च भक्तिराकाशस्य प्रदेश
इति । अनेनात्मप्रदेशो व्याख्यातः । . . (Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985: 594-613);

किञ्चान्यत् । मनोर्त्थसन्निकर्षादित्येव सिद्धेरिन्द्रियग्रहणमनोर्त्थकं स्यात् ॥

अथेन्द्रियैर्विना मनोर्त्थसन्निकर्षाभावात्तदनुत्तरम्भ इति प्राप्त्यभावे प्रतिषेधो न युक्त इति चेत्—नैतदेवम् । विनेन्द्रियैर्मनोर्त्थसन्निकर्षो नास्तीत्यर्थात्सन्निकर्षप्रतिषेधं कुर्वता विषय-प्राप्तिरिन्द्रियद्वारा प्रतिपादिता स्यात् ॥

किञ्चान्यत्—सर्वप्राणभ्रामिन्द्रियमनोर्त्थसन्निकर्षात्सुखदुःखप्रतिलम्भस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात्, आत्ममनःसम्बन्धस्य च नित्यत्वात्, सुखदुःखाभावो योग इत्येव सिद्धेः सूत्रशेषो ऽनर्थक स्यात् ॥

अथापि स्यादिन्द्रियमनोर्त्थसन्निकर्षग्रहणादृते सुखदुःखाभाव इत्येतावति सति मुक्तस्यापि सुखदुःखाभावाद्योगित्वप्रसंग इति तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं सूत्रशेषग्रहणमिति—

तच्च न, मुक्तस्य सुखदुःखप्राप्त्यभावात् । प्राप्तिपूर्वप्रतिषेधस्य न्याय्यत्वात् । [स्य सुखदुःखप्राप्तिः, तद्विषयः सुखदुःखाभाव एव योग इति सूत्रशेषप्रत्याख्यानं युज्यते ॥

किञ्चान्यत्—उपात्ते ऽपि सशरीरग्रहणे मुक्ताद्विनिवृत्तिर्न शक्यते कर्तुम्, निष्प्रयोजनत्वात् । सुखदुःखाभावश्चेद्योगः विद्यमानेऽपि शरीरं कार्याकरणादनर्थकं स्यात् । कार्यानि-पेक्षायां हि मुक्तामुक्तयोरविशेष एव ॥

किञ्चान्यत्—प्राणमनोविनिग्रहापेक्ष इत्यपि न घटते, विधारकस्य प्रयत्नस्यात्मसमवेतत्वात् । विद्यमाने ऽपि मनसः क्रियावत्त्वे, इन्द्रियेणासंयुज्य मनःप्राणनिग्रहो न कर्तुंस्पर्याप्यते ॥

1 °कर्षादि°]em., °कर्षाभाव इ° Σ 1 सिद्धेरि°]ऽ(em.), सिद्धमि° TLMA, सिद्धेः(ऽऽ) इ° १ स्या°]TLAऽ, °त्वा° M 2 °भावे°]T_dLMAऽ, °भावो T_m 5 किञ्चान्यि°]LMAऽ, कित्वा . T_d 5 °सुखदुःख°]T_m^{PC}T_dLMAऽ, °सुख° T_m^{ac} 5 °प्रसिद्धत्वा°]T_dLMAऽ, प्रसिद्धत्वप्रसिद्धत्वा° T_m 6 °त्ममनः°]em., °त्मनः° Σ 6 सिद्धेः सूत्रशेषो]conj., (सि सु°]सिद्धे सूत्रविशेषो T_m, सिद्धे सूत्रविशेषो T_d; सिद्धेस्तत्र *षो L, सिद्धेस्तत्र शेषो MA, सिद्धेः, तत्र [सूत्र]शेषो १ 8 °कर्षग्रहणा°]LM^{PCA}ऽ, °कर्ष° ग्रहणा°° M 9 °गित्वप्र°]ऽ(em.), °ग(स्य)त्वप्र° T_m, °गस्य त्वप्र° T_d, °गत्वप्र° LMA 9 °शेषग्रहण°]T_dLMAऽ, °शेषप्रग्रहण° T_m 11 °द्विषयः सुख°]ऽ(em.), °द्विषयसुख° TMA, °द्विषये सुख° L 12 °ग्रहणे°]T_dMAऽ, ग्रहणो T_m 12 शक्यते]T_dLMAऽ, युज्यते शक्यते T_m 13 कार्याकरणा°]ऽ(em.?), कार्या[°र्या° MA]कारणा° T_mLMA, कार्यकारणा° T_d 15 °विनिग्रहा°]T_dऽ, °विग्रहा° LM^{PCA}, °ग्रहा° M^{ac} 15 घटते]TMAऽ, घ*ते L 16 °त्वात् । वि°]em. °त्वादवि° Σ 16 °वृत्त्वे°]LMऽ, [. त्वे°] T_m, . त्व T_d 16 इन्द्रियेणा°]TL^{PC}MA, इन्द्रि(या)येणा L^{ac} 16 मनः°]TLMऽ, मतः A 16 °प्राणनिग्रहो°]TLMA, प्राण[मनो]निग्रहो १

Cf. also BSBh 2.2.17: तथाण्वात्ममनसामप्रदेशत्वान्न संयोगः संभवति । प्रदेशवतो द्रव्यस्य प्रदेशवता द्रव्यान्तरेण संयोगदर्शनात् । कल्पिताः प्रदेशा अण्वात्ममनसां भविष्यन्तीति चेत्, न, अविद्यमानार्थकल्पनायां सर्वार्थसिद्धिप्रसंगात् । ... (Śāstri and Paṇśīkar 1917:521); 2.3.53: अथोच्येत—विभुत्वे ऽप्यात्मनः शरीरप्रतिष्ठेन मनसा संयोगः शरीरावच्छिन्न एव आत्मप्रदेशे भविष्यति, अतः प्रदेशकृता व्यवस्थाभिसंध्यादीनामदृष्टस्य सुखदुःखयोश्च भविष्यतीति । तदपि नोपपद्यते । कस्मात्? अन्तर्भावात् । विभुत्वाविशेषाद्धि सर्व एवात्मानः सर्वशरीरेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति । तत्र न वैशेषिकैः शरीरावच्छिन्नो ऽप्यात्मनः प्रदेशः कल्पयितुं शक्यः । कल्पमानो ऽप्ययं निष्प्रदेशस्यात्मनः प्रदेशः काल्पनिकत्वादेव न पारमार्थिकं कार्यं नियन्तुं शक्नोति । ... (ibid.: 627).

15 प्रयत्न°] See PDhS (Dvivedin 1984: 70): तस्य गुणाः ... प्रयत्न°.... Cf. also VS 3.2.4.

16 विद्यमाने ऽपि मनसः क्रियावत्त्वे] Cf. PDhS (Dvivedin 1984: 89): क्रियावत्त्वान्मूर्तत्वम्.

1 इन्द्रियसंयोगे च मनसस्तदनारम्भ इत्युक्तम् । मनसश्च प्राणनिग्रहे व्यापृतत्वादनारम्भा-
2 नुपपत्तिः । न चासतीन्द्रियवायुसन्निकर्षे प्राणनिग्रहे । न च निगृहीते प्राणे योगः, आत्मस्थ-
3 विधारकप्रयत्नद्वारमनोगतक्रियासम्बन्धहेतुत्वात्प्राणनिग्रहस्य ॥

4 अथापि स्यात्—योगः समाधिरिति ॥

5 तच्च न, निष्क्रियत्वात् । आत्ममनसोन्नित्यसमाधानमेव । स्थितिश्च समाधिरित्युच्यते ॥

6 तस्माद्युक्तमभिधीयते 'स च सार्वभौमश्चित्तस्य धर्म' इति ॥

7 यद्येवं समाधिश्चेद्योगः, स च सार्वभौमश्चित्तधर्मः, स च सर्वजनानामयत्नसिद्धः, क्षि-
8 साद्यनुगतत्वात्; तथा च सति यथैव श्वासप्रश्वासादीनाम्प्रयत्नादृते सिद्धत्वाल्लक्षणमनन्तर्यकम्,
9 एवं योगानुशासनमप्यनन्तर्यकम्प्राप्तमित्यत आह—

10 अत्र विक्रिये चेतसि विक्रियोपसर्जनीभूतः समाधिर्न योगपक्षे वर्तत इति । क्षिपाद्यनुगतस्य
11 योगपक्षे ऽनभिप्रेतत्वात् । न हि क्षेपाद्यनुगतः समाधिर्भूतात्थावद्योतनादिक्षमः, क्षेपादिप्रधान-
12 त्वात् । विक्रियनिषेधेनैव हि प्रधानमल्लनिवर्हणन्यायेन क्षिप्तमूढयोरपि निषेधः कृतः । प्रधानता
13 च विक्रियसमाधेः, अधिकारयोग्यत्वात् । विक्रियस्थं हि चित्तमपक्षपातादिष्टं विषयमुपनेतुं श-
14 क्यते । न तु विषयासङ्गनादिना मूढमनिष्टविषयवियोगादिना वा क्षिप्तमन्यत्रोपनेतुम् पार्यते ।
15 'योगपक्ष' इति—समाधित्वे सत्यपि कार्य्याकरणात्पक्ष इत्युच्यते । यथा गच्छतः प्रतिपदं वि-
16 द्यमानापि स्थितिः स्थितिकार्य्याकरणान्न स्थितिरित्युच्यते ॥

17 'विक्रियोपसर्जनीभूत'त्वं विक्रियस्थैकसमाधिव्यक्त्यभिप्रायेण । 'सार्वभौम' इति तु प्राधा-
18 न्यं सामान्येन सर्वभूमिषु वृत्तेः ॥

1 संयोगे] TL^{pc}MA^z, *संयोगे L^{ac} 1 मनसश्च] TLM^{pc}A^z, मनसश्च <प्रनसश्च> M 1 व्या-
पृत°] TL^z(em.), व्या°प्या«वृत° M, व्या((प्या))वृत° A, व्यापृ(वृ)त° z 2 *पपत्तिः] TMA^z, *पपत्तिः
L 2 *निग्रहः] LMA^z, [. . .]r T_m, . . . r T_d 2 च नि°]em., चानि° Σ 2-3 *स्थवि-
धारक°] T^z(em.), *स्वविकधारक° L, *स्वविधारक° MA 3 *द्वारमनो°] T, *द्वारा मनो° LMA^z 5
निष्क्रिय°] TMA^z, निष्क्रिय° L 5 *त्ममनसोन्नि°]em., *त्मनो नि° Σ 6 *क्तम°] TLM^z, *क्तसम°
A 6 *भौमश्चित्तस्य] T_dLMA^z, *भौमश्चित्तस्य T_m (the second त beginning of a line)
8 *प्रश्वासा°] TMA^z, प्रश्वासा° L 8 *त्वाल्लक्षणम°] TLMA, *त्वात्तत्करणम°(ल्लक्षणम°) z 8 *न-
त्यर्थक°] T_m^{pc}T_dMA^z, *नत्यर्थ° T_m^{ac}L 10 अत्र विक्रिये] TL, अनविक्रिये MA, [[तत्र] विक्रिये ((अनविक्रिये))
z 11 क्षेपाद्यनुगतः] T_mL^{pc}MA^z, विक्रियोपसर्जनीभूतः T_d, क्षेप(त्व)द्यनुगतः L 11 *क्षमः] TLM^{pc}A^z, क्षमं
M^{ac} 12 विक्रियनि°] LMA^z, विक्रियनि[°पं नि° T_d]° T 12 *षेधेनैव] T_m^{pc}T_dLMA^z, *षेधेनैव T_m^{ac}
12 *निवर्हण°] TLM^z, *निवर्हण° A 13 *दिष्टं] T^z(em.?), *दृष्टं LMA 13 विषय°] TMA^z, विषय°
L 14 तु]em., हि Σ 14 मूढ°] TLMA, क्षिप्त° z(em.?) 14 *मनिष्ट°]em., *मिष्ट° Σ 14 क्षि-
प्त°] TLMA, मूढ° z 14 *न्यत्रो°] TLMA, *न्यत्रो° z(em.?) 14 पार्यते] z(em.), [. . .]त T_m, .
. . . त T_d, वार्यते LMA 15 कार्य्याकरणात्°] z(em.), कार्य्या[°र्या° M]कारणात्° T_mLM, कार्य्यकरणा-
त्° T_d, कार्य्यकरणात्° A 15 गच्छतः] TLM^z, गच्छेतः A 16 *कार्य्याकरणा°] T^z(em.), *कार्य्या[°र्या°
MA]कारण° LMA 17 तु] TLM^{pc}A^z, om. M^{ac}

5 स्थितिश्च समाधिरित्युच्यते] See 179,1.

12 प्रधानमल्लनिवर्हणन्यायेन] See BSBh 1.4.28; 2.1.12 for the use of this maxim.

15-16 यथा गच्छतः . . . न स्थितिरित्युच्यते] Cf. MMK 2.1-25.

10 अत्र विक्रिये चित्तसि विक्रियोपसर्जनीभूतः समाधिर्न योगपक्षे वर्तते ।

यद्युपसर्जनीभावः योगपक्षावृत्तौ कारणम्, इहाप्येकाग्र एकाग्रतोपसर्जनत्वं स्यात् । ततश्च 1
योगपक्षावृत्तिरिति चेत्, अत आह—**यस्त्वेकाग्र** इति । नैकाग्रतायामभूम्युपसर्जनत्वम् । कुतः ? 2
क्लेशकर्मप्रबलत्वात् । क्लेशकर्मप्रबलत्वेन हि विक्षेपादीनामुदयः । एकाग्रताभूमौ समाधिष्यः 3
स भूतमर्थं यथात्मानम् प्रद्योतयत्यवगमयति । अयोग्यर्थज्ञानमयथाभूतत्वगन्धितमेवेति भूत- 4
ग्रहणम् । **क्षिणोति** क्षपयति पञ्चपर्वणो ऽविद्यादीन् क्लेशान् । **कर्मबन्धनानि**—कर्मण्येव ब- 5
न्धनानि, धर्माधर्मविमिश्राणि ; यदि वा कर्मजानि तानि जन्मदीनि बन्धनानि—**श्लथयति** 6
शिथिलीकरोति । **निरोधमामुखीकरोत्यभिमुखीकरोति** । **स सम्प्रज्ञात इत्याख्यायत** आचार्यैः ॥ 7

स च वितर्कानुगतो विचारानुगत इत्यादि भाष्यम्—सम्प्रज्ञातस्य प्राथम्यात् । लक्षणा- 8
भिधाने तु प्राप्ते, अभ्यहितत्वादसम्प्रज्ञातस्यैव लक्षणं युक्तमिह वक्तुम्—**इति सम्प्रज्ञातमुप-** 9
रिष्टात्प्रवेदयिष्याम इत्युच्यते ॥ 10

इतश्चासम्प्रज्ञातस्य लक्षणमिहैव वक्तव्यम्—सम्प्रज्ञातनिरपेक्षो ऽप्यसम्प्रज्ञातः प्रकृष्टवैरा- 11
ग्यविरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासाभ्यां सिध्यतीत्येतत्प्रदर्शनात् । इह तु सम्प्रज्ञातलक्षणाभिधाने त- 12
दुत्तरकाले चासम्प्रज्ञातलक्षणाभिधाने सम्प्रज्ञातापेक्षयैवासम्प्रज्ञातसमाधौ विधिकार इत्याशंका 13
स्यात् । तस्मादुपरिष्टात्प्रवेदयिष्याम' इत्याह ॥ १ ॥ 14

1 योगपक्षा°]conj., समाधिपक्षा° Σ 1 °पसर्जनत्वं]LMA℄, °पसर्ज[°र्ज° T_d]नं T 3 क्लेशकर्मप्रबलत्वात् ।
क्लेशकर्मप्र°]T, »क्लेशकर्मप्रबलत्वात्«क्लेशकर्मप्र° L, क्लेशकर्मात्वात् क्लेशकर्मप्र° MA, क्लेशकर्मप्रबलत्वात् ।
क्लेशकर्मप्र° ℄ 3 °त्वेन हि]TLMA, त्वे न हि ℄ 3 एका°]TL^{pc}MA℄, एवका° L^{ac} 4
°गन्धित°]TL^{pc}MA℄, °गन्धित° L^{ac} 5 क्षपयति]T℄(em.?), पक्षयति LMA 5-6 कर्मण्येव
बन्धनानि]TL^{pc}M^{pc}A℄, om. L^{ac}, (कर्म धर्माधर्म)कर्मण्येव बन्धनानि M 6 °मिश्राणि ; यदि वा कर्मजानि
तानि]em., °मिश्राणि यदि कर्मजानि तानि T, °मिश्राणि यदि कर्मजाति तानि LMA, °विमिश्रकर्मजातानि
℄(em.?) 6 जन्मदीनि व°]T_mLMA, जन्मादिनिव° ℄ 7 °ख्यायत]T, °ख्यायते LMA℄ 8 °गतो
विचारा°]T_d℄(em.), °गतो पि[°गतो ऽपि MA] विचारा° TLMA 8 °ज्ञातस्य प्रा°]TLM^{pc}A℄, °ज्ञातस्य
(सा)प्रा° M 9 तु]conj., om. Σ 9 °तस्यैव लक्षणं]LMA℄, °तस्ये[. . .]णं T_m, °त . पलक्षणं T_d
11 प्रकृष्ट°]TLMA, पर((प्रकृष्ट)° ℄ 12 °भ्यासाभ्यां]T_dLMA℄, °भ्यासाभ्यासाभ्यां T_m 12 तु]T, त
L, om. MA℄ 13 °णाभिधाने सम्प्र°]T℄(em.), °णमभिधानम्प्र[°नं प्र° MA]° LMA 13 °वासम्प्र°]T,
°व असम्प्र[°संप्र° MA]° LMA℄ 13 °समाधौवधि°]LM℄, °समानाधि° A

5 पञ्चपर्वणो ऽविद्यादीन् क्लेशान्] See YS 2.3: अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः ॥

9-10 उपरिष्टात्प्रवेदयिष्यामः] See YS 1.17: वितर्कविचारानन्दास्मितारूपानुगमात् संप्रज्ञातः ॥

2-7 यस्त्वेकाग्रे, स भूतमर्थम्प्रद्योतयति, क्षिणोति क्लेशान्, कर्मबन्धनानि श्लथयति,
निरोधमामुखीकरोति । 7 स सम्प्रज्ञात इत्याख्यायते । 8-10 स च वितर्कानुगतो
विचारानुगत इत्युपरिष्टात्प्रवेदयिष्यामः ।



Translation of the Commentary on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.1

Opening stanzas

In Him *karman* and its ripening do not exist,³³² From Him they originated,³³³ 171,2
Impurities (*kleśas*) are not enough [to affect] him; but not surmountable for everybody [else],

³³²This is a reference to YS 1.24: *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ*. Impurities (*kleśas*) are mentioned in the next pāda.

³³³The part [*karmavipākau*] *yata āstām* may be interpreted in two ways. One way is to understand it to mean that the teachings on *karmans* and their results, i.e., the Vedas, were given by Īśvara. That *karmans* and their ripening, in the context of *dharma*, or in the sense of Vedic rituals and their fruition, were taught by Īśvara is expressed a few times in this text. See syllogisms following the one starting with *anekakartṛ*^o [57,13] translated on p. 107. Also, in one interpretation of the part of YBh 1.24 where it asserts that Īśvara is the source (*nimitta*) of *śāstra* and that *śāstra* is the source of Īśvara as well (starting with the paragraph *atrocyate* [50,9] translated on p. 93), the author interprets the word *nimitta* to mean the cause. The *śāstra* in this case most likely includes the Vedas. Another indication that the author had the Vedas in mind in the expression [*karmavipākau*] *yata āstām* is his marked hostility towards the Mīmāṃsakas. Śabara's interpretation of the word *atha* is examined shortly (see pp. 195 ff.); he alludes to Kumāriḷa many times as an opponent in the Īśvara section. Kumāriḷa champions the view that the Vedas have no personal author and strongly skeptical of the creator god. Our author even cites and criticizes Kumāriḷa's view on *sphoṭa* in the commentary on YS 3.17. It is natural for such an author to mention the relationship between Īśvara and the Vedas in the opening stanza.

Another likely meaning of [*karmavipākau*] *yata āstām* is that the rules regarding *karmans* (in the sense of deeds) and their ripening were set by Īśvara and he oversees their operation. This old idea is mentioned several times in the BhGBh in the form of *sarvasya karmaphalajātasya dhātāraṃ vidhātāraṃ* (BhGBh 8.9), *dhātā karmaphalasya prāṇibhyo vidhātā* (BhGBh 9.17), *dhātāhaṃ karmaphalasya vidhātā* (BhGBh 10.33), etc. Since the author shows affiliation to the BhG in the third pāda of this stanza by using the verb *kal-* in relation to *kāla*, it is conceivable that he had this old idea in mind. Also, one area of Kumāriḷa's criticism of Īśvara involves the relationship between the law of *karmans* (or *dharma*) and Īśvara (ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 43b, 50, 69–72, 75). One common theme that appears in ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra kk. 72 and 75 is that the involvement of Īśvara in the workings of *karmans* and their fruits is redundant. It is also conceivable that the author wanted to give an answer to this problem.

He cannot be fixed by the compelling eye of Kāla,³³⁴
I salute Him, the Lord of the world, the enemy of Kaiṭabha.³³⁵

- 171,6 He is omniscient, ruling all, and omnipotent,³³⁶
[He is] free from defects, [but] actions and rewards are super-
imposed on Him.³³⁷
The Lord who is the cause of creation, end, and maintenance
of everything,
Reverence be to Him, the teacher even of the teacher.

Commentary on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.1

172,1 Now the instruction of yoga. (YS 1.1)

³³⁴The readings in two primary manuscripts differ. T_m reads *kāladīśā* and L reads *kāladṛśā*. Both seem possible. Even the singular for the dual *dvandva* compound *kāladīś* may still be acceptable because its etymologically related synonym *deśakāla* is allowed to be used as singular. However, I slightly favor the reading *kāladṛśā* because it is less likely for it to change to *kāladīśā* (more familiar sounding and graphically simpler) than the other way around. This part refers to YS 1.26: *sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt*.

³³⁵This stanza pays homage to Viṣṇu (the enemy, i.e., the slayer, of Kaiṭabha). On our author's affiliation to the Vaiṣṇavism, see pp. 138, 149, 153, etc. Despite the common view that associates Śāṅkara with Śaivism, it has been pointed out that Śāṅkara had a religious background closer to Vaiṣṇavism. See Hacker (1965). Cf. Mayeda (1979: 4).

³³⁶Various schools or authors attribute certain sets of characteristics to Īśvara. In our author's case, it is typically three: he often refers to Īśvara as all-knowing (*sarvajña*), having all the power or capable of everything (*sarvaśakti*), and the lord of all (*sarveśvara*) or the supreme lord (*parameśvara*). See for example, p. 101 where the author constructs two *anumānas* (inferences) that assert that Īśvara is *sarvaśakti* and *parameśvara*, taking the one on *jñāna* in the YBh as a model.

³³⁷The question whether Īśvara is capable of actions is discussed in conjunction with the question whether Īśvara has a body or not. First the opponent asks the question in two paragraphs starting with *tathāsarvajño* [59,4] (trl. p. 110), and the answer is given starting with the paragraph *athāsarīratvād asarvajño* [67,5] translated on p. 125. There again the intended opponent is Kumārila.

In this stanza the use of the word *upahīta*, deriving from the root *upa-dhā-*, suggests the author's view that *kriyās* and *phalas* attributed to him are not real. There is some ambiguity in the *phala* part of this compound. When the word appears in conjunction with the word *kriyā* (action), the most natural way to understand it is that it is the effect of an action. Even though that may be figurative, it is hard to conceive that Īśvara receives a result of his action. Another possible interpretation, adopted here, is that the *phala* is the reward for actions of others. The difficulty with this interpretation is that such concept is not mentioned in the body of the text. Another problem with this compound, and in an effect, with the whole stanza is that the mention of defects, actions, and rewards with regard to Īśvara is redundant; it has already been mentioned in the previous stanza. Note that this compound is not without textual problems. The primary manuscripts, T_m and L, both read °*phalam* at the end of this line. This reading is certainly not acceptable, and therefore a simple emendation, first introduced by the copyist of M, *phalaḥ* is adopted here. There remains some possibility that the reading *phalam* was a result of further corruption.

Explanation of the sūtra

The Pātañjalayogaśāstra starts with [the word] “now (*atha*)”; its explanation (*vivaraṇa*) is commenced.³³⁸ There (at the beginning of the explanation) if [the *śāstra* (discipline)] does not have the relationship (*sambandha*) and the objective (*prayojana*) [explicitly] stated, it cannot [bring] a person to taking an action or backing off [from something].³³⁹ Therefore the relationship and the objective [of the *śāstra*], which are intended by the Sūtrakāra, and which are the cause of commencement and termination of human [activities], are first discussed.

Objective Of those two, first, the objective—

173.2

[It] is explained [by the Bhāṣyakāra] by means of showing that it (the *śāstra*) consists of four divisions, as in the *śāstra* of healing (*cikitsāśāstra*). Namely—the *śāstra* of healing consists of four divisions: the disease, the cause of the disease, freedom from disease, and the treatment; the goal [of this *śāstra*] is to explain the domains of the four divisions

173.3

³³⁸I have emended °*śāstravivaraṇam* found in the manuscripts to °*śāstram; tasya vivaraṇam*, which would be *śāstrantasya vivaraṇam* without punctuation. Considering that *nta* and *sya* look similar in the Malayalam script, this is a small emendation. The adjective *anākhyātāsambandhaprayojanam* in the next sentence refers to the noun °*śāstram* (a neuter noun), rather than *vivaraṇam*; this is indicated by the subsequent discussion on the relationship and the objective of a *śāstra*. The use of the adjective presupposes that the word modified by it has appeared earlier. Note also that I read *athetyādi* as a separate word, also modifying a neuter noun °*śāstram*.

In addition, regardless whether this is Śaṅkara’s composition or the one that imitates his style, many commentaries that are probably genuine Śaṅkara’s, particularly those on the Upaniṣads, open up with the same formulation to the proposed reading here, viz., first a compound consisting of the first word(s) of the *mūla* text and the word *ādi*, followed by the title of the *mūla* text, forming a phrase “The TEXT TITLE, starting with the word(s) SUCH AND SUCH. . .” That phrase is followed by the main clause, “its commentary (*vivaraṇa* or *virṛti*) is commenced (*ārabhyate*).” See the reference register in the edition (p. 172). That this beginning of the YVi is clearly intended to have the same basic structure (the first word of the *mūla* text compounded with *ādi*, followed by the title of the *mūla*, and the phrase *vivaraṇam ārabhyate*) is a support for my emendation.

³³⁹The convention that a *śāstra* must have the objective (*prayojana*), the relationship (*sambandha*), and sometimes the *abhidheya* is quite old. Such discussions are found, for example, in ŚV Pratiñāsūtra kk. 11–25, NBh/NV 1.1.1. The tradition may originally have been inspired by the opening discussion in the VMBh although it discusses *prayojana*, *abhidheya* and *sambandha* in a quite different context. Śaṅkara also held that a *śāstra* must have *sambandha* and *prayojana*. For example, see the introduction of the BhGBh, MaUBh 1.1, KaUBh 1.1.1, and MuUBh 1.1.1. On the discussions of *prayojana* in various Buddhist texts, see Funayama (1995).

Śaṅkara, like our author here, presupposes the view that the effect of a *śāstra* are *pravṛtti* (taking an action) and *nivṛtti* (backing off from something). He, however, is critical of the view along with the related idea that a *śāstra* leads a person to *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* by means of *vidhi* and *pratiśedha*. See for example, BSBh 1.1.4 (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: particularly pp. 111 ff., 130 ff., 137 ff.). There, Śaṅkara emphasizes that *śāstras* do not have to have them as purpose; telling the truth without leading to any action can be the goal of *śāstras*, especially the Upaniṣads. In BSBh 1.1.1 (Śāstri and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 41–44) a somewhat related topic that *pramāṇa* leads to *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* is examined. According to Śaṅkara, if the effect of *pramāṇa* is either *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti*, human beings are no better than animals.

by means of a limited [set of] injunctions and prohibitions.³⁴⁰ In the same manner, here also, it is shown that the *śāstra* [of yoga] consists of four divisions [in the section] beginning with [the sūtra], “For the one who knows the difference (*vivekin*), everything is suffering, because of the sufferings from change, torment, and residues [of past experiences], and because of the conflict among the activities of the [three] *guṇas* (YS 2.15).” That is: the object to-be-removed (*heya*) is reincarnation (*saṃsāra*) full of suffering;³⁴¹ its cause (*hetu*) is the union of the seer and the to-be-seen (*draṣṭṛdṛśyasamīyoga*) that originates from ignorance (*avidyā*);³⁴² the means of removal (*hānopāya*) is the unwavering discriminative knowledge (*vivekakhyaṭi*);³⁴³ and when the discriminative knowledge is present, ignorance comes to an end. When it (ignorance) comes to an end, the union between the seer and the to-be-seen ends. This is the removal (*hāna*). That verily is emancipation (*kaivalya*).³⁴⁴ As [this *śāstra*] aims at emancipation which is comparable to freedom from disease [of the *śāstra* of healing], that very emancipation is its objective.

173,10 [Objection] The to-be-removed and its cause should not be placed at the beginning, because [doing so is] pointless. Because the objective of the *śāstra* is the removal. [Thus] discriminative knowledge, which is the means to that [aim (the removal)], only should be discussed. For, nobody enjoins the pain and its cause to someone whose foot sole is pierced by a thorn, forgetting about the removal of that [thorn].³⁴⁵

³⁴⁰The phrase *cikitsāsāstraṃ caturvyūham, rogo rogahetur ārogyam bhaiṣajyam iti* (including *iti*) is found in YBh 2.15. The editors of the 1952 edition suggested to emend the text by inserting *tac ca* in between *°dvāreṇa* and *caturvyūhaviṣaya*,^o making the sentence into two. The text certainly reads more smoothly with the change, but it is still an intelligible sentence without the change; the text up to *bhaiṣajyam iti* forms the subject and the rest predicate. Even though the part *cikitsāsāstram . . . iti* is taken from the Bhāṣya, the author’s intention was not to quote from the Bhāṣya, but use that phrase as part of his sentence. The word *iti* at the end of the phrase should be seen as terminating a list of four divisions.

The expression *vidhīpratiśedhanīyamadvāreṇa* is a result of an emendation proposed in the 1952 edition and adopted here. It is a reasonable emendation, given a similar expression *pravṛtīnīvṛtīnīyamadvāreṇa* later in the paragraph starting with *yo-gānuśāsanam iti* [176,5] (translated on p. 193). It is a curious expression. Literally the expression should mean “by restricting . . .”

³⁴¹See YS 2.16: *heyam duḥkham anāgatam*.

³⁴²See YS 2.17: *draṣṭṛdṛśyayoḥ samīyogo heyahetuḥ*, and YS 2.24: *tasya hetur avidyā*.

³⁴³See YS 2.26: *vivekakhyaṭir aviplavā hānopāyaḥ*.

³⁴⁴See YS 2.25: *tadabhāvāt samīyogābhāvo hānam tat dṛśeḥ kaivalyam*. The expression in our text: *duḥkhapracuraḥ saṃsāro heyah; tasyāvidyānimitto draṣṭṛdṛśya-samīyogo hetuḥ; vivekakhyaṭir aviplavā hānopāyaḥ; vivekakhyaṭau ca satyām avidyā-nīvṛtīḥ, tannīvṛtīv ātyantiko draṣṭṛdṛśyasamīyogoparamo hānam* is a close parallel to that in YBh 2.15: *tatra duḥkhabahulaḥ saṃsāro heyah | pradhānapuruṣayoḥ samīyogo heyahetuḥ | samīyogasyātyantikī nīvṛtīr hānam | hānopāyaḥ samīyogdarśanam*. Notable differences are the mention of *avidyā* as the cause of *samīyoga* and the replacement of *samīyogdarśana* with *vivekakhyaṭi*. The first difference is a result of including the teaching of YS 2.24 (*tasya hetur avidyā*), and the latter incorporates the expression from YS 2.26. The effect of these differences is that emphasis is put on the view that *avidyā* is the ultimate culprit.

³⁴⁵Pain from a thorn is also found in NV 1.1.1 as an example of suffering (*duḥkha*). See the reference register accompanying this part of the text on p. 173 for the text of

[Answer] That is not correct. Because the means of removal presupposes the to-be-removed and its cause. It is not possible to discuss discriminative knowledge, which is the opposite of ignorance, until it is stated that this cycle of reincarnation is what should be removed by this means of removal, and that its cause is the union—itself caused by ignorance—between the seer and the to-be-seen. Because we also³⁴⁶ experience that a patient, who has something to-be-removed and its cause, and who seeks for the means of removal [of the disease] goes for treatment. For, the *śāstra* of healing is not taught without presupposing disease and the cause of disease. 173,12

Relationship The relationship, too [is properly presented in the *śāstra*]— 174,3

The result (*phala*) to be achieved (*sādhyā*) by discriminative knowledge is but the removal; also, the means (*sādhana*) of removal is but discriminative knowledge. Precisely this mutual determination (*itaretaraniyama*) of the aim (*sādhyā*) and the means (*sādhana*) [is the relationship]; there is no other relationship. This is analogous to the mutual determination that the result of the treatment is but the freedom of disease and that the means toward freedom of disease is but the treatment. And this [mutual determination] is based on the *śāstra*.³⁴⁷ 174,4

In conclusion, the instruction of yoga (*yogānuśāsana*) [that is this *śāstra*] has proper relationship and objective. 174,7

Justifying the first sūtra [Objection]³⁴⁸ If the removal is the objective, and its means is discriminative knowledge, then [the first sūtra] should say “Now the instruction of discriminative knowledge (*atha vivekakhyaṭyanuśāsanam*).” For what purpose does the [first] sūtra say “Now the instruction of yoga (*atha yogānuśāsanam*)”? 174,8

[Answer] Because yoga is the means of obtaining it (*vivekakhyaṭi*). Precisely the means should be stated. For, if the goal (to be obtained, *upeya*) is [first] explained, then since the goal presupposes the means (to 174,10

the NV.

³⁴⁶The presence of the word *api* here is conjectural. Seeing various corrections both in T_m and L, I infer that there was a confusing correction already in the archetypal manuscript. The exact situation in the archetype is hard to reconstruct but I consider the presence of *vi* in T_m significant. In the Malayalam script *p* and *v* are often hard to distinguish. The presence of the word *api* fits in the context. The subject matter of this phrasal clause expressing a reason is not identical to the preceding. The reason rather functions by pointing out a real word example. In that sense, qualifying the subject with “also” is appropriate.

³⁴⁷The word *iti* at the end of this paragraph marks the end of the discussion on *prajoyana* and *sambandha* of this *śāstra*. The use of *iti*, followed by a concluding remark that starts with the word *tasmāt* is found frequently in this text. See another example on p. 177.

³⁴⁸Our author starts discussions to justify why the reading *atha yogānuśāsanam* is the first sūtra, raising several other alternatives for the sūtra. I doubt that there were real criticisms on the wording of the first sūtra of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. The following arguments rather appear to be purely an intellectual exercise to write a commentary that guards the text being commented.

obtain it), it will furthermore be necessary to speak of the means along with its divisions and in its entirety. On the contrary, when it (the means, yoga) is denoted, then everything is denoted.

- 174,12 [Objection] How is [yoga] the means to obtain that (*vivekakhyaṭi*)?
- 174,13 [Answer] Because the Sūtrakāra says: “When impurities are removed as the result of exercising the divisions of yoga, the intelligence begins to shine until [it becomes] discriminative knowledge (YS 2.28)”; “When skilled in *nirvicāra[samādhi]*, there will be internal tranquility (YS 1.47)”; and “Then there will be an intellect called carrier of the truth (*rtambharā*) (YS 1.48).” Also the Bhāṣyakāra says: “That (*samādhi*), when the mind is focused, illuminates the real object . . . (YBh 1.1).” And discriminative knowledge is the understanding of the real object. Accordingly, it is appropriate that the instruction of yoga—the means to obtain it (*vivekakhyaṭi*)—has been put in a sūtra at the beginning.
- 174,17 [Objection] Is it not that discriminative knowledge arises after exercising the divisions of yoga? Then [the first sūtra] should state “Now the instruction of the divisions of yoga (*atha yogāṅgānuśāsanam*).”³⁴⁹
- 174,18 [Answer] No. Because [a *śāstra* should have] a beginning with the result.³⁵⁰ For, since yoga is the result of exercising divisions of yoga, it is appropriate to begin with that.
- 174,19 [Objection] If so, the beginning should be the removal.
- 175,1 [Answer] No. Because that is a goal. Namely, it is nothing but a goal. On the other hand, yoga is the goal (*upeya*) for its own divisions, and it is also the means to obtain (*upāya*) discriminative knowledge and [supernatural powers, such as] the ability to become subtle (*aṇimā*),³⁵¹ and so on. Therefore it is more valuable, because it is the cause of two fruits.³⁵²
- 175,3 [It is not appropriate to have the sūtra, “Now the instruction of the divisions of yoga,” at the beginning]also because [the first sūtra] introduces

³⁴⁹The Pātañjalayogaśāstra in fact teaches the eight divisions of yoga (*yogāṅgas*), starting from 2.28.

³⁵⁰The answer in this paragraph, which may be paraphrased as “it is appropriate to start a *śāstra* by stating the result” may seem contradictory to what has just been argued: the means to obtain a goal, rather than the goal should be taught. As can be observed in the paragraphs that follow, our author distinguishes a goal (*upeya*) and the result (*phala*). That seems to be his strategy to avoid such a contradiction. Still, the arguments appear weak. This is one reason to suspect that this part was an intellectual exercise to guard the text being commented.

³⁵¹In the Pātañjalayogaśāstra YS 3.44 and accompanying Bhāṣya mention the well-known supernatural powers *aṇimā*, *mahimā*, etc.

³⁵²The reading *phaladvayanimittatvāt* is conjectural. The readings in two primary manuscripts (T_m and L) are unintelligible. It is not even certain what the scribe of L meant to write because there the letters *pa* and *va* are often indistinguishable. Of the three possible readings found in the primary manuscripts (*phalavayanimitta*° or *phapapayanimitta*° for L and *phalavannimitta*° for T_m), *phalavayanimitta*° requires the least change to produce a reasonable reading, *phaladvayanimitta*°, which I have adopted. We can be reasonably certain that the corrupt reading *phalavayanimitta*° was already present in the common ancestor (possibly the direct exemplar of both T_m and L). The reading found in T_m was probably a result of the scribe’s attempt to produce a meaningful reading.

the next sūtra. For, if the first sūtra was to say “Now the instruction of the divisions of yoga,” then it would not be appropriate to say “[It (*asampraññāta-samādhi*) is] yoga [and it is] the termination of the activities of the mind (YS 1.2).”³⁵³ In that case, the [next] sūtra should read “*yama, niyama,*” and so on (YS 2.29).

If you say—[Objection] But then that is exactly how [the sūtra] should read—[Answer] No. For the next sūtra, “[It (*asampraññāta-samādhi*) is] yoga [and it is] the termination of the activities of the mind,” has the purpose of showing the relationship between discriminative knowledge—whose means is yoga,³⁵⁴ and which is the means to obtain the removal—and the removal which is the result.

[Objection] How, then, can it have the purpose of showing the relationship while it states the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of the seedless immersion (*nirbījasamādhi*)?³⁵⁵

[Answer] That is correct. Even so, the sūtra, which is [in fact] only setting forth the relationship between the removal and its means, amounts to the definition of seedless immersion (*nirbījasamādhi*). For, the removal is not different from the immersion which is characterized as suppression (*nīrodha*). There still is the following distinction: in the case of immersion characterized as suppression, there will be further commencement (*pravṛtti*); on the other hand, in the case of removal, cessation (*nivṛtti*) is permanent. But in the state of immersion [characterized as suppression] there is no distinction from the removal at all.³⁵⁶

Namely, [the Sūtrakāra] says [in the immediately following sūtra after 1.2], “At that time the seer stays in his original state (YS 1.3),” [using the same expression as in the last sūtra] “Or³⁵⁷ the power to cognize

³⁵³The translation here follows the interpretation of the sūtra in the YVi where the author states that the sūtra is the definition of the *asampraññāta-samādhi*. This is somewhat counter-intuitive, but our author is clear about sūtra 1.2 being the definition of *asampraññāta-samādhi*. See, for example, the last two paragraphs of the commentary of the current sūtra. See also note 401.

³⁵⁴The editors of the 1952 edition suggested the reading *yogopeyāyā(h)* instead of *yogopāyāyā(h)*, the reading attested in all the manuscripts. It is understandable that they preferred a *tatpuruṣa* compound rather than a *bahuvrīhi* compound, but the following word, another adjective to modify the word *vivekakhyaṭeḥ*, reads *hānopāyābhūtāyā(h)*. The author made an extra effort to make it clear that *hānopāya* is to be read as a *tatpuruṣa* compound. I take it that the author was illustrating the position of *vivekakhyaṭi* using two compounds that both have the word *upāya* as a member. Even without the use of *°bhūta*, in the second compound the case ending of the word *yogopāyāyāḥ* makes it clear that it is a *bahuvrīhi* compound.

³⁵⁵Our author considers YS 1.2 to be the definition of *nirbīja-samādhi/asampraññāta-samādhi*. See note 401. Cf. also note 353.

³⁵⁶This paragraph offers a glimpse of our author’s soteriological position, which is more clearly stated in two paragraphs below. While defending the arrangement of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, he implies that the best yoga can offer, *nirbījasamādhi*, is still inferior to removal (*hāna*). Discriminative knowledge is, as repeatedly expressed, is the means to achieve the final goal. What one might consider as the highest goal in the system of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, *nirbījasamādhi*, is just a temporal experience of real salvation, according to our author.

³⁵⁷I have emended the particle *ca* found in all the manuscripts and in the 1952 edition to *vā*, following the reading of the sūtra. There is no indication in the YVi manuscripts

(*citiśakti*)³⁵⁸ being established in its original state (YS 4.34)” is emancipation.³⁵⁹ For, emancipation, [characterized as *citiśakti*’s] being established in its original state, is the removal (*hāna*).³⁶⁰ Therefore, in order to strengthen the understanding of the purpose of the *śāstra*, the emancipation is revealed by [defining] the seedless immersion (*nirbījasamādhi*)

that our author had the reading *ca* for sūtra 4.34 when it is quoted and explained. The exchange may have been introduced by a scribe who was unaware that the particle *vā* was part of the quotation but thought that there should be *ca* to connect two sentences.

The editors of the 1952 edition proposes to insert *iti* after the first quote (from YS 1.3). I do not find it necessary.

³⁵⁸In the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, *puruṣa* is identified as *citiśakti*. In the YS the word *citiśakti* appears only in the last sūtra 4.34, but it already appears in the Bhāṣya on sūtra 1.2. The author of the Bhāṣya continues to paraphrase *draṣṭṛ* in YS 1.3 with *citiśakti*. The author of the YVi glosses the word as a *karmadhāraya* compound (*citir eva śaktiś citiśaktiḥ*) (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952:11,26). Also, he understands the part *citi* denotes the verbal root *cit-* and hence the *śakti* to be the one expressed by the verbal root. This observation is based on the sentence *yathā pacyādayaḥ śaktayaḥ śaktimadapekṣāprāpanīyajanmāno na svayaṃ śaktayaḥ* that immediately follows the compound analysis above. That *puruṣa* is the root *cit-* (following the understanding of the author of the YVi) is repeatedly expressed in the YBh and in the YVi (first expressed in the YBh 1.2 *citiśaktir aparīṇāminī* . . . on which the YVi’s compound analysis above is given). The view implicit in such an interpretation is that *puruṣa* is changeless because it is a verbal root *cit-* and because the capacity (*śakti*) of a verbal root is consistent. Similarly YS 2.20 has *draṣṭā dṛśīmātraḥ*, again identifying *puruṣa* with a verbal root *dṛś-*. There it is more explicit that the root *dṛś-* exists without a substance or a subject. This is a solution to the problem that anything denoted by a substantive is subject to change. This makes us think of grammarians’ influence on the formation of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. It should be reminded that the beginning of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra imitates that of the VMBh and that the Pātañjalayogaśāstra accepts the *sphoṭa* theory. Note also that identification of *puruṣa* (masculine) with *citiśakti* (feminine) is unique to the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, absent in the Sāṃkhya tradition. Another interesting point is that both in the YBh and the YVi the root *cit-* is seen as special in that it does not require the locus. This is expressed in the YVi on YS 1.2 *citiḥ punaḥ svayaṃ eva śaktir nārthāntaram apekṣate*, following the sentence . . . *svayaṃ śaktayaḥ* above. The view that *puruṣa* is nothing but the root *cit-* is presupposed in the discussion in YBh 1.3 starting with *yadī citir eva puruṣaḥ* . . . Such discussions are echoed in Śaṅkara’s discussion on the meaning of the root *upalab-* in the Upad 2.2.76i ff. where Śaṅkara argues that *ātman/upalabdḥ* is eternally only *upalabdhi* (*nityopalabdhimātra eva hy upalabdḥā*), and that *ātman* does not change.

³⁵⁹Although the last word of this sentence (*kaivalyam*) is not enclosed in the quotes, it is necessary to complete the sentence meant to be referred. The whole sūtra 4.34 reads: *puruṣārthasūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratīṣṭhā vā citiśaktir iti*. The word *kaivalyam* is implied to be supplied in the second statement. It is important for our author to have the word *kaivalya* in this sentence to illustrate that similar expressions are used in the YS to describe the state in *asamprajñātasamādhi* and *kaivalya*.

³⁶⁰Two emendations are involved in this sentence. The first is the reading *svarūpapratīṣṭhatvaṃ* adopted from the 1952 edition instead of °*pratiṣṭhaṃ* in the manuscripts. The former reading is preferable because what we want here is a substantive rather than an adjective. The other emendation is from *kaivalyam āha* to *kaivalyaṃ hānam*. Considering that this paragraph elaborates the point at the end of the last paragraph (“in the state of immersion (*samādhi*) there is no distinction to the ultimate removal (*hāna*),”) there should be a reference to *hāna*. The reading, found in all the witnesses, is non-sensical, but the presence of the syllable *ha* in that reading suggests that it is a corruption involving the word *hāna*. Our author is pointing out the state in *asamprajñātasamādhi* (defined in YS 1.2) is described in the same way as *kaivalya* is described in the YS and therefore that they are not different.

[in the next sūtra].

Accordingly, it is not true that seedless immersion (*nirbījasamādhi*) is the means to establish emancipation, as some say.³⁶¹ Instead, only knowledge is the means, through cessation of ignorance. Because the state of being bound [to the cycle of rebirth] is caused by ignorance. Therefore even if “the instruction of yoga” is placed in the [first] sūtra, since the purpose of yoga is knowledge, [the Sūtrakāra] shows the relationship between knowledge and removal, too, with this [sūtra]. Therefore [the sūtra is] appropriately composed. Also, in order [to express] the relationship with the next sūtra, the [first] sūtra should contain [the words] “the instruction of yoga.”³⁶² 175,14

Even though there is also a teaching of the means for those who seek a result (*phala*) and have come to expect the means to obtain the result, this (the means) is not the objective. Since everyone acts in view of a result, that (the result) is the sole objective.³⁶³ 176,3

Explanation of the Bhāṣya

“The instruction of yoga”— This is comparable to [the way] a student is instructed by means of determining specific actions (*pravṛtti*) [that he should do] and withdrawal from actions (*nivṛtti*) [that he should not do]. Likewise [the *śāstra*] is called the instruction of yoga, like the instruction to pupils (*antevāsyānuśāsana*), since it essentially resembles [the instruction to pupils] in that [the *śāstra*] determines a specific goal (*sādhya*), means (*sādhana*), and their divisions (*aṅga*).³⁶⁴ “Instruction” = instruct- 176,5

³⁶¹Cf. Vācaspati (Tattvavaiśārādī) on YBh 1.1 *nirbījasamādhi* brings about the emancipation is a straight-forward interpretation of the beginning of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. Our author’s interpretation that (discriminative) knowledge is the means to attain emancipation is rather forced and particular. This might be comparable to similar insistence on knowledge in Śaṅkara’s works, such as the BSBh, BhGBh, etc.

³⁶²This paragraph concludes the discussion on the appropriateness of the first sūtra started in the paragraph *nanu ca* [174,8] translated on p. 189. The argument in this paragraph is a little forced. Still, one may note the author’s insistence that knowledge is the means.

³⁶³I have not given a literal translation of the word *iti* at the end of this sentence. The word *iti* and even the whole sentence appear to be a little out of place. Most likely the word *iti* here signals the completion of a major segment of the text. And the segment could be the preliminary discussion on the objective and the relationship of the whole *śāstra*. However, the discussion on the objective and the relationship had completed (see page 189), and the mention of only *prayojana* here is not congruent with the immediately preceding discussions. It is possible that this is a trace of a correction going wrong; this passage was originally omitted while copying but supplied in the margin with a marking in the body indicating where to insert the text; the insertion point was misunderstood by the next scribe. If this passage is indeed misplaced, the proper place would be at the end of the discussion on *prayojana*, i.e., immediately before the passage starting with *sambandho ’pi* [174,3] translated on p. 189. The presence of *iti* at the end of this passage also becomes explicable if it indeed is misplaced. The word *iti* would mark the end of the discussion on *prayojana*.

³⁶⁴I suspect that the sentence, especially the part *tathā viśiṣṭasādhyasādhanaatad-aṅganiyamamātrasādṛśyāt*, is corrupt. Given the somewhat similar discussion in the

ing (*anusiṣṭi*).³⁶⁵ The *śāstra* is the instruction of yoga³⁶⁶ by which or in which yoga is instructed.

176,9 That word “now” means the declaration of the topic. “The declaration of the topic (*adhikāra*)” = opening (*ārambha*) = announcement (*prastāva*), and “meaning (*artha*)” = sense (*abhidheya*). [These words are connected as a *karmadhāraya* compound and then form a *bahuvrīhi* compound.]³⁶⁷ [This interpretation is] based on the authority of a *smṛti* (the Mahābhāṣya) by hands of a learned.³⁶⁸

176,11 [Objection]³⁶⁹ The learned ones teach in a *smṛti* that the word *atha*

TaiUBh (see the apparatus on p. 176 for the text), the discussion could have been longer. However, I cannot offer a viable emendation.

³⁶⁵This seemingly meaningless—particularly in translation—paraphrase is meant to reject the ambiguity that the word *anuśāsana* with the *-na* suffix can denote the means to instruct. By paraphrasing *anuśāsana* with *anusiṣṭi*, the author claims that the word *anuśāsana* is meant to refer to the action of instruction, not the means of instruction.

³⁶⁶I consider the sentence or the phrase *yogānuśāsanam śāstram* to be part of the Bhāṣya. This is equivalent to the sentence *yogānuśāsanam śāstram adhikṛtaṃ vedītavayam* in most transmission of the YBh after the sentence *athety ayam adhikārārthaḥ* (see below). The sequence, starting from the sūtra, *atha yogānuśāsanam || athety ayam adhikārārthaḥ | yogānuśāsanam śāstram adhikṛtaṃ vedītavayam* forms a closer parallel to the opening of the VMBh: *atha śabdānuśāsanam | athety ayam śabdo 'dhikārārthaḥ prayujyate | śabdānuśāsanam śāstram adhikṛtaṃ vedītavayam*. In my reconstruction the sūtra and Bhāṣya, combined, reads *atha yogānuśāsanam || yogānuśāsanam śāstram | athety ayam adhikārārthaḥ*. It is conceivable that the version of the YBh our author used had the opening not exactly parallel to that of the VMBh. It may, however, be noted that there are some uncertainties how well the text of the VMBh is established in the editions. Cf. Cardona (1980:248–50) for the overview of the discussions on the transmission of the VMBh. Cf. also Witzel (1986). Note that the reading of the quote from the VMBh in the YVi below (see pp. 177 for the edition and 196 for the translation) is somewhat different, although close enough to call it a quote, from the readings found in editions of the VMBh. Still, the parallelism is easily recognizable. The current paragraph in our text could be easily seen to be an explanation of the word *yogānuśāsanam* in the sūtra itself. However, it is preferable to see that our author has started to gloss the Bhāṣya, and its first sentence is *yogānuśāsanam śāstram*. Otherwise, the presence of the word *śāstram* is inexplicable. The sentence should be seen as Bhāṣya's gloss of the word *yogānuśāsanam* in the sūtra.

³⁶⁷The sentence is a typical *vigraha* to analyze a compound, *adhikārārthaḥ* in this case. The author of the YVi is clarifying the meanings of constituent words *adhikāra* and *artha* by listing synonyms because they both have divergent meanings. Also, he is showing the relationship between the constituents (in the same case, viz., *karmadhāraya*) and the type of the compound syntactically.

³⁶⁸Thus the learned person is Patañjali. Patañjali, the author of the VMBh, is mentioned by name in the YVi in the commentary on YS 3.44 (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952:299). However, our author shows no awareness of Patañjali being associated with the text he comments upon, viz., the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. Note that the beginning of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra emulates that of the VMBh. See the parallel passage in the edition part. See also note 366.

³⁶⁹Our author consistently starts the objection with the expression *nanu ca* as found here. As noted by Wezler (1983:36), this is fairly consistent in the YVi and might indeed be idiosyncratic to the author. A notable text that uses the expression *nanu ca* frequently is the VMBh that set the standard for Sanskrit commentaries. In Śaṅkara's BSBh the use is significantly less (as far as we look at published editions). Still, the Nirṇaya Sagar Press edition of the BSBh has the expression in 2.3.19, 2.3.43, 2.3.47, 4.2.5, 4.2.6, and 4.2.20. The concentration is a little intriguing. It is nonetheless necessary to wait for a critical study of the BSBh manuscripts before concluding anything

means “immediately after.” Namely, [Śabara] says:

It is experienced that [this word *atha* at the beginning of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (JS)³⁷⁰] has the meaning of introducing something that comes immediately after something has concluded.³⁷¹

[Answer] No. Because [the word *atha*] always has the meaning “open- 177,1
ing,” and because the meaning “immediately after” must be [secondarily] understood. For example—when we say “[he is] a son,” it is understood that [the man can be] a father.³⁷² But the meaning of “son” is not “father.” In the same manner, here, only “opening” is being directly expressed. On the other hand, the meaning “immediately after” is [secondarily] understood. For this very reason, [Śabara] says “It is [often] experienced that [this word *atha* at the beginning of the JS] has the meaning of introducing something that comes immediately after something has concluded.” If the meaning of *atha* was “immediately after,” then he would have said [more explicitly], “[This word *atha* is used] to signify that the beginning comes immediately after something has concluded.”

Also, [the word] “something that comes immediately after (*anantara*)” 177,5

from the use of this expression. We cannot exclude the possibility that the BSBh, being one of the most heavily and closely studied text, has gone through many generations of cleanup in style.

³⁷⁰JS 1.1.1: *athāto dharmajijñāsā*.

³⁷¹ŚBh 1.1.1. The whole sentence runs as follows: *tatra loke 'yam athaśabdo vṛttād anantarasya prakriyārtho dṛṣṭaḥ*. A similar discussion of the meaning of *atha* at the beginning of sūtra texts appears also in the BSBh on BS 1.1.1: *athāto brahmajijñāsā* (note the parallel structure of the JS 1.1.1 and the BS 1.1.1). Śāṅkara holds that the meaning of *atha* at the beginning of BS 1.1.1 is *ānantarya*, just like Śabara, although he claims the intention to learn about Brahman (*brahmajijñāsā*) does not necessarily come after the intention to learn about Dharma (*dharmajijñāsā*). The antagonist of Śāṅkara here holds the view that the *brahmajijñāsā* must come after *dharmajijñāsā*. Śāṅkara was probably dealing with the traditional view that the two sūtra texts (the JS and the BS) formed a set and to be studied in succession. (Śāṅkara considers the JS and the BS form one continuous text; he refers to JS 3.3.14: *śrutilingavākyaaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyanāṃ samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakaśāt* as belonging to “an earlier section (*pūrvasmīn kāṇḍe*).”) As *dharmajijñāsā* is placed at the beginning of the JS, this interpretation of the meaning of *atha* allows one to begin studying the BS without learning the JS, or the discipline of Mīmāṃsā. We may say that Śāṅkara and the author of the YVi are in agreement in that they both refer to the Mīmāṃsaka view of the interpretation of the word *atha* and that they are both anti-Mīmāṃsaka when the word *atha* is concerned. I am unaware of any other author who is so concerned about how the Mīmāṃsakas understand the meaning of the word *atha* as Śāṅkara or the author of the YVi. Note that the author of the YVi here ignores the more developed discussion by Kumāṛila in his ŚV while Śāṅkara appears to be aware of it.

³⁷²The sentence is vague, but the idea behind this example should be the one that frequently appears in śāstric literature—that a man can be a son or a father or many other things. In that vein, the text would read better if we replace *putra* with *puruṣa* and *pitṛ* with *putra*. (A man is always a son.) There is some suspicion that the original text read as such and the reading we have is a result of corruption. The idea is again already expressed in VMBh 1.1.66. Śāṅkara mentions the idea in BSBh 2.2.17. (See page 177 for the text.) There, Śāṅkara refers to the written symbol of the number one in the decimal notation system. He says it is a line (*rekhā*). The passage is a paraphrase of another in YBh 3.13. Here we might have a testimony to the writing system (a line representing the numeral 1) Śāṅkara and the author of the YBh were familiar with.

signifies the thing[, a substance,] that comes immediately after (*anantarahāvin*). And, a *smṛti* (VMBh) indeed says thus:

The primary meaning of some indeclinables is nominal, of others it is primarily verbal. Such words as “upwards (*uccair*),” “downwards (*nīcāir*),” etc., have the nominal meaning as their primary meaning. Such words as “near (*hīruk*),” “separately (*prthak*),” etc., have the verbal meaning as their primary meaning. There is no other meaning of indeclinables apart from these. (VMBh 1.1.38 or 1.2.47)³⁷³

Hence, if the meaning of the word *atha* is “immediately after” [as you claim], hearing a nominal suffix is reasonable, because its primary meaning is a substance. On the other hand, if [the meaning of *atha* is] the action of beginning [as I claim], then it is reasonable not to hear a nominal suffix, because its primary meaning is something that does not exist; and that is the case].³⁷⁴

177,10 In conclusion, it is reasonable that the word *atha* only has the meaning of announcing [a topic].

177,11 The meaning of the word *iti* in the “the meaning of *atha* is the declaration of the topic (*athety adhikārthaḥ*)” is to show that [the word *atha*] is being quoted. For example, “He said ‘cow’ (*‘gaur’ ity āha*).” Even though the meaning of the word *atha* is well-known, it is mentioned [by the Bhāṣyakāra] in order to make a student pay attention to what is going to be started. Indeed the following formula is well-known in *śruti*:

I am going to explain to you. Pay close attention while I am explaining. (BĀU 2.4.4/4.5.5)

178,2 Being asked, “Then what is yoga, whose instruction is announced [as the topic]?” [the Bhāṣyakāra] says—**Yoga is *samādhi***. Since [the Bhāṣyakāra uses] the word ‘*samādhi* (assimilation),’³⁷⁵ [he] rejects the meaning “to unite” of the root *yuj-*, which [appears in the Dhātupāṭha] as

³⁷³Note that the quote here is not exactly the same as what we find in edition of the VMBh. Parallel passages appear twice in the VMBh, and in both cases, the editions of the VMBh have *ādi* at the end of examples while the quote here does not. Perhaps more importantly, the whole part on *taddhīta* or on *tibanta* is missing in the quote here in the YVi. Instead, it has a sentence to exclude the third category of *avyayas*.

³⁷⁴As seen in the critical apparatus, the text of the preceding two sentences has been transmitted in a confused state. It is most conspicuously observed in the nonsensical reading *ārambhakriyārthatve tu sa tu* recorded in both T_m and L. The reading was already in the common archetype. Even more curious is the reading *vibhakt-yarthaśravaṇam* in all the Devanagari manuscripts. The scribes of T_d and M inserted °*rtha*° when their respective exemplars did not have the syllable. I do not believe that there was communication between T_d and M. What probably happened was that two scribes independently and subconsciously inserted the syllable °*rtha*° to form a compound that sounded more natural to them.

³⁷⁵The translation “assimilation” for the word *samādhi* is chosen here because usual translations of the word, such as “concentration,” etc., do not fit in the discussions below. In the following *samādhi* is said to be “a property of the mind common to all stages.” It is explicitly mentioned in our text that *samādhi* is the state of stability in all the five stages of the mind. See the paragraph starting with *nanu ca bhūmīnām*. . . below [178,19] (translated on p. 199).

yuḥir yoge (7.7), instead, he accepts the meaning “assimilation (*samādhi*),” [which appears in the Dhātupāṭha as] *yuḥa samādhau* (4.68). Yoga is assimilating (*samādhāna*).³⁷⁶

[Objection] If the sūtra is explained up to “yoga is *samādhi*,” then the Bhāṣya that starts with “That (*samādhi*) is a [property of mind] common to all stages” is seen as detached.³⁷⁷

[Answer] There is no such fault. For, when it is said that [yoga is] *samādhi* here, since [*samādhi*] presupposes something to be assimilated[, i.e., the subject,] and since there are many things that can be assimilated, there is a dispute among those who know much,³⁷⁸ such as “Is *ātman* assimilated?” “Is the body assimilated?” or “Are the senses assimilated?” Also, since assimilation presupposes something that qualifies itself [as in “what exactly is it?”]³⁷⁹ [it is appropriate that the Bhāṣya continues the

³⁷⁶It is interesting to note that the two entries in the Dhātupāṭha appear to reflect the two major trends in defining yoga. One is, as seen here, to define it as *samādhi* (perhaps originally meant as concentration, but not necessarily as describing a mental process). The other is to define it as *saṃyoga*. One example of the latter definition (from the Vaiśeṣikasūtra) is dealt with later in our commentary. See pp. 200 ff. The same definition was presupposed by the Naiyāyikas (NS/NBh 4.2.38); even the Pātāñjalayogaśāstra 2.53–55 may have had the same system in its background. The system of that yoga probably had the Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika type of view on how perception occurs: by the contact between objects, sense faculties, *manas* and *ātman*. Their yoga was a gradual process to detach the component of perception from the outermost one, viz., first the objects, then the sense faculties. When *manas* resides with *ātman* (*saṃyoga*), it is yoga. See also Carakasamhitā Śārīrasthāna 2.138–139.

³⁷⁷This question arises only from the assumption that yoga/*samādhi* is something special, that should be achieved with efforts. The statement that it is present in all the stages of mind appears betrays such an assumption and thus the following discussions on the stages of mind appears to be detached. This is also the reason I have difficulty translating the word *samādhi* in this context. (See note 375 above.) Thus I think this question was posed by our author himself, as a hermeneutical problem. He felt that the transition was abrupt, but was compelled to defend the text he was commenting upon.

³⁷⁸As the editors of the 1952 edition emended to *bahuvīdhā pratipatṭeḥ*, the expression *bahuvīdhā vipratipatṭeḥ* might seem awkward. However, the construction, genitive plural plus the word *vipratipatti* is found in Śāṅkara’s works. See BSBh 2.1.11: *prasiddhamāhātmyābhīmatānām api tīrthakarāṇām kapilakaṇabhukprabhṛtīnām parasparavipratipattidarśanāt*; 21: *tatraivaṃ sati saṃyagjñāne puruṣāṇām vipratipattir anupapannā*; BĀUBh 4.5.15: *vipratipattis ca śāstrārthapratipattīṇām bahuvīdhām api*. Cf. also BSBh 2.3.18: *sa kiṃ kāṇabhujānām ivāgantukacaitanyaḥ, svato ’cetanāḥ, āhosvit sāmṅkhyānām iva nityacaitanyasvarūpa eva, iti vāvipratipatṭeḥ saṃśayaḥ*. Here the word *bahuvīd* is probably used somewhat sarcastically.

The alternatives (*ātman*, *śarīra*, *indriyas*) listed as the subject of *samādhi* call for some attention. These three, the most conspicuously the term *ātman*, are not part of the Pātāñjalayogaśāstra’s terminology (an indication that our author is thinking of a wide context). This set of three appears to reflect our author’s view of what constitute an individual. What is missing here is the word *manas* or *citta*. (Our author does not distinguish *manas* and *citta*. He does not clearly distinguish *manas/citta* and *buddhi*, either.) But he omitted it because that is the correct answer to the question what is assimilated. The set of *ātman*, *manas* (or *citta*), *śarīra* (or *deha*), and *indriyas* is what our author generally thought of as the constituents of an individual. This is a rather simple view, somewhat reminiscent of the Naiyāyika/Vaiśeṣika view of an individual.

³⁷⁹See the next paragraph for what is considered to be the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of *samādhi*.

discussion on *samādhi*, and hence there is no fault that the Bhāṣya up to *yogaḥ samādhiḥ* and the following are detached].³⁸⁰

178,9 In order to answer the inevitable question, “To what does it (*samādhi*) belong, what qualifies it?” [the Bhāṣyakāra] states the following—**And that is a property of the mind common to all stages.** It is a property of mind, not of *ātman*, etc. And the mind assimilates itself because it does not require another agent.

178,11 Being asked, “Then what are those stages?” [the Bhāṣyakāra] answers—**The stages are fixated (*kṣipta*) [mind], stupefied (*mūḍha*) [mind],** etc. The past passive suffix *-ta* in ‘fixated (*kṣipta*),’ etc., is used in the meaning that the object of an action is the agent itself (*karmakarṭṛ*). Compare, “The granary collapsed by itself.”³⁸¹ **Fixated [mind]** means a benumbed [mind] being fixed with an undesirable object. **Stupefied [mind]** lacks the distinction [between different objects]. **Scattered (*vikṣipta*) [mind]** means being fixated at several objects [where the passive past participle is used] in the same sense [as in the case of fixated mind] in which the object of the action is the agent itself. Also, it is not capable of distinguishing [different objects] for the very reason that it is scattered. **Focused [mind] (*ekāgra*)** means the [mind] holding a consistent notion. **Suppressed [mind] (*niruddha*)** is without any notion—[All the adjectives modify the word] the mind.

178,15 [Objection] If [the Bhāṣyakāra] intends to talk about stages [of the mind], properties (*dharma*), why is an property-bearer (*dharmin*) [that is the mind] discussed by “fixated [mind],” etc.?³⁸²

178,16 [Answer] There is no such fault. The property-bearer indicates exactly the property. Because the properties belong to the property-bearer. For example: If one is asked “What is the characteristic of being a cow?” the property is indicated by the property-bearer, by saying, “It has horns and a hump, and is hairy toward its tail.”³⁸³ Therefore [the Bhāṣyakāra] means

³⁸⁰The translation is based on the understanding that the sentence that starts with *iha samādhir ity ukte...* consists of two main clauses even though it has four phrases in the ablative case expressing reasons. This understanding derives from the positions of the particle *ca*. The first two phrases that end in the ablative case are combined by the particle *ca*. And semantically those are two stages. This should lead to the first major reason *bahuvīdāṃ vipratipatteh*. The second reason *svaviśeṣaṇākāṅkṣatvāc ca samādheḥ* is again connected with first major reason by the particle *ca*. This understanding fits the following commentary as well. The two components of the question *kasyāyaṃ, kiṃviśeṣaṇakah* at the beginning of the next paragraph refer to the two reasons of the current sentence. The first (*kasyāyaṃ*) corresponds to the question of what is assimilated, and the second *kiṃviśeṣaṇakah* corresponds to similarly worded *svaviśeṣaṇākāṅkṣatvāc ca samādheḥ*.

³⁸¹See MBh 3.1.87, Wezler (1983: nn. 22–24).

³⁸²Note that all the terms to refer to the different stages of mind in the Bhāṣya are adjectives in the nominative case, neuter singular. They naturally modify the word *cittam*. And this is the understanding our author holds and is the background of this objection.

³⁸³According to Wezler (1984a), this is a reference to VS 2.1.18. Wezler points out that the *sūtra* is referred to in support of the view held by the author of the YVi, and that the *sūtra*, therefore, was favorable to him. Of course the archetypal description of the cow appears already in the VMBh.

to say that fixation, etc., are the stages, the properties of the mind.

[Objection] If the stages are properties of the mind and *samādhi*, too, 178,19 is [a property of the mind], then how do we distinguish *samādhi* that is said to be “common to all the stages” as a common denominator from the stages? [If there is nothing special about *samādhi*, it would not be necessary to introduce the term.]³⁸⁴ [Answer] That is not correct. Because *samādhi* is universal, while the stages are particulars. That is, in such phrases as “[the mind] stays fixated,” “[the mind] stays stupefied,” “[the mind] stays scattered,” and “[the mind] stays focused,” and “[the mind] stays suppressed,”³⁸⁵ stasis (*sthiti*) in the stages “fixated,” etc., accompanies universally. And *samādhi* is stasis. Therefore [*samādhi*] is commonly³⁸⁶ present in all the stages in the form of a universal.³⁸⁷

[According to AA 5.1.41–42] *sarvabhūmiprthivī* [*bhyām aṇaṇau* and *ta-* 179,3 *syeśvaraḥ*] the suffix *a* (*aṇ*) [added to *sarvabhūmī*] gives the meaning “governing [all stages].” Since the rule *anuśatikādī* [*nāñ ca*] (AA 7.3.20) is applicable [because *sarvabhūmī* is included in the *gaṇa anuśatikādī*], [like in *ānuśātika*, the first vowel] in both constituents of the compound [*sarvabhūmī*] is substituted by the longest modification[, thus resulting in the form *sārvabhauma* as found in the Bhāṣya].

On the other hand, some people explain the stages as external and 179,4 internal objects of *saṃyama* meditation.³⁸⁸ [But] for them there is no

³⁸⁴The whole exchange appears a little clumsy. Answering to the question “How (*ka-tham*)...?” with “no” does not appear to be usual. I have interpreted and translated it as short for “*naiṣa doṣaḥ*” below. Still, some text might have been lost.

³⁸⁵I have conjecturally added *niruddham* after *vikṣiptam* and *ekāgram*, while it is missing in all the manuscript and the *editio princeps*. Also, following the *editio princeps*, I have emended *vikṣiptam* at the beginning of the series to *kṣiptam* and *kṣiptam* at the third position to *vikṣiptam* so that the order of the stages follows that of the Bhāṣya. I do not believe that the swapped positions of *kṣipta* and *vikṣipta* or the lack of *niruddha* were intended by the author. I judge rather that those are results of the damage to the text during the transmission. Cf. the following for the state of the text preserved in manuscripts. Frequent appearances of the same words (*kṣiptam*, etc.) may have contributed to the corruption in this particular sentence.

³⁸⁶The reading *sādhāraṇyena* is a result of emendation. Most manuscripts read *prādhānyena*, except T_m *sādhānyena* before correction. It is likely that the common archetype of T_m and L indeed read *prādhānyena*. What probably happened was that the scribe of T_m first wrote *sādhānyena*, expecting the word *sādhāraṇyena* before realizing that he had written something not in his exemplar. Nonetheless, I adopt the reading what he subconsciously expected; otherwise, the sentence is not coherent.

³⁸⁷The word *iti* at the end of this paragraph marks the end of a topic, and hence no specific translation is given.

³⁸⁸The relation of *saṃyama* with particular objects and its result is the main topic of the third pāda. Here the view that the *bhūmīs* in the context of YBh 1.1 is the same *bhūmīs* in the context of *saṃyamās* in YS 3.6 (*tasya bhūmiṣu vinīyogaḥ*) is criticized. Someone held the view (according to the YVi) that they are the same, presumably because the same word *bhūmi* is used in both places. It should be noted that the author of the YVi is referring to an interpretation of the YBh here. It is probable that he is using a sub-commentary on the YBh. Note, however, that the interpretation is different from that of Vācaspati.

Philologically, our manuscripts indicate that their common ancestor consistently read *samayama* instead of *saṃyama*. It is interesting that such an obviously faulty reading was consistently adopted and more or less faithfully reproduced.

chance to place [a stage and the mind] in the same case (*sāmānādhikaraṇya* relationship) [in the way the Bhāṣyakāra does:] “When the mind is scattered. . .,”³⁸⁹ and they contradict their own doctrine. How? [According to their interpretation,] that on which [the mind] is fixated is “fixated”; that with regard to which [the mind is stupefied] is “stupefied”; and that with regard to which [the mind is scattered] is “scattered.”³⁹⁰ If this [interpretation] were true, then they could not be the object of *saṃyama* meditation. In that (in the state of *saṃyama*) *kṣepa*, etc., cannot occur. For, *saṃyama* meditation is possible at the state of focused (*ekāgra*).

179,8 Furthermore, since the root *kṣip-* does not have the meaning of “steadiness,” etc., it is not possible to have the *niṣṭhā* suffix in the meaning of locus (*adhikaraṇa*) [as prescribed by Pāṇini].³⁹¹

179,9 Furthermore, when the mind has been suppressed, *saṃyama* meditation, too, will not exist because no activity exists. Accordingly, the object of *saṃyama* meditation does not exist. For, if suppression was a specific object, the mind would not be suppressed. Because at that time (when the mind is suppressed) [the mind] ceases to take an object. Also, [there is a problem that] completely enumerating [the stages] is not possible. Because the objects of *saṃyama* meditation are not just five of *kṣipta*, etc. Because they are innumerable.

179,12 Objection: Some consider yoga differently. Namely, they say—³⁹²

179,13 **Pleasure and pain arise from the contact between senses, mind, and objects. [Yoga] is a union (*saṃyoga*),³⁹³ which follows restraining of breaths and mind, and is**

³⁸⁹This is a reference to the next sentence in the Bhāṣya. See page 205 ff.

³⁹⁰The last phrase *vikṣipiyate 'sminn iti ca vikṣiptam* is missing in all the manuscripts and the *editio princeps*. The context requires this last item to be mentioned as well. One, albeit not very strong, indication that there is a textual corruption is the lack of the particle *ca* in the preceding phrase regarding *mūḍha*.

³⁹¹See AA 3.4.76: *kto 'dhikaraṇe ca dhrauvyagatipratyavasānārthebhyah* (The past passive participle affix *-ta* is used in the sense of the locus, too, when it follows verbal roots that have the meanings of steadiness, motion, or termination). The argument here is still based on the analysis of the opponent's view: *kṣipiyate 'sminn iti kṣiptam*, etc. Note the use of the locative case (*yasmin*). It represents the locus (*adhikaraṇa*). Our authors angle of attack here is that such a formulation, “that on which something is thrown is ‘thrown’,” to analyze a past passive participle (*kṣipta*, etc.) is grammatically impossible. Pāṇini allows only verbs that have certain meanings to form a passive past participle in the meaning of the locus. The root *kṣip-* does not have any of the three meanings, *dhrauvya*, *gati*, or *pratyavasāna*. According to the Dhātupāṭha, the root *kṣip-* has the meaning *preraṇa* (driving).

³⁹²Wezler (1982) deals with this quotation from/reference to the VS in detail.

³⁹³All the manuscripts read *saṃyogaḥ* at the end of the second sūtra. Wezler (1982) proposes to emend this to *sa yogaḥ*. But this emendation does not seem necessary.

The commentary that is cited with these sūtras below does not support *sa yogaḥ* in the sūtra. First, the word *sa* in the commentary *sa prāṇamanovinīgrahāpekṣaḥ* towards the end of the quoted commentary corresponds to the preceding relative pronoun *yaḥ* in *yo 'sau*. The syntax of the commentary should be viewed as “*yo 'sau. . .saṃyogaḥ* (a word from the sūtra) *sa prāṇamanovinīgrahāpekṣaḥ* (a word from the sūtra) . . .” Accordingly, the word *sa* does not seem to be from the sūtra. The parallel syntax in “*yo 'sau. . .sannikarṣaḥ. . .tasya*” near the beginning of the commentary supports this view. The commentary employs the similar syntax when explaining the relationship between words in the sūtras. Secondly, the commentary is explicit in that yoga is *saṃyoga* and

treats *sukhaduḥkḥābhāvaḥ* more like a condition (*tasyām avasthāyām*). [Cf. the Mithilā version of VS 5.2.14: *saśarīrasya sukhaduḥkḥābhāvaḥ*] (Jambūvijayaḥ 1961: 113) where the sūtra is terminated after *sukhaduḥkḥābhāvaḥ* and the word is not syntactically connected with the following sūtra: *saṃyogaḥ*]; and NS/NBh 4.2.45: *tadabhāvaś cāpavarge* || *tasya buddhinimittāśrayasya śarīrendriyasya dharmādharmābhāvād abhāvo 'pavarge* | *tatra yad uktam "apavarge 'py evaṃ prasaṅga" iti (4.2.43), tad ayuktam | tasmāt sarvaduḥkḥavimokṣo 'pavargah* | *yasmāt sarvaduḥkḥabījaṃ sarvaduḥkḥāyata- naṃ cāpavarge vicchidyate tasmāt sarveṇa duḥkḥena vimuktir apavargah* | *na nīrbījaṃ nīrāyatanaṃ ca duḥkham utpadyata iti* |.] This makes it difficult for *sukhaduḥkḥābhāvaḥ* and *yogaḥ* to be in the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* relationship, at least according to the commentary. Thirdly, the commentary refers to *saṃyoga* twice. This insistence on *yoga = saṃyoga* makes it easier to think that the word *saṃyogaḥ* was already in the sūtra as part of the definition of *yoga* than that it was introduced from somewhere else. Thus even if the word *saṃyogaḥ* might not be original to the VS, there seems to be little support that the author of the YVi *did not* quote from the VS that already contained the word.

Apart from the commentary quoted in the YVi below, evidence from the Vaiśeṣika side appears to support the presence of *saṃyogaḥ* in the sūtra, too. All the manuscripts of the VS used by Jambūvijaya have *saṃyogaḥ* (Jambūvijayaḥ 1961: 42).

In addition, there appears to have been a great deal of controversy over the definition of *yoga*—whether it is *saṃyoga* or *samādhi*—before the authority of the YS/YBh prevailed. This may be reflected even in two entries of the root *yuj-* in the Dhātupāṭha, namely *yujir yoge* and *yuja samādhau*. The two entries of the Dhātupāṭha are said to be referred to in the YBh. (See the paragraph *kaḥ punar yogo* . . . [178,2] translated on p. 196. Cf. Bronkhorst (1983).) Another reflection of this controversy may be seen between NS 4.2.38 (*samādhiviśeṣābhyaśāt*) and its interpretation in the NBh (*sa tu pratyāhṛtasyendriyebhyo manaso dārakeṇa prayatnena dhāryamaṇasāyātmanā saṃyogas tattvabubhutsāviśiṣṭah* . . .). The NBh uses *saṃyoga* instead of *samādhi* of the sūtra. [The system of *yoga* adopted in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems is closely tied to their epistemology. Cf. the criticism toward the Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika theory of the generation of knowledge through connection (*saṃyoga*) between *manas* and *ātman* in the YVi on Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.2.] Thus given the conflict between *saṃyoga* and *samādhi* surrounding the definition of *yoga*, it seems natural that a sūtra defining *yoga* included the other synonym for *yoga*.

And finally the criticism in the paragraph *athāpi syāt—yogaḥ samādhir iti* . . . [182,4] (translated on p. 204) by the author of the YVi presupposes a defining term (*samādhi* or *saṃyoga*) to be present in the sūtra. Note that when he finally deals with the view *yogaḥ samādhīḥ*, he has criticized most of the words in the opponent's sūtras: *indriyamano 'rthasannikarṣāt* in two paragraphs *kiñ cānyat* | *mano*° . . . [181,1] (trl. p. 203); *sukhaduḥkḥe* in three paragraphs starting with *kiñ cānyat—sarvapṛāṇa*° . . . [181,5] (trl. p. 204); *tadanārambhaḥ* in the paragraph *indriyasamयोगe* . . . [182,1] (trl. p. 204); *ātmasthe manasi* in four paragraphs starting with these exact words [180,9] (trl. p. 202); *saśarīrasya* in the paragraph *kiñ cānyat—upātte 'pi* . . . [181,12] (trl. p. 204); *sukhaduḥkḥābhāvaḥ* in three paragraphs starting with *kiñ cānyat—sarvapṛāṇa*° [181,5] (p. 204); *pṛāṇamanovinigrahāpekṣaḥ* in the paragraph that starts with *kiñ cānyat—pṛāṇamano*° . . . [181,15] (trl. p. 204). There should be something to be criticized in the paragraph *athāpi syāt—yogaḥ samādhir iti* . . . Note again that in NBh 4.2.38 *samādhi* in the sūtra is replaced by *saṃyoga*.

From the above, it appears that there was the word *saṃyogaḥ* in the sūtra in question. Adding *yogaḥ*, as suggested by the editors of the 1952 edition (p. 6, l. 10) might make the sūtras complete as a definition of *yoga*. The commentary of Candrānanda also seems to imply that there was the word *yogaḥ* as the last element of the sūtra (Jambūvijayaḥ 1961: 42,24). Despite my inclinations, both from those of the YVi and the VS, I did not add the word in the sūtra. The fact that the author of the YVi supplies the word *yogaḥ* to both *sukhaduḥkḥābhāvaḥ* (here is a deviation from the interpretation given in the commentary accompanying the sūtras) and to *samādhīḥ* (the replacement I think for *saṃyogaḥ*) suggests that the word *yogaḥ* was provided by the context of surrounding other sūtras.

[characterized as] its (of the contact) not happening, absence of pleasure and pain, and it belongs to someone who still has a body, under the condition that the mind stays with *ātman*.

180,2 The word “Its” presupposes something that is being discussed—the cause of pleasure and pain = the contact between *ātman*, senses, mind, and objects. Its not happening = its not originating. How does it occur? Under the condition that the mind stays with *ātman*—not when it stays with senses. [Yoga] belongs to someone who still has body—belongs to someone whose body has not perished. At that time, as the contact does not exist, pleasure and pain do not exist. For it is said “if the cause does not exist, its result does not exist (VS 1.2.1).” Under this circumstance there is a union between omnipresent *ātman* and the mind. That is yoga, which is a specific union that follows restraining of breaths and the mind.

180,8 We answer—

180,9 [Answer] To say that under the condition that the mind stays with *ātman* is not rational. Because the mind always stays with *ātman*.

180,10 If you say, “[It is said] with regards to [the condition] that contact between senses, etc., is not happening,” then stating “under the condition that the mind stays with *ātman*” would be meaningless since it is already established just by saying “its not happening.”

180,12 Furthermore, even a liberated (*mukta*) would have yoga since his mind stays with *ātman*, and he does not have contact with senses.³⁹⁴ For, since he, too, [being *ātman*,] is omnipresent, and the mind is eternal,³⁹⁵ [the mind] would indeed always stay with *ātman*.

180,14 Furthermore, since there are no regions in *ātman*,³⁹⁶ to say “under the

³⁹⁴Here our author assumes that his opponent would not like the idea that a liberated person has yoga. If the opponent holds the view that yoga is the direct means of liberation, this might not be a problem. This does not appear to be the case. Liberation (*mokṣa*) is defined in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra a few sūtras after the sūtras under consideration here: *tadābhāve saṃyogābhāvo ’prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ* (5.2.20 in the numbering with Candrānanda’s commentary). Hence it is indeed probably undesirable that a liberated person has yoga. It is, however, interesting to note that our author assumes that the “liberated” still has *manas*. The *saṃyoga* in *saṃyogābhāvaḥ* in the above sūtra is, according to Candrānanda, the union between *ātman* and *manas*, and this interpretation is the most plausible. (The word *tad* in *tadābhāve* refers to *adrṣṭas* mentioned in the previous sūtra.) Our author thus has a different understanding of what a “liberated” is. The expression *muktātman* or simply *mukta* is used several times in this work, especially in relation to *Īśvara*. For example, see p. 106. There the assumption is that the liberated *ātman* or a liberated person does not have a body. The use of the term is probably consistent with that of Kumārila. See note 186 on p. 125.

³⁹⁵The Vaiśeṣikas hold that *manas* is eternal. See the references in the edition part.

³⁹⁶That *ātman* has no region is not part of the Vaiśeṣika system. Old Vaiśeṣikas take for granted that *ātman* has regions. This is observed in expressions such as *antarhṛdaye nirindriye ātmapradeśe niścalam manas tiṣṭhati* (Dvivedin 1984: 183), *hastavaty ātmapradeśe prayatnaḥ saṃjāyate* (Dvivedin 1984: 297). Note that the expression *ā-*

condition that the mind stays with *ātman*” is not rational. Also, even if the union with a region of *ātman* is said figuratively, it will not be the cause of true yoga. For something figurative is [ultimately] a false.

There is another [difficulty in your view]. The use of the word “senses 181.1 (*indriya*)” would be pointless since [that contact with objects is] already established just by saying “from the contact between the mind and objects.”

If you may say—[Objection] But since the mind and objects cannot 181.2

tmapradeśa is used in the sense of “a region in *ātman*.” The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, saw a problem in expressions such as *ātmapradeśa*. Nyāyasūtra 2.2.17 reads *kāraṇadravyasya pradeśaśabdenābhīdhānāt*. This is an answer to the criticism expressed in NS 2.2.14 *na, ghaṭābhāvasāmānyanityatvān nityeṣv apy anityavad upacārāc ca*. The part NS 2.2.17 is responding to is *nityeṣv apy anityavad upacārāt*. This, in turn, is an objection to one of the reasons that the proponent gives to establish that *śabda* (sound) is impermanent (*anitya*) and to be created (*utpadyate*) rather than revealed (*abhivyajyate*). It is the part *kṛtakavad upacārāt* in NS 2.2.13. Following the explanation of the NBh, this part of the discourse goes as follows: the sound is impermanent since like any other things that are made (*kṛtaka*), i.e., impermanent, the sound gets the figurative expression such as intense or mild (2.2.13). The opponent argues that the reasoning has a deviation (*vyabhicāra*) since eternal things also get figurative expressions in the same ways as the things that are made do. Examples are a region of space (*ākāśa*) or a region of *ātman* (2.2.14). The assumption is that only the things that are made (*kṛtaka*) have parts, viz., regions, and they can be referred to. But we refer to regions of eternal, viz., non-made, things—presumably without regions—figuratively. Then the proponent replies that in the example the opponent gives, a region of eternal things (*ākāśa* or *ātman*), the referent is not the eternal things but the fact that the union between the eternal thing and [spatially] limited substance does not fill the whole eternal thing (*saṃyogasyāvvyāpyavṛttitvam*). That is, the opponent’s example does not annul the argument that the sound gets figurative expression just like any other things that are made. For, the expression that purportedly show eternal things being referred to in the same manner as impermanent things in fact does not refer to the eternal things. Rather, it is only a derivative (*bhākta*) understanding that *ākāśa* or *ātman* has a region.

Admittedly, it is hard to precisely understand what is meant by the root *upa-car-*, which should be understood as “to figuratively express,” in this discourse. However, we can still glean that the Naiyāyikas were concerned about the expressions such as *ākāśapradeśa* or *ātmapradeśa* in their system adopted from the Vaiśeṣikas where *ākāśa* or *ātman* should not have a region. It is also possible that their solution to the problem was that those are figurative or secondary expressions. This is seen in the next sentence in our text.

It is interesting that our author states that *ātman* has no regions matter-of-factly when there is no statement to the effect in old Vaiśeṣika works. Śāṅkara assumes the same. For example, in BSBh 2.2.17 he simply states that *aṅus*, *ātman*, and *manas* have no regions (*aṅvātmanamanasām apradeśatvāt*). In BSBh 2.3.53 the topic is a region of omnipresent *ātman* delimited by a body. There he argues that, even assuming multiple *ātmans*, since *ātmans* are equally omnipresent (following the Vaiśeṣika doctrine) all the *ātmans* are inside all the bodies and thus it is impossible to postulate a region of *ātman*, even when it is delimited by a body. There is a leap of logic here. As he further discusses, it may be impossible to discern which *ātman* among all the *ātmans* is being affected by a body, yet it does not follow that the part of *ātman* inside a body and the rest cannot be distinguished. He seems to believe that omnipresent means having no region. He further qualifies the word *ātman* with the adjective *niṣpradeśa*, and for such *ātman*, a region delimited by a body is “made up (*kālpanika*)” and incapable of determining a real effect. Along with the assumption that there is no regions in *ātman*, the mention of “made up” region of having no effect is similar to the discussion here. For the text of the BSBh, see p. 180

have contact without senses, it would be irrational to negate something that cannot be achieved, saying “its not happening.”

It is not so. Without senses, the contact between the mind and objects does not exist. Thus naturally, the person suppressing the contact should already know that the acquisition of objects is through senses.

181,5 There is another [difficulty in your view]. Because it is well known that anything that breathes has pleasure and pain from the contact between the senses, the mind and objects, and because the connection between *ātman* and the mind is eternal, [what is meant] would be established by merely saying “yoga is the absence of pleasure and pain.” Therefore the rest of the sūtra would be meaningless.

181,8 There might be the following objection: [Objection] If the sūtra says as much as “[yoga is] the absence of pleasure and pain” without mentioning the contact between senses, the mind and objects, then, since a liberated person does not have pleasure and pain, there would be an undesirable consequence of he becoming a yogin. Therefore in order to avoid this [undesirable consequence], the rest of the sūtra is included.

181,10 [Answer] That again is not correct. Because a liberated does not acquire pleasure and pain. [And] because it is logical that negation is done on something that has previously been acquired. Someone acquires pleasure and pain, and yoga is only the absence of pleasure and pain with regard to him. Therefore it is reasonable to reject the rest of the sūtra.

181,12 There is another [difficulty in the sūtra]. Even though the word “[that] belongs to someone who still has a body (*saśarīrasya*)” is adopted, it is impossible to exclude a liberated (*mukta*). Because it lacks the purpose. If yoga is the absence of pleasure and pain, then the body does not mean anything, even when it still exists, because it does not produce any effect. When we do not take the effect into consideration, there is absolutely no distinction between a liberated and not liberated.

181,15 There is another [problem in the sūtra]. The part “[which] follows restraining of breaths and mind” is not appropriate, either. Because the effort that is holding the restraining is inherent to *ātman*. Even though the mind does have activities, without being connected with senses, it is impossible to restrain the mind and breaths.

182,1 Also, if the mind is connected to senses, it is not reasonable to say “its (contact’s) not beginning.” Also, since the mind is immersed in restraining breaths, it is impossible for it to not begin [contacting with senses]. Also, if there is no contact between the senses and the mind, there is no restraining of breaths. Also, if breaths are restrained, there is no yoga. Because the cause of restraining breaths is the relation with the action in the mind through the holding effort residing in *ātman*.

182,4 Then you might say—[Objection] Yoga is *samādhi*. [Answer] That is not right. Because [saying so] does not have any effect. Again, *ātman* and *manas* are eternally assimilated. Also, it is said that *samādhi* is stasis.³⁹⁷

182,6 In conclusion, it is appropriate to say “And that (*samādhi*) is a prop-

³⁹⁷See page 199.

erty of the mind common to all stages.”

[Objection] If, as you say, yoga is *samādhi*, and it is a property of mind 182,7 common to all stages, then it is [already] established for all the living creatures without effort, because [it] includes fixated [mind], etc. Accordingly, the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) is meaningless because it is established without effort, just like inhaling and exhaling. Thus the instruction of yoga (*yogānuśāsana*) also becomes meaningless.

Answering this, [the Bhāṣyakāra] states—**among those, if the mind 182,10 is scattered, the *samādhi* that is dominated by being scattered does not belong to the side of yoga.** For, [*samādhi*] that includes “fixated [mind],” and so on, is not intended to be on the side of yoga. Namely, *samādhi* that includes [the condition of] being fixated, etc., is not capable of illuminating an object as is. Because the action of being fixated is predominant in it. By merely negating [the stage of] scattered (*vikṣipta*), according to the maxim of defeating the representing wrestler, the stages fixated (*kṣipta*) and stupefied (*mūḍha*) are also negated. *Samādhi* of being scattered (*vikṣepasamādhi*) represents [other types of *samādhi* that do not belong to the side of yoga] because it [still] has an adequate qualification [to be included on the side of yoga]. Namely, the mind which is in the state of scattered is able to acquire desirable object, for it has not fallen into [a particular] side. But stupefied [mind]—by means of attaching [it] to an object, for example—or fixated [mind]—by means of detaching [it] from undesirable object, for example—cannot be led to anywhere else. [The Bhāṣyakāra] says “the side of yoga”—Even though it is still *samādhi*, since it does not produce an effect [expected from yoga], he says “the side.” For example—even though a walking man stops at every step, since it does not cause the effect of stopping, it is not called standing.³⁹⁸

With the intention [of specifying] a particular kind of *samādhi* that 182,17 is in the state of being scattered, [the Bhāṣyakāra refers to] the quality of being “dominated by being scattered.” Because, on the other hand, [that yoga is *samādhi*] primarily applies to all the stages equally, for [the Bhāṣyakāra] has stated “common to all stages.”

If one might question—If being dominated is the cause of not belong- 183,1 ing to the side of yoga, now, in the case of focused [mind] there would be the dominance of being focused. Then [the *samādhi* in the stage of focused] does not belong to the side of yoga. In order to answer this, [the Bhāṣyakāra] states—**But [*samādhi*] when [the mind is] focused.** At the stage of being focused, there is no domination by the stage. Why? Because defects (*kleśa*) and *karman* are not powerful [at that stage]. Because when the power of defects and *karman* are powerful, [the states of] diversion and so on arise. *Samādhi* at the stage of being focused is **the one that illuminates = makes the object understood as is = as itself.** [The Bhāṣyakāra] uses the expression “as is (*bhūta*),” because,

³⁹⁸Cf. Nāgārjuna’s famous discussion on going/walking (*gati*) in *Madhyamikakārikās* (de la Vallée Poussin 1913:kk. 2.1–25). Note that while Nāgārjuna tries to prove there is no such thing as “going,” the point the author of the YVi making is the opposite.

if there is even a trace of non-exactness (*ayathābhūta*), the knowledge is not for a yogin.³⁹⁹ [*Samādhi* at the stage of being focused] **destroys**—makes the five fold **defects**, ignorance, etc.,⁴⁰⁰ destroyed— **[It] loosens the bindings of *karma***—[the compound *karmabandhanāni* is a *karmadhāraya* compound in which] *karmans* are the bindings [connected in the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* relationship]. The [*karmans*] are good, bad, and mixture of good and bad; or, [the compound *karmabandhanāni* is a *tatpuruṣa* compound that means] those originated from *karmans* and they are the birth, etc., i.e., the bindings—**[and it] loosens** = makes something loose. **[It] directs [the yogin] to suppression (*nīrodha*)**—orients him toward [suppression]. **It is called “conscious (*samprajñāta*)”** by the master(s).⁴⁰¹

183,8 The Bhāṣya continues—**And that is accompanied by *vitarka*, or by *vicāra***, and so on. [The reason why the Bhāṣya mentions this] is because *samprajñāta* occurs first. On the other hand, when it comes to stating the definition, since *asamprajñāta* is more important, it is reasonable to state the definition of it here—**this *samprajñāta* we will teach later**.

183,11 For the following reason, too, the definition of the *asamprajñāta* should be given at this very place. Without having the *samprajñāta* prerequisite, the *asamprajñāta* can be realized by either excellent detachment or practicing the notion of termination.⁴⁰² In order to show this [the definition of the *asamprajñāta* comes first]. On the other hand, if the definition of *samprajñāta* was stated here, and if the definition of *asamprajñāta* was stated later, there would be a suspicion that one qualifies for *asamprajñāta-samādhi* with *samprajñāta* as prerequisite. Therefore [the Bhāṣyakāra] states **we will teach later**.

³⁹⁹There is some suspicion that sentence is corrupt. The first word *ayogyarthajñānam* is already suspect. One would rather expect *ayogyārtha*°. Also, the appearance of the word *jñāna* is somewhat confusing. Knowledge has not been discussed in relation to *cittabhūmis* and therefore appears out of context. One could also conceive that the compound was in fact two words, *ayogy(a/ā)rthañ jñānam*; the conjunct character for *ñjñā* is complicated and can easily look like *jñā*. Or it is even possible that the word *jñānam* is a corruption from something entirely different. Furthermore, the word *gandhita* is not well attested in the sense our author apparently intends. Śaṅkara uses the word *āgandhita* or its negated form *anāgandhita* in the sense “not left with any trace of,” and this is one of his idiosyncrasies. We could consider the possibility that instead of *ayathābhūtatvagandhitam*, the text in fact read *ayathābhūtānāgandhitam*. Even after considering these emendations, the text does not appear very coherent.

⁴⁰⁰See YS 2.3 (*aviḍyāsmītarāgadvēṣābhīniveśāḥ kleśāḥ*).

⁴⁰¹Note that the author of the YVi reads the YBh . . . *nīrodham āmukhīkarotī* | *sa samprajñātaḥ*, while most versions of the YBh reads *sa samprajñātaḥ yogaḥ*. See Maas (2006: 3). As a result of this lack of the word *yogaḥ*, the author of the YVi considers the subject of the YBh to be *samādhi* throughout after *yogaḥ samādhiḥ*. Hence, the terms *samprajñāta* and *asamprajñāta* can only modify the word *samādhi*. Consequently he considers the next sūtra as the definition of *asamprajñāta-samādhi*. See the next paragraph.

⁴⁰²See YS 1.12–18.

The ending of the YVi

The ending of a text, especially the colophons in its manuscripts, can give us various information about the text itself, its author, provenance, transmission, etc. This applies also to the YVi. Its closing stanzas have already attracted some scholarly attention.⁴⁰³ Unfortunately, the ending of the YVi has not been reproduced properly in the 1952 edition.

Here is an attempt to give a better picture of the ending of the YVi. I will first present transcripts from the manuscripts T_m and L.⁴⁰⁴ Then I will present an edition, accompanied by a translation and annotations, of the part that is common to both manuscripts. Then I will proceed with editions of additional endings (the colophon or colophon stanzas) that are unique to T_m and L each. A note on the presentation of the ending in the 1952 and discussions on the layers in the endings will follow.

Transcripts

Here are transcripts of T_m and L toward the end. The commentary proper ends with . . . *vedāraṇyakavad ity om iti* (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 369).⁴⁰⁵

Conventions generally follow those that have been adopted to report readings in the critical apparatus.⁴⁰⁶ The ones used here are: ⟨ and ⟩ to represent canceled elements; » and « to represent elements added later; [and] to represent physically lost portions (if signs are partially lost but recoverable with confidence, the brackets enclose the reading and if signs are completely lost, they are represented by center dots (·) whose number represents the estimated number of lost signs); { and } to represent modifications to the text that do not necessarily involve simple deletion and insertion.

⁴⁰³See Rukmani (1992: 420).

⁴⁰⁴I am not concerned with the remaining manuscripts, T_d, M or A here. We know them to be direct descendants of either T_m or L. (See pp. 25 ff.) Unlike the other parts of this volume where editions of the YVi was presented, the purpose of this section is to discuss the transmission history of the YVi. It was useful to include readings in those modern manuscripts when the goal was to reach the most plausible reading of the YVi (in its intended form). Readings resulting from the intelligence and knowledge of the modern copyists, particularly that of M, are worth consulting and reporting.

⁴⁰⁵After this, both manuscripts have the decorative sign that appears when the commentary on a sūtra ends. Here the sign is transcribed as *. Cf. p. 37.

⁴⁰⁶See pp. 41 ff. for more complete explanations.

The end of T_m

T_m ends in folio 125 recto (line numbers are in parentheses):

(1) ntarasvarūpatatvanirddhāraṇena tantrāntarīyakatvasvarūpanirākara(n)ṅṅ«ena ca kaivalya[. . .]vedī[tavyā .]ta[tro . . . maṅgalārtthaḥ] prayuktaḥ parameśvaranāmāṅkitamastakatayā »ta«(s ta)ntrapra»y«ārttham śāntyarttham vedāraṅyakavad ity om iti * (2) oṅkāro yasya vaktā samacarata phalaih karmma yasmād aśeṣaṇa niṣkarmmakleśapāko gha[t]aya-[ti] sakalaṃ yaḥ phalen{a ā → ā}⁴⁰⁷kriyānā(m īsvaro) »m īś«ānam īsvaro ya sthitibhavanidhanaprakriyāṅgaṃ vi(p)»dh«ātā ddhyāyan naś śuklimānaṃ vyapanudatu tarāṃ kṣṇimānaṃ sa kṣṇaḥ anekapha(3)ṇaratnaughavidyoti(X)⁴⁰⁸ dyunabhodiśe yogīndrāya phaṅīndrāya tat patañjalaye namaḥ vadanāhitapūrṇacandrakaṃ gurum īśānaṃ abhūtibhūṣaṇaṃ praṇamāmy abhuñjaṃgasamgraha(m) »ḥ« bhagavatpādam apūrvvaśaṃkaram * govindabhagavatpūjya(4)pādaśiṣyasya paramahaṃsaparivrajākācāryasya śaṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtau pātañjalayogaśāstrabhāṣyavivarāṇe caturtthaḥ pādaḥ * yātrākṛtas trijagatāṃ yadacintyaśaktileśān daśāhur iha mīna-mukhāvatarā(t)»n« kleśo(5)dbhavatrividhatāvavaramparārttās tan nāganāthaśayanaṃ śaraṇaṃ vrajāmaḥ yogena cittasya padena vācā»ṃ«malaśarīrasya ca vaidyakena yo pākaro(kta) »t ta«m pravaramunīnām (v)⁴⁰⁹ātāñjalim prāñjalir (X)ā⁴¹⁰nato smi * * (6) śrīmat patañjalimaharṣivarapraṇīta(m)śrīyogabhāṣyahṛdayaprakāṭikṛd etat śrīśaṅkara(ṇa)ṃ vivarāṇaṃ samava{tti → rtti}śatro {[g → rgg]ā} »gā«rggyo⁴¹¹ vyalīlikham aha(tvi)»n tva«(ñca)dvāptikāmaḥ * * (va)»pa«rakroḍaḥ * * *

⁴⁰⁷Due to the fact that in the Malayalam script, the diacritical sign for the vowel *ā* is written as an independent letter, what happens here is that the diacritical sign for *ā* has replaced what appears to be an independent vowel *ā*. So, the manuscript originally had *phalena ā°* and was corrected to *phalena°*.

⁴⁰⁸I cannot decipher the sign marked to be cancelled. It appears to have a *d* element as first part of the conjunct letter. The rest of the conjunct letter could have a *c*, *ṣ*, and/or *m* element. It could have the vowel *i*, but the circle-like part of the letter is too small for the usual way of marking a syllable with the *i* vowel.

⁴⁰⁹This *va* is clearly marked to be cancelled but I do not find the obvious replacement, *pa*, in the manuscript. Also, the diacritical sign for *ā*, too, should be cancelled, but I do not see a trace of such cancellation.

⁴¹⁰What appears to be written here is the sign *ra*, followed by what appears to be the diacritical sign to mark the following consonant sign with the vowel *e* (which is cancelled), and another such sign to mark the preceding consonant with the vowel *ā*. What probably happened here was that the scribe started to write *rane* or *rano*, but realized the mistake and wrote *rā na*.

⁴¹¹There are two stages of corrections. First the original scribe wrote °śatro gārggyo as it should read. Someone altered *gā* to *rggā* by adding strokes to the original sign for *ga*. This made the word *samavartīśatro* in the vocative case to the *samavartīśatroḥ* in the genitive case. Then again the whole of the modified *rggā* was cancelled and in the margin *gā* was inserted. These two stages of corrections may have been done by the same person. All these alterations are not inked.

The end of L

And here is a transcript of L (folio 138 recto):

(4) . . . tatromkāro maṅgalārthḥ prayukṭḥ parameśvaranā-
 māṅkitamastakatayā tantrapracayārthḥ śāntyarthḥ vā ve-
 (5) dāraṇyakavad ity om iti * oṃkāro yasya vaktā samacarata
 phalaiḥ karmma yasmād aśeṣaṇ niṣkarmmakleśapāko ghaṭaya-
 ti sakalaṃ yaḥ phalena kriyānām īśānām īśvaro ya sthi(6)ti-
 bhavanidhanaprakriyānām vidhātā dhyāyan naḥ śuklimānam
 vyapanudatu tarām kṛṣṇimānam sa kṛṣṇaḥ phalaratnaughavi-
 dyoti [dyu]nabhodiṣe yogendrāya phaṇindrāya [ta · ta]ñja(7)-
 laye namaḥ padanāhitapūrṇacandrakaṃ gurum īśānam ab-
 hūtibhūṣaṇam praṇamāmy abhūñjaṅgasamgraham bhagava-
 tpādapūrvvaśaṅkaram * govindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣya[sya
 ·]ramahaṃ(8)saparivrājakācāryasya śaṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛ-
 tau pātañjalayogaśāstrabhāṣyavivarāṇe caturtthḥ pādaḥ *
 samāptaṁ cedam vivaraṇam * yātrākṛtas trijagatāṃ yada-
 [ci]ntya(9)śaktileśān daśāhur iha mīnamukhā[· · · n] kleśot-
 bhavatrividhatāpaparamparārttās tan nāgatnāthasāyanaṃ śa-
 raṇam prajāmaḥ yogena cittasya padena vācāmmalāśarīrasya
 tu (10) vaidyakena yo pākarot tam pra(vara)munīnām patañja-
 li[m] prāñjalir ānato smi⁴¹² jitam patañjalimuninā yena śreyo-
 rtthisārtthasasyānām vihito harṣas tāpatritayahṛtā (138v1) dha-
 rmmameghena| yas tatāna bhavamārggalaṅghinām kleśaka-
 rmmamayagharmmatuttaye dharmmameghamukhayogatoya śrī-
 keśavaprakābhātāarakāṇām śiṣyasya satyānandasya iyam pā-
 dañjalatī(2)kā * * *

An edition of the common part

Quite clearly, the ending is shared between the two manuscripts up to some point; the shared part must have been in the common ancestor,⁴¹³ which I consider to have been the exemplar of T_m.⁴¹⁴ Here is an edition, translation of the common part along with some comments.

The end of the commentary

The YVi as a commentary ends as follows:

तत्रौकारो मंगलार्थः प्रयुक्तः। परमेश्वरनामांकितमस्तकतया तन्त्रप्रचयार्थं शा-
 न्त्यर्थं वा वेदारण्यकवदित्योमिति॥

⁴¹²As I write on p. 37, hardly any punctuation is used in either T_m or L. Here, however, L has what appears to be a *danḍa*.

⁴¹³Note that this does not necessarily mean that *only* the shared part was in the common ancestor. There are possibilities that the common ancestor had more and that some of the continuation made it to either or neither of T_m or L. It is, however, highly unlikely that the text shared in both T_m and L originated independently.

⁴¹⁴See section “Exemplar of T_m” on pp. 31 ff.

There the syllable *om* that has the auspicious meaning is used. [It is used,] since it is the foremost of things bearing the name of Īśvara, so that the system (*tantra*) [expounded in this *śāstra*] grows, or for the sake of tranquility, analogous to the Vedas and the Āraṇyakas [ending with the syllable *om*]. Therefore [the *śāstra* ends with] “*om.*”/Thus *om.* End.

This concludes the commentary. It appears that the author loaded several meanings in the last words of his text. The last part *om iti* can be seen as the quote of the end of the root text, but it is at the same time the conclusion of his own text, too. In that sense, readers understand that he, too, placed the syllable *om* at the end in the sense he has just explained. This is the same technique the author uses at the beginning of the commentary. He starts the commentary with *athetyādi pātāñjalayogaśāstram. tasya vivaraṇam ārabhyate.*⁴¹⁵ He uses the very first word of the root text as the first word of the commentary. Also, the very last word, *iti* serves several functions. One is to signal the end of a quotation from the root text. Another is as part of the quote of the very last word of the root text; we naturally expect the word *iti* at the end of the root text. The third is to mark the end of the commentary itself. The part *parameśvaranāmāṅkitamastakatayā* alludes to the statement in the commentary on YS 1.27 where the syllable *om* is said to be the favorite name of Īśvara.⁴¹⁶

First common concluding stanza

This conclusion is followed by a stanza in the *sragdharā* meter:

ओंकारो यस्य वक्ता समचरत फलैः कर्म यस्मादशेषत्रिष्कर्मकेशपाको घटयति
सकलं यः फलेन क्रियाणाम्।
ईशानामीश्वरो य स्थितिभवनिधनप्रक्रियाणां विधाता ध्यायन्नः शुक्तिमानं व्यपनुदतु
तरां कृष्णिमानं स कृष्णः॥

pāda b: phalena kri° L] phalena ākri° T_m^{ac}, phalenākri° T_m^{pc}
pāda c: īśānām īśvaro L] īśvaro T_m^{ac}, īśānam īśvaro T_m^{pc}; vidhātā LT_m^{pc}
vipātā T_m^{ac}

The syllable *om* signifies him; from him all the actions appeared along with [their] fruits;
He, [himself] having no actions, impurities or [their] ripening, unites everyone with the fruit of actions;
He is the lord of lords; he performs the procedures of stability, rise, and end.
May that Kṛṣṇa, thinking of my good, utterly remove [my] wrong.

This stanza applies a similar playful composition technique to that just seen in the end of the commentary. The author finished the commentary

⁴¹⁵See p. 172 for the text and p. 187 for the translation.

⁴¹⁶See p. 81 for the edition and p. 153 for the translation, and n. 289 on p. 153 for parallel passages in the BĀUBh and the ChUBh.

with the syllable *om*. Now a closing stanza immediately starts with the same word. This is deliberate and the mind behind this choice appears to be the same as that which chose to finish the commentary with the syllable *om*. This stanza is thus probably integral to the bulk of the commentary.

Much of the content in this stanza also agrees with what is put forward in the Īśvara section of the commentary and the opening stanzas.⁴¹⁷ The first segment of the stanza refers back to YS 1.27. The second and third segment (about Īśvara's being the legislator and enforcer of the law of *karmans*) strongly resonate with the first *pāda* of the first stanza in the opening of the whole text (see p. 171 for the text and p. 185 for its translation). It is interesting that Īśvara's being the creator of the laws of *karman*, rather than his being the author of the Vedas that prescribe them, is more or less clearly stated here. In the opening stanza and in the Īśvara section of the commentary, this point was ambiguous. Also notable is the similarity in wording to that of the BhGBh. See n. 332 on p. 185 for the wording in the BhGBh. In that connection, the explicit naming of Īśvara as Kṛṣṇa is also noteworthy. The author of this commentary repeatedly hints that he considers Īśvara to be Viṣṇu, especially the Bhagavat of the BhG (see pp. 77, 80, 81, 138, 149, 153, and 186), who indeed is Kṛṣṇa. The last *pāda* further employs a word-play, between black/bad (*kṛṣṇīman*) and Kṛṣṇa, alluding to terminologies in the text that has been commented; YS 4.7, for example, refers to actions as white or black (and their mixture).

In the last *pāda* the author asks Īśvara, who is revealed to be Kṛṣṇa, for his forgiveness. Mentioning Īśvara or Kṛṣṇa as someone who can remove bad actions attracts attention. I am not aware of any passage in the YVi that expresses the view that Īśvara can remove bad *karman*. Hence this last *pāda* sounds a little like being addressed to a human king, a judicial authority who, in reality, can grant pardons.

The whole stanza gives the impression that it is about a governing personage. This impression comes from the lack of the mention of Īśvara's being omniscient or omnipotent—the two aspects the author of the YVi usually mentions along with his being the lord of all. The last *pāda*, by introducing the view not put forward in the text, reinforces that impression. As a result, this stanza can be read as a prayer to Kṛṣṇa the deity as well as a plea to Kṛṣṇa a human ruler.⁴¹⁸ The author has already shown some literary techniques in this stanza. It would not be surprising if he meant this stanza to be read in these two meanings.

Second common concluding stanza

Then T_m and L records a śloka:

⁴¹⁷Both are dealt with in this volume. For the opening stanzas, see pp. 171 ff. for the text and pp. 185 ff. for translation. The Īśvara section is the main part of this volume.

⁴¹⁸This point catches my attention because I propose the theory that Śaṅkara, the author of the BSBh, lived under the rule of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king, Kṛṣṇa I (Harimoto 2006).

अनेकफणरत्नौघविद्योतिद्युनभोदिशे।

योगीन्द्राय फणीन्द्राय तत्पतञ्जलये नमः॥

pāda a: *anekaphaṇa° T_m*] *phala° L*

pāda c: *yogīndrāya T_m*] *yogendrāya L*

pāda d: *tat patañjalaye T_m*] [*ta · ta*]ñjalaye L

To him who irradiate the heaven, sky, and directions with multitude of jewels residing in [each of] his many hoods
Thus salutation to [him,] the lord of yogins, the lord of serpents, Patañjali.

The above translation is tentative. As presented, I do not think the Sanskrit text of the stanza is intelligible. Yet I cannot offer a better solution to make the text meaningful. Either the transmission of this stanza was bad or it was not well composed in the first place.

In pāda a, I have adopted the reading *anekaphaṇaratnaugha°* found in *T_m*. *L* does not have *aneka°* and hence the first line is short of three syllables there. The 1952 edition, based primarily on the manuscript *M* (an apograph of *L*) supplied *prthivī°* in the beginning of pāda b, resulting in the reading *phaṇaratnaughavidyoti [prthivī]dyunabhodiśe* for the first line.⁴¹⁹ Although I do not think this was a successful emendation, it was a clever one. When one sees *dyaus* and *nabhas*, it is natural to expect something that means “earth.” I do not adopt this reading because we do have a reading from *T_m* that satisfies metrical requirements. In addition, the word *diś* in the compound might have meant the same thing, the earth.

The reading adopted here, *anekaphaṇaratnaugha°*, is still not completely satisfactory because *aneka* and *ogha* seem semantically redundant. I cannot eliminate the possibility that the word *aneka* in the beginning of the line was an emendation on the part of the scribe of *T_m* (*T_m* is an apograph of the common ancestor of *T_m* and *L*).

In pāda c, while *L* reads *yogendrāya*, *T_m* reads *yogīndrāya*. I have adopted more common word *yogīndra* of *T_m*. If we applied the principle of *lectio difficilior*, perhaps *yogendrāya* would be more likely to have been in the common ancestor. Given how syllables with the vowel *e* is written in the Malayalam script, it is hard to imagine how *gī* or *ge* becomes the other by misreading. If, then, the change was intentional, it would be from *ge* to *gī* (*yogīndra* being more common Sanskrit word). Note, however, that being in the common ancestor does not necessarily mean that the stanza was originally composed with that reading. I have decided to adopt the word that would have been used by an author who knew standard Sanskrit; that is, I have followed the probable judgement of the scribe of *T_m*. Nonetheless, as a result of this decision, the constituted reading is more or less that of *T_m*. This is quite a contrast to the previous stanza where the scribe of *T_m* was apparently struggling to record correct readings (see the variants for the previous stanza). If there is a trend that *L* was more successful in reproducing readings in the common ancestor,

⁴¹⁹*L*, and hence *M*, read *phalaratnau°* rather than *phaṇaratnau°*. That the 1952 edition still reads *phaṇaratnau°* is an emendation.

more acceptable readings in T_m might in fact be a result of conscious alterations. Note that *phanaratnaughavidyoti* that starts the stanza in L is in itself a good pāda of *śloka*. And there is a sign that I cannot decipher in T_m after °*vidyoti*. Perhaps, despite metrically more correct or using more common words, the readings adopted from T_m may still be far from what was originally intended.

I have further problems with this stanza. One of them is the word *tat* in the second line. Again, a pronoun that points to a missing entity. It cannot be the first member of a compound (or can it?) affixed to a proper name. As an independent word, what we need is *tasmai* that does not fit metrically. As the last resort, I have translated it as an adverb, meaning “therefore.” It still is preferable if the preceding line had a relative pronoun such as *yat*, *yatas* or *yasmāt*. We cannot easily supply it as an emendation in the previous line.

It to me appears that this stanza is a remnant of badly transmitted text. It could have constituted of more than just 4 pādas. One possibility is that the original text was a sort of *nirukti* of the name Patañjali, trying to explain that it constitutes of elements of the verb *pat-* (to fall) and *jalin* (possessing water), perhaps in the sense that he rains down gems that shine the universe. The association between snakes and rain is a universal topos.

Third common concluding stanza

Next we have a stanza in the *vīyoginī* meter, dedicated to the first Śaṅkara:

वदनाहितपूर्णचन्द्रकं गुरुमीशानमभूतिभूषणम्।

प्रणमाम्यभुजंगसंग्रहम् भगवत्पादमपूर्वशंकरम्॥

pāda a: vadanāhita° T_m] padanāhita° L

pāda c: abhujamga° L] abhūñjamga° T_m ; °samgraham LT_m^{ac}] °samgrahaḥ T_m^{pc}

pāda d: °pādam apūrvva° T_m] °pādapūrvva° L

The one to whose face the full moon is attached, the master,
the ruler, the one not adorned by ashes

I salute him, without a collection of snakes, the Bhagavatpāda,
the unprecedented Śaṅkara.

This stanza is interesting in that it emphatically distinguishes Śaṅkara the teacher from Śiva, one of whose popular epithets is Śaṅkara. The first attribute mentioned here is the full-moon like face of Śaṅkara, a common description of a beautiful face. Its wording *vadanāhitapūrṇacandra*, literally “to whose face the full moon is attached” is a contrast to Śiva, to whose head the crescent moon is attached. The expression *abhūtibhūṣaṇam* appears to be a straightforward negation of Śiva’s attribute of wearing ashes. However, there can be more positive interpretations such as “not wearing any ornament,” or “to whom not owning wealth is an ornament.” This should be a positive attribute for a renouncer. Another

contrast to Śiva, *abhujamgasamgraha*, may be a play on the two major meanings of the word *bhujamga*, the snake and the lover. Since the word *samgraha* has a wide range of meanings, it is difficult to construe it with the second meaning. One possibility is that the compound means something like “the one who does not partake in intercourse as a lover.” This would be a description of again a renouncer. Nonetheless, it appears safe to assume that the technique of *śleṣa* is used in these three attributes.

A few more things may be noted. One is that Śaṅkara is referred to as a lord (*īśāna*). *Īśāna* is another popular name of Śiva and this one is not negated. The application of this name to Śaṅkara indicates that his authority as a spiritual leader had already been established when this stanza was composed. In addition, the author of this stanza used the expression *apūrva* (the first), which implies that there were succeeding Śaṅkaras. This stanza presupposes the tradition of Śaṅkarācāryas already in place. We do not know when the Śaṅkara *mathas* where their heads are called Śaṅkarācāryas were institutionalized, but their earliest possible establishment is during Śaṅkara’s lifetime. Hence this stanza must be from at least a few generations after Śaṅkara’s life time.

Colophon of the work

A sub-colophon for the fourth pāda and the colophon for the entire commentary follow:

गोविन्दभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्यस्य परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यस्य शंकरभगवतः कृतौ
पातञ्जलयोगशास्त्रभाष्यविवरणे चतुर्थः पादः ॥ समाप्तश्चेदं विवरणम् ॥

The first part, the sub-colophon, is a fairly standard colophon to a work ascribed to the famous Śaṅkara.⁴²⁰ At least, whether true or not, there is no ambiguity to whom the work is ascribed: not a random person called Śaṅkara, but the author of the BSBh.⁴²¹ What troubles me slightly is the fact that there has been no *iti* preceding these colophons. The end of the text is not clearly marked. This may or may not be a sign that some of the preceding concluding stanzas were not by the author of the bulk of the text itself.

Post-colophon concluding stanza 1

The colophon is followed by two more stanzas in both T_m and L. This first one is as follows:

यात्राकृतस्त्रिजगतां यदचिन्त्यशक्तिलेशान्दशाहुरिह मीनमुखावतारान्।
क्लेशोद्भवत्रिविधतापपरम्परार्त्तास्तन्नागनाथशयनं शरणं ब्रजामः॥

pāda a: yadacintya° T_m] yada[ci]ntya° L

pāda b: °mukhāvatārān T_m^{pc}] °mukhāvatārāt T_m^{ac} , °mukhā[. . . n] L

pāda c: °tāpaparamparārttās L] °tāvavaramparārttās T_m

⁴²⁰See Hacker (1978).

⁴²¹Another context in which this colophon is significant is the discussion on the title of the work. For that, see Wezler (1983:17)

pāda d: nāganātha° T_m] nāgatnātha° L; vrajāmaḥ T_m] prajāmaḥ L

They say, in this world, that the ten avatāras, starting with the fish, that keep the three worlds going, are fractions of his inconceivable power.

We, being continuously afflicted by three kinds of sufferings originated from the impurity, seek refuge in him, the one who sleeps on the serpent king.

This stanza in the *vasantatilakā* meter has few textual problems (mostly exchanges between *p* and *v*, typical of the Malayalam script). It shows, in more or less a straightforward manner, an allegiance to Viṣṇu. It should be noted that *tan* in the text in fact is *tam*, an inflected word. The consonant *m* is homogenized with the following *n*.⁴²²

Post-colophon concluding stanza 2

योगेन चित्तस्य पदेन वाचाम्मलं शरीरस्य च वैद्यकेन।
यो ऽपाकरोत्तम्प्रवरम्मुनीनाम्पतञ्जलिम्प्राञ्जलिरानतो ऽस्मि॥

pāda a: vācām T_m^{pc}(vācām) L] vācā T_m^{ac}

pāda b: malaṃ em.] mala° T_m, malā° L; ca T_m] tu L

pāda c: pākarot tam T_m^{pc}L] pākaroktam T_m^{ac}; pravara T_mL^{ac}] pra(vara)
L

pāda d: patañjalim L] (v)ātañjalim T_m, patañjali[m] L; °jalir ānato T_m^{pc}L]
jalir (X)ānato T_m

The one who removed the impurity from the mind by yoga,
from the speech by word, and from the body by medicine,

the best of the sages, Patañjali, I bow to him, with my hands
forming *prāñjali*.

This is, as Endoh (1993: (22)) points out, a stanza widely known among grammarians.⁴²³ As such, it is doubtful that this stanza was part of the original composition of the YVi.

This is the end of the shared text between T_m and L. Following this stanza, T_m has another colophon stanza.

An edition of the colophon stanza of T_m

The colophon stanza of T_m involves many corrections. The text that was meant can be reconstructed as follows:

⁴²²An unlikely, yet not impossible, interpretation is that the *tan*- is read as part of a compound *tannāganāthaśayanam* (“his [Viṣṇu’s] serpent king bed,” i.e., Śeṣa). If that (too) is meant, then the speaker of the stanza seeks refuge in Śeṣa while praising Viṣṇu. Note that Śeṣa and Patañjali are sometimes identified.

⁴²³See also Woods (1977: xiv) and Kielhorn and Abhyankar (1985: 503). Cf. Meulenbeld (1999: 141–4)

श्रीमत्पतञ्जलिमहर्षिवरप्रणीतश्रीयोगभाष्यहृदयप्रकटीकृदेतत्।
श्रीशांकरं विवरणं समवर्तिशत्रो गार्ग्यो व्यलीलिखमहन्त्वदवासिकामः॥

pāda a: °praṇīta° T_m^{pc}] °praṇītaṃ T_m^{ac}

pāda c: śrīśāṃkaraṃ T_m^{pc}] śrīśāṃkaraṇaṃ T_m^{ac}; samavartti° T_m^{pc}] sama-
vatti° T_m^{ac}

pāda c-d: °śatro gārggyo T_m^{ac}] śatro <[g → rgg]ā>gā«rggyo T_m (see note
411)

pāda d: ahan tvad° T_m^{pc}] aha(tvi)»n tva«(ñca)d° T_m

This [text] reveals the essence of the Yogabhāṣya composed by the venerable Patañjali, the best of the great sages I, Gārgya, have made it written, the commentary by venerable Śaṅkara, o slayer of Samavartin, hoping to reach you.

This stanza is followed by the very last word in the manuscript:

परक्रोडः

of which the first letter is originally written *va* and corrected by a later hand (not inked) to *pa*.

This colophon informs us of several things. First, we learn the name, Gārgya, of the person who was one way or another responsible for the production of T_m. He shows allegiance to Samavartīśatru, possibly Viṣṇu or Śiva: the slayer of Samavartin (Yama).⁴²⁴ This much is certain.⁴²⁵

However, there are many uncertainties. I am not certain if the name Gārgya belongs to the individual or it is his *gotra* name. (For the possibility of it being a *gotra* name, see below.) Nor am I certain in what capacity he was involved in the production of T_m. The verb *vi-likh-*, used in causative, usually means that the subject ordered the manuscript to be prepared. Most of the time, there is a mention of another name as the scribe.⁴²⁶ But we do not have another name. We cannot take the name Samavartīśatru as that of the scribe. The word *tvat-* “you” and the vocative case of *samavartīśatro* compliment each other. Another curiosity is that the verb is in the first person. As far as the Nepalese manuscripts—to whose colophon data I have an easier access—are concerned, when the verb *vi-likh-* is used in the causative aorist, it is in the third person. The third person makes sense since the subject is not the person who was doing the actual writing. The stanza reads as though someone gave the scribe the text to be copied and the scribe reproduced it. I do not have enough experience to know if this was a common practice in Kerala.

It may further be noted that the constituted text of the stanza essentially follows the text after corrections in order to be more or less

⁴²⁴Dictionaries list names such as Yamāri, Yamaghna, Yamaripu as names of Viṣṇu. I am not aware of any work in which such names occur as such. On the other hand, a name similar in meaning, Yamāntaka is well-attested as a name of Śiva.

⁴²⁵Another potentially interesting point exists. The person who wrote this stanza considers Patañjali to be the author of the Yogabhāṣya.

⁴²⁶These statements come from the observation of colophons of Nepalese manuscripts to which I have a good access to.

intelligible. The fact that there are so many corrections in the manuscript and the nature of the errors are also curious.

Two of the errors originally made in the manuscript (*praṇītaṃ* for *praṇīta°* and *śrīśāṃkaraṇaṃ* for *śrīśāṃkaraṇa°*) do not tell much of a story because they can occur in various circumstances;⁴²⁷ they are caused by mental expectations. Such writing mistakes could happen even when the person writing the manuscript was the composer himself.⁴²⁸ However, the mistake that was corrected to *ahan tvad°* is rather inexplicable for any reason other than copying. The two signs of the original reading *tvi* and *ñca*, later replaced by *ntva*, are completely unintelligible and hyper-metrical when read together. The only feature I find in these three signs is their graphical similarities. Unintelligible yet graphically similar signs appearing in a manuscript typically occurs when the scribe did not understand the nature of a correction. In this case, what happened was probably as follows: there was a manuscript where the part was first written *vyalīlikham ahañ ca* and subsequently corrected to *ahan tva°* by cancelling *ñca* and inserting *tva* in the margin; then a scribe (of T_m) who was copying from this written text did not realize the cancellation and wrote down both, additionally misreading *ntva* as *tvi*. After T_m was inked, someone further corrected it to the intended reading. The nature of errors being graphical, we can exclude the possibility that this error was produced by mishearing or mental associations. We can hence exclude the possibility that this colophon stanza was being dictated (cf. the causative *vyalīlikham* discussed above).

Furthermore, I doubt that this stanza was present in the exemplar of T_m. This is the very end of the manuscript where, in most cases, information relevant to the manuscript is recorded. There still is enough space on the side for about three lines of text and the side is the recto. It is not that the last folio was lost or that the scribe did not have enough space to write further. This stanza was intended to be the colophon of the manuscript. The most likely scenario appears to be that it was prepared by the person who commissioned the manuscript (Gārgya) in written form and the scribe copied it.

⁴²⁷They are surely mistakes. If the word *śrīmatpatañjalimaharṣivarapraṇīta* ended there, then the *etat . . . vīvaraṇam* would be a work by Patañjali. That would contradict with the adjective *śrīśāṃkaram*. The word *śrīśāṃkaraṇam* is unintelligible and would make the stanza unmetrical.

⁴²⁸As I see more colophons, I notice many mistakes are made in them even though the scribes were presumably writing their own words. I used to find it odd and suspected that colophons were being copied. However, it appears more likely that scribes are more used to copying than composing. Copying is a mechanical activity that one can train themselves to excel. However, composing and writing down at the same time is quite a different activity. I experience myself making more mistakes when writing something down especially by hand, at the same time thinking what to write. I find it not so rare to write my own name wrongly. I do not assume a colophon being copied when mistakes, including the ones involving the scribe's own name, are found any more.

I would now like to discuss the final word of the whole manuscript, *parakroḍaḥ*.⁴²⁹ Parakroḍa is the name of the family known to have produced Jyeṣṭhadeva (active between 1500 and 1610)—the author of an astronomical work, *Yuktibhāṣā*.⁴³⁰ But Parakroḍa may have been the name of the family deity as well.⁴³¹ I do not have a clear idea what function the word *parakroḍaḥ* in the nominative singular at the end of T_m serves. It would seem that it is there as an auspicious word.⁴³² Yet again, the original scribe wrote *varakroḍaḥ* instead of *para*°. This is a typical error stemming from the graphical similarity between *pa* and *va* in the Malayalam script. As I have speculated above, the scribe might have been given what to write at the end of the manuscript and was copying it. He was probably not a Parakroḍa himself; he was not familiar with the word.

It is in this connection that I cannot take the name Gārgya simply as a personal name. It can instead be the *gotra* name of the person who commissioned T_m . Jyeṣṭhadeva mentioned above had some close relationship with another astronomer from Kerala, Nīlakaṇṭha Somayāji (born 1444 and composed the *Tantrasaṃgraha*, in 1500).⁴³³ They are said to have been fellow disciples of the same teacher and Jyeṣṭhadeva based his *Yuktibhāṣā* on the *Tantrasaṃgraha*. And this Nīlakaṇṭha Somayāji's *gotra* was Gārgya.⁴³⁴ Given the historically recorded relationship of a Gārgya and someone from the Parakroḍa family, it is hard not to consider the person referred to as *gārgyaḥ* in T_m 's colophon stanza as a Gārgya as well. On the other hand, it does not appear that Jyeṣṭhadeva and Nīlakaṇṭha Somayāji came from the same family, and hence there is no need to consider that Jyeṣṭhadeva's *gotra*, too, was Gārgya, i.e., Parakroḍa family's *gotra* was Gārgya. I cannot deny the possibility that the nominative singular of the word *parakroḍaḥ* might correspond to that of the word *gārgyaḥ* in the colophon stanza; but connecting these two words is not necessary.

There is too little information in the colophon stanza to determine the provenance of T_m precisely. The most we can say is that it may have had something to do with the circle of Kerala astronomers of the late 15th to

⁴²⁹I owe Yasutaka Muroya for calling my attention to the fact that Parakroḍa is a name.

⁴³⁰See Sarma and Hariharan (1991:187–188, and 207). In addition to the post-colophon statements in a manuscript of a Malayalam commentary on the *Sūryasiddhānta*, Sarma cites Parayil Raman Namputiri, *Nampūṭirīmār* (in Malayalam), Trichur 1918, p. 55, as a source of the information that Jyeṣṭhadeva hailed from the family Parakroḍa (Sanskritised name of Malayalam *Paraññoṭṭu*).

⁴³¹This comes from the opening of a manuscript of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* to which Yasutaka Muroya drew my attention. The scribe of the manuscript shows allegiance to *parakroḍadeva*. I do not have the details of the manuscript. Muroya kindly sent me a digital reproduction of the first side of the manuscript, and it starts with *hari śrīgaṇapataye namaḥ śrīparakroḍadevāya namo namaḥ*. The first word here is *hariḥ* whose *visarga* has dropped before the combination of a sibilant and a semi-vowel.

⁴³²This use would be analogous to the *Nyāyabhāṣya* manuscript mentioned in the previous note.

⁴³³See Sarma and Hariharan (1991:187–8). For the date of Nīlakaṇṭha Somayāji, see Sarma and Narasimhan (1998:S 3).

⁴³⁴See Sarma and Narasimhan (1998:S 1).

early 16th century.

An edition of colophon stanzas of L

L has other dedicatory stanzas and a brief colophon. The text and a tentative translation of stanzas may be presented as follows:

जितम् पतञ्जलिमुनिना येन श्रेयोत्थिसार्थसस्यानाम्।
विहितो हर्षस्तापत्रितयहृता धर्ममेघेन॥

Victorious is the sage Patañjali, who caused joy by means of the cloud of Dharma (the Dharmamegha [*samādhi*]), the remover of heat (three torments), to the crops which are the multitude of those who seek better fortune.

यस्ततान भवमार्गलंघिनां क्लेशकर्ममयधर्मनुत्तये।
धर्ममेघमुखयोगतोय... .

[[I salute Patañjali...]] who expanded [[... that produces]] water that is yoga [pouring] from the Dharmamegha (Dharma-cloud) in order to remove the heat, consisting of impurities and deeds, from those who are traversing the path of reincarnation.

As can be seen, I did not make any emendation from the reading found in the manuscript. It does appear that the scribe wrote down what was meant to be written down. However, there are problems that raise questions about the circumstances under which these two stanzas were recorded in this manuscript.

The first and most glaring defect is that the second stanza is not complete. It lacks 12 syllables at the end. The stanza is interrupted in the middle of a word and the scribe simply continues to write the name of the owner (not certain; see below) after °*yogatoya*. The scribe did not leave any indication that something was missing.

Another outward problem is a metrical defect in the first stanza. It starts with a *ja-gaṇa* (◡-◡). This is a metrical defect in the *āryā* meter.⁴³⁵ This was probably the reason why the editors of the 1952 edition silently emended the first *pāda* of this stanza to *sa jayati patañjalimuniḥ* (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 370), which means the same thing, is metrically sound, and has the added benefit of having the corresponding pronoun to the relative pronoun *yena*, the first word of the second *pāda*.

The first stanza also appears clumsy for having so many words in the instrumental singular, masculine (*patañjalīnā*, *yena*, *dharmameghena*, and *tāpatritayahṛtā*). The first three each occupy different syntactic functions and the last modifies the fourth. In particular, I find the composition “*yena ... harṣo vihito ... dharmamethena*” (the words rearranged for

⁴³⁵Harunaga Isaacson pointed this out to me.

clarity) to mean “who caused the joy by means of *dharmamegha*” not clean. There the words *yena* and *dharmameghena* refer to two different things in the same clause: the agent of the action and an instrument, respectively.

The compound *śreyorthisārthasasyānām* also looks somewhat clumsy. What the author of the stanza wanted to convey was probably that Patañjali promised joy to the *śreyorthins* in the form of crops or the fruits achieved by the heat-reducing, i.e., rain producing, cloud, viz., the Dharmamegha *samādhi*. The author of the stanza is apparently playing on the word *megha* (cloud) part of the Dharmamegha and the meanings of the word *tāpa* (heat and suffering). The topos behind this is the autumnal cloud that produces rain, relieving people of the summer heat, and contributing to agriculture. However, with the compound *śreyorthisārthasasyānām* ending with the genitive plural, followed by *harṣa*, the natural interpretation is that the people are compared to crops and they experience joy. This probably is not what was meant. I would think people rejoice due to the removal of heat and the crops, both given by the autumnal cloud. I would attribute the clumsiness to the inability of the author of this stanza to formulate his idea precisely.

The second stanza in the *rathoddhātā* meter is, as has been mentioned, short of one syllable and one pāda.⁴³⁶ The parts enclosed in the double brackets in the translation are what I conjecture to have been in the missing part. Interestingly, the topos of the stanza significantly overlaps with that of the previous one. This stanza is about Patañjali who rescues those who are suffering from the karmic existence by means of yoga; the suffering is compared to the (summer) heat; and the Dharmamegha *samādhi* is compared to the (autumnal) cloud that produces rain. Seeing the word *tatāna* “expanded,” I would speculate that there was also an imagery of the serpent king Patañjali who expands the hood to cause rain. However, as the editors of the 1952 edition conjectured, the most fitting syllable to supply at the end of the c-pāda indeed is *da(m)*. There are not many words that have only one syllable after *toya*. But then the whole compound (*dharmameghamukhayogatoyada*) becomes rather unintelligible. The relative clause would then mean something like “the one who spread the cloud that is yoga where the Dharmamegha is the foremost.” It is not impossible but not good. In addition, there is no sign that the omission in the manuscript was a copying mistake. The best explanation for the lack of 12 syllables appears to be that the scribe (author of the stanzas himself?) just gave up finishing the stanza. That the last two stanzas in L convey more or less the same content contributes to this suspicion. It is as if the author of these stanzas were experimenting with different expressions to convey the same sense and gave up on finishing the second attempt.

⁴³⁶ Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952: 370) supplies °*dam* [*patañjalim ṛṣiṃ praṇato 'smi*]. Although the editors indicate that only the last pāda was their reconstruction by brackets, they in fact added °*dam* to have °*toyadam*.

The puzzling conclusion of L continues with the final statement. Here is the text without any corrections:

*śrīkeśavaprakā[sic]bhaṭṭārakānām śiṣyasya satyānandasya i[sic]yam
pāda[sic]ñjalaṭikā*

(This [manuscript of the] Pātañjaliṭikā belongs to Satyānanda, a disciple of Keśavaprakāśabhaṭṭāraka).

I note three problems (one is minor). First of all, the teacher's name should be *śrīkeśavaprakāśabhaṭṭāraka*. The manuscript omits *śa* in °*prakāśa*°. Also, it misspells *pādañjala*° for *pātañjala*°. This is most likely an influence from the scribe's native language (presumably Malayalam) where a consonant is voiced or unvoiced according to the position. Another minor issue is the lack of the *sandhi* between *satyānandasya* and *iyam*; if the *sandhi* is applied, the text would read °*nandasyeyam*. I am not certain if Satyānanda was the scribe or the owner of L. (It is also possible that he was the scribe and the owner.) At least, we can gather that he was closely involved with L and his teacher was Keśavaprakāśa. I consider this colophon to be genuine, as opposed to being copied from elsewhere. He was thinking of the text word by word (lack of the *sandhi*), he wrote down what he would pronounce rather than what he saw (*pādañjala* rather than *pātañjala*). He might have been losing focus and was in a hurry with the prospect of finishing the manuscript (dropping a syllable from the teacher's name).

Notes on the 1952 edition

As has been noted, in the closing part of the YVi the editors of the 1952 edition introduced some changes to the text, mostly silently.⁴³⁷ They made another, more significant, change to the text without telling the reader: they moved around the stanzas and the colophon.

According to the two principle manuscripts, the end of the YVi consists of the following elements. First, both have:

1. a *sragdharā* stanza, a prayer to Kṛṣṇa
2. a (corrupt) śloka(?) paying homage to Patañjali
3. a *vīyoginī* stanza paying homage to Śaṅkara
4. colophon to the work
5. a *vasantatilakā* stanza expressing allegiance to Viṣṇu, and
6. an *upajāti* stanza paying homage to Patañjali

then T_m has the colophon stanza. L further has:

7. a defective *āryā* stanza saluting Patañjali
8. an incomplete *rathoddhatā* stanza (presumably) saluting Patañjali
9. the ownership statement

⁴³⁷See pp. 212, 219 and 220.

The 1952 edition ends its text with most of the above but in a different order: 1, 5, 2, 6, 7, 8, 3, and 4 (the colophon).⁴³⁸ The edition derives from the manuscript M, which is a copy of L,⁴³⁹ and M has the same ending as L. So, it was the editors of the 1952 edition who rearranged the text. The result was that the YVi ends with: two stanzas (1 and 5) dedicated to Viṣṇu, four stanzas (2, 6, 7 and 8) to Patañjali, one stanza (3) to Śaṅkara, and the colophon (4). We can easily infer the motivation behind the change. Apparently the editors were not happy with the original arrangement because the objects of dedication went back and forth; usually, stanzas dedicated to one object appear in succession. The editors tried to *fix* this perceived peculiarity. They did not, however, take into account if there is any reasonable explanation how the arrangement they imagined could have been mangled so badly. I doubt there is any. They in fact assumed that all the concluding stanzas were part of the text and found the arrangement strange. I, on the other hand, find the assumption not warranted.

Layers in the ending of the YVi manuscripts

I rather view the seemingly peculiar arrangement of dedicatory stanzas in the end of the YVi as a sign of the following: the ending grew as manuscripts were copied because different scribes added their own dedicatory/colophon material without (completely) removing their predecessors'. There are several other signs that the ending of the YVi manuscripts consists of several layers.

One immediately sees that the texts of T_m and L deviate at one point. That is after the item numbered 6, using the list in the previous section. This tells us several things. The first is that items 1 to 6 were in the latest common ancestor of the two manuscripts, α (T_m 's exemplar).⁴⁴⁰

As far as T_m is concerned, it is most likely that the colophon stanza of T_m is unique to it. Similarly, the ownership statement of L (item 9) is probably unique to L. The two faulty stanzas (7 and 8) of L may well belong to the same layer, judging from the curious quality (full of errors) shared by the stanzas and the ownership statement. Even if they were in α ,⁴⁴¹ the scribe of T_m felt them auxiliary enough to drop them. We can,

⁴³⁸It does not have 9; this is understandable because it pertains only to the manuscript L.

⁴³⁹See pp. 26 ff.

⁴⁴⁰See pp. 32 ff.

⁴⁴¹There are various possibilities with regard to the origin of the two stanzas. It is not inconceivable that stanzas 7 and 8, in their entirety or partially, were in α and the scribe of T_m dropped the part thinking that it pertained only to his exemplar and not something he had to reproduce. The faulty nature of those stanzas, if they were in the exemplar, might have contributed to the decision. Also, we cannot preclude that items 7 and 8 were added during the transmission between α and L since there is a possibility that there were intervening manuscripts between α and L (see p. 33). Other possibilities include: that the colophon stanza found in T_m was in α but it was replaced in L while it survived in T_m ; and that α had more text that was dropped both in T_m

therefore, draw a border after stanza 6.

Another border is after the colophon (4), revealing a layer consisting of stanzas 5 and 6. Unless there is a compelling reason to suggest otherwise, I consider anything after the colophon to have been added by a scribe. The scribe does not have to be the one who produced the manuscript at hand. Even if later scribes reproduced what an earlier scribe had added, it is still by a scribe. What we have here appears to be such a case. I find no reason to consider the two stanzas not to be scribal. Stanzas 5 and 6 express allegiance to Viṣṇu and pay homage to Patañjali respectively. This is consistent with what a scribe would do. He was expressing allegiance to his tutelary deity and paying homage to the author of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra on which the YVi is a commentary.

Now we are left with three stanzas (items 1, 2, and 3) and the colophon. I do not see any clear borders in this part. Here I start examination from the first stanza.

The first stanza, a prayer to Kṛṣṇa, appears integral to the body of the text as has been discussed.⁴⁴²

I do not see any strong positive or negative indications whether the second concluding stanza (numbered 2 above)⁴⁴³ is part of the original composition. One thing that attracts my attention is that it pays homage to Patañjali. The reason why Patañjali should be paid homage to in the context of a commentary on the Pātañjalayogaśāstra is that he is considered the author of it. However, while the author of the YVi mentions the name Patañjali, he shows no awareness that Patañjali is considered the author of the work he is commenting on. Patañjali is referred to only as the author of the VMBh, a grammarian.⁴⁴⁴ Thus the stanza gives a sense of incongruence with the rest of the work.⁴⁴⁵ Moreover, as mentioned above (pp. 211 ff.), this stanza is, if it was a stanza at all, badly transmitted, showing contrast to the immediately preceding and following stanzas that were transmitted with few problems. This gives an impression of different origins.

The third stanza⁴⁴⁶ is in a similar situation: no clear boundaries around it, but some incongruence with the body of the work. It pays homage to Śaṅkara but in no place in the body of the YVi is he or his BSBh mentioned. Additionally, if we assume that the text of the YVi continued up to this stanza, then the immediately following colophon that ascribes the YVi to Śaṅkara will contradict what the stanza implies: the author is not Śaṅkara. The speaker of the stanza cannot be Śaṅkara because he praises Śaṅkara and is from generations later. Then the colophon ascribes the YVi, including this stanza, to Śaṅkara...?

and L.

⁴⁴²See pp. 210–211.

⁴⁴³See p. 211.

⁴⁴⁴See note 1 on p. 7 and note 368 on p. 194.

⁴⁴⁵In this regard, all the stanzas at the end of the YVi manuscripts that pay homage to Patañjali (2, 6, 7 and 8) are subject to the same doubt about their authenticity.

⁴⁴⁶See p. 213.

Rather, the stanza and the colophon should be read together. The stanza salutes Śaṅkara and the colophon attributes the work to him. The stanza can simply be understood as paying homage to the author of the text. If we do not wish to explain a contradiction, then the stanza should be placed outside the YVi, coming from the idea that Śaṅkara was the author of the YVi.

Finally the colophon.⁴⁴⁷ It is about the text (YVi) and is not part of the text. We cannot treat it as in the same level as the body of the text. It is outside of the YVi.

In the end, the first stanza (numbered 1 above) following the conclusion of the commentary is the only stanza that I feel compelled to attribute to the same author who composed the body of the commentary. For the rest, I have some reservations. The likelihood of the subsequent elements being additions during the transmission of the YVi increases as we go down the list.

Here I would like to call attention to a lack of the word *iti* that was last seen at the end of the commentary and before the first stanza. The word would clearly mark the end of the text. One of the reasons why there are uncertainties about the extent of the original text, and why the editors of the 1952 edition struggled to make sense out of the arrangement of stanzas, is the lack of that word. The lack may indicate that there was more tampering in the ending than has been discussed here.⁴⁴⁸ Someone who was adding his own material might have inadvertently removed the clear marking of the end of the text, the word *iti*.

⁴⁴⁷See p. 214.

⁴⁴⁸Although I do not have any statistics, that scribal additions being preserved in subsequent copies to such an extent as seen here may already be a rare case. On the one hand, this indicates a complex text transmission process. On the other hand, it might suggest the possibility that even the body of the text itself consists of several layers. If this is the case, it will be much harder to reveal layers than to do so in the ending. Note that at least for the part edited in this volume, I did not consider the possibility of text being tampered by later hands. See pp. 33 ff.

Materials for the Authorship Problem

The authorship of this work has been controversial apparently because it is ascribed to one of the most famous Hindu philosophers, Śāṅkara, defined as the author of the BSBh.

Chronology of controversy

Here is a chronological overview of the scholars who in one way or another dealt with the authorship of the YVi.

1927 Kavi (1927) was the first scholar to mention the YVi with regard to its authorship. He ascribed the YVi, the Bhāṣyapradīpa (a commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya), and commentaries under the name Jayamaṅgalā,⁴⁴⁹ to one Śāṅkarācārya, whom he considers a member of the Payyur family of Kerala.⁴⁵⁰

1929 Sharma (1929) followed Kavi (1927) in that he ascribed the YVi, as well as the Jayamaṅgalā on the Sāṃkhyakārikās, to a Śāṅkara from the Payyur family, but he places the author before Māṭhara and Vācaspati Mīśra (both authors of commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikās) and after Śāṅkara, the advaitin. He is strongly against placing him in the 15th century.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁹The Jayamaṅgalās referred by Kavi (1927) are commentaries on the Bhaṭṭikāvya, the Sāṃkhyasaptati (Sāṃkhyakārikās), the Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana, (the Nīṭisāra of?) Kāmandaka, and Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra. All of them have been published. As seen in the New Catalogus Catalogorum (vol. 7, p. 184), not all the manuscripts of the Jayamaṅgalās attribute them to Śāṅkarabhagavat(pāda)/-pūjya(pāda).

⁴⁵⁰I will discuss the relationship between the members of the Payyur family and persons named Śāṅkara on pp. 247 ff

⁴⁵¹In a footnote on p. 431:

In the journal of Oriental Research, Madras, January, 1928, p. 94, it is mentioned by the editor that "Mr. Kavi says that all these authors are identical and that this Śāṅkara lived about 1400 AD."

This is a mistake. Mr. Kavi mentions that the "Ms. belonged to the well-known Payyur Patteri who flourished between 1300 and 1400 AD." so that, 1400 A.D. can be the date of the possessor of the Ms. and not that of the author. Therefore, this Śāṅkarācārya cannot be placed later

1931 S. K. Rāmanātha Śāstri (1931), in the introduction to the edition of the Sphoṭasiddhi, discussed the lineage of the Payyur family.⁴⁵² He ascribed the YVi to Śaṅkara who was an uncle and/or a teacher of Parameśvara I, the author of commentaries on the Nyāyakaṇikā (a commentary on the Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana Miśra) of Vācaspati Miśra. It should be noted that Rāmanātha Śāstri distinguished three Parameśvaras, as well as three Ṛṣis, each father of a Parameśvara.

Even though the family tree on p. xxiii of the introduction shows only one Śaṅkara as an uncle of Parameśvara II (the author of a commentary on the Sphoṭasiddhi, etc.), he mentions two Śaṅkaras, one as an uncle/a teacher of Parameśvara II (pp. x–xi) and another as a teacher of Parameśvara I (the author of commentaries on Nyāyakaṇikā, etc.) (pp. xiv–xv). Rāmanātha Śāstri (1931) ascribed the YVi to this earlier Śaṅkara.

Rāmanātha Śāstri (1931) was also the first to publish a part of the YVi as an appendix to his edition of the Sphoṭasiddhi, for he thought it is indispensable for someone who appreciates the Sphoṭasiddhi (*sphoṭasiddhirasikair avasāyadarśanīyah*). Indeed the portion of the YVi is helpful in understanding the Sphoṭasiddhi because it may presuppose the discussion in the YVi, but not the other way around.⁴⁵³

1952 P. S. Rama Śāstri and S. R. Krishnamurthi Śāstri 1952 published the YVi for the first time as a whole. The editors ascribed the text to Śaṅkara, the advaitin (pp. xiii ff.).⁴⁵⁴

1968 Hacker (1968), who worked on Śaṅkara for many years, after getting acquainted with the YVi, proposed a hypothesis that famous Śaṅkara was first a yogin, then became an advaitin. Hacker thought the hypothesis would explain peculiarities in Śaṅkara's philosophy.

This article virtually inspired interest in the YVi among the Western and Japanese scholars. This article is referred to in almost all the literature that deals with the authorship problem of the YVi.

1976–8 Nakamura (1976a), another specialist of Śaṅkara, drew attention of Japanese scholars to the YVi. Although he did not try to examine

than 1000 A.D., or near about.

He is referring to the following sentence in Kavi (1927: 134) who discusses a manuscript of the Bhāṣyapradīpa (a commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya): “At the end of one of the colophons to close the line the scribe wrote Payyur-Bhagavatpāda-virachitam—of course the manuscript once belonged to the well-known Payyur Patteri of Malabar who flourished between 1300 and 1400 AD., or even later.” Aside from the dating, I wonder if the identification of this “Payyurbhagavatpāda” with a person named Śaṅkara is justified. Although the famous Śaṅkara is a Bhagavatpāda, it does not mean all the Bhagavatpādas are called Śaṅkara. The word *bhagavatpāda* is an appellation.

⁴⁵²See also Halbfass (1991: 206–7).

⁴⁵³The same verses from Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika are quoted and criticized both in the Sphoṭasiddhi and the YVi. I plan to publish a detailed analysis as part of the volume on the authorship of the YVi. Preliminary discussion are found in Harimoto (1999).

⁴⁵⁴For that matter, they also ascribed the Yogabhāṣya to the same Vedavyāsa, who they think is the author of the Brahmasūtra.

the authorship, he worked with the assumption that it could be genuine. He also questioned Hacker's thesis of conversion from a yogin to an advaitin, pointing out the possibility that the notion of (philosophical) schools may not have been mutually exclusive for people who believed that Śaṅkara, the author of the *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, wrote a commentary on the PYŚ. Nakamura (1976a) spent most of the space for notes on points he noticed while he was preparing a translation. A noticeable trend is found in his remarks on the terminology of the YVi. He either points out the similarity of the terminology to the Buddhists or to the author of the *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*. Another thing one may notice is that he always refers to the author of the YVi as Śaṅkara without distinguishing him from the author of the *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*.

Following the first article, he published another pair of articles (Nakamura 1976b, 1977). This time, most of the space was devoted to displaying how Vedāntic/Advaita philosophy is reflected in the YVi. Apparently, he was inclined to think that the YVi was a genuine work of the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

He also published a Japanese translation of the first chapter of the YVi.⁴⁵⁵

1979 Vetter (1979: 21) did not attempt to examine the problem of the authorship. He simply accepted the YVi as genuine, following Hacker.

1979 Mayeda (1979: 6, 64–5) expresses his inclination towards assuming Śaṅkara's authorship of the YVi. His impression was mainly based on the indebtedness of Śaṅkara's doctrine of perception to the YS and the YBh.

1983 (1991) Halbfass (1983) and its revision (Halbfass 1991) offered numerous inspiring observations on the YVi, pointing out remarkable connections, affinities, etc., with Śaṅkara in arguments against the Buddhists and the treatment of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Nonetheless, he did not commit himself regarding the authorship.

One of the most significant contributions of the article was the reminder of the YVi's close tie with Kerala, especially the Payyur family. The earlier contribution of Śāstri (1931) that was not noticed by Hacker et al. was noted. In addition, the references in Parameśvara I's commentary on the *Nyāyakaṇikā*, reported by Halbfass, have set the lowest limit of the YVi to 14th century.

The majority of the article was devoted to a discussion of philosophical peculiarities found in the YVi, keeping the Hacker's "conversion" theory in mind. The conclusion of the newer edition is subtle, and leaves many reservations, but implies that the YVi could be an earlier work of Śaṅkara.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁵It was published as a series of translations in 36 issues of a journal called *Āgama* since December 1979.

⁴⁵⁶Halbfass (1991: 228):

Yet it is hardly appropriate to characterize the reorientation and change

1983–2001 Wezler (1983) has been influential on the studies of the YVi. With this and his subsequent articles (Wezler 1984b,a, 1986), he has given new life to the studies in the YVi. With regard to the authorship problem, he pointed out inherent problems in Hacker's thesis and emphasized the need for further study (Wezler 1983: 35–6). He also emphasized the importance of the YVi as the oldest available commentary on the YBh (Wezler 1983: 31–4), apart from its authorship problem. This does not necessarily exclude the possibility of the YVi being a work of Śaṅkara. Or perhaps, he might have been inclined to admit that the YVi is a genuine work of Śaṅkara. Interestingly, however, as he further studies the YVi, he grows skeptical with regard to its being an authentic work of Śaṅkara (Wezler 1986: 173), (Wezler 2001: 302, n.54).

1990 Bader (1990: 81 ff.) briefly states, "The author of the YV [YVi], who may well be Śaṅkara," (p. 106) and spends most of his discussion examining Hacker's thesis.⁴⁵⁷

1990 Leggett (1990)⁴⁵⁸ is a complete translation of the YVi.⁴⁵⁹ The author spends most of his "technical introduction" with the authorship problem in mind. He seems to be convinced that the YVi is a genuine work of Śaṅkara. Despite the name "technical," the discussions are, as he admits,⁴⁶⁰ not very systematically pursued. Some of the analyses are genuinely flawed.⁴⁶¹ Still, many remarks appear to contain genuine points that, if pursued, should yield significant results. At the same time, the introduction may show the limitation of searching for similarities in the YVi and Śaṅkara's authenticated works.⁴⁶² There are many similarities, but none can be conclusive since one cannot exclude the possibility that

of allegiance we would have to assume if Hacker's hypothesis were true as a "conversion." In accordance with Advaitic self-understanding, it would rather have been an act of progression and transcendence, that is, of relegating Yoga practice and Sāṃkhya theory to a lower, preliminary level of insight and orientation.

⁴⁵⁷See also a review (Olivelle 1992) on the book.

⁴⁵⁸See also a review by de Jong (1994).

⁴⁵⁹The author had published translations of the first two chapters of the YVi (Leggett 1981, 1983).

⁴⁶⁰Leggett (1990: 18):

This is not a study, and I am simply pointing out a few indications noticed during the translating.

⁴⁶¹For example, his assessment of the reading of the YS and the YBh relies on the readings provided separately from the body of the YVi in the 1952 edition. As repeatedly pointed out, they have little bearing on the actual readings expected in the body of the YVi. Interestingly, the editors of the 1952 edition apparently changed their attitude towards the readings of the YS and the YBh as they neared the end of the text. This can be observed in the frequency of footnotes that report variant readings of the YS and the YBh. The further the text proceeds, the more frequent such footnotes become.

⁴⁶²Such as the closeness of the YVi to the Gītābhāṣya (pp. 31-2), frequency of citations and their sources (pp. 33-4), etc., appear to be worth to be paid attention.

the similarities are due to the author who was very well-read in the works of Śāṅkara.

1992 Gelblum (1992: 87), while examining Leggett (1990), implicitly expresses his doubt about Śāṅkara's authorship of the YVi. The arguments are based on philological observations of the text. Therefore the article is significant in that it was the first to propose counter-arguments towards the authenticity of the YVi philologically.

However, it appears that Gelblum was predisposed to attack whatever is said in Leggett's translation.⁴⁶³ I have to confess that I have a hard time understanding the logic behind the arguments.

The first argument (Gelblum 1992: 84–5) that implies his doubt about the authenticity derives from a criticism of a discussion on a reading of the YBh by Leggett (1990: 22). I do believe Leggett's argument is flawed, and I wholeheartedly agree that the YBh transmitted to the author of the YVi did not have a gloss *vārtāto divyagandhavijñānam* as in the vulgate YBh (see for example, Āgāśe et al. (1919: 156, l. 5)). However, I cannot see why it is guaranteed that the YBh with the gloss is the original and without it is a corruption.⁴⁶⁴ It is similarly possible that the YBh with the gloss is a result of contamination.

Another argument is that placing the YVi prior to Vācaspati is difficult, for a reading of the YBh proposed as an emendation in the YVi was not adopted by Vācaspati even though the reading is apparently better.⁴⁶⁵ It should be noticed, however, that even if the YVi predates Vācaspati, he

⁴⁶³This may be seen in the following strong words on p. 84:

Some of the interesting philological problems discussed in Leggett's Introduction are not handled with the care and circumspection that they deserve. Trying to reinforce the case made out by Hacker and his followers for identifying the author of the *Vivaraṇa* with the celebrated Śāṅkara, author of the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, Leggett bends over backwards to discover 'some interesting cross-correspondences between the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Gītābhāṣya*' (p. 31; cf. p. 9).

⁴⁶⁴Gelblum (1992: 85):

However, it would be reasonable to suppose that the traditional gloss with *gandha* was missing in the version of Vyāsa available to the author of the *Vivaraṇa*—presumably because of damage to the relevant place in the transmitted MS; for otherwise he is not likely to have ignored Vyāsa's explicit *gandha* gloss. It is hard too to see how the *Vivaraṇa* would have contemplated a neuter interpretation of *vārta*—unless the Vyāsa gloss *vartātaḥ* were also missing.

⁴⁶⁵Gelblum (1992: 87):

It should also be noted that the version of Vyāsa used by Vācaspati was known to the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, since he refers to a corrupt reading in it (*vartamānasya*) and very plausibly proposes its correction (substituting it by *atītasya*; text p. 257, l. 13; see above, p. 78). This indicates that the *Vivaraṇa* could hardly have been earlier than Vācaspati and is likely to have been later (since Vācaspati would hardly dismiss a so obviously correct and pertinent interpretation).

does not have to know exactly what is said in the YVi. The majority of the readings found in the YVi and Vācaspati's commentary suggest that the authors were unaware of each other.⁴⁶⁶

The third argument is that the apparently original (in Gelblum's assessment) reading of YS 4.34 is not adopted in the YVi. According to Gelblum (1992: 37), the reading adopted by Bhoja (*citiśakteḥ* as in *svarūpapraṭiṣṭhā vā citiśakteḥ*) is also the one presupposed in the YBh. However, I fail to see that the genitive form (*tasyāḥ*) in the sentence *tasyāḥ sadā tathāivāvasthānaṃ kaivalyam* in the YBh presupposes the reading in the sūtra to be *citiśakteḥ*. In the immediately preceding sentence, the YBh has *svarūpapraṭiṣṭhā punar buddhisattvānabhisambandhinī puruṣasya citiśaktir eva kevalā*. This certainly justifies the understanding that the word *tasyāḥ* refers to the feminine word *citiśakti*, but more importantly, this sentence is naturally a gloss of *svarūpapraṭiṣṭhā vā citiśaktiḥ*. The YBh does not presuppose the reading *citiśakteḥ* in the sūtra. The reading *citiśaktiḥ* adopted in the YVi appears to be the original in the YS 4.34. Also, even though Gelblum (1992) does not mention, Vācaspati (Āgāśe et al. 1919: 207, l. 17), too, reads *citiśaktiḥ*. I have to wonder why the reading known by Bhoja, who is apparently later than Vācaspati,⁴⁶⁷ is more original than the reading known to Vācaspati.

In addition, if we see this argument in combination with the previous one, one is left wondering why on the one hand, the YVi is said to be posterior to Vācaspati for knowing the same reading as Vācaspati,⁴⁶⁸ while on the other hand, said to be posterior to Bhoja for not adopting the reading found in his commentary.

1992–2001 T. S. Rukmani published three articles (Rukmani 1992, 1993, 1998), and a translation of the whole YVi (Rukmani 2001) arguing against Śāṅkara's authorship of the YVi. Here are some observations regarding her arguments.

Rukmani (1992) She says, "All the known works of Śāṅkarācārya are either original works or are commentaries on original works," (Rukmani 1992: 449) without specifying which works she considers Śāṅkara's

⁴⁶⁶See Halbfass (1991: 219–24). In many places the author of the YVi knows unique readings of the YBh not shared with others, including those known to Vācaspati. He often adheres to readings of the YBh that forces him difficult interpretations. One such example is in YBh 1.1 toward the end. He reads *sa samprajñāta ity ākhyāyate* | (see p. 183). On the other hand, all the versions consulted by Maas (2006: 3) read *sa samprajñāto yoga ity ākhyāyate* |. Because of the simple lack of the word *yogaḥ* in the YBh, the author of the YVi is forced to interpret the word *asamprajñātaḥ* to modify the word *samādhiḥ*. He interprets the term *samprajñāta* and *asamprajñāta* as two kinds of *samādhi* throughout. See n. 353 on p. 191 and n. 401 on p. 206. See also his lengthy discussion on the role of sūtra 1.2 (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 9–10). Given a case like this, it is hard to believe that the author of the YVi was aware of the version of the YBh known to Vācaspati.

⁴⁶⁷See for example, Gelblum (1992: 37). Bhoja is assigned the 11th century.

⁴⁶⁸Note that if this logic was allowed to work, anyone could claim that a given commentary is posterior to any other commentary on the same text since the most of the text commented upon is inherently identical.

genuine works. Scholars are aware that any work ascribed to Śaṅkara, with the exception of the BSBh, is subject to the authorship problem. All the other works that are considered authentic by scholars have different degrees of likelihood of being spurious, and therefore they are only hypothetically authentic.⁴⁶⁹ Readers of the 1992 article have to speculate which text is considered genuine by its author, based on her later discussions. Her discussion continues that since the YVi is a commentary on a commentary, it does not fit into the known works of Śaṅkara. She appears to be willing to dismiss Śaṅkara's authorship of the commentary on the commentary of Gauḍapāda on the Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad as well.⁴⁷⁰

Similarly, her assumption, "Śaṅkarācārya also, as far as we know, did not even write commentaries on the *sūtra* texts of the other systems of Indian Philosophy," (Rukmani 1992: 419) is begging the question. Since we do not know which texts Śaṅkara wrote, we are discussing the authorship of texts ascribed to Śaṅkara, including the YVi. Accordingly, the subsequent comparison between Śaṅkara on the one hand, and Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu on the other, in the article appears to have little relevance to the authenticity of the YVi. At least we can conclude that she probably does not think that the Jayamaṅgalā on the Sāṃkhyakārikās (although it is not a *sūtra* text) and a commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya (perhaps also because it is already a commentary) ascribed to a Śaṅkarabhagavat are not genuine.

Rukmani (1992: 420) considers that the existence of two *nāndī* verses in the YVi goes against the style of Śaṅkara. The existence of dedicatory verses at the beginning and the end and the reference to the first Śaṅkara in one of them in the YVi have been noticed by Hacker, et al.⁴⁷¹ The existence of the verses was in fact one of the reasons why Hacker thought the YVi to be an earlier work.

Her discussion of the dedicatory stanzas, particularly for Śaṅkara, at the end of the YVi needs to be reconsidered in the light of the manuscript material. See the section "The ending of the YVi" on pp. 207 ff. My evaluation is that the stanza paying homage comes from the same mind that ascribed the YVi to Śaṅkara in the colophon, and hence it is not part of the text.

There is a factual error in the 1992 article: "The fact that there has been so far only one known manuscript of the YSBhV (YVi) which was obtained from Kerala, is also significant in this connection" (p. 420). Wezler (1983) had already reported the existence of two Malayalam manuscripts (T_m and L) before her article.

⁴⁶⁹For example, there have been doubts about the authenticity of the works widely considered to be authentic works such as the Bhagavadgītāsāṃkarabhāṣya among scholars. See Potter (1981: 294) for an overview of the discussion on the authorship problem of the BhGBh ascribed to Śaṅkara. See also Mayeda (1965).

⁴⁷⁰See p. 233.

⁴⁷¹See Hacker (1968: 124–5), Nakamura (1976a: 73–4) Halbfass (1991: 220, n. 84), Endoh (1993: (20–3)).

The use of the word *anye* or *anyeṣām* “others” in the YVi would form the most significant part of the argument against Śāṅkara’s authorship of the YVi in the 1992 article. The author would eventually develop the view that the author of the YVi always refers to Vācaspati as the “others.” Rukmani (1992:421) presents the first such argument. The particular case mentioned in this 1992 article involves two interpretations of the word *nimitta* in YBh 1.24.⁴⁷² The author of the YVi first introduces the interpretation that it means literally the cause why Īśvara’s knowledge eternally increases. Then he introduces another interpretation that the word *nimitta* means the source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) of Īśvara, ascribing the view to others (*anyeṣām*). Vācaspati does take this position, but this view is quite a natural interpretation of the word in the context. For example, and interestingly, Śāṅkara proposes similar two interpretations for BS 1.1.3, alluding to YS 1.24 and 25.⁴⁷³

The same article (1992:421) refers to the word *vivaraṇabhāṣya* in Yogavārttika 3.39 of Vijñānabhikṣu as evidence of Vijñānabhikṣu’s knowledge of the YVi. Aside from the impossibility to interpret the compound in the sense of “the vivaraṇa on the Bhāṣya,” the article does not show the whole context where the word is used. That would make it clear that such an interpretation is impossible. The relevant portion of the Yogavārttika reads:

kaścit tu—atra prāṇādijīvanaśabdābhyāṃ prāṇādi[°prāṇanādi°
in the edition] *nāmakavāyukriyāviśeṣahetuḥ prayatnabheda evoktaḥ, sa ca karaṇaniṣṭha iti bhāṣyārtham āha—tan na, vivaraṇabhāṣye prāṇādīnāṃ gatyādivacanasya virodhāt. . .* (Rukmani 1981–89: vol. 3, p. 150).

This may be translated as:

One speaks of the meaning of the Bhāṣya as follows: “By the words ‘*prāṇādi*’ and ‘*jīvana*’ [in the Bhāṣya], a particular effort that is the cause of special activities of the wind called *prāṇa*, etc., is taught. It is also dependent on the organs.” This is not so. Because [the view] would contradict the words, such as “the movement,” of *prāṇa*, etc., in the explanatory Bhāṣya (*vivaraṇabhāṣya*) . . .

The word *gati* indeed is found in the YBh. It reads:

samastendriyavṛttiḥ prāṇādīlakṣaṇā jīvanam | tasya kriyā pañcadhā: prāṇo mukhanāsikāgatiḥ āhrdayavṛttiḥ; . . . (The life is the activity of all the organs. It is characterized by *prāṇa*. Its activity is five-fold: *prāṇa* has the movement in the nostrils in the face, and its activity reaches the heart; . . .)

⁴⁷²For the text of the relevant portion see pp. 50–52. It is translated on pp. 95–96. The Bhāṣya text whose interpretation is concerned, according to my reconstruction based on the YVi’s reading, is: *sa kiṃ sanimitta āhosvin nīrnimittah? na niškāraṇah, sāstranimittatvāt | sāstram punah kinnimittam? prakṛṣṭasattvanimittam | etayoḥ sāstrotkarṣayor īśvarasattve vartamānayoḥ nīrādyantaḥ sambandhah |*

⁴⁷³See pp. 50 and 51 for the relevant portions of BSBh 1.1.3. See also n. 109 on p. 95. Cf. n. 173 on p. 119..

Vijñānabhikṣu is criticizing the interpretation of his opponent (Vācaspati Miśra, as Rukmani correctly identifies), saying that the interpretation contradicts with the rest of the Bhāṣya. The compound *vivaraṇabhāṣya* does not allow the understanding that it refers to a commentary on a *bhāṣya*. It is a *karmadhāraya* compound in the meaning of “explanatory *bhāṣya*.”

In the 1992 article the author of the YVi is accused of changing the text of the YS and the YBh.⁴⁷⁴ But we cannot conclude that he changed the reading of the root text just because he comments on different text compared to published editions of the YS or the YBh. First of all, we do not know exactly what readings he had in front of him (we do not possess the manuscript of the YBh he used). Hence we also do not know whether the differences between the text commented in the YVi and the other versions of the YS/YBh (there still exist many in the form of manuscripts) are the results of the unfaithfulness of the author of the YVi or the differences in versions. The implications of the different readings of the YS and the YBh had already been pointed out by Wezler (1983) before the publication of the 1992 article.

Rukmani (1992: 422) criticizes Hacker’s hypothesis, based on the “tradition.” However, the tradition does not dictate that Śāṅkara should have only written on Advaita. It is also not difficult to notice that the author of the YVi was not very sympathetic to the ontological position of Sāṃkhya. Whenever the YBh expresses the dualism of Sāṃkhya, the YVi limits itself to be a mere gloss. Although Hacker’s thesis is depicted as though it was purely formed because of the colophon of the text,⁴⁷⁵ there were more. He had noticed the affiliation of the author of the YVi with the Vaiṣṇavism, which he thinks distinguishes Śāṅkara from the later tradition.⁴⁷⁶

Rukmani (1993) The second article (Rukmani 1993) is in a similar vein as the first one. Its second paragraph is on the commentary on the Gaudapādakārikās, which the article’s author might have forgotten to consider when she said, “All the known works of Śāṅkarācārya are either original works or are commentaries on original works” in the first article (see p. 230). Now the sentence is qualified with “the only exception being the *Māṇḍūkyakārikābhāṣya*.” This is a clear example of circular argument. It amounts to saying “I do not believe the YVi to be an authentic work of Śāṅkara. Therefore Śāṅkara only wrote original works or commentaries on original works, or a work of his teacher’s teacher. Therefore the YVi is not a work of Śāṅkara.”

⁴⁷⁴See Rukmani (1992: 422).

⁴⁷⁵Rukmani (1992: 422):

It is surprising thus to note that a scholar of Hacker’s eminence accepts the *YSBhV* [YVi] as Śāṅkarācārya’s work on the rather weak argumentation of the colophon of the manuscript mentioning the author as Śāṅkara-bhagavadpāda[sic].

⁴⁷⁶On the affiliation to the Vaiṣṇavism of the author of the YVi, see section , pp. 244 ff.

Indeed the 1993 article makes it clear that its author opposes Śāṅkara's authorship of the YVi not because of philological evidence but because of her expectations. It is stated on p. 396:

Thus it would be futile to expect Vātsyāyana, Praśastapāda, Śābara or Śāṅkara to have commented on the *sūtras* of other schools.

also on the same page:

To imagine that with these strong views Śāṅkara would yet write a commentary on a commentary of the *Yogasūtras* (YS.), which is an out and out dualistic school, is not an easy matter.

The article is devoted to pointing out the differences between the philosophies expressed in the BSBh and the YVi. I find no substantial philological evidence discussed in the article. I do not think that philosophical/doctrinal differences expressed in commentaries are necessarily a result of different authorship. Perhaps Staal (1995)'s response is best directed to this second article in which he calls Rukmani's articles "very competent," but remarks that Hacker's thesis was yet to be refuted.

On p. 398 of the 1993 article, we find the statement, "Śāṅkara quotes from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the *Kaṭha* and finally from the *Yogasūtras*..." in BSBh 2.1.3, Śāṅkara does not quote from the YS.⁴⁷⁷

What is labelled as "a rambling about the same idea in different ways" (Rukmani 1993: 400) is a standard gloss. Each word in the YBh is paraphrased by one or more words, and compounds are analyzed. I have trouble understanding why she came to such a conclusion, especially when the editors of the 1952 edition kindly had typeset the words from the YBh in the bold typeface.⁴⁷⁸

The next complaint about the style of the YVi (Rukmani 1993: 400) again is puzzling. The portion she refers to (Rukmani 1993: n. 25) as defining "*samādhi* rather clumsily" and getting "into a discussion about the difference between *samādhi* as means and *samādhi* as the end" does not define *samādhi* or discuss the difference between *samādhi* as means and *samādhi* as the end at all. It is part of a discussion on what was

⁴⁷⁷The quote is *atha tattvadarśanopāyo yogaḥ* (Śāstrī and Paṇṣīkar 1917: 438,8). This is not found in the YS. Jacobi (1929: 600, n. 2) speculated that this might have been the first sūtra of Hiranyagarbha's yogaśāstra. An interesting reference is found in the YVi: *tathā cācāryair uktaṃ yogas tattvadarśanārtha itī* (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 208,13).

⁴⁷⁸The part in question (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 234,14–7) reads as follows (here the text is reproduced as printed, including the punctuation and the non-application of *sandhis*):

tatra pratyayaikatānatā dhyānam | *tasmīn deśe dhāraṇāvṛttiviśaye*
nābhicakrādau | *dhyeyālabhanasya dhyeyo deśādih tadālabhanasya* |
pratyayasya [ekātānatā] sadṛśappravāhaḥ, tulyapratyayānāṃ pravāha
ekākāraḥ pratyayasantānaḥ pratyayāntareṇa vijātīyena aparāmṛṣṭaḥ
anākīrṇaḥ | *tat dhyānam* |

The words from the YBh are typeset in bold. The word between the brackets is a word in the vulgate YBh. The editors of the 1952 edition thought it should be supplied. Rukmani (1993: 404, n. 24) quotes this portion without indicating which words are from the root text.

meant when YS 3.3 said *dhyāna* is *samādhi*.⁴⁷⁹ The author of the YVi is trying to resolve the conflict between the statement *yogaḥ samādhiḥ; sa ca sārvaḥmaṣā cittaśya dharmāḥ* in YBh 1.2 with YS 3.3 where *dhyāna* and *samādhi* are identified. This time again, the editors of the 1952 edition made this clear by starting a new paragraph with a question and introducing the answer.⁴⁸⁰ It is misleading just to cite the answer as the 1993 article does in the note.

When referring to the YVi's discussion on whether Īśvara has a body or not (Rukmani 1993: 402), the author of the article says, "How the argument shifts from *Īśvara* to an individual *ātman* is not made clear here." The article has no indication of the text portion being referred to, but it should be p. 67, l. 26–p. 68, l. 6 in the 1952 edition.⁴⁸¹ In this case *ātman* is mentioned as an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) to prove that something can be with and without a body. In fact the author of the YVi does not introduce *ātman* as an example, but his opponent does. The discussion in question is an answer to the *pūrvapakṣa* introduced previously (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 61, 23–5) or p. 59 in the edition in this volume.⁴⁸² There it is clearly indicated that *ātman* is an example (*nidarśana*).⁴⁸³

There is a mention that Īśvara is not identical with Brahman "due to the presence of *māyā*" (Rukmani 1993: 403). This follows the standard view on the *school* of Śāṅkara. However, Hacker (1950) has pointed out that there is little to no distinction between Brahman and Īśvara in Śāṅkara's authentic works. The possibility that this brings the YVi in fact closer to Śāṅkara is apparently not considered.⁴⁸⁴

Rukmani (1998) The third article by the same author is said to offer "conclusive evidence against Śāṅkara's authorship" of the YVi. How-

⁴⁷⁹YS 3.3: *tad evārthamātranirbhāsaṃ svarūpaśūnyam iva samādhiḥ.*

⁴⁸⁰*nanu ca yogaḥ samādhir ity aṅgī pūrvam uktāḥ | ihāṅgo yogasya samādhir ity ākhyāyate | kaḥ punar atrāṅgāṅginor bheda iti? ucyate—yogaḥ samādhir iti cittasthiti-viśeṣo vivakṣitāḥ | iha tu pratyayasantānasyaiva dhyeyasvabhāvāveśād adhyeyākāratvam aṅgam iti viśeṣaḥ* (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 234, 27–30).

⁴⁸¹Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952: 67, l. 26–68, l. 6): *atha aśarīratvād asarvajñāḥ, muktākāśādivat iti cet—na—saśarīratvāt | vyaktāvyaktaṃ hi sarvam aśarīraṃ saśarīratvād anityeśvaratvaṃ dharmādyapekṣatvād ity uktatvād iti cet—na—aśarīratvāt | saśarīrāśarīratvavirodha iti cet—na—muktamucyamānaikātmano 'śarīratvasaśarīratvadarśanāt | tatra bhinnakālatvād avirodha iti cet—na—atrāpi bhinnakālābhyyupagamāt ||* In the edition in this volume, the corresponding part is on p. 67. The translation is on p. 125. In my edition I read *vyaktāvyaktaṃ hi sarvaṃ śarīram* (following T manuscripts) as one sentence instead of *vyaktāvyaktaṃ hi sarvam aśarīram*. The text printed in the 1952 edition is incomprehensible.

⁴⁸²In my edition it reads: *tathā—asarvajño 'nīśvaraś ca, aśarīratvāt, muktāmavat || saśarīraś ced dharmādyapekṣaśarīratvam | tathā ca saṃsarītvam, asmadādivad eva | aśarīratvam eveti cet—jagatkartṛtvānugrahakatvādyanupapattih, muktāmanīdarśanena ||*

⁴⁸³The opponent presupposed by the author of the YVi is Kumārila. Kumārila uses *ātman* as an example to argue against the possibility of Īśvara because he presupposes his opponent to consider Īśvara to be a special kind of *ātman* (such as the Naiyāyikas). See related discussions in n. 186 on p. 125.

⁴⁸⁴For the usage of the word *brahman* (m/n) in the YVi and Hacker's observation, see section on pp. 242 ff, especially note 520 on page 246.

ever, the real discussions is postponed till her coming translation.⁴⁸⁵

When introducing the YVi's close connection to Kerala, including Kavi (1927)'s contribution,⁴⁸⁶ the author does not appear to have consulted any of the texts involved. All the information comes from secondary literatures such as Kavi (1927), Halbfass (1991), Śāstri (1931: introduction). The *Sphoṭasiddhi* and its commentary, the *Gopālikā* had been published (Śāstri 1931) and the introduction of the book is referred to in the article. The *Svāditaṃkaraṇī* was edited and available (Stern 1988). If she had consulted these texts, she might have noticed that the *Gopālikā* is completely silent about the YVi, and that the *Sphoṭasiddhi* itself might presuppose the YVi.⁴⁸⁷ Also, she appears to have Parameśvara I and II confused, and the first few paragraphs are full of factual errors.⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁵The opening paragraph of (Rukmani 1998):

I have just completed a line by line translation of the *Yogasūgrabhāṣya-vivaraṇa* (YSBhV.) which will be published in two volumes this year by Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi. The introduction to this publication discusses in detail the authorship problem and those interested in different aspects of this question may refer to it when it is published.

Rukmani (2001) is the said translation published three years later. The introduction spends 17 pages for the discussion on the authorship (Rukmani 2001: xv–xxxi), and it is mostly repetition of the arguments previously discussed in the three articles.

⁴⁸⁶The title of the article is spelled “Literary Leanings” throughout in Rukmani (1998). The correct title is “Literary Gleanings.”

⁴⁸⁷See n. 453 on p. 226.

⁴⁸⁸Kavi (1927) treated all the occurrences of the name Parameśvara in colophons of the works of members of the Payyur family as belonging to the same person (see page 225), but Śāstri (1931: introduction) distinguished three Paramēśvaras (see page 226). He ascribed commentaries on the *Nyāyakaṇikā* to Parameśvara I; commentaries on the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, the *Vibhramaviveka*, the *Tattvabindu*, and the *Nīti-tattvāvirbhāva* to Parameśvara II; and the *Mīmāṃsāsūtrārthasaṅgraha* and a commentary on the *Mīmāṃsākāśikā* (Sucarita Miśra's *Kāśikā* commentary on the *Śloka-vārttika* of Kumāṛila) to Parameśvara III.

On p. 263 of Rukmani (1998), we find “Kavi also refers to a Śābarabhāṣya [sic] ascribed to Śāṅkarācārya which is called *Bhāṣyapradīpa*.” This should read “Kavi also refers to a commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya...” There is only one Śābarabhāṣya. Also on the same page, she says, “The VK. [the author of the YVi] as we know, accepts *sphoṭa* and this acceptance of *sphoṭa* by the VK. is, according to Kavi, in keeping with Parameśvara's commentary on verses 712–717 from *Śloka-vārttika* (SV.) of Kumāṛila [sic].” What she must be talking about are the facts a) that the YVi accepts *sphoṭa*, b) that it cites and modifies the verses from the *Śloka-vārttika* so that they promote the *sphoṭa* theory (Kumāṛila's position is anti-*sphoṭa*), and c) that the *Sphoṭasiddhi* (not the commentary on it) cites the same verses and modify them as well. She mentions the same fact again in the next page, “Śāstri [the editor of the *Sphoṭasiddhi*] has identified a set of verses in the *Viv.* [YVi] quoted in the *Gopālikā* commentary of Payyur Parameśvara on Maṇḍana's *Sphoṭasiddhi*.” Again, the same set of Kumāṛila's verses are quoted in the YVi and the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, and the *Gopālikā* (the commentary on the *Sphoṭasiddhi*) quotes it only secondarily.

She repeats another same fact that a Parameśvara, the author of a commentary *Svāditaṃkaraṇī* on the *Nyāyakaṇikā*, mentions a Śāṅkarapūjyapāda as his teacher. She mentions this the second time in the context of the author of the *Gopālikā*. Accordingly, I can only think that she did not distinguish the two Parameśvaras. In the second reference to the same fact, confusions are seen: “Parameśvara's commentary on the 3rd verse of the SVA. states definitely that he is the *śiṣya* of Śāṅkarapūjyapāda.” The *Svāditaṃkaraṇī* is a commentary on the NKṇ, and Parameśvara is its author. The third

What she calls a “fanciful explanation of the ending *ava* in the word *pranava*” (Rukmani 1998:266) is an explanation of how the syllable *om* derived from the verb *av-*, referring to Uṇādisūtra 1.128 and Dhātupāṭha 1.631.⁴⁸⁹

On p. 266 of the 1998 article, we find the claim that the YVi is “un-Śāṅkara” because it cites from an Upaniṣad Śāṅkara never does.⁴⁹⁰ Even though the editors of the 1952 edition give the Subāla-Upaniṣad as the source of a verse cited in the commentary on YS 1.26,⁴⁹¹ the same verse is the very last verse of the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad, a Bhāṣya on which is ascribed to Śāṅkara. The name Subālopaniṣad is merely given by Śāstrī and Śāstrī (1952:76), and nowhere in the body of the text the name is mentioned. The assumption that the verse is from the Subālopaniṣad is not warranted, or one cannot base her argument on ignorance of the more or less well-known Upaniṣad.⁴⁹²

The latter half of the 1998 article is said to “address the most convincing evidence according to me, that flies in the face of the BSBhK. being the author of the YSBhV.” The evidence consists of five uses of the word *anya* in the plural in the YVi, referring to someone else’s interpretation or the reading of the YS/YBh. The tenet is that Vācaspati was meant by *anya*. However, the portions of the YVi cited in Rukmani (1998:267–9) do not contain “explicit references to Vācaspati Miśra’s statements.”

The first case involves the use of the word *anye* (others) in YVi 1.1.⁴⁹³ First, the description of the portion the article gives and the actual Sanskrit text do not match. Here is a quote from the article (spacing, including

verse should be that of the VidhiV on which the NKṇ comments. The colophon Śāstrī (1931:xiii) refers to (to which Rukmani (1998:264) refers) is seen in Stern (1988:462).

I cannot even construe the sentence “This also gives us the lower limit of the YSBhV. because of the Viv. [YVi?] references in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* to Parameśvara” (Rukmani 1998:264). If anything gives the lower limit of the date of the YVi, it should be the references in the Svadīpaṅkaraṇī to the YVi.

⁴⁸⁹The numberings of the Uṇādisūtras and the Dhātupāṭha follow Vasu (1905–7) and Böhtlingk (1887) respectively. The “fanciful explanation” in the YVi reads *avate rakṣaṇādyarthān maṃṣ ṭilopāś ceti*]. See p. 81 for the text and references and p. 152 for the translation and explanation.

⁴⁹⁰Rukmani (1998:266):

Another un-Śāṅkara feature of the *Vivaraṇa* is a quotation from an *Upaniṣad* which the BSBhK. [= the author of the BSBh] has never mentioned either in the BSBh. or even in his commentaries on the ten Upaniṣads associated with him. It is the *Subāla Upaniṣad* which, by the way, does not even figure in the exhaustive Upaniṣadic list that Belvalkar and Ranade prepared. It is by all accounts a late Upaniṣad.

⁴⁹¹See p. 80 in this edition. It appears on p. 76 in the 1952 edition with the ascription to the Subāla-Upaniṣad.

⁴⁹²A quick trip to the Upaniṣad-vākya-mahā-kośa (Sadhale 1987) would have helped her to identify the source. There the verse is shown to be in three Upaniṣads, i.e., Śvetāśvatara-, the Subāla-, and the Yogaśikha-. The Subāla Upaniṣad certainly is one of the 108 Upaniṣads and may not be very late.

⁴⁹³An edition and its translation of the relevant passage are found on p. 179 and p. 199 respectively.

the use of a hyphen instead of a dash, in the Sanskrit text is as is in the article):

But then he says “others say that the stages are external and internal objects of *saṃyama*...” and quotes another person through the use of the word *anye* saying “*anye punar-bāhyādhyātmiḥ saṃyamaviśayān bhūmaya ityācakṣate. teṣāṃ vikṣipte cetasi iti sāmānādhikarāṇya*[sic]*nupapattiḥ svavirodhaśca katham*...”. (Rukmani 1998: 267)

Perhaps there are errors in the editing process since the first sentence of the Sanskrit text is the one she just translated, and there is no “another person” quoted “through the use of the word *anye*” in the Sanskrit text. The first sentence is quoted with attribution to others (*anye*). Perhaps the second sentence was not intended to be in the article since it is not a reference to others’ view but a refutation of the view. In addition, the same portion from the YVi is quoted in note 44 of the article.

As for the portions of Vācaspati’s commentary that she thinks are referred to in the YVi, the first one she refers to in note 45⁴⁹⁴ seems to be another editing error. There is nothing that connects the portion to the reference in the YVi except that the terms *vikṣipta* (one of the *bhūmis*) and *viśaya* are used. Accordingly, I assume the second portion of Vācaspati’s commentary referred to in note 46⁴⁹⁵ is probably what was actually

⁴⁹⁴The note reads:

...vikṣiptasya tu kādācitkasadbhūtaviśayasthemaśālināḥ saṃbhāvayeta yogatvamiti niṣedhati – “tatra” iti, vikṣipte cetasi samādhiḥ kādācitkaḥ sadbhūtaviśayaścittasya sthemā na yoga-pakṣe vartate... TV. on YSBh. I.1.

There is no indication from which edition of the Tattvavaiśāradi this quotation comes from. This edition is inferior to that of the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, which reads

vikṣiptasya tu kādācitkasadbhūtaviśayasthemaśālināḥ saṃbhāvayeta yogatvam iti niṣedhati | **tatra vikṣipte cetasi samādhiḥ** | kādācitkasadbhūtaviśayasya cittasya sthemā **na yogapakṣe vartate** (Āgāṣe et al. 1919: 3,11–3)

(words from the YBh are typeset in bold), in that it inserts “*iti*” in between *tatra* and *vikṣipte*. Those two words are from the YBh and should be continuous.

⁴⁹⁵Rukmani (1998: 271, n.46)

tatra citte sattvāt kiñcidūne rajastamasī yadā mithaḥ same ca bhavatastadaīśvaryaṃ [sic] ca viśayaśca śabdādayastānyeva priyāṇi yasya tattathoktam. sattvapraḥdhānyātkhalu cittam [sic] tattve praṇidhitasadapi tattvasya tamasā pihitavād aṇimādikamaīśvaryameva tattvamabhimananyamāna [sic] tatpraṇidhitasati praṇidhatte ca kṣaṇam. atha rajasā kṣīpyamāṇa [sic] tatrāpyalabdhashtitiviśeṣāttatpriyamātram bhavati... TV. on YSBh. I.2.

The ANSS edition reads slightly differently

tatra citte sattvāt kiñcidūne rajastamasī yadā mithaḥ same ca bhavatas tadaīśvaryaṃ ca viśayaś ca śabdādayas tāny eva priyāṇi yasya tat thathoktam | *sattvapraḥdhānyāt khalu cittam tattve praṇidhitasad api tattvasya tamasā pihitavād aṇimādikam aiśvaryaṃ eva tattvam abhimananyamānam tat praṇidhitasati praṇidhatte ca kṣaṇam* | *atha rajasā kṣīpyamāṇam tatrāpy alabdhashtī tatpriyamātram bhavati* |... (Āgāṣe et al. 1919: 4,28–5,9)

This is a gloss over the YBh text: *rajastamobhyāṃ saṃśṛṣṭam aiśvaryaṃ viśayapriyam bhavati*.

meant.

However, although Vācaspati interprets the compound *aiśvaryaviśaya-priyam* in the YBh as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, meaning “for which *aiśvarya* and objects, viz., sound, etc., are attractive,” exemplifies “atomisation (*aṇīman*),” which is mentioned as a result of *saṃyama* in YS 3.45 and as one of the *aiśvaryas*, and says that the mind fixes itself on *aiśvarya*, he never says that *vikṣipta* is an object of *saṃyama*. It is impossible to conclude that the YVi is referring to Vācaspati’s interpretation unless one misinterprets of the YVi’s reference to others: *anye punar bāhyādhyāt-mikān saṃyamaviśayān bhūmaya ity ācaksate* (“Others say, however, that *bhūmis* are objects of *saṃyama*, either external or internal”). The author of the YVi is referring to an understanding of the word *bhūmi* in YBh 1.1 that it is the same *bhūmi* in YS 3.6. A quick look at the commentary on YS 3.6⁴⁹⁶ would make it clear. Due to the same adjective *bāhyādhyātmika* used to modify *bhūmis* (YVi 3.6) and *saṃyamaviśayas* (YVi 1.1), I can only understand that *saṃyamaviśaya* (YVi 1.1) refers to *bhūmis* of YS 3.6. YBh 3.16 introduces *pariṇāmatraya* as the first instance of objects of *saṃyama* (*saṃyamasya viśayah*), and the YVi equates the *bhūmis* with *pariṇāmatraya* and others, in the gloss on YS 3.6. Here we have an equation: *bhūmis* = *saṃyamaviśayas* = *pariṇāmatraya*, etc. Accordingly, *bhūmis* are indeed *saṃyamaviśaya* in the context of YS 3.6ff., and the author of the YVi does not have a problem with the equation. Therefore the problem with him when commenting on YBh 1.1 is to identify the *bhūmis* in YBh 1.1 with the *bhūmis* from the later context.

Thus the author of the YVi does not refer to someone who mentions “the state of the mind being known with reference to the *saṃyama*-object.” He refers to someone who understands the *bhūmis* of YBh 1.1 (*kṣipta*, etc.) as comparable to *pariṇāmatraya*, etc. (YS 3.16). Vācaspati never says or implies that the *bhūmis* of the YBh 1.1 are the *bhūmis* of YS 3.6. It is completely different that one meditates on *kṣipta*, etc. and that the mind is attracted to one of the results of *saṃyama* while it is in *kṣipta* state. Since the views referred to by the author of the YVi and what Vācaspati says are so different, I have real trouble understanding what could lead someone to think they have a connection.⁴⁹⁷

The next evidence of “explicit references to Vācaspati Miśra’s statement” revisits the discussion on the alternative interpretation of the word *nimitta* in YBh 1.24 mentioned in the 1992 article.⁴⁹⁸ This time, the

⁴⁹⁶*tasya saṃyamasya bhūmiṣu bāhyādhyātmikāsu* [⁹*keṣu* in the edition] *dhyānālam-banabhūtāsu pariṇāmarayādiṣu* (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 235,28–9).

⁴⁹⁷One possibility is that it was a complete misunderstanding of the passage in the YVi. As mentioned above, the second sentence quoted in Rukmani (1998:267) is a refutation of the view introduced of the “others.” The word *vikṣipta* in the phrase *vikṣipte cetasi* has nothing to do with the others’ view but it is an example of impossible constructions if one follows that view. By somehow misinterpreting that part as still belonging to the others’ view, an argument such as put forward in the article might be possible. Perhaps the passage in the YVi quoted in the article was not an editing error, but was intended. Then it would be a more serious error.

⁴⁹⁸See p. 231.

following statement is added:

But the reference is very clear and unambiguous and could only refer to Vācaspati Mīśra. (Rukmani 1998: 268)

But the author of the YVi does not say that he refers to the interpretation of Vācaspati Mīśra, in which case it would be very clear and unambiguous and can only refer to him. Otherwise, the same reading does not guarantee that the interpretation was unique understanding of Vācaspati.

When commenting on YS 2.7, the YVi reports variant readings of YS 2.7 and 8. The variant readings are identical with those read by Vācaspati. Rukmani (1998: 268) thinks this is a reference to no one but to Vācaspati. Unfortunately, the text has been silently emended by the editors of the 1952 edition. The readings in the manuscripts suggest that the portion had been corrupt, prompting the editors (who used one of them) to emend. Especially notable is the reading of the sūtras themselves followed by the author of the YVi. The manuscripts record the reading *sukhānujanmāśayī rāgaḥ* for YS 2.7 and *duḥkhānujanmāśayī dveṣaḥ* for YS 2.8. The reading of the sūtras the editors adopted (°*nujanmā rāgaḥ/dveṣaḥ*) might be preferable, but the text of the whole paragraph adopted in the edition does not seem very good. This place requires a better treatment. Still, I have to express reservations about what the 1998 article concludes from the portion. The author of the YVi introduces the interpretation of others (*te vyācakṣate sukham anu bhavitum śīlam asya sa sukhānuśayī, tathā duḥkhānuśayīti*), which is not found in Vācaspati's commentary. Hence, I do not associate this "others" with Vācaspati. In relation to this discussion, the article (p. 268) refers to Halbfass (1991: 208) where he expresses doubt if the text of the YBh we see in printed editions was what Vācaspati indeed knew.

I have found that the TV. [Tattvavaiśārādī] is, by and large, well established and so is the *bhāṣya* followed by Mīśra.

Such a statement might make one suspect that the author is not interested in philological studies. The only critically edited text of the above is the first chapter of the YBh (Maas 2006). I have yet to see any critical edition of the rest. In addition, if one reads Vācaspati's commentary carefully, it will be discovered that the Bhāṣya text woven in the Ṭikā is not always the same as the one given above the text. The bold typeface in a commentary should not be trusted as authentic. There always are words not typeset in the bold typeface but still from the text being commented on. That is what was meant by Halbfass (1991: 208), but Rukmani failed to realize it.⁴⁹⁹

Another piece of evidence that the article refers to as showing that the author of the YVi knew Vācaspati is the ascription of the words *pūraka* and *recaka* to others while commenting YS/YBh 2.50 (Rukmani 1998: 269). But those terms are not Vācaspati's invention. Those terms are generic

⁴⁹⁹Notes 494 and 495 may illustrate the situation. The text of the Tattvavaiśārādī quoted by Rukmani is different from what I see in an edition, and the *mūla* text is not always marked.

to yogins. Numerous Purāṇas and Tantras know the terms. The BhGBh ascribed to Śāṅkara knows them, too.⁵⁰⁰

The next instance (Rukmani 1998: 269) thought to be a reference to Vācaspati is contrary to the truth. The interpretation of the word *tadarthasya* in YBh 3.6 given by Vācaspati⁵⁰¹ is comparable to that of the YVi,⁵⁰² while the view the YVi refers to as belonging to others⁵⁰³ is not found in Vācaspati's commentary.⁵⁰⁴

As the conclusion of the third article on p. 269, its author tries to establish that the author of the YVi always refers to Vācaspati as “others *anye/anyeṣām*.” As pointed out above, the pieces of evidence she presented in the article all contain problems. It is not possible to reach the conclusion.

Rukmani (2001) Rukmani (2001:ix–xxxi) was to “[discuss] in detail the authorship problem,” and “those interested in different aspects of this question” were to “refer to it when it is published.”⁵⁰⁵ However, the arguments regarding the authorship problem all repeat some of the points already raised in Rukmani (1992, 1993, 1998).⁵⁰⁶

Thus many, if not all, points the T. S. Rukmani introduces show factual errors, misinterpretations or misrepresentations of the material. Despite her enthusiasm and strong words, she did not provide substantial arguments against Śāṅkara's authorship of the YVi or regarding its relative chronology.

Summary To summarize the discussions on the authorship of the YVi: before the publication of the entire text, scholars were inclined to think that the YVi was by the hand of a Śāṅkara, a member of or someone closely related to the Payyur family of Kerala. After the publication of the 1952 edition and the influential article by Hacker, scholars were concerned more about Hacker's conversion theory but did not question the authenticity much. While pieces of evidence that might favor Śāṅkara's authorship of the YVi have been accumulating, none has been conclusive. In the 1990s various arguments against Śāṅkara's authorship of the YVi were proposed, but none has been persuasive.

⁵⁰⁰BhGBh 4.29.

⁵⁰¹*kasmāt tadarthasyottarabhūmivija[ṣa?]/yasya pratyāsannasya ...* (Āgāṣe et al. 1919: 121,17–8).

⁵⁰²*kasmāt? tadarthasyātmāder uttarabhūmeḥ ...* (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952: 236,20–1).

⁵⁰³*anyeṣāṃ vyākhyānam—arthasya paracittajñānādeḥ* (*ibid.*: 237,12)

⁵⁰⁴The article does not quote the text that the author thinks is referred to by the YVi from Vācaspati this time. This makes me wonder whether there was an awareness that Vācaspati's text does not support the claim.

⁵⁰⁵See note 485 on page 236.

⁵⁰⁶See Harimoto (2004) for my review of the volumes.

Criteria of Hacker and Mayeda

Hacker (1978, 1950)⁵⁰⁷ proposed some criteria to distinguish Śaṅkara's authentic works from those spurious, primarily based on peculiar usages of some technical terms. Mayeda (1965, 1973) added some other terms to the criteria, as well as criteria that examine citations in the text in question and citations from the text in other texts. Furthermore, he employed as a criterion the presence/absence of commentaries by Śaṅkara's direct disciples. Some comments on these criteria should be made, since I, too, am dealing with the authenticity of a work ascribed to Śaṅkara.

Some general comments about the criteria should first be made. While innovative and insightful, if we try to apply them formally and programmatically, those criteria are still ambiguous. As seen below, I will try to formulate them more precisely. When I attempt it, there emerges a pattern: there can be two different kinds of criteria. The first group consists of those that filter out spurious works (the colophon test, for example). That is, if a work does not meet a condition, it fails to be authentic Śaṅkara's. This kind of criteria are conclusive and no further investigations are necessary. But such a condition is a necessary condition and meeting it does not a guarantee for authenticity. The second group of the criteria consists of the ones that promote the probability of the work being authentic. The difference from the other kind is the conclusion when a work fails to meet the condition. Failing it is not conclusive.

The first test one can devise from Hacker (1978) involves colophons. In fact, the article does not propose the test as such. It is more of an observation of striking pattern that the works that are probably authentic are all ascribed to Śaṅkarabhagavat. Therefore, saying "If a work is ascribed to Śaṅkarabhagavat, then it is authentic (because all the authentic works are ascribed to Śaṅkarabhagavat)" becomes circular. The works Hacker appears to presume authentic are the BSBh, the BhGBh, and the Bhāṣyas on early Upaniṣads⁵⁰⁸ Nonetheless, we can still devise a test based on the data and arguments presented in the article:

Assuming that the BhGBh and the Bhāṣyas on early Upaniṣads are all by the author of the BSBh, when a work is ascribed to Śaṅkara,

- All the colophons and sub-colophons in all the manuscripts of the work must ascribe the work to Śaṅkarabhagavat, Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda, or Śaṅkarabhagavatpūjyapāda

⁵⁰⁷Between these two articles, Hacker (1978) is in fact a cleaned up version of an older article, Hacker (1947). Despite having a late date, it should be considered that the content reflects the thoughts of the author in 1947, earlier than those in Hacker (1950). In Hacker (1978) the author explains the circumstances that led to the revision.

⁵⁰⁸Hacker (1978) does not specify which Upaniṣads. Judging from the list of works under the label "Works attributed to Śaṅkara-Bhagavat (bh) or Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda (p) or Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpūjyapāda (pp)" on pp. 50-51, the Upaniṣads must be Īśā-, Aitareya-, Kaṭha-, Kena-, Chāndogya-, Taittirīya-, Praśna-, Bṛhadāraṇyaka-, Māṇḍūkya-, Muṇḍaka-, Śvetāśvatara-

- That the author must be told to be a disciple of Govinda at least once in every manuscript

for the work to be by the same author.

Failing either of these conditions disqualifies the work to be considered for its authenticity. Exceptions might be drawn only if the mention of the title *ācārya* is considered accidental. The list of works Hacker (1978) consulted was, as he himself admits (p. 51), “far from complete.” Yet further data I can gather from the manuscript catalogue data for the Nepalese manuscripts still more or less affirms his findings (the pattern of ascriptions).⁵⁰⁹ And this test fails most of the Jayamaṅgalās⁵¹⁰ if we look at the New Catalogus Catalogorum, vol. 7 (Raja 1973: 184–5), under the heading Jayamaṅgalā.⁵¹¹

The YVi passes this test, but not without some caveats. The most obvious is that the validity of this result is very much dependent on the assumption that the BhGBh and the Bhāṣyas on early Upaniṣads are all by the author of the BSBh. Secondly, we do not have much data with regard to colophons of the YVi. We know that all the available manuscripts of the YVi derived from an exemplar of one of the available manuscripts.⁵¹² We cannot be certain if the YVi always had the colophon ascribing it to Śaṅkarabhagavat. I interpret the data presented by (Hacker 1978: 49–51) to mean that the proper format to ascribe a work to the famous Śaṅkara was well-known, even without waiting for Hacker’s article. So, if anyone wanted to attribute a work to Śaṅkara, he could have easily done so. All the works that fail the colophon test (Hacker 1978: 49–51) in fact sometimes do have colophons that would fulfill the requirement. They fail because they have manuscripts that ascribe them to Śaṅkarācārya. If, by chance, any of the works had survived in one manuscript with the *-bhagavat* type colophon, then the work would pass the test. We cannot deny the possibility that this was the case for the YVi. Having said that, it is unlikely that the YVi has the *-bhagavat* type colophon on a whim of a scribe who thought he should use the “correct” format for the colophon rather than simple *śaṅkarācāryaviracita*... Rather, someone had a conviction that the YVi was strongly associated with Śaṅkara; he

⁵⁰⁹Conducting searches for **amkarabhagavat**, **ankarabhagavat**, **ankaracary**, and **ankaracary** on the NGMCP Wiki site http://catalogue.ngmcp.uni-hamburg.de/wiki/Main_Page gives a comprehensive picture. It should be noted that the results for **amkaracary** or **ankaracary** include manuscripts that actually do not contain the word in their colophons. In many cases the word was supplied as the author by cataloguers. The colophons collected from the Nepalese manuscripts more or less affirms the two conditions to be authentic, but one manuscript of the BSBh fails the test. A 34/11, NAK accession no. 1-1475, is a BSBh manuscript and its colophon and sub-colophons never mention the teacher of the author as Govinda. We cannot fail the BSBh from being authentic. If we wanted to be truly consistent and logical, we should modify the test. My formulation above is probably too rigid.

⁵¹⁰See p. 225, especially n. 449.

⁵¹¹The only exception is the commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikās. According to the NCC, there is only one manuscript (presumably the one scholars since Kavi were referring to and the one that became the basis of editions). It passes the test.

⁵¹²See pp. 25 ff.

made an effort to compose (or at least to borrow) the rather interesting stanza that pays homage to the unprecedented human Śaṅkara.⁵¹³ The colophon, including the stanza, is more of a reflection of at least one person's strongly held notion that the YVi was a work of the famous Śaṅkara. At any rate, since the YVi passes the first elimination, it can be considered for further tests. Obviously, Hacker (1968:124) himself was aware of this when he wrote about the YVi.⁵¹⁴

In the 1968 article, Hacker (p. 124) mentions a features of the YVi that made him think it authentic Śaṅkara's. It is the YVi's affiliation to Vaiṣṇavism. The affiliation to Vaiṣṇavism was not part of the criteria he had proposed in 1950. But in a later article in 1965 Hacker proposes that Śaṅkara had a Vaiṣṇava affiliation (Hacker 1965) and I have not found anything that contradicts the theory. The YVi indeed exhibits its author's Vaiṣṇava affiliation. The opening and closing stanzas are dedicated to Viṣṇu; there are references to the names Viṣṇu/Nārāyaṇa/Bhagavat in the body of the YVi⁵¹⁵ while the name Śiva appears only once along with the name Nārāyaṇa;⁵¹⁶ the author of the YVi even identifies Īśvara with Viṣṇu/Kṛṣṇa.⁵¹⁷ If we want to formalize this feature as a test, it would be: a work fails to be authentic Śaṅkara's if it shows Śaiva affiliation (eliminated); it promotes the probability of being authentic if it shows Vaiṣṇava affiliation (gains a point); if it shows neither, it is not eliminated nor does it gain a point. The YVi gains a point.

Let us go back to the criteria Hacker (1950) proposed. Two of the terms Hacker (1950) proposes as critical are mentioned in Hacker (1968).

The first term (Hacker 1950:249) discusses is *avidyā*. If we formulate his discussion as a test, it would be: a work fails to be considered authentic Śaṅkara's if it uses the word in the sense of material cause; it gains a point if it uses the term in accordance with the teachings in the YS and the YBh; it neither fails nor gains point if it does not use the term. Although Hacker (1968: 123) only briefly mentions, he most likely thought that he found the reason for Śaṅkara's peculiar usage of the term *avidyā* he noticed before

⁵¹³See p. 213.

⁵¹⁴Some scholars got the impression that Hacker jumped on to the conclusion that the YVi is authentic based only on that criterion. Cf. Wezler (1983), Rukmani (1992:422) and page 233.

⁵¹⁵See 60, 77, and 81 in this edition. The reference to a statue of Viṣṇu (*viṣṇupratimā*) as an example of convention (Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1952:271–2) even appears to suggest that the author had personal background where such statues were common, possibly Vaisnava@Vaiṣṇava temples. Cf. this with passages in the BSBh Hacker (1965:149) refers to (Śāstri and Paṅśikar 1917:760,7; 938,6; 943,12). See also Vetter (1979:21).

⁵¹⁶See p. 60. In addition, when commenting on the YBh that talks about the lineage of Sāṃkhya, the author of the YVi lists Nārāyaṇa along with Kapila as names of the Bhagavat referred to in the citation (see p. 138). It appears that the author wanted to make certain that the name Nārāyaṇa would be always associated with the word Bhagavat. One would expect only the name Kapila from the context in which the origin of Sāṃkhya is discussed.

⁵¹⁷See the first opening stanza that refers to YS 1.24 and pays homage to Viṣṇu. The first closing stanza that I consider to form an integral part with the body of the text is a prayer to Kṛṣṇa (see p. 210). Also the repeated use of the word Bhagavat for Īśvara in commentary on YS 1.26–7 is noteworthy.

(Hacker 1950: 249) in the YVi. He observes that Śaṅkara uses the term *avidyā* in the sense in accordance with the teachings in the YS and the YBh. It is a matter of course that the author of the YVi uses the term in accordance with the YS and the YBh. The YVi gains another point.

The second term whose significance in the BSBh is discussed in Hacker (1950) is *nāmarūpa*. This term is, unlike other terms discussed in the article, has no significance for other Advaita authors, according to Hacker. Hacker does not mention the non-Śaṅkara use of the term. Accordingly, the logic behind the mention of this term by Hacker is vague. If we try to formalize a test using this term, there can be several versions, from the most strict to more relaxed ones. The most strict version would be: a) a work gains a point toward being authentic if it uses the term in the same sense as in the BSBh; b) it is eliminated if it uses the term in a different sense; and c) it is again eliminated if the work does not use the term. In less strict versions the second and the third conditions (b and c) change; we do not eliminate the work under those conditions (different sense or no use). Among the possible combinations, Hacker would probably agree with the following version: we do not eliminate the work in case c (no use of the term) or it does not gain a point. Otherwise, one of the works he considers authentic is almost eliminated; the BhGBh uses the term only in one passage (18.50). The YVi is not eliminated or does not gain any score, following the most realistic version of the formalized test since it does not use the term at all.

The third term Hacker discusses as distinguishing Śaṅkara from other Advaitins is *māyā*. To summarize, despite common perception that Śaṅkara's (school's) view is *māyāvāda*, that is not at all the case as long as Śaṅkara himself is concerned. Śaṅkara does not assign significance to the word *māyā*, according to Hacker. Thus, again trying to formulate the discussion into a test, it would be: a work fails to be authentic when it gives the word *māyā* ontological significance; it gains point toward being authentic if it uses the term consistent with Śaṅkara's usage (Hacker discusses a few generic meanings in which Śaṅkara uses the word *māyā*); if it does not use the word at all, it is not eliminated or it does not gain any point. There certainly are ambiguities as to how we should determine if the term is given a significance or not, but in the case of the YVi, it is not difficult to see that the author did not give much significance to the term. The term *māyā* appears only when commenting on a stanza⁵¹⁸ quoted in YBh 4.13. The stanza itself uses the word *māyā* as an object of comparison to something "quite empty (*sutucchakam*)."⁵¹⁸ This is consistent with Śaṅkara's use of the term. We could give the YVi another point toward authenticity.

Another term, *īśvara*, is mentioned in passing by Hacker (1968: 124) as a positive sign of the YVi's being authentic work of Śaṅkara. Vetter (1979: 21, n. 13) notices the significance of the *īśvara* section of the YVi.

⁵¹⁸ *guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ dṛṣṭipatham ṛcchati | yat tu dṛṣṭipatham prāptaṃ tan māyeva sutucchakam ||*. Vācaspati ascribes this stanza to Vārṣaganya in the Bhāmāṭi on BSBh 2.1.3.

The author of the YVi does not distinguish *īśvara* and *ātman/antaryāmin*.⁵¹⁹ Since Hacker, following Otto (1926), finds little to no distinction between *īśvara* and *ātman/brahman* and heavy emphasis on *īśvara* in Śaṅkara's authentic works (Hacker 1950: 276–286), this is consistent with the authentic works of Śaṅkara.

Hacker (1968: 136) mentions that three more terms (*jaḍa* in the meaning of *acetana*, *sphuraṇa/sphūrṭi* in the meaning of *abhivyakti*, and *sva(yam)-prakāśa(māna)* in the meaning of *svayañjyotis*) never occur in Śaṅkara's works. All these three are not used in the YVi.

The term *vivarta* that Hacker (1953) says has no significance in Śaṅkara's Advaita does not occur in the YVi, nor is there any verbal form from *vi-vrt-*.

Thus, as far as Hacker's criteria (terminology tests) are concerned, the YVi survives the elimination, gaining some points.

Mayeda (1965, 1973) introduces some more terms—*ānanda*, and *vyāsa*. The term *ānanda* may not have any significance in determining the authorship of the YVi since the comparison of the term is only meaningful when Śaṅkara's Advaita and that of other Advaitins are concerned. Nonetheless, the term *ānanda* is not used as an attribute of *brahman* in the YVi. For that matter, the term *brahman* is not used in the YVi except in quotations.⁵²⁰ The YVi mentions the name Vyāsa only as the name of the author of the Mahābhārata. This is consistent with the use of the term in the BSBh.⁵²¹

Mayeda (1965, 1973) proposes other kinds of criteria. One is to identify the sources of quotations and compare frequencies of quotations from different sources, especially those from the Upaniṣads. As it concentrates on citations from only Śrutis and some of the Smṛtis (the Mahābhārata, especially the Bhagavadgītā), and ignores other texts,⁵²² I am not certain how much validity the comparison has. Vetter (1979: 22) and Leggett (1990: 33–4) apply this criterion to the YVi and find that the pattern of citations in the YVi do not contradict the patterns in Śaṅkara's authentic

⁵¹⁹See pp. 126 and 128. It may also be noted that the author of the YVi never uses the word *brahman* except when it is in a quotation. See note 520.

⁵²⁰The neuter noun *brahman* appears only twice in the YVi. Once in a quote from BĀU 5.1.1 (p. 81 in this edition). The word once again appears in the YVi as YBh 4.22 quotes a stanza (1952 ed. p. 355, l. 24). There the word *brahman* is used in an unidentified stanza. The masculine noun *brahman* (the god Brahmā) is used once in a quote (from an Upaniṣad?) on YBh 3.14 (1952 ed. p. 257, l. 28). Other usages of *brahman* (m/n) are in common compounds such as *brahmahatyā*, *brahmacarya*, *brahmacārīn*, *brahmāñjajī*, *brahmādistambāvasāna*.

⁵²¹The word *vyāsa* is used four times in the YVi: (1) 1952 ed., p. 101, l. 9: MBh 12.197.8 is referred; (2) 146,15: BhG 4.12; (3) 147,16: MBh 12.204.16; and (4) in an occurrence (1952 ed. p. 222, l. 20) Vyāsa is referred to as an example of someone who is capable of receiving knowledge as a result of *brahmacarya*. This could well be the author of the MBh. That the author of the YVi associates the name Vyāsa only with the MBh also has a significance with regard to the authorship of the YBh. The YBh is traditionally ascribed to Vyāsa.

⁵²²Śaṅkara quotes from or refers to other texts such as the Mahābhāṣya, Śābarabhāṣya (BSBh 1.1.1), or possibly even the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti (Upad padya. 142 = Pramāṇavārttika, Anumāna 354), and many times the YS or the YBh.

works. That is, the BĀU is the most trusted by the author of the YVi as by Śaṅkara.

The next criterion Mayeda introduces is whether or not the text in question is cited by direct disciples of Śaṅkara. So far no such quotations have been found, but I do not think serious attempts to identify them have been made.

The last criterion Mayeda introduces is whether there are commentaries by Śaṅkara's disciples. No such commentaries on the YVi are known.

From the above, the following may be said: As far as internal criteria based on the usages of terms are concerned, usages of some (*avidyā*, *īśvara*, and *vyāsa*) in the YVi meet the criteria. Among others, the absence of *nāmarūpa* appears noteworthy. On the other hand, the terms that should not be in Śaṅkara's authentic works do not exist in the YVi. Since the subject matter of the YVi is not Advaita, the lack of those terms may not be considered a strongly positive indication. Still, the lack of *jaḍa*, *sphuraṇa*, *sva(yam)-prakāśa(māna)* appears quite noteworthy since their counterparts that Hacker says Śaṅkara uses (*acetana*, *abhivyakti*, *svayañjyotis*) are present in the YVi. At least we may be able to say that the author is not someone who was influenced by post-Śaṅkara Advaita. With regard to external criteria, the YVi fails them. Śaṅkara's direct disciples' works do not refer to it. Despite this fact, it is rather impressive that the YVi meet the internal criteria. If the YVi is a work of a much later author, he must have been very much determined so that his work would look like a work by the famous Śaṅkara. He must at the same time have been a very good philologist conversant with Śaṅkara's terminology and a very skillful author who does not allow any Advaita terms of later development to creep into his text.

The Payyur Family

As noted in the previous section, some scholars ascribe the YVi to a Śaṅkara, a member of or someone in close relation to the Payyur family. I will call a person named Śaṅkara who has a close connection to the Payyur family Payyur-Śaṅkara in the following to distinguish the person from the famous Śaṅkara.

The evidence collected from writings of members of the Payyur family appears to provide the strongest counter-argument against ascribing the YVi to the famous Śaṅkara, the advaitin. However, opinions of scholars regarding Payyur-Śaṅkara(s)⁵²³ have not been consistent. In the following, attention will be paid to how Payyur-Śaṅkara has been viewed by scholars.

The first modern scholar who mentioned the YVi in a publication was Kavi (1927). He was also the first to point out the possibility that the YVi was by the hand of someone from the Payyur family. His argument follows

⁵²³As will be shown, there can be more than one Payyur-Śaṅkara.

observations (Kavi 1927: 134–5) on the śloka cited from Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika (ŚV), Sphoṭavāda in both the Sphoṭasiddhi (SS) and the YVi. Kavi thought that the YVi's treatment of the śloka was inspired by the SS and that consequently it was reflected in Parameśvara's commentary on the SS.⁵²⁴ He also found a close connection between Parameśvara and Śaṅkara in a colophon of the Svaditaṃkaraṇī, a commentary on the Nyāyakaṇikā (itself a commentary on the Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana Mīśra). He referred to several other colophons from the works of members of the Payyur family where the name Śaṅkara(bhagavatpāda) was mentioned, and concluded that this Śaṅkara must be the author of the Bhāṣyapradīpa (a commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya) and the YVi. He also suggested that commentaries entitled Jayamaṅgalā⁵²⁵ were by the hand of this Śaṅkara.

There are several noteworthy points in Kavi's arguments. First, the starting point of his ascribing the Jayamaṅgalās, the YVi, and the Bhāṣyapradīpa was "to relieve the anxiety of some critics that the great Āchārya should not be associated with the authorship of these commentaries (Jayamaṅgalās) under the same name." Accordingly, he had to "search for another Śaṅkarāchārya in Malabar who, besides being an author, must be a pupil of Govindabhagavatpāda." The possibility that any of the works he mentions might be by the famous Śaṅkara (who also happens to be said to be a pupil of Govinda) was precluded.

His identification of the author of the YVi with Payyur-Śaṅkara relies on two facts: 1) colophons of works by family members of the Payyur family mention the name Śaṅkara; 2) the YVi and the SS on which Parameśvara wrote a commentary quote the same śloka from the ŚV.

Śāstri (1931) in his introduction to an edition of the SS and its commentary (Gopālikā) by Parameśvara more closely examined colophons of the works of the Payyur family and revealed the scholarly tradition. He distinguished three Parameśvaras, who Kavi (1927) thought to be a single person. Among the material he used, a colophon of a commentary by Parameśvara II on the Nītitattvāvīrbhāva mentions the name Śaṅkara.⁵²⁶ It appears that Rāmanātha Śāstri was not certain if this Śaṅkara was an uncle or a teacher of the author Parameśvara II. In addition, he (pp. xiv–xvi) names another Śaṅkara as an uncle/teacher of Parameśvara I, based on a colophon of his Svaditaṃkaraṇī,⁵²⁷ and ascribes the YVi to him. Since he does not mention specific reasons for this ascription, it is presumed that he followed Kavi's opinion. With regard to having more

⁵²⁴On these citations from the ŚV, see nn. 11 on p. 11 and 453 on p. 226.

⁵²⁵For the list of texts on which there is a commentary called Jayamaṅgalā, see footnote 449 on page 225.

⁵²⁶The stanza reads:

कायवाङ्मनसां सम्यक् प्रह्वीभावेन शङ्करे।
अन्यथाख्यातिवादेऽपि व्याख्यातुं समुद्यतः॥

⁵²⁷The colophon cited (श्रीमच्छङ्करपूज्यस्य शिष्येण . . . । . . .तेनेयं व्याक्रिया कृता॥) in fact belongs to the Juṣadhvaṃkaraṇī, another commentary on the Nyāyakaṇikā by Parameśvara I. See Stern (1988: 56–58).

than one Śaṅkara as an uncle/teacher of Parameśvara I and Parameśvara II, he notes a custom in Kerala that sons are named after the father's father and his brothers.⁵²⁸

Furthermore, scholars do not agree on which text should be ascribed to which Payyur-Śaṅkara. Since Kavi (1927) did not distinguish Parameśvaras, he ascribed the YVi, Jayamaṅgalās, and the Bhāṣyapradīpa to a single Śaṅkara. Among the scholars who discussed the Payyur family, Haradatta Sharma (1929) and Rāmanātha Śāstri (1931) ascribed the YVi to Payyur-Śaṅkara. Others, Ramaswami Sastri (1936), Pillai (1951), and Kunjunni Raja (1980) did not mention the YVi in relation to Payyur-Śaṅkara. While I am not certain whether they were just indifferent or did not agree with the authorship, the silence of Kunjunni Raja and Pillai may be noteworthy, since unlike Ramaswami Sastri who was discussing the Mīmāṃsā tradition of Kerala, they were giving a broader account of the Payyur family. If they had been of the opinion that the YVi was by the hand of Śaṅkara from the family, they might have mentioned it.⁵²⁹

A chronological problem stems from ascribing commentaries called the Jayamaṅgalā, especially the one on the Sāṃkhyakārikās (for convenience, I call it the Sāṃkhyajayamaṅgalā) to Payyur-Śaṅkara. Haradatta Sharma (1929) points out that Vācaspati Mīśra knew the Sāṃkhyajayamaṅgalā, and his argument appears valid. He, then, following Kavi, ascribes the Sāṃkhyajayamaṅgalā as well as the YVi to Payyur-Śaṅkara, an uncle/a teacher of Parameśvara. It should be noted that he does not distinguish three Parameśvaras. Here a problem arises. If Payyur-Śaṅkara was the author of the Sāṃkhyajayamaṅgalā, then he lived before, or at the latest, contemporary with Vācaspati. For, Vācaspati knew the Sāṃkhyajayamaṅgalā. If the same Śaṅkara was a contemporary of Parameśvara (I), then he was after, or at the earliest, contemporary with Vācaspati Mīśra. Parameśvara (I) wrote commentaries on Vācaspati Mīśra's Nyāyakaṇikā. Chronologically the order of these three would be Payyur-Śaṅkara → Vācaspati → Parameśvara I, and Payyur-Śaṅkara is a teacher of Parameśvara, viz., a contemporary. Payyur-Śaṅkara's being prior and posterior to Vācaspati without his life overlapping that of Vācaspati is impossible. However, his being contemporary with both Vācaspati and Parameśvara I seems very unlikely. There are several centuries between Vācaspati and Parameśvara. Although Haradatta Sharma (1929: 430–1) tries to set the date of Parameśvara and consequently Payyur-Śaṅkara at "1000 A.D. or near about," by attributing the date 1300–1400 CE given by Kavi to the

⁵²⁸This custom appears to require that only the eldest son can have a family. Otherwise, a Parameśvara would have cousins with the same name as sons of his uncles, and he would have many nephews that have the same names as his uncles. This would make it practically impossible to identify someone in a family. Even if a man is identified in the form of "son of . . .," there are theoretically a number of persons that fit in that criterion if more than one generation is involved. In fact, the custom allowed only the eldest to be married, according to Pisharoti (1929: 678), Raja (1980: xiv).

⁵²⁹Kunjunni Raja (1980: 93) mentions a view of Kunhan Raja that a Payyur-Śaṅkara may be the author of the Niruktavārttika. However, I could not find a corresponding description in the reference Kunhan (Raja 1945).

owners of the manuscripts (members of the Payyur family as well), later scholars agree that six generations of Ṛṣi-Parameśvara belonged to the period 1400 A.D. onward.⁵³⁰ Vācaspati's date is perhaps 11th century at the latest.⁵³¹ Consequently, at least the Sāṃkhyajayamaṅgalā has to be separated from Payyur-Śaṅkara, a teacher of Parameśvara I.

Thus ascribing the YVi along with other commentaries to Payyur-Śaṅkara is not free from problems. There certainly appears to be a teacher of one or more Parameśvaras named Śaṅkara. However, to have two Śaṅkaras as teachers of Parameśvara I and II does not seem very plausible. The name Śaṅkara does not appear to be the name of an uncle of either of them. Therefore the custom of naming sons according to one's father and his brothers does not explain why each time Parameśvara was born, there was a teacher called Śaṅkara. Could they be from a neighboring family with the same custom? There is no reference that explicitly says such and such work was written by Śaṅkara, a teacher of Parameśvara. Ascribing one text or another to Śaṅkara mentioned by family members of the Payyur family has been purely conjectural. We need to further investigate the chronology of texts and family tree of the Payyur family, based on internal evidence.

Yet evidence that suggests close connection between a person or persons named Śaṅkara, the YVi, and the Payyur family does not disappear. Here is a summary of the basis for ascribing the YVi to Śaṅkara, a teacher of members of the Payyur family:

- Colophons of various works from the Payyur family mention Śaṅkara(-bhagavatpāda/-pūjyapāda) as (a) teacher(s) of family members. Table 4 on p. 251 lists the colophons that mention Śaṅkara.⁵³²
- The Sphoṭasiddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra and the YVi quote and criticize the same stanzas from the ŚV of Kumārila.
- In addition, the Svaditaṃkaraṇī of Parameśvara I on the Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra on the Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana Miśra refers to the YVi.⁵³³

All these are observable, but how to interpret them can be highly subjective. It is indeed tempting to ascribe the YVi to one Śaṅkara close to the Payyur family, given the close relation, especially with Parameśvara I. At the same time, however, nothing in the above explicitly denotes that the YVi was by the hand of someone from the Payyur family.

Another thing may be noticed—while colophons refer to the name Śaṅkara, the works that suggest a close relation between the YVi itself and the Payyur family are a Maṇḍana Miśra's work and a commentary on

⁵³⁰For example, see Pillai (1951: 12 ff.).

⁵³¹For the date of Vācaspati, see Acharya (2006: xviii ff.), Srinivasan (1967: 60–63), Schmithausen (1968) and Aklujkar (1999).

⁵³²In addition, according to Kavi (1927: 135), Vāsudeva (a brother of Parameśvara (I?)) mentions Śaṅkara in his Śivodaya, and a colophon to a commentary to the Śābarabhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara refers to its author as Payyurbhagavatpāda (p. 134).

⁵³³See Halbfass (1991: 206–7).

Table 4: Colophons that mention Śaṅkara

- Parameśvara I
 - The Juṣadhvaṃkaraṇī (comm. on the Nyāyakaṇikā)
श्रीमच्छङ्करपूज्यस्य शिष्येण [1]
. तेनेयं व्याक्रिया कृता॥
See Śāstri (1931: xiv), Raja (1945: 6), Stern (1988: 56–8).
 - The Svaditāṃkaraṇī (comm. on the Nyāyakaṇikā)
इति श्रीर्षिगौरीनन्दनश्रीभवदासपितृव्यश्रीमच्छङ्करपूज्यपादशिष्य-
परमेश्वरकृतौ स्वदितंकरण्यां तृतीयः श्लोकः
See Kavi (1927: 135), Raja (1945: 6), Sastri (1936: intro. 87–8).
 - The Sumanoramaṇī (comm. on the Meghasandēśa [Megha-
dūta])
कौमारिलाचार्यवरस्य नाम्ना वृत्तेन मूर्त्यापि च शङ्करस्या
शिष्येण सृष्टा परमेश्वरेण व्याख्येयमेनां विमृशन्तु सन्तः॥
See Raja (1945: 6), Pillai (1951: intro. 18), Raja (1980: 93), Unni
(1987: intro. 120–121).
 - ditto
मन्त्रब्राह्मणसूत्रविकृतमतिः शास्त्रे च कौमारिले
कर्ता न्यायसमुच्चयस्य कणिकाव्याख्याप्रणीता कविः।
उत्पत्तिं त्वघमर्षणप्रवरजाद्वौर्यामृषेरासवान्
कर्तास्याः परमेश्वरो नतशिराः पूज्ये गुरौ शङ्करे॥
See Pillai (1951: intro. 18), Raja (1980: 92), Unni (1987: 202).
- Parameśvara II
 - a commentary on the Nītitattvāvirbhāva (Kālapratyākṣatā-
vāda)
कायवाङ्मनसां सम्यक्प्रह्वीभावेन शङ्करे
अन्यथाख्यातिवादे ऽपि स व्याख्यातुं समुद्यतः॥
See Kavi (1927: 135), Śāstri (1931: x), Pillai (1951: intro. 22), Raja
(1980: 92).

another work of his. Maṇḍana is considered a contemporary of Śaṅkara and plays an important role in Śaṅkara's life stories. It is at least curious that his name surfaces in the discussions on the authorship of the YVi.



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